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ABSTRACT

Political and institutional leaders in the Pacific Northwest have struggled over
how best to manage Columbia River Basin development and the implications of that
development since the early 1900s. Their efforts present a seeming paradox: whereas
prominent political and institutional leaders believed some form of regional
governance system was necessary, those same leaders refused to establish systems
with the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the issues that led them to
create the systems in the first place. This study examines the historical record at the
institutional level to determine why.
This study found twenty-six governance systems proposed since 1933 of which
eleven were enacted. Prior to then, a private market oriented system dominated,
assisted by supportive federal agencies with jurisdictional authority over individual
resource domains. Since 1934, the Basin has experienced an unbroken succession of
one governance system or another, at times with multiple systems operating in
parallel. This study categorized each system under one of four governance models,
distinguished by the locus of decision-making.
Transitions from one system to another came about through evolutionary
processes or the emergence of circumstances that allowed for dramatic shifts between
models. Evolutionary change within models resulted in collapse due to internal
structural weaknesses or shifts to improved systems through mutual agreement.
Dramatic change between models occurred when a “critical situation” appeared that
called existing governance systems into question and allowed new systems to rise in
i

their place. Four such critical situations occurred between 1929 and 1999. These
were the onset of the Depression, the end of World War II, the hydro-thermal crisis of
the mid 1970s, and the first ESA listings of salmon in 1991.
This study concluded that the conflicting interests of powerful institutions only
partially explain the Basin‟s governance paradox. Differing worldviews and senses of
institutional culture, identity, and values aggravated the conflict over competing
interests by shaping the perspectives each party held over the goals and motivations of
the others. This study recommends further research to determine how institutional
values translate into individual level decision-making. It offers a theoretical
framework under which such research might proceed.
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PROLOGUE

The Columbia River is international and interstate in geographic scope. It is
over 1200 miles long, drawing its water from two countries, five states, and the
reservation lands of thirteen Native American tribes. It drains a 258,000 square mile
area encompassing parts of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and
Canada. It moves at an average stream flow of 265,000 cubic feet per second. It
drops 2,650 feet in elevation from its source to mouth. The combination of elevation
and flow provides the energy from which the hydropower system‟s electricity is drawn
and constitutes a third of the nation‟s hydropower potential. It serves as a major
transportation corridor, moving timber and agricultural products for distribution to
west coast and Pacific Rim markets. Its water irrigates the farms of the arid areas
between the Cascade and Rocky Mountain ranges (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995;
DeLuna, 1997; Brigham, 1998; Pope, 2008).
Lang (1999) notes that two competing images of the Columbia River have
existed since the first Euro Americans arrived. The first is the view of “the river as a
spiritual force,” the second as a “cornucopian provider of economic value” (p. 147).
In more recent years, the conflicts between these two visions have been framed as a
clash between regional icons: the Columbia Basin‟s sophisticated and technologically
integrated system of multipurpose dams and its historic runs of wild salmon and
steelhead. Within this debate, each icon serves as a metaphorical representative of
broader economic, moral, aesthetic, and, in some cases, spiritual values regarding the
1

social role of the river in particular and natural resources in general within the
Northwest (White, 1995; Williams, 2006; Vogel, 2007).
Disagreements over the river‟s use have existed since the river‟s development
was first envisioned. The United States side of the Columbia Basin spans multiple
jurisdictions of federal, state, tribal, and local agencies. No single entity (other than
the courts) has ever had a scope of authority sufficient to resolve disputes spanning
multiple jurisdictions. The desire for a rational process to manage (if not resolve)
differences over river use, planning, development, and operation led to the region‟s
continuous experiments with various governance systems and structures. The framing
of those disagreements evolved over the years as circumstances changed and new
institutional actors, often with competing values and worldviews, gained access to the
debate through accumulation of financial resources and political power.
The Pacific Northwest region of today generally corresponds to the area
bounded by the Northwest Territory of 1848, shown in Figure P-1. However, the
Northwest has always had a tenuous relationship with the concept of itself as a unified
region. A single territorial government administered the region until 1853. At that
point, the increase in population in settlements north of the Columbia (especially in
the Puget Sound area), their distance from the seat of government in the Willamette
valley, and difficulties in communication led to a successful petition for establishment
of what became the Washington Territory (Schafer, 1943/1918).

2

Figure P-1.
Oregon Territory 18481
(Showing Current State Boundaries)

Although Oregon achieved statehood in 1859 the communities of the new
state, like those in the Washington Territory and the rest of the nation, consisted of
relatively isolated “island communities” prior to the expansion of railroad and
communications technology (Wiebe, 1967). These technologies did not reach the
inland areas of the Northwest until the latter 1800s. Within the Northwest, disparate
communities exploited resources of furs, fish, water, timber, minerals and crops for
their own local interests and purposes in relative independence. The idea of the region
as a unified political, social, or economic entity did not begin to emerge until the
1920s (Ogden, 1949; Vogel, 2007).
The concept of the region as a potentially unified entity took shape as planners
looked to develop the Columbia for purposes of irrigation, navigation, and –

1
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Map source: Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_Territory.

Map source: Northwest Region, National Marine Fisheries Service at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/SalmonHydropower/Columbia-Snake-Basin.
3
3
Vogel (2007) provides a great deal of information and insight regarding the establishment and

eventually – hydropower (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Vogel, 2007). White (1995)
argues that the developed river gives the Northwest a unique unifying identity. The
Columbia‟s current developed state is a sophisticated blend of engineering skill and
institutional organization. The map provided in Figure P-2 displays the location of the
Basin‟s multipurpose dams illustrating this “organic machine” (White, 1995). These
dams are managed and operated to serve as “the Northwest‟s primary power plant,
central navigation channel, biggest irrigation ditch, and storage facility for flood
waters” (Volkman, 1997, p. 10). Other purposes include domestic, municipal, and
industrial water supply, outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife restoration, and water
quality.
No single entity holds jurisdictional oversight over the entire system. Instead,
jurisdiction is fragmented among federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies
with benefits accruing to a variety of public and private entities (Volkman, 1997).
Although management of the Columbia as a system has been predominately a federal
responsibility (Ogden, 1997; Williams, 2006), the interests and prerogatives of these
other jurisdictional entities and their competing values and worldviews efforts often
confounded governance efforts. Consequently, since the 1920s Northwest leaders
have struggled with how to come to a common vision regarding system planning,
development, and operation of what was to become the Federal Columbia River Power
System (FCRPS).

4

There is an abundance of material addressing the historic settlement of the
American Northwest in general (Schafer, 1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen,
1967; Dodds, 1986; and Robbins, 1997 and 2004) and Columbia River development in
Figure P-2.
Columbia River Basin2
(Showing Location of Major Dams)

2

Map source: Northwest Region, National Marine Fisheries Service at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/SalmonHydropower/Columbia-Snake-Basin.
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particular (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; DeLuna, 1997; Brigham,
1998; Vogel, 2007; Pope, 2008). Each illustrates or emphasizes different aspects of
the region‟s settlement and development. Although many mention the regional
governance systems relevant to the story the authors wish to tell, only Roy Scheufele‟s
(c. 1970) insightful analysis of the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee and
Hemingway‟s (1983) discussion of the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation
Council focused exclusively on Columbia Basin governance systems in the United
States as the central subject.3 No one has yet written a history devoted to Basin
governance.
The intent of this paper is to do so. The author was inspired to undertake this
work based on his observations of and experience with the Columbia River Basin
Forum (CRBF or the Forum), a short-lived governance effort initiated in 1997 that
ended in 2000. When first proposed the idea of a new governance effort enjoyed
widespread support from regional governors, tribal leaders, and members of the
region‟s congressional delegation. Nevertheless, despite this support the resulting
system collapsed after only a little over a year of operation. The author undertook this
research effort to understand why and to determine if the experience of the CRBF was
unique or representative of past governance efforts.
This study provides an institutional level analysis of the governance history in
the United States portion of the Columbia River Basin., introduced through the CRBF

3

Vogel (2007) provides a great deal of information and insight regarding the establishment and
operation of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission. Her focus, however, is on the role
of the Commission in creating the northwest‟s regional identity rather than the Commission itself.

6

experience. Whereas this institutional approach established the events, circumstances,
institutional actors, interests, and outcomes of regional debates over governance form,
it could not reach the motivations within individuals that led them to their stated
positions or drove their actions. Differing worldviews and senses of institutional
culture, identity, and values aggravated conflicts over interests by shaping the
perspectives each participant held over the goals and motivations of the others.
Determining how institutional values translated into individual level decision-making
regarding governance choices requires further research.
This research effort found that state and federal agency and political leaders
debated twenty-six multi-jurisdictional governance systems between 1933 and 1999.
Of these, they enacted eleven. This study presents and analyzes the history of these
twenty-six systems. The goal was to use a framework inspired by the CRBF
experience to understand why regional and national leaders adopted some types of
systems and rejected others and determine lessons as may be applicable to future
governance efforts. Chapter 2 presents the methodology through which this
framework was applied. Chapters 3 through 7 provide the history, with the study‟s
findings and conclusions presented in Chapter 8.
This study report begins by documenting the rise and collapse of the Columbia
River Basin Forum. The richness of primary material regarding the CRBF‟s inception,
operation, and demise offers a fairly complete introduction to the institutional actors,
issues, and challenges that governance efforts faced in the recent past and will likely
face in the future. From it can be gleaned insights into the interests and positions of
7

the entities involved, the types of issues institutional leaders expect such systems to
address, and the types of challenges faced. It also suggests a research framework by
which a study of past systems can be undertaken. The CRBF experience thus provides
an informative case study introduction to this overall research report.

8

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO BASIN GOVERNANCE:
THE RISE AND COLLAPSE OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FORUM

A Paradox in Governance?
The Columbia River Basin Forum (CRBF or the Forum) had its origins in a
“Three Sovereigns” governance structure proposed by Oregon‟s then-governor John
Kitzhaber in October 1997. As the name implies, this process would be comprised of
the region‟s three sovereign entities: federal, state, and tribal governments.
Navigation, public power, and irrigation interests met this original proposal with
aggressive resistance over concerns about the exclusivity of the new organization‟s
decision-making processes. States, tribes, and federal agencies expressed concerns
regarding potential impacts on their jurisdictional prerogatives. All became involved
in the drafting of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) that would serve as a guiding
charter. Governmental representatives engaged directly while non-governmental
actors participated either directly or indirectly through elected congressional
representatives. The result was the evolution of the original “Three Sovereigns”
concept into the more inclusive “Columbia River Basin Forum.” The non-government
entity participation in the MOA‟s drafting ensured that any CRBF related meetings
were to be open to non-governmental participants.
An enormous amount of institutional energy and effort went into bringing the
CRBF into being. State, tribal, federal, and non-governmental representatives met
over a sixteen-month period to craft an agreement under which they would operate.
9

State parties to the agreement were Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Montana. There
were thirteen tribal governmental parties. Four were from the Lower Columbia River,
collectively referred to as the lower river tribes. These were the Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, and the
Nez Perce Tribe. Six were from the Upper Columbia River, collectively referred to as
the upper river tribes. These were the Coeur D‟Alene Tribe, the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, the Kalispel Indian Community, the
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, and the
Spokane Tribe of Indians. Three were from the Snake River basin, collectively
referred to as the Snake River tribes. These were the Burns Paiute Indian Tribe, the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, and the Shoshone-Paiute
Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation. Federal parties consisted of the four
departments and ten agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities in the Columbia
Basin. These were the Department of Commerce (National Marine Fisheries Service),
Department of the Army (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Department of the Interior
(Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and
Bureau of Indian Affairs), Department of Energy (Bonneville Power Administration),
and Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service and Natural Resources
Conservation Service) and the Environmental Protection Agency (MOA, 1999, p. 1).
Each of these entities entered into the CRBF negotiations with their own set of
interests and prerogatives. Differing worldviews and senses of institutional culture,
10

identity, and values aggravated the conflict over competing interests and shaped the
perspectives each party held over the goals and motivations of the others.
Most of the parties signed the MOA in January 1999. Others signed later and
some not at all. Regardless, the CRBF went ahead and held its first meeting the
following March with high participant expectations. However, in eleven meetings
held over sixteen months4 members argued almost exclusively over issues of goals,
procedure and format. Frustration over lack of progress on substantive issues resulted
in key participants either quitting or threatening to quit the process at several points.
Despite the well-meaning efforts by CRBF proponents, participation trailed off amid
an increasing sense of pointlessness. The CRBF held its last meeting on April 28,
2000.
The experience of the CRBF presents a seeming paradox. Whereas many
prominent northwest political and institutional leaders strongly believed some form of
regional5 governance system necessary, those same leaders failed to grant the CRBF
the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the issues that lead them to think
that such a system was needed in the first place. Why?

4

Meeting notes or references to meetings exist for each month from March through October 1999 and
February through April 2000.
5

“Regional” in this context refers to the jurisdictional space between state and national levels of
government. Geographically, for the purposes of this study, it means the states affected by FCRPS
related activities within Columbia River Basin: Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana and the
Native American tribes residing therein. Jurisdictionally, it means the state and federal agencies and
tribal governments with operational, regulatory, and/or tribal trust and treaty responsibilities over these
activities. “FCRPS activities” refers to the purposes for which the FCRPS was developed (hydropower,
irrigation, river-borne navigation, flood control, and water supply) and the impact those activities have
on the Basin‟s natural resources in general and its salmon and steelhead runs in particular.
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The remainder of this chapter chronicles the inception, operation, and ultimate
disintegration of the CRBF. It provides the institutional background from which the
CRBF emerged. It then presents the arguments made by political leaders in support of
a new regional governance system as cited in conferences, publications, and the media.
It chronicles the creation of the CRBF‟s guiding memorandum of agreement (MOA)
and analyzes the structural weaknesses that contributed to the Forum‟s ultimate
failure. It then discusses the arc of the CRBF‟s existence from inception to eventual
collapse. It concludes with a summary of key points and an examination of the
challenges to regional governance as illustrated by the CRBF experience, thus setting
the stage for this study report‟s research questions and methodology.

Institutional Background
In his history of the Northwest salmon crisis, Taylor (1999) argued that
“centrifugal forces of competing interests” (p. 247) constantly undermined solutions to
challenges to policy and governance. He criticized all major Northwest resource
users, including the institutions and industries of timber harvest, logging, grazing,
mining, fisheries, “urban environmentalists,” development, and dam building and
public bureaucracies who all “artfully converted self-interest into principle” (p. 241).
Although Taylor (1999) focused on the history of the regional salmon fishery,
this study extends his argument to issues of Columbia River Basin governance. This
study organizes the “centrifugal forces” under three broad institutional categories.
These are salmon harvesters, those dependent on the commercial benefits and
12

economic development provided by the multi-purpose dams, and environmental
interests.
The first two focused their attention on Pacific Northwest‟s two most enduring
icons: the once massive runs of pacific salmon and the large multi-purpose dams
located on the mainstems of the Columbia River and its major tributaries. To
commercial and sports fishery advocates the salmon harvest was symbolic of a critical
regional economic and cultural resource and way of life that was rapidly collapsing.
Tribal fishermen, while sharing a commercial interest in fish harvest, were equally if
not more concerned with the depleted fish runs‟ impacts on their culture and the roles
played by salmon in their sense of identity and way of life. Although often bitterly
opposed to the goals and objectives of each other (Taylor, 1999) and often litigation
adversaries (Pevar, 2002), this three-way community of commercial, sport, and tribal
fisheries were generally united in their claim that the dams were the primary reason
for declining fish numbers (Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004).
To those dependent on the commercial benefits provided by hydropower,
irrigation, and navigation the dams were a symbol of the region‟s economic health as
well as a guarantor of public safety through flood control. The electricity produced by
the dams provided inexpensive power to fuel the region‟s economy; the irrigation
system supported the region‟s agricultural community; and waterborne navigation
provided an inexpensive means to move timber and agricultural products to market
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963). To them, the moralistic arguments of the fishery
community were a self-serving and disingenuous attempt to subsidize commercial and
13

sport fishing interests under pressure from natural changes in ocean conditions, rising
global competition, and an inability to curb their own historic excesses. There were
deep disagreements among members of the community of dam proponents as there
were within members of the fishery community. Nevertheless, they shared a belief in
the economic importance of the dams and related to them as symbolic indicators of the
region‟s economic development and growth potential. The constituent interests of the
fishery and commercial development communities have been in conflict at least since
the Army Corps of Engineers began its review in the early 1940s of the 1932 “308
Report” (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Wilkinson,
2005).
The third category, American environmentalism, is more recent. Concurrent
with the Nation‟s rising environmental consciousness, strong support for the value of
restoring sustainable populations of wild fish for their own sake emerged. National
and state environmental protection statutes in general and the Endangered Species Act
in particular embody this value (Dunlap, 1992; Taylor, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005).
The geographic breadth and socio-political complexity of this three-way
conflict illustrated the inadequacy of the region‟s governance systems, as they existed
in the mid to late 1990s. One party or another filed multiple lawsuits looking to the
courts to resolve the issues and, as Taylor (1999) argued, validate the legitimacy of
their values and beliefs.
The first listings of salmon and steelhead by the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) in 1991 and 1992 and the establishment by NMFS of the federally led
14

Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum)6 in 1995 shifted the locus of
governance away from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPPC or
Council) to the federal agencies, especially NMFS.7 Other listings followed. By
1997, regional concerns over the listings and their potential impacts were coupled
with:
Uncertainty over a pending new NMFS biological opinion (BiOp) regarding
the effect of hydropower operations on listed salmon species,8
A related study by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the impact of the four
lower Snake River dams on salmon survival and the study‟s potential to lead to
the breaching of those dams,

6

The Regional Forum is not to be confused with the Columbia River Basin Forum. The Regional
Forum was established as a provision of a biological opinion issued by the National Marine Fisheries
Service on the FCRPS in 1995. It consisted of state, federal, and tribal institutional representatives.
The Executive Committee was comprised of the state Governors or their designated representatives,
tribal government leaders, and regional federal agency executives.
7

The Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council was created under the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation of Act of 1980 to balance hydropower
planning with fish and wildlife needs. Chapter 6 discusses the origins of the Council in greater detail.
The Council‟s name was officially changed to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council in 2003
in order to emphasize the fish and wildlife aspects of its mission. In the 1980 Power Act, the word
“Conservation” in the Council‟s name specifically referred to energy conservation. The name change
was intended to convey the equal status of enhancing and protecting fish and wildlife resources affected
by the dams with energy planning in the Council‟s programs (NPPC, 2007). To minimize confusion,
this report uses the Council‟s most recent name throughout.
8

If an agency proposes an action that will take place in an area in which listed species reside, then the
Endangered Species Act requires the agency to consult with the regulatory authority over the species
affected. Jurisdiction over salmon resides with the National Marine Fisheries Service. Upon reviewing
the proposed action, the regulatory agency issues a written opinion (referred to as a “biological opinion”
or “BiOp”) as to whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification to the listed species‟ critical habitat. See ESA
sections 7(a)2 and 7(a)3.
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Concern over the nationalization of the dam removal debate by fishery and
environmental activists,
Uncertainty over the impacts of new policies regarding energy deregulation on
the region‟s federally operated hydropower system,
The collapse of the Executive Committee of the Regional Forum, and
Frustration with the region‟s complex and often contradictory patchwork of
treaties, statutes, regulations, policies, agency decisions and court
determinations regarding salmon.
Regional leaders presented three arguments in favor of a Columbia River Basin
governance system. First was the desire to better manage and organize the sheer
complexity of Columbia Basin issues. Regional leaders argued in favor of some form
of system to eliminate duplication, confusion and conflict in regional decision-making
then being carried out through multiple processes. Second, and related to the first, was
the desire for greater inclusiveness in the decision-making process. Third was concern
over periodic threats to the benefits derived from the Columbia – the most recent of
which were outlined above - and the degree to which external forces could assume
control over the system and divert those benefits out of region (Crampton, October 16,
1998; Batt, Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998).
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, released in June 2004, clearly
portrays the complexity of Columbia River issues. The states of Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, and Montana share a geographic and jurisdictional footprint with the thirteen
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sovereign Indian tribes with rights within the Basin and ten federal agencies.9 The
report characterized federal responsibilities as “a multilayered collection of laws,
treaties, executive orders, and court decisions.” It identified two Canadian and six
Indian treaties; thirty-one nationwide statutes; six basin-specific statutes; fourteen
mission-specific statutes applying to individual federal agencies; seven federal
executive orders and memoranda applying to all agencies; and seventeen court
decisions that defined and guided agency responsibilities for mission authority and
operations, fish and wildlife mitigation, and tribal relationships. These in turn
spawned thirty-eight supporting plans and programs involving a varying array of
federal, state, and tribal involvement (GAO, 2004). This array of rules, regulations,
and programs constitute a structure of regional governance absent the benefit of a
unifying system to mediate their often-inconsistent goals and requirements.10
As complicated as it made the situation out to be, this GAO report was in fact
somewhat simplistic in that it only addressed federal activity. It did not discuss
additional layers of regulation and bureaucracy resulting from state, tribal, and local
levels of responsibility. These other levels of government hold jurisdiction over
9

The agencies identified in the GAO report are the Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Marine Fisheries Service, Environmental
Protection Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and U.S. Geological Survey.
10

This research report on Basin governance uses the terms “system” and “structure” in the sense offered
by Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991). Social systems are relationships between and practices of
human agents patterned to the point where they form recognizable entities. These entities manifest as
organizations, institutions, or other social groupings. Structures are the formal and normative rules and
resources by which established systems operate. To use the CRBF as an example, the organization of
institutional participants into an arrangement called the Columbia River Basin Forum constitutes a
system. The CRBF‟s memorandum of agreement, facilitation and note-taking support, and internal
operating procedures represents its structure.
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nonfederal Basin policy domains such as water rights, permitting, fishery harvest
levels, recreational facilities, and hunting and fishing regulation and add additional
levels of complexity to issues of resource management. No single entity has the
authority to integrate areas of jurisdictional overlap or resolve disputes.
Further compounding the issue were nongovernmental private interests active
in the Basin and dependent on the missions and programs of federal and state agencies.
To use the federal agencies as examples, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
traditionally draws its support from navigation interests; the Bureau of Reclamation
from irrigation interests; the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) from public
utility districts and direct service industries; the NMFS with commercial fishing
interests; and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with sports fishermen, hunters, and
state fish and game agencies (Clarke and McCool, 1996; Ogden, 1997). Rightly or
wrongly, these private interests were frequently perceived to bias agency decisionmaking either through direct lobbying or by acting through their congressional
representatives to ensure that agencies paid proper attention to their concerns.
Such a dizzying array of requirements, activity, and competing interests all but
guaranteed interpretative disagreement and jurisdictional dispute. Writing to the
CRBF following their June 24, 1999 meeting, attorney James Buchal argued for
adoption of a clear salmon recovery goal. In doing so, he underscored several of the
arguments in favor of developing a coherent governance framework. Buchal argued
that unless the CRBF exercised leadership in “tempering and balancing them [fish and
wildlife goals] with other relevant goals, the region‟s fishery managers will continue to
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work at cross purposes.” He noted that at several times during the meeting, members
asserted the establishment in law of their relative positions to support their arguments.
He argued that “the laws are vague and contradictory” and that “Columbia Basin
salmon recovery is not progressing because of a lack of coordination among the
relevant agencies to strike reasonable accommodations among these statutory goals.”
“Only when some entity succeeds in taking charge of the recovery program, and
giving meaningful guidance to those charged to implement it, can we obtain genuine
progress” (emphasis added). 11
The case for Northwest regional governance, based on the desire for greater
efficiency, the desire for more inclusive decision making, the need to reconcile
competing statutory and regulatory demands, and protection of regional benefits led
many to conclude that existing governance systems were not adequate to the task. For
example, former Senator and Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield recommended that
Congress expand the membership and authority of the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council through legislative action (Collette, 1997). Then-Governor John
Kitzhaber stated that the Council “lacks the proper mission, proper representation, and
the proper authority” to manage the Columbia River benefits (Crampton, October 16,
1998) and eventually recommended replacement of the Council altogether (O‟Bryant,
September 24, 1999). Collectively, these issues convinced regional leaders that a new

11

Quoted from a Murphy and Buchal, LLP, memorandum to Columbia Basin Forum Committee Members
concerning Columbia Basin fish and wildlife goals. The memorandum is dated June 29, 1999. The original
document is on file with Columbia River Basin Forum meeting notes held in the offices of the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council and DS Consulting, Portland, Oregon.
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system of decision-making was necessary to replace the Regional Forum‟s Executive
Committee and to address weaknesses in the scope and authorities of the Council.

Establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum
Seeking to offset the growing federal role in Basin decision-making generated
by the salmon listings with increased state and tribal input, Oregon Governor
Kitzhaber hosted a regional conference in October 1997 at which he promoted creation
of a “Three Sovereigns” process. The stated goal was to manage Columbia River
basin issues in a more integrated, accountable, and responsive manner. This was to be
done through establishment of a collaborative decision-making process that would
develop consensus recommendations for regional decision-making authorities
(Crampton, October 16, 1998). Kitzhaber was successful in convincing his fellow
governors that some such effort was worthwhile. In a memo issued on July 15, 1998
the four governors presented a statement of joint intent to bring the region together on
a “common position” and not let the issues be “determined solely at the national level”
(Batt, Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998).
Governor Kitzhaber, supported by the regional governors, envisioned the Three
Sovereigns operating through a “high-level policy forum” consisting of one
representative each from the federal government, the four Northwest states, and the
thirteen Columbia River Basin tribes. The members of this forum would “address,
collaborate on and coordinate basin-level policy, planning, decision-making, and
implementation issues.” A senior staff-level committee of four state, four federal, and
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four tribal representatives would constitute this forum. Recognizing the difficulty of
reaching decisions on the Basin‟s conflicting issues through consensus, the governors
suggested that, “a river governance framework may need to be legislated by the U.S.
Congress…a process that could take several years.” They then initiated a parallel
initiative to determine whether a new statutory structure could be achieved (Batt,
Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998).
The governors also proposed that a memorandum of agreement (MOA)
institutionalizing the Three Sovereigns Process be developed and signed by November
1998. However, not all felt that the “Three Sovereigns” process was the “right
solution to the right problem.” Upriver agricultural and timber interests dependent on
the river‟s commercial uses of irrigation and navigation and hydropower users were
deeply concerned over a body so heavily represented by tribal and downriver fishery
and environmental advocates. They questioned whether any form of regional
governance would be part of a “sensible solution” (Tansey, March 17, 1998; Senate
Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns, 1998).
This group found a receptive audience among some members of the regional
congressional delegation. In a joint letter to Kitzhaber, Representatives Bob Smith (ROR), Doc Hastings (R-WA), Michael Crapo (R-ID), and Rick Hill (R-MT) expressed
their concern over the “scope and intent” of the Three Sovereigns proposal and the
suggested one-per-government voting scheme. They called for a greater
representation of non-governmental interests and more non-governmental participation
(Congressmen Rap Three Sovereigns Process, 1998). Senator Slade Gorton (R–WA)
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openly questioned whether the “problem” was a “lack of coordination or the inherent
tension of federal agencies having to make decisions in the face of conflicting federal
laws and the strong voices of diametrically opposed interests” and whether the Three
Sovereigns was the proper response (Senate Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns
Process, July 13, 1998). Going a step further, Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR)
introduced Senate Bill S-214 that would require a non-governmental advisory group
for whatever system eventually chosen (Three Sovereigns Develops New Twist, June
9, 1998; Senate Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns Process, July 13, 1998;
Espenson, August 28, 1998).12
The governors‟ memorandum of July 15 offered four governance options in
addition to the original Three Sovereigns proposal.13 A regional discussion ensued
from which emerged a compromise. The compromise called for more inclusive
involvement by non-governmental parties and a renaming of the resultant governance
system as the “Columbia River Basin Forum” in order to distance it from the
governments-only connotation of the Three Sovereigns label. Commercial interests
thus received assurances that CRBF-related meetings would be open to nongovernmental participants.14

12

The state legislatures also voiced concern that more stringent recovery efforts may have to be funded
from state resources. They created the Legislative Council on River Governance (LCRG) to stay
abreast of developments in the Three Sovereigns process.
13

The governance alternatives offered in the July 15 memo are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

14

Ironically, there is no indication in any of the CRBF records or meeting notes that any nongovernmental participant ever attended a formal CRBF meeting. When asked about this, a public power
participant to the process replied that once the MOA was signed, his organization realized that the
CRBF would be unable to make any significant changes to the system, and therefore posed no threat to
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Some saw the CRBF as an interim solution that allowed time for trust and
relationship building and greater coordination. Concurrently the parties – particularly
the states – could explore whether enough common ground existed for a more formal
arrangement with true decision-making authority empowered by statute (Crampton,
October 16, 1998; Espenson, October 23, 1998). Others held great hope and faith in
the CRBF‟s own intrinsic potential, although from different perspectives. The federal
agencies in general voiced support for a process that would bring the regional parties
together and result in greater input to and support for federal decisions. NMFS in
particular sought regional input and ultimate buy-in to whatever decisions the
biological opinion - due by the end of 1999 - would ultimately make. Many of the
tribes were eager to get on with substantive discussions as governing equals. Spokane
tribal representative Howard Funke captured tribal feeling when he argued that “the
idea of governments sitting down and talking about fish, wildlife, and the habitat…and
in their ecosystem…is the right thing to do” (Crampton, October 16, 1998; Espenson,
February 5, 1999).
The compromise did not satisfy everyone. Although supportive of regional
governance in the abstract, the governors of Idaho and Montana expressed concern
over how potential outcomes would affect the agricultural and recreational interests of
their respective states. Idaho particularly was leery of even the appearance of ceding
authority over water use to some regional authority made up of parties suspected of
designs on Idaho water and supportive of the breaching of the four lower Snake River
their interests. Consequently, they stopped investing any time into its workings (Personal
communication with participant.)
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dams. Both states threatened to withhold support for the CRBF unless these concerns
were addressed (Montana, Idaho won‟t Sign on to Northwest Salmon Plan, 1999).
The Nez Perce, distrustful of excessive state influence in the process, felt that
their time would more be effectively spent in dealing directly with federal agencies
through consultation and, when necessary, litigation. They also, more than other basin
tribes, believed that the CRBF was not an appropriate forum for their tribal leaders. In
their view, government-to-government negotiations between the Nez Perce and the
federal government should not occur through federal agency heads but rather through
direct involvement by the White House. They staunchly opposed the notion of
representative involvement, stating that they would not allow anyone other than tribal
leaders to represent tribal interests and insisting on direct tribal participation at each
level of the process (Espenson, Feb 5, 1999; Espenson, Mar 12, 1999). The Nez Perce
never signed the MOA.
Divisions existed among the Umatilla board of directors. Like the Nez Perce,
they harbored deep distrust of state motives, especially Oregon. Citing previous
efforts by the state attorney general to limit tribal fishing rights, many board members
did not believe that collaborating with a body historically hostile to fundamental tribal
interests was possible. Others on the board believed that the benefits of participation
outweighed the risk. It is not clear whether the Umatilla ultimately signed the MOA.15

15

Frankly, it is not entirely clear which of the lower Columbia tribes did or did not eventually sign the
MOA. The original MOA signature sheet was not filed among the records reviewed for this study. The
information presented as to signatories is derived from media accounts and recollection of process
participants.
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After two postponements16 generated by concerns over state decision-making
prerogatives, tribal concerns, funding, and extensive review by the federal agencies, a
CRBF signing ceremony finally occurred on January 29, 1999. Fourteen regional
sovereign entities signed. Six others were supportive and signed a short while later,
including Montana. Governor Kempthorne of Idaho signed the following March,
although in doing so he made it clear that the state of Idaho would not support any
recommendation that included either removal of the Snake River dams or additional
water flows out of Idaho (Espenson, Feb 5 and Mar 12, 1999).
The signing ceremony in January of 1999 culminated almost two years of
debate and negotiations over roles, responsibilities, representation, and institutional
authority. The discussion identified both a general interest in addressing the issue of
regional governance and the myriad differences among regional interests that made
structuring a governance framework so difficult. Thus, it underscored the paradox of
the effort. Almost all parties agreed that a regional governance system could allow for
more efficient decision-making, be more inclusive, and help protect regional
resources. However, the discussion also revealed a deep unwillingness to concede to
the CRBF the decision-making authority that could make it a successful resolver of
disputes. A large reservoir of skepticism remained among regional parties as to each
other‟s intent and motives. This skepticism and the lack of agreement over formal
decision authority led several to believe that a statutorily constituted body would
16

The draft MOA was released for regional comment in August 1998 and originally scheduled for
signing in the following November. The signing date was postponed until mid December and again
until January 1999.
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ultimately be needed. Nevertheless, signatories agreed to allow participation by nonsignatory entities in the interest of moving forward and with the hope that those parties
who had not yet signed would eventually come around.
The document that emerged from this process reflects the concerns and
interests of the debate that created it. Its structure and language played a significant
role in the ultimate operation of the CRBF. It embodies the rules and procedures of
the CRBF‟s establishment through negotiation by regional agents. It is therefore
useful at this point to review its key elements.

The Memorandum of Agreement
The fifteen pages comprising the MOA signed in January 1999 contain detailed
language laying out the Forum‟s purposes, organization, processes, guidelines for
public involvement, and rules for financial management. An appendix outlined five
substantive issues intended to receive immediate attention.
Section II of the MOA (1999) identified the Forum‟s purpose. Its overarching
purpose was “to provide a high-level policy forum in which federal, state and tribal
governments, working with interested members of the public, will address, collaborate
on and coordinate basin-level policy, planning, decision-making and implementation
issues that effect [sic] the Columbia River Basin fish and wildlife and related habitat.
The parties recognize the need to prioritize their efforts, focusing on the most pressing
issues with the greatest opportunity to improve the effectiveness of regional efforts.”
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Specific purposes included ensuring coordination among governmental parties
and addressing all factors that affect anadromous fish in the Basin, such as
hydropower operations, harvest, habitat, and hatcheries. Other purposes were to
“harmonize actions and shape initiatives,” “simplify current processes by eliminating
duplicative efforts and consolidating or eliminating existing committees or bodies,”
provide for dispute resolution; improve financial management; ensure effective and
independent scientific and economic review mechanisms; and “ensure a structured
process of public information and involvement” (MOA, 1999, pp. 3-4).
For funding, the MOA (1999) called on the parties to “commit to investigate
the full range of funding alternatives.” The parties agreed that “funding obligations
are to be shared among the parties on an equitable basis,” subject to the availability of
appropriated funds. The Committee identified an initial budget of $119,000 to
$189,000 and appended this budget to the agreement (MOA, 1999, p. 6 and Appendix
B.)
The MOA (1999) defined a two-tiered organizational structure almost identical
to that prescribed under Governor Kitzhaber‟s Three Sovereigns concept. At the upper
policy level was the Columbia River Basin Forum Board (the Board). The Board
consisted of the governors of Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Montana; the leaders of
the thirteen Basin Indian tribes; and a “representative of the federal Administration.”
The key functions of the Board were to provide policy guidance with regard to MOA
implementation, review priorities and tasks, provide oversight for the Forum
Committee. The Board was also empowered to make determinations and
27

recommendations on matters upon which it reached consensus (MOA, 1999, pp. 4-5).
There was no formal connection between the Board and the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council or with the remnants of the NMFS‟ Regional Forum, both of
which continued to function.
The MOA delegated implementation to the Columbia River Basin Forum
Committee (Forum Committee). The Forum Committee consisted of twelve members.
One each was to be appointed from the four Northwest states; four collectively
representing the twelve tribes;17 and one each representing the federal Departments of
Commerce, Defense, Interior, and Energy. Committee members were to elect a chair
to serve a one-year term. Functions of the Committee included carrying out the
purposes of the Forum; development of annual internal operating budgets;
implementation of the MOA‟s public involvement and outreach provisions;
monitoring implementation of agreed-upon actions; and preparing issues of such
policy significance as would require referral to the Board (MOA, 1999, pp. 5-6).
The MOA carefully defined the processes for getting an issue before the Forum
Committee and for the Committee to issue a recommendation. Although any
Committee member could propose an issue for consideration, three separate voting
processes were required before the Forum Committee could issue a formal
recommendation. First, the Committee put the issue to a vote to determine whether to

17

Two represented the upriver tribes and two the lower river tribes. The tribes could also designate up
to four alternate representatives from those tribes whose programs were directly affected by an issue
before the Forum Committee. (As noted earlier, the Nez Perce did not delegate to anyone the right to
represent Nez Perce tribal interests.)
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consider it. Nine (75%) of the twelve Committee members had to concur before an
item could be taken up. If an issue passed this step, it was designated a “Forum
Issue.” Forum Issues were eligible for further discussion, analysis, and the
development of alternative resolutions. Although not clear from the language of the
MOA (1999), it appears that the Forum Committee could provide this level of analysis
to relevant decision-makers without further action and without making a formal Forum
Committee recommendation. If, however, the Committee desired a formal
recommendation or believed additional discussion needed then it would call for a
second vote. Putting a Forum Issue into the collaborative process required the
consensus of the Forum Committee. The Committee member with jurisdiction over
the issue in discussion could limit or terminate the process at any time. Once the
collaborative process was completed, the Forum Committee could make its
recommendation after a third consensus vote. The MOA defined “consensus” as a
recorded vote of all twelve Forum Committee members, with no votes in opposition.
Members who did not register a vote within two weeks of an issue being called or who
chose to abstain did not count against the consensus (MOA, 1999, pp. 6-7).
In addition to spelling out what the Forum could do and how it would do it –
and perhaps more importantly – the MOA (1999) included a list of twelve exclusions
specifying what the Forum could not do. Among these were prohibitions on limiting
the otherwise lawful decision-making discretion of any of the parties; prohibitions on
requiring parties to limit their use of Basin resources; prohibitions on addressing “local
issues that do not have basin-wide effects;” prohibitions on any affect to private
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property and water rights; and a prohibition on requiring any party to expend funds in
support of the agreement (pp. 9-10).
The language and procedures embodied in the MOA (1999) are reflective of
both the hope and suspicion that underscored the debate and discussion leading up to
its signing. The hope was that the Basin‟s collective interests would outweigh more
localized interests and render the restrictive provisions of the MOA unnecessary. Yet
this hope was undermined by the parties‟ deep seated (and, as this study report will
show, long standing) opposition to centralized authority in any regional governance
system. The states, tribes, and federal agencies would not support a decision process
that could challenge state or tribal sovereignty or federal agency prerogatives. The
MOA underscored this principle through the requirement for a super-majority to get
issues even considered by the Committee; the requirement for consensus voting; the
long list of exclusions; and the provision that allowed any party to terminate
collaboration of any issue that fell under its jurisdiction. These provisions are the
heart of the paradox.18 The result was a document crafted on the optimism that
consensus on substantive issues would emerge while denying the CRBF, as an
institution, any mechanism for resolving issues for which consensus proved
impossible.

18

The predictable problems with this sort of arrangement caused some regional leaders to champion a
permanent legislative solution to alter the institutional prerogatives that the MOA‟s provisions were
designed to protect. The CRBF debate illustrates how difficult it will ever be to get the political process
to produce such legislation absent a regional crisis of such magnitude that it dwarfs parochial concerns.
It is difficult to see how the MOA signers – all of whom represent sovereign entities that could have
voluntarily surrendered some sovereignty to further region wide interests – would support creation of a
statute leading to the same end. As this study will show, they never have.
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The CRBF in Action
The Forum Committee19 met thirteen times between March 1999 and April
2000. The first two meetings, both in March 1999, understandably focused on internal
organizational issues. The Forum Committee appointed two ad hoc subcommittees,
one to address budget and funding and the other to develop an agenda and logistical
arrangements for a proposed Forum Board meeting. It unanimously elected Eric
Bloch, an Oregon representative to the Council and Oregon‟s representative to the
Forum Committee, as chair. It agreed that discussions of substantive issues would
take place within the Forum Committee as a whole rather than developing an overly
bureaucratic system of multiple subcommittees. The Committee agreed that each
representative should produce credentials from their respective agency head or
government formally appointing him or her as their parent body‟s official
spokesperson.20 The Committee agreed to hire a coordinator to manage its internal
business and assigned a subcommittee to develop a work plan for meeting its MOA
responsibilities (Meeting Minutes, March 10 and March 30 1999). In short, the first
meetings were used to “sort out the membership and begin formulating a plan for
19

The Forum‟s tribal representatives were John Platt, Chad Colter, Howard Funke, and Brian
Lipscomb. State representatives were Eric Bloch (Oregon) who also served as the Forum Committee
Chair, Bob Nichols (Washington), Mike Field (Idaho), and Stan Grace (Montana). Federal
representatives were Doug Arndt (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for the Department of Defense),
Karen Hunt (Bonneville Power Administration, for the Department of Energy), Anne Badgley (U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, for the Department of Interior), and Danny Constenstein (National Marine
Fisheries Service, for the Department of Commerce).
20

By insisting on credentialing, the group hoped to avoid a problem that plagued the Regional Forum:
different people claiming to represent the same governmental entity or non-government interest but
advocating different policy positions (Meeting Minutes, March 10 1999).
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addressing the tasks outlined in the MOA” (Espenson, March 12, 1999). Subsequent
meetings resulted in development of a work plan and agreement on a guiding goal
statement (Meeting Minutes, April 29 and September 7, 1999).
The tone of discussions as recorded in meeting minutes and reported in press
coverage of meeting proceedings is civil, respectful, and conveys the sense of
importance that all participants attached to Forum Committee business. However,
over time, the meeting notes also document the growing frustration with the group‟s
inability to come to grips with issues of substance.
Federal agencies and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council had six
major, interrelated processes underway in the Columbia Basin at the time of the
CRBF‟s formation. These were:
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers environmental impact statement (EIS)
concerning juvenile fish passage through the Snake River dams. 21 The
most controversial option under consideration in the EIS was potential
removal of the earthen portion of four dams on the lower Snake River.
Selection of this option would eliminate commercial navigation into Idaho
and hydropower production.
The National Marine Fisheries Service biological opinion on the Federal
Columbia Basin Power System (FCRPS). This opinion and the Corps EIS
21

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies integrate environmental
values into their decision making processes. To meet NEPA requirements, federal agencies must
consult with any other federal agency holding jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to a
potential environmental impact of a proposed action. The agency then prepares a detailed statement
known as an environmental impact statement. See NEPA, 1970, section 102 (C).
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comprised the core elements informing a much-anticipated decision
expected by 1999 on the future of the FCRPS.
The Federal Caucus‟ Basinwide Salmon Recovery Strategy. 22 The federal
agencies producing this document intended it to serve as a roadmap to
salmon recovery. It addressed all of the “Hs” believed to affect the salmon
life cycle: habitat, harvest, hatcheries, and the hydropower system. 23
Then Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s “Multispecies
Framework.” The Council undertook this initiative to look holistically at
opportunities to improve environmental conditions for all Basin fish
species.
Bonneville Power Administration‟s (BPA) 2001 – 2006 rate case. The
Bonneville Project Act of 1937 requires the BPA administrator to sell
electricity generated from federal hydropower projects in the Columbia
River to preference customers at cost. Cost includes the cost of energy
acquisition, conservation, and transmission and includes routine operations
and maintenance and the amortization of capital projects. The rates at the
time of the CRBF went into effect in 1996 for the five-year rate period from

22

At this point, the Federal Caucus was a loose consortium of the federal agencies involved with
NFMS‟ Regional Forum. The Federal Caucus would meet to coordinate federal agency positions in
preparation for discussions within the Regional Forum and CRBF. The CRBF envisioned three such
caucuses; the Federal Caucus, a state caucus, and a tribal caucus. The Federal Caucus was formally
codified under a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2000 (personal experience of author).
23

The Basinwide Salmon Recovery Strategy was initially referred to as the “4-H Paper.” This
colloquialism was changed to the “All-H Paper” upon receipt of a letter of complaint sent by the 4-H
Club organization (personal experience of author). The original document can be found at
http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/BiologicalOpinions/FCRPS/2000Biop/AllHStrategy.aspx.
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October 1996 through September 2001 (BPA, 1996). BPA was undergoing
its rate setting process for rate period October 2001 through September
2006. The federal government was deregulating and restructuring the
energy industry in order to improve competition and reduce prices.
Deregulation was especially complex in the Pacific Northwest due to the
dominant position in the energy market occupied by BPA, a federal agency
under the U.S. Department of Energy. 24 The impact of deregulation on
BPA in general and highly volatile swings in west coast energy prices
during the summer of 2000 raised anxiety in the minds of many over the
future of the region‟s cherished low energy prices (BPA, 2001).
The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of
Land Management‟s Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management
Project (ICBEMP). Created through a 1993 directive from President
Clinton, ICBEMP‟s purpose was to develop a “scientifically sound,
ecosystem based strategy for management of 64 million acres of lands
administered by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
within the Columbia River Basin, and portions of the Klamath and Great
basins in Oregon.” Concerns over forest and rangeland health, wildland
fires, and threats to fish and wildlife species inspired this effort. ICBEMP
released a final environmental impact statement and proposed decision in
December 2000 (ICBEMP, undated). The release initiated a period of
24

At the time, BPA provided on average about 40% of the electrical power sold in the region and
controlled more than 50% of the region‟s transmission lines (BPA, 2001).
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protest and recriminations as communities grounded in resource extraction
industries such as timber, mining, and ranching reacted to perceived threats
to their ways of life.
These six processes were each addressing substantive and far-reaching issues.
The resolution of those issues had the potential to disrupt the status quo of regional
economic and commercial arrangements. Each participant in the CRBF, as well as
numerous non-governmental organizations and institutions, had a substantial stake in
the outcome of these other processes and the potential impact of one process on the
others. Despite this, as pointed out by the facilitator during the October meeting, even
after four or five sessions, the time still being spent on discussing process to the
exclusion of substantive matters (Meeting Minutes, October 11, 1999).
It was the importance of the potential policy outcomes of these parallel
processes that led to the creation of the CRBF. Ironically, that importance was equally
the reason that regional agents ensured, through the MOA‟s provisions, that the CRBF
was impotent to substantively resolve differences over the underlying issues. The
resulting sense of frustration led to members eventually losing confidence in the Forum
Committee‟s ability to achieve anything significant.

The Collapse
The group grew increasingly frustrated over (1) the uncertain role of the CRBF
in relation to other regional processes addressing many of the same issues, (2)
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questions by some participants over the actual level of commitment to the CRBF by
member governments, (3) funding, and (4) the requirement for consensus decisions.
Recall that the overlapping nature of multiple complex processes and the lack
of any comprehensive coordinating mechanism was one of the motivations behind
creation of the CRBF. However, the lack of clarity in the MOA (1999) as to precisely
what the Forum Committee was expected to do carried into the Forum Committee
discussions. Recall also that the purpose written in the MOA (1999) called on the
CRBF to serve as “a high-level policy forum in which federal, state and tribal
governments… will address, collaborate on and coordinate basin-level policy,
planning, decision-making and implementation issues that effect [sic] the Columbia
River Basin fish and wildlife and related habitat” (p. 3-4). The parties interpreted this
differently. The representatives from Washington, the upriver tribes, and the Corps of
Engineers felt the Forum Committee should be developing a basin-wide strategic plan
to guide the other ongoing processes.25 Others (Montana, Idaho, and lower tribal
representatives) 26 felt that such an overarching plan would be redundant to the other
processes and instead looked to the Forum Committee to resolve specific issues
(Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, September 7, 1999).
25

Interestingly, this planning function was similar to that performed by The Pacific Northwest Regional
Planning Commission (1933-1943), the Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee (1946-1967), and the
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967-1981). Efforts at multi-domain, region wide
planning essentially ended with the 1981 termination of the Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission. These other governance systems will be discussed later in this report.
26

It is not exactly clear what Oregon‟s position was on the need for an overarching plan. The July
meeting minutes record the Oregon representative as stating that a desired goal of the group was a “plan
that will lead to fish and wildlife recovery.” In September, however, the meeting minutes state that he
believed that, with other processes underway, it would not be appropriate for the Forum to develop
another plan.
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By July, group frustration over the lack of agreement over its role grew more
pronounced. Fundamental differences in policy objectives held by the parties
exacerbated the situation. For example, representatives from the Salish Kootenai and
lower river tribal representatives argued for restoration of a “natural cycle” to the river,
which could mean partial removal of the Snake River dams and/or additional flows out
of the reservoirs in Montana and Idaho – actions that Montana, Idaho, and other upper
river tribes vehemently opposed. Other controversial issues included the role of
hatcheries to supplement conservation objectives, the practice of barging of fish past
the dams during the late summer, and a definition of the appropriate balance between
“fish and people”. Representatives from Idaho, Washington, and the upriver tribes
were eager to move on with substantive discussions on these issues. Meanwhile,
Oregon and the representative from the lower river tribes believed the group needed to
agree to specific objectives before such substantive discussions could be meaningful
(Meeting Minutes, July 21 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).
Although the Committee adopted an overarching goal statement in September
(Meeting Minutes, September 7, 1999), the group was never able to agree to objectives
that were more specific or engage on substantive issues. Governor Kitzhaber,
concerned over the lack of progress, noted in September that the region was at “grave
risk” of losing its two most prized assets: salmon and the “reliable low cost supply of
power produced for the Northwest by the federal dams on the Columbia River.”
Noting once again that neither the Columbia River Basin Forum nor the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council could authoritatively address the region‟s issues, he
37

renewed the call for congressional legislative action to replace both. Governor
Kitzhaber likened the situation to the Balkans of Europe, noting that regional parties
have “no requirement for coordinated action and no way to resolve conflicts between
themselves” (O‟Bryant, September 24, 1999).
The second general source of member frustration was deep suspicion over the
level of genuine commitment the other participating governments had to the process.
Both the state and tribal representatives questioned the degree to which federal
agencies were willing to accept CRBF recommendations on pending NMFS‟
biological opinions, the Corps‟s environmental impact statement on the effects of the
Snake River dams on salmon survival, and elements of the Federal Caucus‟ Basinwide
Salmon Recovery Strategy. The continuation of federal-only meetings on those
subjects formed the basis of state and tribal skepticism. The states also noted a
decreased participation by federal agencies in the Council‟s Framework process.
NMFS, responding for all the agencies, stated that while input from the region was
welcome, the federal government alone was statutorily responsible and legally
accountable for the responsibilities charged to it under the ESA (Meeting Minutes,
March 10 and March 30, 1999). It could not risk failing in these duties should the
CRBF be unable to come up with useful recommendations. Adding to the suspicion
over federal intent was the fact that, although the federal government had filled its four
positions on the Forum Committee, it never formally put a name to its one position on
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the Forum Board (Meeting Minutes, May 27, June 24, and October 1999).27 Federal
Forum Committee representatives contended that this was a function of bureaucratic
inertia rather than lack of support for the Forum (Meeting Minutes, May 27 1999).
The lack of an administration-level representative symbolically reinforced the sense
among states and tribal representatives that the federal government was not as
committed to the spirit of the CRBF as had been hoped.
Tribal commitment was internally mixed and externally perplexing. Tribal
leaders were among the most critical of the NPPC28 and Regional Forum as
governance systems due to the lack of tribal membership in those bodies. Tribal
leaders had long called for greater input into regional processes and the inclusion of
tribal governments in regional decision-making was a central and important purpose of
the Three Sovereign‟s process and CRBF (Crampton, December 5, 1997).
The Snake River and upper Columbia tribes all signed the MOA, and their
representative was among the most vocal urging the Forum Committee to begin work
on substantive issues. However, a history of court battles over fishing rights had made
the four lower river tribes skeptical of state motives. 29 The lower river tribes

27

From the beginning, the Forum Committee struggled to identify a meeting date for the Forum Board.
Although the federal government never formally appointed a representative to the Board, the Chair of the
President‟s Council on Environmental Quality agreed to attend the Board meeting should it ever be held. It
never was.
28

It should be noted that the Council‟s Multispecies Framework process had the active support and
participation of the tribes, and that the 1980 Power Act specifically required consultation with tribal fish
managers on the Council‟s fish and wildlife program.
29

These comments are based on the author‟s personal experience in listening to tribal elders and leaders
concerns regarding regional governance systems. See also Taylor (1999), Pevar (2002), and Dompier
(2005).
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consistently made the point that their treaties are with the federal government and are
leery of any process that may open an opportunity for state interests to encroach on the
rights ensconced in the treaties. Additionally, the Forum Committee‟s representative
structure ran counter to tribal political culture of direct democracy (as underscored by
the Nez Perce position).30
The lower river tribal governments that were unable to resolve the question of
whether to sign the MOA presented a frustrating conundrum to the Forum Committee.
These tribes justified their reluctance to sign as by arguing that it was not yet clear if
the CRBF process would prove worth their time. Yet, as the Forum Committee chair
noted, their official input was essential in the design of what that process would turn
out to be (Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1999). In effect, the lower river tribes refused to
engage in the process to design the structure that would make their formal
participation worthwhile.
Federal and state CRBF members were rankled by the lack of formal
involvement and sometimes participation by all of the Basin‟s tribes. The Idaho
representative voiced this frustration when he noted that other participants had signed
on to the CRBF process with the understanding that formal tribal participation (the
lack of which was noted as a “huge void” in the Regional Forum process) would be
forthcoming. If their participation did not occur, he argued that the group should
“reassess” what the Forum was doing (Meeting Minutes, June 24 1999). Ultimately, a

30

It was a significant concession on the part of those tribal governments that did sign the MOA to have
their interests represented by people not directly associated with their respective tribe.
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substantial part of the lower river tribal commitment problem was one of the Forum
Committee‟s own making. By agreeing early on to allow non-signatories to
participate in CRBF business, they removed a major incentive for those tribes who had
not already done so to sign on to formal membership.
State commitment to participation in the CRBF process was very strong, which
is not surprising given that the CRBF was the product of an initiative by the four
regional governors. However, the amount of authority carried by each state‟s
representative to truly collaborate and compromise on substantive issues was limited.
The governor of Idaho delayed signing the MOA and made it clear when he did so that
the issue of dam removal was not up for discussion, a position also maintained by the
Washington representative. Idaho and Montana also opposed additional flow
augmentation or increases to spill (Meeting Minutes, June 24 1999). What emerges
from the meeting minutes is the sense that the states were willing to talk about a great
number of things, but would not negotiate or compromise on any action or
recommendation from the Forum Committee contrary to core state interests. An
unwillingness to compromise or negotiate on key issues led a Yakama tribal council
member to chide the group as a whole for “competing and jockeying for position
rather than joining forces to improve the resource” [referring to salmon] and noted that
“each participating party is unbending in representing its own interests” (Espenson,
July 30, 1999).
The third source of frustration related to the second in that questions regarding
participant commitment brought attention to participant funding. The MOA (1999)
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required each participating government share an “equitable” distribution of costs.
Unfortunately, the MOA failed to define “equitable.”
The initial budget called for $119,000 - $189,000 for federal fiscal year 1999.
The delay in signing the MOA and establishing the Forum Committee meant that the
Committee did not need entire amount. A revised estimate put direct costs for 1999 at
$70,000. The Council agreed to provide about $28,000 of in-kind services.31 Funding
was not secured until the following July, and then only for $50,000. Of this, the
Northwest Power and Planning Council provided $40,000 but agreed to pay no more
than 1/3 of direct costs for subsequent years.32 The four states represented the Council
contribution as their share. BPA provided an additional $10,000. Contributions from
the other entities represented on the Forum Committee consisted of in-kind support
provided by member participation (Meeting Minutes, April 29 1999; Fazio, July 2,
1999).
The Bureau of Indian Affairs initially agreed to fund $3,000 per tribe for travel
(Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1999) although they had trouble actually coming up with
all of the money. Despite MOA language calling for “equitable” sharing of costs,
neither the tribes nor states contributed any of their general fund moneys to the CRBF.
Other than BIA and BPA, no federal agency provided cash contributions. In effect,
the Bonneville Power Administration financed the lion‟s share of the CRBF, either
31

CRBF funding followed the federal fiscal year of October 1 through September 30. The $70,000
noted here would fund the Forum Committee through September 1999. The budget for fiscal year 2000
was estimated at $75,000. BPA contributed $10,000 and NPPC $25,000 consistent with its previous 1/3
commitment. No other entity offered funds. As it turned out, additional funds were not needed.
32

BPA provides all funding for The Northwest Power and Planning Council and its programs in
accordance with the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980.
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directly or through the Council‟s program (Meeting Minutes, April 29 and October 11,
1999).
The fourth area of frustration was the MOA‟s requirement for consensus
decision-making. Even the seemingly simplest decisions could become difficult. For
example, scheduling the first Forum Board meeting was a frequent subject of
discussion. The Forum Board never held its meeting, partly due to scheduling but
mostly due to disagreement as to the meeting‟s purpose. Oregon, the tribes, and the
federal agencies felt that the first such meeting would be ceremonial in nature,
representing a statement of commitment by each participating government.
Washington, on the other hand, opposed a Forum Board meeting unless the Forum
Committee provided substantive issues or accomplishments for Board member
discussion.
The Forum Committee chair summed up the problem of consensus based
decision making at the October meeting. He stated, “people think they can come and
go, and any time they‟re not here, then they have a bye that month, and nothing that is
accomplished or agreed to is in any way binding on them” (Meeting Minutes, October
11, 1999). The inability to schedule a meeting of the Board meant that the disputes
within the Forum Committee could never be elevated, let alone resolved.
The inability to come to agreement over the role of the Forum Committee;
lingering suspicion over participants‟ true level of commitment; funding; and the
inability to resolve the challenges of consensus decision making came to a head in
January 2000. The Montana representative stated he would no longer attend Forum
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Committee meetings. “I yet see little opportunity for this body to be effective in
resolving solutions to the problems they address,” he said. “Most of the issues are
being debated in other forum arenas that we [Montana] have access to. In those arenas
the decision-making bodies have traction in bringing resolution to the issues and
implementing those decisions.” Also citing the lack of commitment and participation
by other parties, he noted that Montana would reengage if the Forum Committee could
agree to “changes and commitments” (O‟Bryant, January 14, 2000).
Coupled with the withdrawal of Montana was the growing perception that the
perceived threats enumerated by Governor Kitzhaber were not as severe as first
thought. For example, over time, regional utilities adapted to energy deregulation
without major disruption to the region. The Corps study of the Snake River Dams and
the NMFS BiOp did not make the dramatic calls for dam removal that some feared.
The collective sense of threat posed by the suite of issues facing the region dissipated
as other venues worked through them. In effect, the issues that caused so much
concern in the beginning failed to rise to a level of criticality sufficient to justify the
CRBF as an enduring governance system.
The withdrawal of Montana signaled the end of the CRBF. The Forum
Committee held its last meeting on April 29, 2000 after which effectively dissolved.
What could pass as its epitaph is captured in the last line of a document about the
CRBF posted on the Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s website: “The
Forum conducted its deliberations for slightly more than one year before collapsing
through diminished participation of the Forum membership” (NPPC, undated).
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Challenges to Governance in the Columbia River Basin
Why is it that, even with agreement on the common goals of better decisionmaking, a more inclusive process, and preservation of common regional interests, the
CRBF failed? Is regional governance intrinsically paradoxical? The circumstances
surrounding the CRBF illustrate several inherent challenges to establishing workable
governances systems. These are the difficulty of resolving deep-seated conflicts over
resource use among resource users, especially when exacerbated by differing values;
and structural issues of common vision, commitment to the governance body‟s goals
and objectives, funding, and processes for substantive decision-making.
Competing interests, aspirations, and values.
Inter-institutional conflict can occur over conflicting interests and/or when
parties perceive that their aspirations are incompatible with the aspirations of others
and when mutually satisfactory alternatives are not available (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).
For example, within the Columbia Basin, the interests and aspirations of those
dependent on the commercial benefits of the dams were incompatible with those of
advocates for dam removal in the interest of improved fish runs. Another example is
the incompatibility of the aspirations of those favoring market mechanisms for the
pricing of electricity with those favoring cost-based rates. Similar examples could be
found of other perennially controversial issues in the region, such as flow
augmentation (pitting aspirations of fish advocates against the aspirations of irrigation
and recreation advocates) or levels of tribal harvest (pitting the aspirations of tribes
against those of recreational and commercial fishermen). No argument, however well
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crafted, regarding dam removal, dam retention, or a significant modification to dam
operations can ever completely satisfy all parties.
What leads parties to become so intransigent in defending their aspirations and
interests? Pruitt and Kim (2004) identified four conditions that can cause aspirations
to become rigid to the point of precluding any opportunity for compromise. These are
(1) the importance of the underlying interests, (2) the degree to which strongly held
principles are believed to be at stake, (3) the degree to which available options are
perceived to be of the either-or variety, and (4) the degree to which parties see their
aspirations as being legitimate or just (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). All four conditions are
present in the Northwest. A few examples: The preservation of inexpensive
hydroelectric power is of vital economic interest to the region as a whole. The low
cost of waterborne navigation is of vital importance to agricultural and wood products
businesses in Idaho, Montana, and eastern Oregon and Washington. The salmon
fishery is of fundamental cultural and economic importance to the tribes and the
economic mainstay of communities in the lower Columbia River and along the coast.
Then there is water. Many of the farmers and ranchers in the region are
descended from original settlers lured to the region by the promises of free land
supported by irrigation water (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986; Pisani, 2002). To them
preserving their water rights is the central priority, even to the extent of discouraging
neighbors from voluntarily trading or selling their water rights for environmental
purposes.
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The disputes among regional parties are often perceived as zero-sum options
that leave little room for compromise. All parties claim legitimacy grounded in either
law or tradition (Taylor, 1999). Examples include tribal rights to fish as protected by
treaties and federal trust responsibilities; the defense of long-established water rights
by inland farmers and ranchers; and commercial fishermen struggling to maintain a
way of life began by their grandfathers and great-grandfathers.
All of this creates an enormous challenge for regional leaders. Their
constituents perceive any predilection of an elected or politically appointed official to
compromise for the sake of a greater good as a betrayal. One cannot simply attribute
this lack of a basis for compromise as a rational defense of tangible institutional
interests. Many Columbia Basin resource advocates genuinely and honestly believe in
the moral righteousness of their respective positions. These positions are thus
reflective of deeply held values and beliefs.
Structural issues: Shared vision, commitment, funding, and decision-making.
In addition to conflict over values, four significant structural problems crippled
the CRBF. The first was a lack of a common vision over what the CRBF was intended
to do, especially given that other processes were underway in the region addressing
many of the issues the CRBF was established to address (Meeting Minutes, April 29,
May 27, June 24, July 21, and September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).
The second was a perceived lack of commitment on the part of all participants.
From the beginning, participants approached the CRBF with varying degrees of
enthusiasm. All voiced commitment to the process, but the lack of support to address
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key issues, the failure for all parties to sign the MOA, and the failure to appoint
individuals to all positions served to aggravate existing senses of distrust over other
parties‟ motives (Espenson, Feb 5 and Mar 12, 1999; Meeting Minutes, May 27, June
24, and October 1999).
The third contributing factor to the demise of the CRBF was funding. Whereas
the MOA (1999) called for each participant to contribute an equitable amount of funds
for CRBF operations, only the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and, to a
lesser degree, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did so. Holding participants to the
funding terms of the MOA could have potentially accomplished several things. It
would have signaled the commitment of each participating government to the process,
would contribute to the sense that the deliberations of the group were “real” to its
participants, and would have likely sustained attention of the region‟s elected
leadership. None of these occurred since BPA managed ratepayer dollars
predominantly funded the CRBF. Consequently, none of the participants other than
BPA had a financial stake in ensuring process efficiency (Meeting Minutes, April 29,
July 21 and October 11, 1999; Fazio, July 2, 1999).
Fourth and perhaps most importantly was the cumbersome and ineffectual
decision-making process called for in the MOA. The process required almost
complete agreement before the Forum Committee could even discuss and issue, let
alone resolve it. The results of this decision-making process were not binding, even if
strong majority agreement existed, in that anyone disagreeing with an outcome could
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simply veto it (MOA, 1999; Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, July 21, and
September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).

Chapter Summary:
Following are the key points drawn from the CRBF history:
Regional leaders sought to establish a new governance system that would
provide a reasoned and rational basis to resolve regional differences.
Pending significant decisions on energy deregulation, dams, and salmon
occurring within processes from which many felt excluded motivated
regional leaders to explore a new decision process. These issues held the
potential to exert considerable impact on the regional economy,
environment, and individual livelihoods.
The CRBF was comprised of institutional actors with long standing
attachments to regional resources and established worldviews and values
regarding those resources. These actors included federal and state
agencies, regional Indian tribes, commercial firms and trade associations,
and non-governmental organizations. Each institution had rights,
authorities, interests, and/or prerogatives they wished to protect.
Regional institutional leaders established the CRBF to address critical
regional issues while paradoxically refusing it the authority needed to do
so.
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Some signatories to the Forum MOA made their signature contingent on
precluding discussion of key issues. As a result, the Forum was unable to
address many of the issues for which it was formed.
Regional political leaders who recognized this potential weakness from the
beginning believed a more effective and authoritative system should be
established through federal legislation. However, this legislative effort was
either not seriously attempted or eventually abandoned.33
Refusal of all parties to sign the CRBF MOA (1999) exacerbated the
MOA‟s structural problems. The Forum Committee decision to allow nonsignatories to participate in its discussions and decisions added to the
dysfunction. Representatives of non-signatory parties were thus free to
engage in extended debates without being bound by whatever agreements
or decision the group as a whole eventually reached.
Despite the time spent in negotiating the MOA, serious disagreement
remained among Forum Committee members over the Forum‟s purpose
and authorized scope of activity. The Forum Committee spent most of its
time debating process as opposed to debating and resolving substantive
issues.
Serious distrust existed as to the commitment and motivation of other
Forum Committee members to meet the spirit of the MOA.

33

The records reviewed for this study are not clear on this point.
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Frustration with the inability of the Forum Committee to address issues of
substance led Montana to withdraw. The Forum collapsed soon thereafter.
The CRBF faced challenges of constitutional structure, competing interests
and values, and structural design.
The Columbia River Basin Forum had set for itself the purpose of simplifying
processes by, “eliminating duplicative efforts and consolidating or eliminating existing
committees or bodies” (MOA, January 1999, p. 4). By denying itself any capability
for definitive decision-making and lacking commitment from a significant number of
participants, the CRBF had no basis for replacing other ongoing processes at the time,
almost all of which focused on some substantive goal, however limited that goal may
be. In limiting its role to only discussion of the issues, the Forum Committee ended up
replicating debates taking place within these other processes. With no real ability to
influence outcomes, the CRBF ironically positioned itself to be another one of the
“duplicative efforts” it had hoped to eliminate.
In designing the CRBF MOA, institutional negotiators deliberately created a
consensus-based process based on the hope that, if reasonable leaders from regional
institutional stakeholders could meet to rationally discuss the issues at hand,
reasonable compromises would be reached. However, they hedged their bets by
ensuring that every representative reserved veto authority over any collective position
not in accord with the interests of their respective constituency. As a result, parties to
the CRBF gave themselves no ability to address substantive issues.
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As observed by Russell Linden (2002) in his book on collaboration, “the forces
that pull people apart are very strong, some of them wired into the very DNA of
organizations, and it takes far more than good intentions and kind-hearted people to
make collaboration work” (Linden, 2002, p. 36). This study researched the historical
record to determine why Linden‟s assertion seems so applicable to the Columbia. It
adopted the apparent paradox of the Columbia River Basin Forum as its research
question. The next chapter explains the method through which this question was
addressed.
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CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Research Question, Purpose, and Relevance
The paradox suggested by the Columbia River Basin Forum experience
presents a fundamental question. Whereas many prominent northwest political and
institutional leaders strongly believed some form of regional governance system was
necessary, why did those same leaders fail to empower the system with the authority
necessary to resolve the issues that led them to create it the first place?
This study is the first step in a larger research project to address this question.
It presents an institutional level case history of Basin governance that identifies the
various governance systems proposed and enacted since 1934 and categorizes them
into models according to their locus of decision-making as defined by their dominant
institutional participants. Its purpose is to analyze the Basin‟s multi-jurisdictional
governance experience for trends both in the types of systems enacted and those
rejected. The goal, in effect, is to understand and explain how the region chose the
governance systems it established.
This study identified twenty-six governance systems proposed during the
period of study of which eleven were established. It presents the history of those
systems using an analytical framework suggested by the circumstances surrounding
the rise and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum. Chapters are organized by
the catalytic, critical situations whose occurrences allowed existing systems and
structures to be challenged or overturned and new ones formed in their place – an
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approach inspired by Bessey (1963) in his history of northwest regional planning.
Other elements of the framework include each system‟s dominant participants, the
other institutional actors involved, the social and political context from which each
system emerged, and the salient issues that they were intended to address or influenced
their establishment.
Why does any of this matter?
Giddens‟ (1976, 1979, and 1984) theory of structuration and Sztompka‟s
(1991) theory of social becoming argue that no social system springs anew. All social
systems evolve from those that came before and serve to shape those that follow. The
findings of this study support those arguments. Each governance system identified,
whether merely proposed and debated or actually enacted, demonstrably had roots in
earlier systems and structures. Each new system either evolved noncontroversially or
resulted from some catalytic event that allowed excluded parties to challenge existing
system(s) as they vied for influence over regional resources and institutional
prerogatives. Each was either a modification or an outright replacement of an earlier
system and in turn formed the basis for those that came after.
This point is relevant because efforts to establish new Basinwide governance
systems did not end with the Columbia River Basin Forum. For example, in 2004
staff from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council presented a proposal to
reconfigure the National Marine Fisheries Service‟s Regional Implementation Forum
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and establish a new Executive Committee under the auspices of the Council34 (Council
to Look, May 7, 2004). More recently, sovereign parties in litigation over the impacts
of the FCRPS on salmonid species listed under the Endangered Species Act
established a Regional Implementation Oversight Group to oversee the measures
called for in the National Marine Fisheries‟ 2008 FCRPS biological opinion (personal
experience of author). Understanding the historical connections to past governance
systems can inform these and future governance efforts.
The author found no history centered on Columbia Basin governance systems
as a whole in researching this report. Of the materials reviewed for this study, only
two (Scheufele, c.1970 and Hemmingway, 1983) wrote to objectively analyze a
particular governance system. Scheufele (c.1970) analyzed the Columbia Basin InterAgency Committee and Hemmingway (1983) the Northwest Power Planning and
Conservation Council. All other accounts were written to either address other aspects
of the region‟s history (for examples, see Ogden (1949), McKinley (1952), Bessey
(1963), White, (1995), DeLuna (1997), Brigham (1998), Vogel (2007), Pope (2008)
and others) or promote a particular system (see McKinley, 1952 and Ogden, 1997).
Consequently, their discussion of any particular governance system was usually
limited to those elements relevant to the story they wished to tell.
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This proposal is fully laid out in two NPCC staff memos. The first, dated June 1, 2004 and authored
by Doug Marker, is entitled Discussion of Implementation of Mainstem Amendment Measure
Concerning Council Sponsorship of Federal Hydrosystem Decision Making Structure. The second,
authored by John Shurts, John Ogan and Doug Marker, subject: Proposal for revision to mainstem
implementation forum consistent with fish and wildlife program amendments, is dated July 6, 2004.
The July 6 memo is available at the Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s web site at
http://www.nwppc.org/news/2004_08/ aug04_13.pdf. A May 4 draft of the June 1 memo can be found
at http://www.nwppc.org/news/2004_05/ fw2.pdf.
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In addition to providing a history, this study offers diagnostic, predictive, and
normative contributions to the general understanding of the Northwest‟s governance
experience. The study provides its diagnostic contribution through its exploration of
the social and political contexts and issues from which various governance systems
emerged. As such, it provides an in-depth look at how Basin governance evolved with
the region‟s history and in response to the motives and interests of institutional
participants. It thus helps explain why things are the way they are and provides a
partial explanation as to why getting to accord over governance of the region‟s natural
resource issues has often proven so difficult.
The study provides predictive contribution through its identification of two
sources of system change. The first is noncontroversial evolutionary change from
within existing systems. The second is conflict-based change that involves a sequence
of activities that appears to repeat itself each time certain conditions are present. In
essence, this conflict change pattern showed that regional governance arrangements
maintained themselves in relative stability until faced with a critical situation
(Giddens, 1984).35 These critical situations allowed existing arrangements to be called
into question and opened the door for introduction of new governance systems by
previously excluded parties. The region then goes through a period of adjustment as
these previously excluded entities attempt to gain influence while the included entities
seek to retain and/or expand the influence they have. Certain procedural events

35

Giddens (1984) defines critical situations as those that result in changes to social systems and
structure. By this definition, if no change occurs then circumstances were not sufficiently “critical.”
Consequently, the occurrence of such a situation can only be confirmed in hindsight.
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follow, with regional institutional leaders calling for public meetings, engaging in
negotiations, and eventually deciding to either reach agreement on new systems and
structures or modify those already in place. Assuming the situations that inspired the
effort prove sufficiently critical, the region adopts new systems that eventually settle
into a condition of stability pending arrival of the next critical situation. What the next
critical situation will be, or when it will arrive, cannot be predicted with any precision.
What is predictable is that, once institutional leaders perceive such a situation to have
arrived or be imminent, they will likely initiate the change pattern. By understanding
this dynamic, those seeking to change (or preserve) the status quo of governance
arrangements can plan accordingly for the day when such circumstances appear.
The study provides its normative contribution in part through its identification
of the patterns of change noted above and through its proposal for additional research
into the role of values in governance related decision-making. The pattern of system
development can lead to expectations over how things are supposed to be and how
individual institutional members should behave when critical situations present
(Schein, 1984; Giddens, 1984). Consequently, such circumstances can serve to shape
the behavior of individuals as similar conditions present themselves in the future. The
history reviewed for this study alone did not completely answer the paradox question.
It did, however, suggest that a more complete answer might be found through
additional research into the role that values associated with institutional worldviews,
cultures, and identities play in individual decision-making during periods of
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negotiation. Such research may offer further prescriptions to increase the likelihood of
success in future governance efforts.

Scope
The geographic scope of this study is that portion of the Columbia River Basin
lying within the United States Pacific Northwest, including its major tributaries, as
illustrated in Figure P-2. This corresponds to the geographic scope of the CRBF and
most of the other multi-jurisdictional governance systems with which the region has
experimented over time.36 The study focused only on governance systems involved
with the planning, development, and/or operation of what became the Federal
Columbia River Power System and the impact that FCRPS operations had on the
commercial and sports fishery, natural regional salmon runs, Indian treaty rights, and
the region‟s economic and social development.
The study did not address international issues of governance, such as the 1964
treaty with Canada that governs flood control and power benefit allocations between
the two countries. Nor did it examine other natural resource governance systems and
structures involving other natural resources issues, such as the Regional Interagency
Executive Committee organized under the Northwest Forest Plan or the Pacific
Fishery Management Council established under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976.

36

All systems identified in this study encompassed the Columbia River Basin. Some, such as the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission encompassed the entire Northwest.
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Methodology
Whereas this study presents a case history, it does not follow a traditional case
study methodology. With the exception of the discussion of the Columbia River Basin
Forum, it uses an historical method, relying on secondary sources to research
governance systems at the institutional level. This section describes this method. It
discusses the methodological sources upon which the study design relies, the
methodological approach, and the study‟s potential limitations and weaknesses.
Method.
The methodological approach used generally followed those offered by
Neustadt and May (1988) in Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision
Makers and Ritchie and Spencer (2002) Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy
Research. Neustadt and May‟s (1988) Thinking in Time is based on the authors‟ Use
of History course offered through the Kennedy School of Government. The authors
intended their book for senior policy makers as a manual for staff work regarding the
use of history to inform decision-making. Using a case study approach, the authors
advocate a reflective and systemic process for analyzing history to inform policy
choices. They offer a seven-step process that focuses on storytelling to make the links
between what is known to what the researcher wishes to find. Ritchie and Spencer‟s
(2002) Qualitative Data Analysis, although intended for use in analyzing original data,
offers useful advice for the review of secondary sources as well. Their framework
involves a systematic process for sifting and sorting material according to key issues
and themes.
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This study‟s unit of analysis was the institutions involved in Basin governance
systems. These institutions included those Indian tribes, federal and state agencies,
and private enterprises involved with land and water use, river infrastructure
development, and the salmon fishery within the boundaries of the Columbia River
Basin (Figure P-2). This study emphasizes the federal agencies in the interest of space
and since the operation of the Columbia River is essentially a federal responsibility
(Ogden, 1997, Williams, 2006).
Research proceeded through three steps. The first step documented the history
of events leading to the rise, activity, and collapse of the CRBF. This step analyzed
the issues and challenges faced by the CRBF as presented in Chapter 1. This study
used the results of that analysis to develop a framework around which to construct a
history of Basin governance systems. The components of that framework were:
The catalytic events or circumstances that created the opportunity for
conflict-based change to existing systems and structures. This study frames
the narratives of Chapters 3 through 7 using these critical situation events.
The governance systems proposed or enacted in response to the perceived
changes in circumstances.
The dominant institutions that would form or formed the locus of decision
making for each governance system proposed or enacted. This study used
this criterion to define the six models subsequently identified.
The political and social context surrounding the points in time at which
change occurred.
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The salient issues in the Pacific Northwest for which new governance
systems were proposed or enacted to address.
The institutional participants and their interests.
The worldviews held by the institutional participants.
Additional information as available. Such information included the
duration of enacted systems, types of products produced, effectiveness, and
any other material as may be relevant to the research question.
The second step reviewed regional histories in the method recommended by
Neustadt and May (1988) and Ritchie and Spencer (2002) and used the framework to
develop an institution-oriented historical overview of past governance efforts.
The third step inductively analyzed the historical record, identifying key
themes and lessons as may explain the CRBF‟s institutional genealogy and provide
insights that may inform future governance efforts.
Potential problems and limitations.
This study identified four categories of potential problems and limitations.
These were source reliability, source completeness, the risk that the historical record
alone would prove insufficient to fully explain the paradox of governance, and the
author‟s proximity to the circumstances surrounding the CRBF.
Source reliability
This study used both primary and secondary sources. The history of the
Columbia River Basin Forum presented in Chapter 1 relied exclusively on primary
source material. These included press reports from print and electronic media, CRBF
61

meeting notes taken by a contracted note taker, and notes taken by the CRBF‟s
contracted facilitator. All of these materials represented firsthand accounts by
witnesses to the events being recorded. They are, however, potentially subject to the
biases, misinterpretations, and/or lapses of attention of those who prepared them.
This study partially mitigated this potential weakness by cross checking, where
possible, the accounts of one against the accounts of the others for the same events.
As an additional step, the author allowed several of the direct participants to the CRBF
process to review early drafts of Chapter 1. None offered substantive corrections. As
such, the author is confident that the events portrayed occurred essentially as
presented.
The history of governance presented in Chapters 3 through 7 relied
predominantly on secondary sources. This study pieces together fragmentary
discussions of governance found in a wide array of historic accounts. As such, there is
some risk of misinterpretation regarding the details of each system‟s purpose,
organization, and membership. This author attempted to mitigate that risk by cross
checking significant events and facts among multiple sources. As a matter of protocol,
this study notes disagreements either in the text or in an accompanying footnote. If
research found sufficient information to resolve the difference, the resolution was so
explained.
The following example illustrates the risk and approach to mitigate possible
misinterpretation. Both McKinley (1952) and Bessey (1963) mention state
participation in the Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee. McKinley (1952)
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claimed that the states participated only as observers, while Bessey (1963) reported
that they participated as full voting members. Scheufele (c.1970) resolved the
difference. The CBIAC existed from 1946 into 1967. During that time, the nature of
state participation fluctuated between passive observation and active participation.
Thus, both McKinley (1952) and Bessey (1963) were accurate as of the time they
wrote. However, having relied only on one or the other would have resulted in a
misrepresentation as to what actually occurred. This study used a general approach of
crosschecking multiple sources within each domain throughout to present as accurate a
portrayal as possible.
Source completeness
Even if the primary and secondary sources used were completely accurate in
the information they contained, there was still risk that they did not tell the complete
story. And there are, in fact, gaps in the narrative. For example, as detailed as was the
reporting on the events leading up to the signing of the CRBF memorandum of
agreement (MOA), there were no records found by this author describing the specifics
of the MOA negotiations. Presumably, if they exist, they would be in the form of the
personal notes kept by the negotiators. The CRBF story would benefit from additional
interviews to see if these additional sources exist in addition to exploring the
motivations and institutional objectives as understood by the participants.
This risk also applied to the history of governance as inferred from the
secondary sources used. In some cases, secondary source authors provided a great
deal of information for some systems. For example, there was a wealth of published
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material regarding the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, the Regional
Forum, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, and the Pacific Northwest
Regional Planning Commission. Alternatively, the sources reviewed contained only
passing references to the Northwest States Development Association, the Committee
on Fish Operations, and the Fish Operations Executive Council. Consequently, the
sources reviewed did not contain all of the information sought for each governance
system identified. However, they did provide sufficient information to warrant the
findings and conclusions presented in Chapters 8.
Risk of insufficient material in the historic record to resolve the paradox
There was a risk that the historical record alone, including both primary and
secondary sources, would not present sufficient information to answer the research
questions or offer a satisfactory resolution to the paradox of regional governance.
That proved to be the case. Most accounts of the Columbia Basin‟s development
spoke to events and the related economic and political interests and issues. Examples
included McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), DeLuna (1997),
Brigham (1998), Pope (2008), and others. It is a fundamental conclusion of this study
that events, politics, economics and disagreements over tangible party interests offered
only a partial answer to the question of the paradox. Relatively few spoke to the social
issues of worldview, institutional culture and identity, and values that drove
individuals to so passionately believe in one position or viewpoint. Examples of those
that did were Hays (1957 and 1999/1959), Wiebe (1967) and Taylor (1999).
Particularly good at describing the role that worldview (or conceptual framework)
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plays in policy decisions and social structure are Lichatowich (1999), Dunlap (2004),
and Williams (2006). However, none directly linked how those values actually
affected regional governance or policy choices. The understanding of the CRBF‟s
history in particular and the study of regional governance in general would be greatly
improved by in-depth interviews with participants to better explore the role that
worldview, social identity, and individual values played in negotiations over the MOA
and the CRBF‟s operations.
Author’s proximity to the events under study
Maxwell (2002) argues that good qualitative work must be transparent in its
articulation of author background, potential biases, and selected methodology. The
author of this study was closely associated with the events that led to the Columbia
River Basin Forum‟s creation. He served as the Deputy Commander and Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army Corp of Engineer‟s Northwestern Division, headquartered in
Portland, Oregon. He held that position from 1997 to 2001. He held supervisory
authority over and appointed the Corps‟s CRBF representative. He exercised
executive coordination with other federal agencies regarding the Corps‟s
environmental impact statement on salmon survival through the lower Snake River
dams, one of the major issues in which the CRBF members took interest. He presided
over four regional public meetings regarding that study and on several times testified
to Congressional committees regarding the study and related biological opinions on
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the operation of the Columbia Basin dams.37 Consequently, he was familiar with
many of the issues and events discussed.
To mitigate the effects of any bias, points supported only by the personal
experience and observations of the author were kept to a minimum and offered only
when no other source could be found or to amplify a point made by others. To the
maximum degree possible, this study presents information found in already published
accounts, the public record, and other sources accessible to the public.
The author is currently on contract as facilitator and program coordinator for
the Columbia Basin Federal Caucus. In that capacity, he is required to maintain a
confidentiality agreement regarding information presented in meetings, discussions, or
documents to which he is available. The events discussed in this study predate this
confidentiality agreement and concern events outside of the confidentiality
agreement‟s scope. There are no instances in which information was withheld due to
constraints or conditions from the author‟s past or current professional duties.

Sources
Primary sources.
Primary material for the rise and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum
presented in Chapter 1 included meeting minutes, facilitator notes, and other CRBF
related documents and committee reports. The Northwest Power and Conservation
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A transcript of one such testimony as presented to the House Committee on Environment and Public
Works, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water Works, can be found at
http://bluefish.org/mogren.htm.
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Council in Portland, Oregon, maintains one set of files of these documents. The other
set of files is located with DS Consulting, a firm also located in Portland. 38 To the
author‟s knowledge, these are the only existing collections of CRBF records. Both the
Council and DS Consulting were very gracious in allowing the author full access to
their files to research this paper. This was fortunate in that some records were
included in one file but not the other. It may be that additional records exist in the
private hands of CRBF participants. However, the effort to contact those individuals
was beyond the limit of this research project. Consequently, the material reviewed
bounded the CRBF history presented in Chapter 1.
In addition to official CRBF related documents, the files contained notes
prepared by two sources. The Northwest Power and Conservation Council hired a
contractor (Mr. Jeff Kuechle) to prepare CRBF meeting minutes. Although not
verbatim transcripts, these minutes provide a relatively detailed summary of meeting
discussions. Copies of minutes are on file in both the Council and DS Consulting
collections for meetings conducted on March 10 and 30, April 29, May 27, June 24,
July 21, September 7, and October 11 1999. The files did not contain minutes for any
of the meetings held in 2000. Apparently, Mr. Kuechle was not replaced when his
contract expired. Chapter 1 cites information from Mr. Kuechle‟s notes as “meeting
minutes.”
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DS Consulting specializes in public health, natural resource, organizational, and health care issues.
Services include facilitation, mediation, conflict-needs assessment, systems design, negotiated
rulemaking, collaborative problem solving, and consensus building. Additional information is available
from the company websites at http://www.mediate.com/dsconsulting/index.cfm and
http://www.mediate.com/DS/index.cfm.
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The second source of notes was DS Consulting, contracted to provide
mediation and facilitation support for meetings beginning on May 27, 1999. In
addition to the meeting minutes recorded by Mr. Kuechle, Ms. Donna Silverberg,
meeting facilitator, and/or members of her staff, took abbreviated outline notes. These
notes are on file with DS Consulting for the meetings held on July 21, 1999, and
February 25, March 10, April 21, and April 28, 2000. Chapter 1 cites information
from these documents as “facilitator notes.” An attendance sheet and references in
media reports indicate a meeting also held on January 19, 2000 although the files
contained no record of what transpired at that meeting. Subcommittee memos, budget
reports, meeting agendas, and the memorandum of agreement developed to guide
CRBF activities provided additional information.
In addition to the meeting notes and CRBF records, regional news outlets
carried a running account of the CRBF‟s formation, operation, and collapse. The
author screened online websites of regional news sources for “Three Sovereigns” and
CRBF related articles. This study used almost every news article thus found; the few
not used were rejected solely because they were superficially redundant of coverage
found elsewhere. The articles and editorials used appeared in the Oregonian and the
online NW Fishletter and Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife News Bulletin. Energy
NewsData produces the Fishletter. Founded in 1982, Energy NewsData provides
reports of interest to the electric and utility industry. The NW Fishletter is found
online at http://www.newsdata.com/fishletter/index.html, with specific locations of the
articles used identified in the list of references following Chapter 8.
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Although the Oregonian and Fishletter articles were helpful, this study drew
the preponderance of its news account related information from reporters Barry
Espenson and Mike O'Bryant from the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife News
Bulletin. Intermountain Communications of Bend, Oregon publishes the Bulletin.
The Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s Fish and Wildlife Program funds
the Bulletin, a program funded by the Bonneville Power Administration. The Bulletin
is found online at www.cbbulletin.com. In addition to meticulously following the
establishment of the CRBF, either Espenson or O‟Bryant attended and reported on
each CRBF meeting. Their reporting thus greatly supplements the CRBF meeting
minutes and facilitator notes. The list of references following Chapter 8 identifies the
specific online location for each Bulletin article cited.
Secondary sources.
Secondary sources provided the preponderance of of information for the
governance history discussed in Chapters 3 through 7. There were several reasons for
this. First, delving into the archives for primary material on each of the twenty-six
proposed systems identified in this study was time prohibitive. Second, this study
found the body of material in each literature domain to be substantial and well
developed. Third, although this account would undoubtedly benefit from additional
analysis of primary documents, the published material reviewed provided sufficient
information to support the findings and conclusions presented herein.
This study constructed its historical narrative from references to governance
systems and contextual trends in works generally intended to address other issues or
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present other arguments. The study reviewed published material selected from the
following topical domains:
Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives,
Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest,
Columbia River Basin commercial development,
The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs, and
The American environmental movement.
The discussion below reviews the material considered essential to this study‟s
argument. Appendix A presents an expanded review of this literature. This study used
additional sources to cross check information and to add or supplement details to
specific incidents or issues. The reference list that follows Chapter 8 identifies these
other sources.

Literature Review
This section summarizes the literature used to write the history of Basin
governance, organized by domain. Works categorized under more than one domain are
listed under each that applies.
Domain: Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives.
The research into regional Indian tribes (1800s through 2000) focused on a
general background of Northwest tribes, their interactions with white settlers, the
worldviews and perspectives around which tribal society was organized and how these
views shaped later debates over Columbia Basin issues.
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Trosper (1995), Pevar (2002), and Wilkinson (2005) provided information on
tribal social values. Trosper (1995) summarized Indian cultural precepts based on his
study of native peoples. Pevar (2002) focused on the legal and political evolution of
tribal rights. Wilkinson (2005) traced the history of the tribal sovereignty movement.
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide additional tribal
social context. These works offered insights into the connection between worldview
and tribal social organization and behavior. They also provided a comparison of tribal
worldviews and with those of early Euro-American explorers and settlers and discussed
the impact of shift from one to the other on the region‟s natural resources.
Three other books provided regional context oriented from the tribal
perspective. In two books, Ruby and Brown (1981 and 1992) provide an encyclopedialike overview of the tribes and bands of the Pacific Northwest. Clark (1953)
transcribed traditional Northwest Tribal stories that provided Indian interpretations of
the creation and man‟s relationship with nature. Collectively, this body of work
provided a sufficient array of historical context, facts and circumstances relevant to the
tribal role in the region.
Domain: Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest.
Research of regional exploration and settlement focused on the worldviews of
the new arrivals, the impact of those worldviews and white expansion on native tribes,
and the impact settlement had in setting the region‟s social trends. This study reviewed
material for facts, dates, and circumstances; the early roots of regional institutions; and
the context from which later efforts at planning and governance emerged.
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In their essay promoting a new conceptual framework to guide regional salmon
management, Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams (2006) argued
that conceptual foundations (or worldviews) have a profound effect on social
organization and behavior. Taylor (1999) and Lichatowich‟s (1999) critique of
regional fishery management also argued the power of worldviews on social structure.
They further argued that the replacement of the tribal foundation of unity with nature
with the Euro-American concept of nature as a warehouse of marketable resource
commodities directly resulted in the depletion of those resources – some, like salmon,
almost to the point of extinction.
Four authors captured the origins and nature of the worldviews brought by
settlers to the Pacific Northwest. These were Max Weber (2002/1920), Henry Nash
Smith (1950), Jenks Cameron (1928 and 1929) and Dodds (1986). That worldview
believed in the moral rightness of the creation of personal wealth (Weber, 2002/1920).
It embraced the right of property ownership, especially land, as a guarantor of
individual liberty and republican virtue (Smith, 1950), a belief in the west as an
Edenic garden of opportunity (Smith, 1950), a belief in the inexhaustibility of the
resources the west offered (Cameron, 1928 and 1929). It also carried a belief in the
doctrine of Manifest Destiny. The doctrine of Manifest Destiny held that some
combination of God, nature, and/or fate ordained an American empire from coast to
coast (Dodds, 1986).
Dodds (1986) further argued that the institutions of the Northwest evolved
under circumstances of relative complacency. This was because white settlers the
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region predominantly emigrated from the upper Midwest of the United States.
Consequently, they already shared a common belief in American values and how those
values were to be applied in social, political, and economic settings. As the region
filled with people all operating within the same conceptual framework, the institutions
they chose to establish faced little crucial review or challenge (Dodds, 1986).
This study relied upon the following sources to document the Northwest
settlement up to the early 1900s. Robert Wiebe (1967) and Samuel Hays (1957) wrote
from national perspectives, discussing broad trends that shaped American settlement
and development in the 19th century and thus provided context for the settlement of the
Pacific Northwest. Research into the history of Northwest exploration and settlement
examined the work of Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen (1967), Schafer (1943/1918),
Dodds (1986), and Robbins (1997 and 2004). Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen (1967),
and Dodds (1986) concentrated on key personalities and the region‟s economic, social,
and political development. Robbins (1997 and 2004) wrote from an environmental
perspective, focusing on the impact of regional development on the regional ecology.
All provided at least some additional insight into the worldview carried by the white
settlers to the region and the influence of that worldview on Indian culture and
development of the region‟s Anglo-American political and social institutions.

Domain: Columbia River Basin commercial development.
This study found that almost all references to Columbia Basin governance
systems were contained in histories of the river‟s commercial development. Johansen
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(1967), White (1995), DeLuna (1997) and Brigham (1998) provided contextual
background regarding the impact of Progressive and New Deal philosophies in general
and the public-power debate in particular on Columbia River development. Ogden‟s
1949 doctoral dissertation traced the economic and social reasons behind the river‟s
development and the political environment in which that development took place.
White (1995) argued the social impact of converting the Columbia from a natural
ecologic system into an “organic machine” producing multiple commercial benefits is
what makes the Northwest a true region of common interest. Vogel‟s 2007 doctoral
dissertation took White‟s (1995) argument a step further. She concluded that the
concept of the Northwest as a unified region centered on the provision of inexpensive
hydroelectricity and socially institutionalized through the Pacific Northwest Regional
Planning Commission (PNWRPC). Vogel (2007) based her argument on review of
primary materials in PNWRPC archives. Although not focused on the PNWRPC as a
governance system per se, her work provided a great deal of insight into PNWRPC
origins and operation.
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), and Norwood (c.1981)
provide firsthand accounts written by men with active roles in regional developmental
policy and governance in the 1950s and „60s. McKinley (1952) provided an overview
of federal responsibilities in the region, analyzed the voluntary nature of interagency
governance, and argued for establishment of a more authoritative Columbia Valley
Authority to plan and manage Basin resources. Bessey (1963) traced the region‟s
efforts at regional planning. Scheufele (c.1970) provided an insightful analysis of the
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Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee and in so doing provided an applicable
critique to collaborative governances systems in general. Norwood (c.1981) traced the
history of the policies of the Bonneville Power Administration.
Histories of more recent events included Pope‟s (2008) account of the hydrothermal crisis of the 1970s; Blumm‟s (1982) discussion of the background of the 1980
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act; Hemmingway‟s
(1983) analysis of the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council; and
Crampton and Espenson‟s (2009) synopsis of salmon litigation between 1991 and
2009. This study effort researched these works with the goal of identifying the key
issues facing the Pacific Northwest at the time, and the governance systems proposed
or enacted in order to address those issues. Also researched were the key arguments
for or against the various governance systems and the positions of regional institutional
actors as those debates played out.
Domain: The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs.
All Columbia Basin efforts at collaborative governance were initiated to guide
planning and management of the Basin‟s resources and/or to provide a forum where
differences among regional institutional actors could be resolved. Many of the most
dominant differences have involved conflicts among commercial, sport, and tribal
fishery interests and the collective opposition of fishery interests to the construction
and operation of mainstem dams. This issue was central in the formation of the
Columbia River Basin Forum and has been at least a component issue of every
governance system proposed or enacted since the 1940s. Its importance intensified
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once NMFS began listing Columbia basin salmonid species as threatened or
endangered under the Endangered Species Act in 1991. Fish management and
conservation will likely continue as a central governance issue into the future.
Literature on the Northwest salmon situation proved a mix of objective analysis
and issue advocacy. Research focused on basic facts, dates, and circumstances;
institutional context with regard to governance; insights into various advocates‟
interests and worldviews; and the role the issue played in governance choices. The
National Research Council (1996) provided an objective and comprehensive general
overview of the salmon crisis and interrelated causes of salmon declines. Cone and
Ridlington (1996) provided excerpts from statutes, policy statements, Indian treaties,
speeches, and technical reports considered central to policy decisions and editorial
comments on each from regional salmon scientists and activists. Lichatowich (1999),
Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide holistic critiques of the causes of salmon
decline and the impacts of cultural perspectives on salmon policy.
This study researched advocacy books and articles for basic facts, dates, and
circumstances and insights into how worldviews of the parties on whose behalf the
authors were writing influenced perspectives on causes and solutions. Buchal (1998),
writing from the perspective of those dependent on the commercial benefits of the
developed river, tends to dismiss the impact of dams and primarily attributes the
salmon decline to overfishing, mismanaged hatchery practices, and ulterior political
motives of federal regulatory agencies. Alternatively, Blumm et al. (1998) placed
primary blame on the existence and operation of Columbia and Snake River dams.
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Lichatowich (1991) critically focused on hatchery policy, arguing that it was an
application of industrial-scale fish production through hatcheries that created a
misguided belief that the region could continue to have harvestable fish runs and
commercial development – all of which came at the expense of natural salmon runs.
Notwithstanding the enormous cultural importance of salmon to tribal culture,
much of the salmon debate in the first half of the 20th century consisted of a contest
among competing economic interests framed within the market-capitalist worldview.
In the 1960s and 70s a new worldview emerged that emphasized environmental values.
Arguably, one of the underlying reasons that the salmon crisis seems so irreconcilable
is the view by some parties of salmon as an economic commodity to be exploited and
by others as an ecological treasure to be preserved. The environmental worldview has
gained significant traction in the Northwest with adherents insisting that resource
managers consider ecological concerns. Understanding that worldview is therefore
important to understanding the Basin‟s more recent governance history.
Domain: The American environmental movement.
This study effort researched literature on the United States environmental
movement primarily for its contextual roots and the role environmentalism played in
recent American political life.
Many environmental historians generally credit George Perkins Marsh as
providing the intellectual foundation of the American environmental movement.
Marsh (1965/1864) provided an intellectual framework for the conservation
movement. Marsh (1965/1864) promoted a responsible stewardship approach to
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natural resource use grounded in the American capitalist and protestant traditions.
Kline (2000) and Thomas Dunlap (2004), while giving Marsh his due, traced the
historical trajectory of environmental philosophy from the Middle Ages up through the
1990s. Both are self-described environmentalists who provided critiques of the impact
of the market-capitalist worldview on natural resources.
Hays (1999/1959), Riley Dunlap and Mertig (1992a), and Rosenbaum (2005)
collectively presented a history of the movement‟s political and institutional
development. Hays (1999/1959) argued that to most environmental historians, the
significance of the progressive conservation movement lay in the substance of
progressive policies concerning sustained yield forestry, multiple use river
development, and efficient public land management. He argued that the movement
was much more than that. It was nothing short of a major realignment of American
political power away from private corporations and into the hands of government
administrative agencies in the moral interest of promoting the public good. Dunlap
and Mertig (1992a) argued that despite predictions to the contrary, the American
environmental movement has not had the short life span of most social movements
and has embedded itself in American political life as a core value. Rosenbaum (2005)
offered an accounting of the nation‟s progress toward environmentalism, how much
lost, and how much gained. He chronicled changes in national policy due to changes
in presidential administrations and congressional makeup. He discussed the shift from
single-issue policies for protection of individual elements of the environment such as
water, air, and discrete species to more holistic concerns over ecological impacts. He
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addressed the uncertainty of science and the political difficulty of justifying costs for
environmental consequences that fall to individual consumers whereas the benefits are
spread over the population.
Although no piece of the environmental literature reviewed directly addressed
the Pacific Northwest, they provided a context for the environmental worldview that in
recent years played an increasingly significant role in Northwest natural resource
issues.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions
Findings.
This study produced five primary findings, outlined here and discussed more
fully in Chapter 8. First is the sheer complexity of the governance task. This
complexity is due to several factors. The first is the sheer scope of the operational
issues to be addressed, especially in balancing the commercial purposes of the river‟s
operation with mitigation for impacts on fish and wildlife. The second is the legacy
effects of localism, institutional power, and perspectives over resource use dating to
the region‟s early settlement. Third is the challenge of structure, or coming to
agreement on a common vision of purpose and the internal rules and procedures to
guide routine business and decision-making. The complications of scope, institutional
legacy, and structure are further exacerbated by the different worldviews institutional
participants bring to debates over substantive issues.
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The second general finding concerns the role of law and legal structure. The
U.S. constitutional framework and federal and state laws establish legal standing for
state and federal agencies to carry out assigned tasks. They also define relationships
among institutional parties, delegate decision-making, and mandate tasks and
objectives to be achieved. Consequently, the legal structure both enables and
constrains efforts at multi-jurisdictional governance.
The third general finding is that, despite these complexities and legal
framework, the Basin managed to employ some form of inter-jurisdictional
governance system since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning
Commission in 1934. The Basin has not been without at least one governance system
in place since. Between 1934 and 2000, twenty-six different governance systems were
proposed. Eleven were established. This study found that either each system
identified was an evolutionary progression from an existing system or a new system
specifically established to displace another. This study categorized each identified
system as either decision oriented or collaboration oriented. As the names imply,
decision oriented systems favored efficient, authoritative decisions regarding resource
management and use at the expense of inclusiveness. Conversely, collaborative
systems favored broad inclusion at the expense of efficient decision-making.
This study further subdivided these two broad characterizations into six
governance models as determined by the dominant institutional actors in each system.
The study identified three decision oriented and three collaboration oriented models.
This study termed the decision-oriented models as the Market Model, the Iron
80

Triangle Model, and the Valley Authority Model. Private enterprises led decisionmaking under Market Model systems. Three-way arrangements among federal
agencies, their congressional oversight committees, and private interests controlled
individual resource policy domains under the Iron Triangle Model. In contrast to the
decentralized decision-making nature of the Market and Iron Triangle Model, Valley
Authority Model systems centralized federal decision-making under one
administrative structure.
This study categorized collaborative systems under models termed the Federal
Cooperation Model, the State Cooperation Model, and the Three Sovereigns Model.
Under the Federal Cooperation Model, federal agencies coordinated their discretionary
decision-making and programs. State Cooperation systems were led by state entities,
usually representatives from the governors‟ offices. Three Sovereigns systems
envisioned federal, state, and tribal representatives working as co-equal management
partners. Chapter 8 discusses the models in more detail and identifies the systems
assigned to each.
The fourth general finding concerned patterns of system change. Change came
about either through evolutionary processes within models or the emergence of
circumstances that allowed for dramatic shifts between models. Evolutionary changes
occurred through collapse due to internal structural weaknesses for which participants
lacked a compelling reason to resolve or mutual agreement to improve and replace
extant systems. Conflict-based system change occurred through emergence of a
critical situation that called existing governance systems into question and allowed a
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new set of participants to achieve dominance. This study found four such critical
situations to have occurred between 1929 and 1999. These were the onset of the Great
Depression in 1929, events surrounding the end of World War II circa 1945, the
issuance of a notice of insufficiency by the Bonneville Power Administration in 1976,
and the first listings of regional salmon under the Endangered Species Act in 1991.
Events and circumstances that precipitated the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee (the end of World War II), the Northwest Power Planning and
Conservation Council (the BPA notice of insufficiency in 1976), and the Columbia
River Basin Forum (potential threat of deregulation and loss of regional benefits from
the FCRPS) suggest a patterned response to perceived pending critical situations.
Chapter 8 explains this pattern and illustrates it in Figures 8-4 and 8-5. The events that
led to formulation of the CRBF did not rise to the level of criticality that would justify
replacement of other extant forums and regimes. This circumstance undermined any
incentive for participants to invest in CRBF success, rendered it duplicative of these
other forums, and thus contributed to its collapse.
Fifth is the regional preference for collaboration-oriented governance systems.
Between 1934 and 2000, the region repeatedly rejected decision-oriented models in
favor of collaboration-oriented models. All eleven systems enacted were collaboration
oriented under one model or another; no decision-oriented system has yet been chosen.
This is in spite of a mixed record of success. Some collaborative systems, such as the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee, and the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council, existed for
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decades and delivered substantive and credible programs, plans, products and services.
Others, such as the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee,
Regional Forum Executive Committee, and Columbia River Basin Forum collapsed
after a relatively short period, accomplishing little. The systems that succeeded appear
to have achieved a shared sense of purpose and identity among their members that
transcended individual participant institutional interests. Those that failed apparently
did not.
Conclusions.
The study‟s findings led to the following six conclusions, introduced below
and discussed more fully in Chapter 8. First, regional leaders are likely to continue to
support some form of multijurisdictional governance system. The reason for that
support is the continuing desire to establish a rational process for resolving (or
precluding) problems of competition and disagreement over resource uses that
transcend individual federal agency, state and tribal government jurisdiction.
Second, the apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s
consistent preference for collaboration-based governance systems. The challenge of
reaching consensus among multiple parties with deeply held interests, strong
institutional cultures, and differing worldviews seems one the region is consistently
willing to tackle. This elusive – if not unattainable – goal seems an institutionalized
characteristic of the Northwest‟s approach to natural resource management within the
Columbia River Basin. It is not likely to change. The region derived value and
benefit from collaboration-oriented systems established under the Federal
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Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three Sovereign models. Despite recurring
frustration over the inability of such systems to solve the region‟s more intractable
problems, regional leaders find that living with that frustration is preferable to the
outcomes that may be produced by more decision-oriented alternatives.
Third, statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system success. This study
found examples of successful collaborative systems that were not established through
law and examples of not-so-successful systems that were. The reason is that the
effectiveness of the collaborative systems identified in this study was more dependent
on the relationships among the institutional leaders involved than any external
mandates.
Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a sufficient
condition for any decision-oriented system that the region may desire to establish. The
authorities and prerogatives of state, federal, and tribal governments and agencies and,
to some degree, the relationships among them are all established in law. Any system
with the authority to direct agency priorities and prerogatives must therefore have
statutory authority to do so. The degree to which the relationships and decision
hierarchy of participating entities are defined in some new authorizing statute will
determine the degree to which effectiveness will depend on voluntary compliance with
system decisions.
Fourth, the region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decisionoriented governance system. Even if the region were able to overcome the
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constitutional, statutory, and institutional challenges at the state and federal levels,
institutional leaders have historically rejected such systems. The regional preference
for collaborative systems does not reflect an avoidance of tough choices. Rather it
reflects a strong desire to obtain as much agreement on choices made as possible –
even though getting to those choices frequently involves a contentious mix of
negotiation, legislation, and/or litigation. It may be possible that, at some point in the
future, a critical situation of such magnitude occurs that allows establishment of a
more authoritative system. However, the history shows that the Great Depression, the
end of a World War, a major regional financial crisis represented by BPA‟s notice of
insufficiency in 1976, and the listing of regional salmon under the Endangered Species
Act were not of sufficient criticality to allow enactment of such a system. At this
point, it is difficult to imagine one that would.
Fifth, regardless of the level of unity achieved within any one system, there
will likely always be parties who believe that the system(s) in place do not properly
serve their interests. These parties will look for opportunities to challenge existing
structures when presented with critical situations. As was shown in the CRBF
experience, the perception of a pending critical situation is not sufficient to
institutionalize a new system or overturn existing ones. When such situations do arise,
the region‟s experience with past governance system changes suggests the behavioral
model explained in Chapter 8 and illustrated in Figure 8-4 will likely be followed.
The sixth and final conclusion concerns limitations to the institutional
methodology as used in this study to fully explain the governance paradox. The
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history recounted provided only partial answers to the study‟s research question. This
study findings suggest that worldview belief patterns embedded in institutional
identity and culture, (Tajfel and Turner, 1979/2004; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Hogg
and Terry, 2001; Schein, 2004) inculcated in individual institutional members as the
correct way to think, perceive, and feel (Schein, 2004) and manifest through individual
decision making processes (Beach, 1998) condition the agents of those institutions as
to what constitutes acceptable policies and systems. The experience of the Columbia
River Basin Forum offers an opportunity to investigate this question in greater depth.
Appendix B presents a framework for such a study.

Organization of Study
This study used an organizing framework inspired by Bessey (1963) and drawn
from Giddens‟ (1984) argument regarding critical situations. According to Giddens
(1984), when social systems become established, they remain in place until a significant
event occurs that upsets the status quo and allows new or previously suppressed
alternatives to become viable. Giddens (1984) terms such occurrences “critical situations”
and defines them as those situations where the “established modes of accustomed life are
drastically undermined or shattered” and “circumstances of radical disjuncture of an
unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten
or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines” (Giddens, 1984, p. 60-61). Writing
in 1963, Roy Bessey presented changing economic factors alone as the primary catalysts
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for this sort of dramatic change within the Columbia Basin.39 This study takes advantage
of the additional context offered by the forty-plus years since Bessey published his work
expands his argument to include the catalytic effect of events other than economic drivers
of change.
This study found major events that marked a turn in public interest for or against
various regional governance systems from the 1920s to the present. The first two are in
accord with Bessey (1963): the onset of the Great Depression and the end of World War
II. The second two are the Columbia River power system‟s hydro-thermal crisis of the
1970s and the first listing of Columbia basin salmon under the Endangered Species Act in
1991. These events frame Chapters 3 through 7.
Chapter 3 summarizes the region‟s history up to the first of these critical
situations, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. It presents the region‟s early
exploration and settlement by Euro-Americans and their impact on Native Indian
people. It explains the Indian and white settler worldviews and how those worldviews
influenced their respective social organizations. It identifies the key institutions that
would come to be significant actors in regional governance debates. It also
summarizes the political and social context leading up to the Depression. It concludes
by explaining the market and agency-oriented governance systems that managed
regional natural resources at the time.

39

Giddens‟ (1984) theoretical construct and Bessey‟s (1963) empirical work reflect Gersick‟s (1991)
theory of “punctuated equilibrium.” Gersick argues that social activity tends to follow status quo
behaviors until disrupted by a threat or changed condition that calls those routine behaviors into
question and sets the conditions under which new policies and behaviors can be brought into being.

87

Chapter 4 focuses on the onset of the Depression in 1929 and the changes the
policies enacted in response to the nation‟s economic crisis caused in regional
governance systems. The chapter outlines the national political and social context of
the time, the salient regional issues that directly or indirectly affected Basin
governance and the governance systems proposed in response. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 do
the same for the three other critical situations found in this study to have created the
circumstances that led to Basin governance changes. These are the end of World War
II in 1945, the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis and resultant BPA notice of insufficiency
(NOS) in 1976; and the first listings of regional salmon under the Endangered Species
Act in 1991, respectively.
Chapter 8 summarizes and analyzes the findings of Chapters 3 through 7 and
presents the study conclusions. It categorizes the twenty-six governance systems
proposed or enacted under the six governance models introduced above. It also
presents a pattern of governance development that in which the region appears to
engage each time a perceived critical situation presents. A complete reference list
follows Chapter 8. Appendix A provides the detailed literature review; Appendix B a
theoretical framework to guide future research.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING THE STAGE:
THE COLUMBIA BASIN PRIOR TO 1929

Introduction
This chapter establishes the point of departure for the discussion of Columbia
Basin governance systems in the chapters that follow. It documents the legacy effects
of regional settlement that would influence future governance debates. It begins with
a discussion of the worldview of the Native tribes in the region and a comparison of
those views with those of the first European explorers. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the impact of the Great Depression in 1929, an event that dramatically
altered the market-based, decentralized systems of regional governance in place up to
that time.
This chapter also introduces the major regional institutions that would come to
shape future governance systems. These institutions include the Indian tribes, federal
and state agencies, and private enterprises that were established around the Columbia
Basin‟s fisheries, land and water use (agriculture, grazing, and timber harvest), and
river development (irrigation, navigation, flood control, and – eventually hydropower). Since the Columbia as currently developed is a primarily a federal
responsibility, emphasis is placed on federal agencies with jurisdictional
responsibilities over the Basin‟s land, water, fish, wildlife, and timber.
The chapter is divided into the following eight sections:
The social structure and worldview of the region‟s Indian tribes.
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Early European exploration and Anglo-American settlement.
The region‟s economic development and its underlying worldview.
Regional institutional development, focusing on the institutions established
around land use, western water law, early federal Columbia River
development projects, the salmon fishery, and the rivers hydropower
potential.
The earliest indications that the philosophies that guided initial settlement
and development may carry serious consequences.
The Progressive conservation movement and the implications of that
movement for the Northwest.
The governance systems by which the Basin‟s resources were being
managed as of 1929.A short chapter summary.

Native Social Structure and the Tribal Worldview
The Columbia region‟s temperate climate, abundance of water, and plentiful
food sources resulted in a large variety of early native tribal bands and cultures in the
Pacific Northwest. Ruby and Brown (1992) identified fifteen “language families”
comprised of 115 native Indian tribes that lived in the present states of Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana by the early 1800s. Of these, five language families
dispersed among thirty-eight tribes lived in the Columbia and Snake River basins.40
40

Information on the number of historic tribes and language families is taken from the maps in Ruby
and Brown (1992), pages 116-124. The authors note that this information is based on the best available
information, but may not be complete. They also do not identify the time periods over which the tribes
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Indian social systems were clan based. Social mores varied. Coastal peoples
were highly individualistic, materialistic, and competitive with a limited concept of
“tribe”” loyalties belonged to the family and village. Inland people were less
materialistic and more likely to identify with tribal allegiances (Johansen, 1967).
Indian economies were dependent on the wildlife and plants of the surrounding
countryside for food and materials for tools, weapons, and building materials. Wealth
accumulated at the clan level; Indians sought wealth for the power and security of the
clan (as opposed to individuals) and depended on the clan to sustain them through
hard times. Marriage and trade brought wealth to the clan while gift giving circulated
it within the clan. In addition to the practical effect of distributing food and other
items throughout the community, gift giving enhanced individual prestige and
influence (Johansen, 1967; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich,
McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).
Underlying all of the various tribes was a shared worldview grounded in
cultural values of respect and commitment to the community, connectedness with the
natural world, humility, and the need to consider the impact of one‟s actions today on
those that will live seven generations hence (Trosper, 1995; Taylor, 1999;
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006). This worldview led to
complex social and ethical arrangements that prescribed how humans should interact
with the world around them. Tribal culture grounded natural resource use in a

they identify existed, and the assertion that the number of tribes identified was as of the early 1800s is
based on the authors‟ reference citations. The authors note that many of the tribes they identify no
longer exist and it is unknown how many others disappeared and whose histories are lost.

91

spiritual basis that recognized the “inexorable linkage between salmon, humans, and
the world” (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006, p. 32).
Tribal stories and legends in which landforms, fish, and animals routinely interact with
Indian peoples and occasionally change from one form to another illustrate this
“inexorable linkage” (Clark, 1953). Within this general conceptual framework, each
tribe prided itself on its own distinct traditions and orally passed them from generation
to generation (Clark, 1953; Wilkinson, 2005).
Central to Northwest tribal economies was the concept of reciprocal exchange as
practiced through the potlatch – although its practice varied between coastal and inland
tribes (Johansen, 1967). The potlatch was a gift giving and barter event that distributed
the clan‟s collective wealth among individuals. It modeled what the Indians observed in
the processes of nature: soil gave seeds the opportunity to produce plants; plants fed the
animals; animals fed other animals; and, in death, the animals fed the soil. It was a natural
cycle in which no element was dominant, not even humans, and in which each element
depended on the others. The etiquette of reciprocal exchange called for a return in equal
or greater measure for gifts received (Trosper, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999).
None of this precluded the use of technology to manage nature‟s resources to
improve tribal life. Indians used fire throughout the Northwest to enhance root
gathering and hunting and weirs, gillnets, seines, dip nets, and spears to enhance the
harvest of fish (White, 1995; Robbins, 1997; Hays, 2000; Taylor, 1999). Salmon was
the “largest single source of protein” (Taylor, 1999, p. 13) for Northwest tribes and
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preservation through drying, smoking, and pemmican-making allowed food to be
stored for winter and transported over extended distances for trade or gift giving.
These technologies, coupled with the stable and healthy populations of tribal
people, posed potentially significant threats to fish runs. Natural calamities caused
periodic food shortages, but tribal tradition and custom provided normative restraints
that prevented human over-use. “Restraint flowed from the concepts and practices of
Oregon country Indians, who filled their world with spirits that demanded respect.
The way they understood this relationship resulted in a series of activities dedicated to
propitiating salmon, and although conservation was not the stated purpose, moderation
of harvests was the effective result” (Taylor, 1999, p. 27). The result was a regime of
natural resource management that sustained tribal society for centuries (Taylor, 1999;
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).
Spanish explorers first arrived along the Northwest coast in the early 1540s.41
They sought new sources of wealth to supplement the treasure taken from the Aztecs
and Incas of Central America (Dodds, 1986). Lyman (1963/1917) and Dodds (1986)
argue that the Spanish maps of the Northwest coast, unlike those drawn of other parts
of the North American coastline, were wildly inaccurate implying little or no inland
exploration. In an oft-repeated story,42 William Lyman (1963/1917) records a legend

41

Dodds (1986) says the first Spanish ships arrived in 1542; Lyman (1963/1917) says 1543. Schafer
(1943/1918) and Johansen (1967) do not specify.
42

This story appears in Clark (1953), Indian Legends of the Pacific Northwest and Judson (1916), Early
Days in Old Oregon. Both cite Lyman (albeit from different editions of his book) and others. Judson
states that a Chinook version of the story was recorded in 1896. Judson and Lyman also relate a story
from a book by Gabriel Franchere, an early settler in Astoria. Franchere tells of meeting an old man in
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told him by an old Clatsop woman. According to Clatsop tribal lore, two white sailors
of unrecorded origin, perhaps shipwrecked or marooned, landed in a small sail boat
about two miles south of the Columbia‟s mouth. One or two local tribes, depending
on the version, either adopted or enslaved them, again depending on the version. One
was apparently a blacksmith, providing the tribes a new and invaluable technology for
tool making and jewelry. Using this story, coupled with other circumstantial evidence
and a healthy dose of speculation, Lyman (1963/1917) concludes that the landing of
the two sailors could have occurred as early as 1725.43 Lyman also argued that this
explains why, as recorded in the journals of Captain James Cook in 1778, the Indians
showed no surprise at Cook‟s weapons or other iron implements.44 Later explorers
engaged in trade with the tribes and, occasionally, violence (Lyman, 1963/1917;
Schafer, 1943/1918; Johansen, 1967). Thus, Northwest Indians may have had up to
250 years of sporadic contact with whites before arrival of the Lewis and Clark
expedition in 1805.
Prior to 1828, the official policy of the American government toward the tribes
was one of “agreements between equals” (Pevar, 2002, p. 6). Congress passed laws

1811 near the Cascades who claimed that his father, a Spaniard, had been wrecked at the river‟s mouth
many years before.
43

Judson (1953) and Lyman relate a story from a book by Gabriel Franchere, an early settler in Astoria.
Franchere tells of meeting an old man in 1811 near the Cascades who claimed that his father, a
Spaniard, had been wrecked at the river‟s mouth many years before. Lyman suggests that the father of
the old man was one of the two found by the Clatsops and uses this in support of his 1725 date of the
landing.
44

Presumably they could have been made aware of European metalwork through contact with earlier
Spanish explorers as well.
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restricting access by whites onto tribal lands, regulated white-Indian trade relations to
ensure fairness to the tribes, and exempted tribes from state trade laws. Although well
intentioned, the states and settlers in general did not respect these laws and they
proved virtually impossible to enforce. Besides, they also stood in direct conflict with
the growing nation‟s westward expansion (Pevar, 2002).
Official policy changed with the election of President Andrew Jackson in
1828. Under Jackson‟s administration, continuing through 1887, removal and
relocation to make way for white settlement became the dominant federal policy
(Pevar, 2002). The General Allotment Act, passed in 1887, further reduced tribal land
holdings. The Act was motivated both by well-meaning reformers who believed tribal
interests were best served by turning Indians into farmers and by white developers and
speculators who coveted Indian land. The Act, applied to about three-fourths of the
nation‟s tribes, provided every member of a reservation tribe a personal allotment of
160 acres (80 acres on some reservations), with reservation land in excess of that
amount declared “surplus” and put up for sale to non-Indians. By the time Congress
repealed the Act in 1934, federal policy had relegated Indians to a state of “coerced
dependency” on the federal government (Pevar, 2002, p. 7).
The beginning of settlement in the Northwest in the early 1800s held dire
consequences for regional tribes. Initially, white dependence on Indians to provide
fish and furs for trade moderated consumption. As the number of white settlers grew
through the mid- to late-1800s, the demand for land and resources increased
exponentially. Concurrently, disease decimated tribal populations. Taylor (1999)
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cites estimates of Oregon Indian populations declining by 95% from 1840 to 1900 as
non-Indians increased from less than 800 in 1840 to over 1.1 million in the same
period. Robbins (1997) relates similar numbers.
Tribal society was under assault from Anglo-American influences other than
disease. Fur trappers introduced alcohol to Northwest tribes in the 1820s and 30s with
devastating results. Burgeoning pride in American nationhood, coupled with
Protestant missionary zeal in the late 1700s, led to national Indian policies intended to
“civilize” Indian tribes and assimilate their people into mainstream American society.
For many, “‟civilize‟ quickly became a near synonym for “Christianize” (Pevar, 2002;
Wilkinson, 2005, p. 33). The goal of the missionaries, often with the best of intentions
and believed in the best interest of the Indians, was in effect to eradicate the tribal
cultural worldview and replace it with white values regarding private property,
agriculture, and religion. Less altruistic trappers and settlers simply took what they
wanted. Violence was sporadic until the Cayuse war of 1847. Unable to effectively
compete militarily with encroaching white settlement, Northwest tribes signed a series
of treaties between 1854 and 1863. These treaties relegated the tribes to designated
reservations, most of which were beyond areas in which white settlers were initially
interested. War erupted again with the Modocs in 1873, the Nez Perce in 1877, and
the Bannacks in 1878. Organized tribal resistance ended by 1880. From then on, the
tribes had little choice but to accept life on the reservations (Lyman, 1963/1917;
Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986; Ruby and Brown, 1981; Wilkinson, 2005).
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Although the treaties and subsequent legislation resulted in the loss of most
Indian lands and relocated the tribes to remote reservations, the Northwest tribes
retained important rights to hunt and fish at their usual and accustomed locations
(Wilkinson, 2005). These treaty rights would come under repeated assault over the
following years by whites seeking additional land and by fishery interests.
Nevertheless, federal courts upheld the treaty promised rights. These court cases
would come to play a significant role in the governance debates in the decades to
come. 45 But by 1929, and despite having been formally recognized as United States
Citizens in 1924, the tribes lost virtually all influence over the management of
Columbian Basin resources – influence they would not begin to regain until the 1970s
(Ruby and Brown, 1981; Pevar, 2002).

European Exploration and Anglo-American Settlement
Whereas early Spanish interest in the Northwest centered on gold to replace
that taken from South and Central America, it was the abundance of furs that sparked
initial settlement (Lyman, 1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986). The
potential value of the Northwest fur trade was in effect discovered by accident.
According to Schafer (1943/1918), the sailors of James Cook‟s 1778 voyage
exchanged “baubles as the sailors cared to part with” with natives for sea otter and

45

The treaty tribes have consistently prevailed in federal court in defending their treaty fishing rights,
and the judicial history of the Pacific Northwest contains numerous milestones in the development of
Indian law. The National Research Council (2004) identifies United States v. Winan (198 U.S. 371),
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1905, as the foundational legal case regarding treaty reserved
fishing rights. Others are discussed later in this report.
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other furs to supplement their clothing and bedding and improve shipboard comfort.
Upon arrival in Canton, China, they were beset by merchants willing to pay “a
hundred dollars” for “[s]kins that did not cost the purchaser sixpence sterling”
(Schafer, 1943/1918, p. 15). As word spread, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal,
Russia, Great Britain, and the United States all sought or claimed rights to the Pacific
Northwest. A growing demand for fur pelts in China and East India and long-standing
interest in finding a northern waterway linking the North American east and west
coasts fueled this international interest.
United States and Great Britain held the strongest claims; those of the others
eventually fell away or were otherwise resolved (Schafer, 1943/1918; Lyman,
1963/191746). The United States based its claim on Robert Gray‟s exploration of the
mouth of the Columbia in 1792 (which gave the river its current name47) and the
Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804-1806. Great Britain rested its claim on the seabased discoveries of Francis Drake, James Cook and George Vancouver and
Alexander Mackenzie‟s overland expedition in 1793. A treaty in 1846, establishing
the current border between the United States and Canada, settled British claim
(Lyman, 1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986).
“Mountain Men” operating as independent trappers (mostly from Kentucky
and Virginia) or as employees of large fur companies followed in the wake of the

46

See Lyman, 163/1917, pp. 157-162 for discussion as to how these various claims were resolved.

47

Gray named the river after his ship, the Columbia Rediviva. See Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman
(1963/1917), Dodds (1986), and just about everyone else who has ever written about the Northwest.
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Mackenzie and Lewis and Clark expeditions. These companies included the British
Hudson‟s Bay Company, first chartered in 1670; the Canadian Northwest Fur
Company, established in 1783; and the American Pacific Fur Company founded by
John J. Astor in 1810. These companies did more than just pursue their business
interests. Their posts and forts established the first systems of white governance in the
region, providing social organizations for defense, trade, food production,
administration of justice, and other regulations over day-to-day life (Lyman,
1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986; Robbins, 1997).
In the 1820s, the Hudson‟s Bay Company (the Company) merged with the
Northwest Fur Company and bought out the American Pacific Fur Company. The fact
that the the Hudson‟s Bay Company almost derailed establishment of a provisional
government in the Oregon Territory demonstrates the Company‟s regional political
power. The policy of the British as implemented through the Company was to “keep
the country a wilderness, to maintain amicable relations with the Indians, and to
depend mainly on the fur trade for the great profits of their enterprise” (Lyman,
1963/1917, p. 162). American interests, in contrast, lie in regional settlement and
development.
The Northwest established its first provisional territorial government in May
1843 when local leaders called a meeting of American and French Canadian settlers to
create a framework of laws and elect officers. The Hudson‟s Bay Company ordered
their employees, which accounted for about half of the delegates selected, to vote
against any such plan. Nevertheless, the proposal to form a provisional government
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passed albeit by a narrow margin. The new government laid the basis for American
settlement and eventual establishment of the Oregon Territory in 1848 (Schafer,
1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967).48
The Oregon Territory of 1848 (see map at Figure P-1) consisted of the current
states of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho and portions of Wyoming and Montana. In
1853 settlements north of the Columbia, located around Puget Sound and along the
Cowlitz River, petitioned Congress to form a new Territory from within the
boundaries of the Oregon Territory. Noting that the current Oregon Territory was too
large to form a single state and stating their frustration at the distance between their
communities and the Territorial capital in Oregon City, proponents argued that
division was inevitable anyway. Presciently identifying the governance conflicts that
were to follow, their petition stated that the residents north and south of the Columbia
“would always rival each other in commercial advantages…” The petitioners
predicted the communities around Puget Sound and those within the Willamette
Valley would always “as they are now and always have been, be actuated by a spirit of
opposition” (Johansen, 1967, p. 248). The bill creating the Washington Territory
passed in 1853 with little opposition. Similar arguments led to further dividing the
Washington Territory to create the Idaho Territory in 1863, followed by the Montana
Territory in 1864 and Wyoming Territory in 1868. Statehood came for Oregon in
48

See Lyman, 1963/1917, pp, 162-169 for a detailed and dramatic account of the proceedings leading
up to this vote and description of the newly formed provisional government. He claims the measure
passed by two votes from over a hundred cast. The veracity of his telling may be suspect, however,
given that he mistakenly reports the year of the provisional government‟s formation as 1841 apparently
confused it with a different meeting that occurred in that earlier year. Johansen (1967) questions the
closeness of the vote.
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1859, Washington and Montana in 1889, and Idaho in 1890 (Johansen, 1967; Dodds,
1986). With formal government structures in place and treaties signed with the
Indians, migration to the Northwest began in earnest.

Regional Economic Development and the Anglo-American Worldview
White economic and social development flourished just as tribal societies
disintegrated. The economy of the Pacific Northwest developed along five lines of
extractive industries between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries. These
were the fur trading, fishing, mining, forestry, and agriculture (to include farming and
ranching) and their supporting social and institutional infrastructure (Norwood,
c.1981; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999).
Trapping died out as a major commercial enterprise by the 1840s. Fueled by
the trappers‟ stories, promises of free land, and discovery of gold in California in 1848
and in Oregon in 1850, the population quickly grew. The rapid influx of settlers and
prospectors created demands for food, land, and timber. The market for increased
food supported development of an extensive salmon fishery in the lower Columbia
River and farms and ranches throughout the region. Canning technology provided the
means to preserve food economically transport it over long distances supported the
growth in food production. Farm land in the water-rich area west of the Cascades,
particularly in the fertile Willamette Valley, was developed first and was fully claimed
by the 1850s. Timber harvest from the forests of the Northwest and northern
California, made efficient through the use of the steam engine, fed the need for
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building material for mines, and towns (especially San Francisco) (Smith, 1950;
Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).
The railroads arrived in the 1870s, connecting the resources of the Northwest
to growing demand from the nation in general and the meteoric growth and
development in California in particular. With the arrival of the railroads, the period
1870 – 1914 saw an expansion of cattle and sheep ranching and the growth of dry land
farming east of the Cascades in Oregon and Washington and in southern Idaho.
A belief in market capitalism and divine support for the American political
system grounded the general social values of the Euro-American settlers. These
values held nature as a warehouse of natural goods provided by Providence for human
enrichment (Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams,
2006). These values epitomized the Judeo-Christian belief in human dominance over
nature (Kline, 2000) and the accumulation of individual wealth as a divinely endorsed
moral good (Weber, 2002/1920). They were coupled with uniquely American
concepts of private property in general and land ownership in particular as guarantors
of social equity, individual wealth creation, and democratic government. These
concepts were combined with a belief that divine providence preordained an American
empire from coast to coast (Smith, 1950).
In addition, those arriving in the Pacific Northwest, having survived the
arduous cross-country journey, brought with them an enormous sense of selfconfidence. New settlers poured into the region, especially following the Indian
treaties. Most came from the Midwest, descended from British stock and already
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American by several generations. They were conservative, ambitious, and strongly
believed in the west as a mythical garden awaiting the plow and settlement. They saw
the land of the West as an opportunity for a better life and for the growth of American
republican virtue. Thus, they added to an already American value of economic
prosperity through capitalist enterprise and the belief that settlement of the west was
part of God‟s divine plan (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986).
These philosophical predispositions were coupled with the seemingly limitless
natural resources of the North American continent. Writing with regard to timber,
Jenks Cameron (1928) argues that a “legend of inexhaustibility” evolved beginning
with the earliest reports from European New World explorers. The perception of
inexhaustibility applied to fisheries (Weber, 2002; Cart, 2004) and game (Cameron,
1929) as well. Estimates of annual salmon and steelhead returns to the Columbia
River Estuary are as high as 16 million (National Research Council, 2004). With
regard to game, Cameron (1929) wrote that the abundance of birds and wildlife
…bred in the early American settler a fixed idea and a trait. The fixed idea
was a conviction that any such thing as the extermination of game was
impossible. The trait was a prodigal disregard for not merely game but
wildlife of all sorts comparable to the solicitude which the boy with a stick in
his hands feels for the weeds by the wayside. And both the trait and the idea
were transmitted to the early settler‟s children and to his children‟s children.
And along with them were transmitted the fierce conviction that a free-born
American had the right to bear arms, and to „gun‟ pretty much where, when,
and how he pleased (Cameron, 1929, p. 5).
The national belief in markets and individual liberty, an assumption of resource
inexhaustibility, and dubious assumptions about water availability led to federal
policies on western settlement, agriculture, mining, grazing, water, and timber
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intended to encourage passage of western public lands into private hands with little
regard for consequences (Wilkinson, 1992; Reisner, 1993). As settlement progressed,
the newcomers began to call for the institutional infrastructure needed support their
ambitions.

Regional Institutional Development
America as a whole in the late 1800s was largely a country of “island
communities” - small towns separated by miles of rural land. Most people‟s concept
of the nation was limited to their immediate and surrounding communities (Wiebe,
1967). Drawn by the region‟s abundance and the land and wealth promised by
national policy, people and business enterprises established isolated, independent, and
relatively self-contained communities built around mining, farming, ranching, fishing,
and timber throughout the Northwest (Robbins, 1997, Vogel, 2007). Seattle,
Washington (timber); Bend, Oregon (timber); Astoria, Oregon (initially a fur-trading
outpost; later fishing); Wenatchee, Washington (initially a fur-trading outpost; later
agriculture) and Kellogg, Idaho (mining) provide examples of these early communities
and the resources around which they were built.
Isolation and independence also occurred in the administrative framework for
oversight of federal and state statutes and policies. Responsibility for policy oversight
and implementation was assigned to specific government agencies, such as the Corps
of Engineers for waterway navigation and flood control; the Bureau of Reclamation
for irrigation; the U.S. Forest Service and General Land Office for timber harvest,
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grazing, and mining on and/or distribution of public lands; the Department of
Agriculture for farming; the state fish and wildlife agencies and federal Fish and
Fisheries Commission (later the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine
Fisheries Service) for fishery management (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; McKinley,
1952, Steen, 1976; Shallat, 1994; Cart, 2004; Pisani, 2002; Rowley, 2006 ).
Thus, local communities, private enterprises, and state and federal agencies
evolved together around the region‟s fisheries, water resources, land, farms, ranches,
and timber. The approach and attitudes of the federal agencies were functions of their
origins. The earliest agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers (established
1802), the General Land Office (established 1812), and the Department (later Bureau)
of Indian Affairs (established 1824) had organizational roots and traditions dating
back to the nation‟s colonial period. Congress expected the Corps, GLO, and the
Department of Agriculture (established 1868) to work with private interests to support
and promote development of the nation‟s economy. Later arrivals, such as the
Reclamation Service (later Bureau of Reclamation) (established 1902) and U.S. Forest
Service (established 1905), while grounded in Progressive values of scientific
management, efficiency, and management of public resources for the greatest public
good, were also development oriented albeit with the twin goal of sustainability over
the long term. Each developed close working relationships with the private
constituencies that came to depend on them (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; Steen, 1976;
Shallat, 1994; Pisani, 2002; Rowley, 2006).
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The upshot was that by 1929 the Northwest economy and social system rested
almost entirely upon extraction and development of the region‟s rich natural resources.
Although frequently in conflict over markets and other tangible interests, regional
institutions met with little challenge during their formative years (Dodds, 1986). Later
attempts to provide a more holistic management system, regardless of how well
intentioned, would often be seen as threats to established ways-of-life, entrenched
interests, and agency prerogatives and thus met with deep suspicion. (Ogden, 1949;
Smith, 1950; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992; White,
1995; Robbins, 1997; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).

The remainder of this

section introduces the major institutional actors that would come to play significant
roles in future debates over the Basin‟s governance systems. In addition to the
already-discussed Indian tribes, these include the federal and state agencies and
private enterprises developed around regional land development, water law, river
development, fisheries, and hydroelectric power.
Land use: farming, ranching, and timber.49
Eighteenth and early 19th century policies focused on the sale of public land to
help fund the federal government (Conover, 1923). By the mid 19th century, federal
policies offered both free land ownership to encourage an agricultural life style for
average Americans and generous access for resource extraction to support settlement
and economic development. The Homestead Act of 1862 promised160 acres to
49

Mining was also a major land use activity and a significant factor in regional settlement. However,
the research for this study revealed no involvement by mining interests in any of the proposed or
enacted governance systems identified. Consequently, discussion of mining is limited to its
interconnection with other agencies and land uses.
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anyone willing to claim and work the land; the Hardrock Mining Law of 1872 allowed
free access to public land for extraction of minerals; and state grazing laws permitted
private use of public land free of charge. The stated goal of these policies was to build
a society of small, “yeoman” farmers in the Jeffersonian tradition to avoid the
European practice of an aristocracy of major landowners. The west‟s abundance of
natural resources could support regional settlement, enhance the national economy,
assist in establishing the United States‟ place in international commerce, and offer a
relief valve for potential crowding and social unrest in the east (Smith, 1950;
Wilkinson, 1992; Cortner and Moote, 1999).
The strategy for implementing settlement policy was simple and
straightforward. Adopting laissez faire policies at the state and federal levels, the
government would essentially “open the gates to western public lands, step back, and
allow American ingenuity to take over” (Wilkinson, 1992, p. 18). Federal policy
encouraged the exploitation of resources on public land; federal and state laws
provided incentives for people to move west and codified the practices of those
already there. The two federal agencies charged with implementing these policies
were the General Land Office (GLO) and, later, the Forest Service.
Originally organized under the Department of the Treasury, GLO was moved
to the newly created Department of the Interior in 1849. In effect, GLO served as the
nation‟s real estate agent (Conover, 1923). GLO opened its first office in the Pacific
Northwest in the Oregon Territorial capital, Oregon City, in 1855. Field offices later
opened in Olympia, Seattle, Walla Walla, Yakima, and Spokane in what is now
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Washington and Burns, Lakeview, Roseburg, The Dalles, and Vale in the future state
of Oregon.
GLO‟s already large workload increased with the issuance of railroad grants
between 1851 and 1872, the mission of managing public timber in 1855, the
Homestead Act, and the Hardrock Mining Act. These laws intended settlement to
proceed in an orderly fashion guided by careful surveys. The additional
responsibilities imposed on GLO by these laws did not bring with them new staff, and
the agency felt constantly besieged by more work than it could handle (Conover,
1923). Complaints over the slow processing of claim and requests by the agency
mounted, and settlers, developers, and business interests often moved ahead with their
development plans without formal approval.
The agency compensated for its staff shortages by depending on grant
applicants to provide their own surveys. This often led to fraud, especially with regard
to timber and minerals. Reports to Congress requesting additional funds, larger staffs,
better regulation, and greater authority went largely unheeded (Steen, 1976).50
Much of the abuse on public land involved timber poaching. Progressive
reformers, motivated by the efforts of Franklin Hough, repeatedly tried to establish a
professional forest service to combat the wasteful and damaging practices by timber
companies on public land. Congressman Mark Dunnell of Minnesota tried
unsuccessfully to get such a bill through the Public Lands Committee in the mid
1870s. Private timber interests and their supporters on the committee opposed the bill.
50

For an example, see the report to Congress from the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
1888).
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In frustration, Dunnell slipped a rider for a “forest study” under seed distribution
provision in the Department of Agriculture appropriations bill. Conducted by Hough,
the report proved highly influential. Congress appropriated funds for additional
reports on a case-by-case basis until establishment of a formal Division of Forestry in
Agriculture in 1881 with Hough as its chief. Upon its establishment in 1905 under the
leadership of Gifford Pinchot, the U.S. Forest Service assumed full responsibility for
public forest management (Steen, 1976). Six local district offices (later regions) were
established the same year. District (region) 6 was headquartered in Portland, Oregon.
The federal government owns a large percentage of land within the Northwest,
land now managed by the Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service. 51 The
agencies developed close working relationships with local cattlemen‟s associations,
farm bureaus, and timber companies interested in leasing access for grazing, farming,
and timber harvest on lands under agency management (Conover, 1923; Steen, 1976).
This close relationship with local interests coupled with the shear amount of land
under their control destined both agencies to become significant actors in future
governance activities.
Western water law: the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Prior to the early 1800‟s, east coast states based access to water on a doctrine
of riparian rights and reasonable use. Those holding streamside lands had a right to
draw water for use as long as the use was “reasonable” in relation to other stream
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As of 2007, USFS and BLM owned land constituted 60% of Idaho, 46% of Oregon, 27% of Montana,
and 23% of Washington. Data obtained from http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2007/western-statesdata-public-land.htm.
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users. Although this began to change in the 1820‟s with industrialization in New
England, in general private individuals could own the land along lakes and riverbanks
while the water itself was considered a public resource (Steinberg, 1991; Wilkinson,
1992).
This concept of water use was carried west by the early settlers. It began to
change with the use of water in hydraulic gold mining in California in 1848. The
demands for water at mining sites located far from any water supply resulted in
construction of elaborate systems of canals throughout western mining states.
Predating written law and court decisions, miners developed their own water rules –
which paralleled the rules they developed for mineral extraction. The rule was simple:
“first in time, first in right” or “prior appropriation.” Influenced by the role of gold
mining in the newly admitted state, the Supreme Court of California upheld this
doctrine in 1855 (Wilkinson, 1992).
Newly arriving ranchers and farmers adopted the doctrine of prior
appropriation and incorporated it into state constitutions and statutes throughout the
west. Later developments clarified that, in order to maintain a water right, the user
had to put the water to “beneficial use.” The water had to be diverted from its natural
bed and consumed for specified purposes such as mining, agriculture, municipal or
domestic supply, livestock, or hydropower. Not included were in-stream uses such as
recreational boating, swimming, or fish and wildlife protection. Although some states
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eventually adopted exceptions,52 by 1929 prior appropriations doctrine governed
almost all water use in the West (Wilkinson, 1992).
Prior appropriation doctrine was embedded in the Reclamation Act of 1902,
which – while claiming a water right for the federal government on water on public
lands not already appropriated - prohibited the federal government from interfering
with State and Territorial laws governing control, use, appropriation or distribution of
water (Rowley, 2006). Jurisdiction over water use and allocation was vested in the
state, and not federal, governments. The Northwest states would jealously guard their
prerogatives over water in future governance debates. Local parties quickly contested
any hint of encroachment on local water by federal or other regional entities.
State water law provides rules for water use. Other than the provisions
respecting the doctrine of prior appropriation found in the 1902 Reclamation Act, state
law does not govern the development of water infrastructure. That responsibility
would ultimately fall to the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation.
Early federal development of the Columbia River.
Given the centrality of hydropower to the region‟s economy today, it is worth
noting that electricity was not the first commercial purpose envisioned for the river.
Irrigation water for farms and river transportation to move agricultural and timber
products to market were more pressing needs for early settlers (Ogden, 1949,
Norwood, c.1981).

52

For example, Oregon exempted from appropriation several of its scenic waterfalls in 1915
(Wilkinson, 1992).
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Whereas farms in rain-rich areas west of the Cascades did well, most of the
19th and early 20th century farming efforts east of the mountains failed due to limited
rainfall. The lack of rain, coupled with ever-increasing demand, prompted residents
and political leaders to look to the region‟s major river systems as sources of largescale irrigation. Additionally, monopolistic pricing practices by the railroads caused
inland farmers, organized through the Grange, to promote development of the rivers as
means of cheaper transportation (Ogden, 1949, Norwood, c.1981).
The demand for irrigation and inland navigation were the two primary
motivators for the series of dams and reservoirs that exist today. Private investors or
other local resources developed smaller tributaries and rivers, such as found in the
Klamath and Umatilla basins. However, major projects on the mainstem of the
Columbia River were far too complex and expensive for local developers or the states
(Robbins, 1997) and the cost of mainstem dam construction could not be economically
justified based on irrigation and navigation benefits alone. Eventually, projected
revenue from hydroelectricity provided the economic justification for large-scale dams
that irrigation and navigation improvements alone could not (Ogden, 1949; Norwood,
c.1981).
Early visionaries foresaw a system of dams providing efficient and inexpensive
navigation and irrigation, the cost of which would be subsidized by the sale of
hydroelectricity. Consistent with the Progressive emphasis on the instrumental use
and scientific management of natural resources, proponents of river development
sought to harness the water being “wasted” by allowing it to run to the sea and transfer
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it to equally “wasted” open land lying unused for want of moisture (Robbins, 1997).
Their plan was to turn the unpredictable Columbia into a machine serving commercial
and developmental purposes (White, 1995).
Federal responsibility for irrigation and navigation rested with the U.S.
Reclamation Service (later the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, respectively. The Reclamation Act of 1902 established the Reclamation
Service. Whereas the older Corps of Engineers drew its members from the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, the Reclamation Service was initially staffed from
the U.S. Geological Survey, self taught engineers, and graduates of the many
engineering colleges opening around the country. Progressive values of competence
and scientific management grounded the Reclamation Service. It based career
advancement on merit and demonstrated achievement. By 1926, the government had
authorized twenty-nine federal irrigation projects. Northwest projects included
Minidoka, Idaho (1904), Boise, Idaho (1905), Klamath and Umatilla, Oregon (1905),
Okanogan and Yakima, Washington (1905), King Hill, Idaho (1917), and Owyhee and
Vale, Oregon (1926) (Rowley, 2006). Eventually, the Boise office would be
designated the headquarters for the Service‟s Pacific Northwest Region. Reclamation
project offices established close working relationships with local Grange offices,
irrigation districts, irrigation associations, and other agricultural interests and entities.
The Minidoka project, located on the Snake River, was the first federally
constructed hydroelectric facility built by the Reclamation Service. The Minidoka
project came on line in 1909 (Pisani, 2002; FCRPS, 2003). The 1902 Reclamation
113

Act authorized dams to be outfitted with turbines to generate hydroelectricity in order
to power the pumps that would move reservoir and groundwater to farms. Later, the
Town Sites and Power Development Act of 1906 authorized the Bureau to lease
surplus power with a preference to municipal purposes (Bureau of Reclamation,
2006). Later Bureau irrigation-hydropower dams came on line in the Snake Basin at
the Boise River Diversion project in 1912 and Black Canyon in 1925. The Federal
Columbia Basin Power System All would eventually come to encompass all of these
projects (FCRPS, 2003).
These first dams were single-purpose in that they were oriented primarily on
irrigation; the hydropower plants provided the electricity needed to pump water from
the projects‟ reservoirs to higher elevations. Proposals for multi-purpose water
development were beginning to be made in 1908 but did not gain widespread support
until the broader push for development and promotion of hydroelectric power began
around 1918. The multi-purpose approach ultimately reinforced the notion that the
federal government needed to take the lead on river development due to the
complexity of the issues and the multiple jurisdictions that spanned major watersheds
(Billington et al., 2005).
Federal civil engineering expertise also resided in The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps). Congress provided for the first American military engineers in
1775 on the day before the Battle of Bunker Hill. The Continental Army was heavily
dependent on French trained engineers, as there were few technically trained
Americans. The Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802 formally established what
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the Corps of Engineers. This act also established a military academy focused on the
teaching of civil engineering at West Point, New York (Holt, 1923; Shallat, 1994; U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).
The Corps civil works mission dates to the River and Harbors Act of 1824.
Supporters of the act hoped to create an interconnected series of improved waterways,
canals, and roads to facilitate national defense and promote the commercial
development of the interior.53 However, Congress never fully supported this nationwide vision, electing instead to fund projects on a piecemeal basis in keeping with
local needs and interests (Holt, 1923; Shallat, 1994; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
1998).
In the early 1900s, the Corps officially opposed multi-purpose river
development.54 The Corps position was that development of waterways for navigation
purposes, both to enhance national defense and to facilitate internal growth and
development, was justified under the “general welfare” and “promotion of commerce”
clauses in the Constitution. The constitutional support for other proposed purposes
was, in the Corps‟s view, suspect. Hydropower – even if constitutionally supportable
- was untested in the open market and investing in large dams risked a significant
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The United States had been invaded by Great Britain from Canada, the eastern seaboard (which
resulted in the burning of Washington, DC), and the south at New Orleans during the War of 1812.
Improving inland transportation infrastructure would improve the ability to move troops and military
supplies within the country. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998, pp. 37-39.
54

The Corps‟s “official” position on any given issue at any particular point in time can be hard to
determine. The Corps traditionally operated in a decentralized decision making structure. Thus, despite
“official” positions being often declared by Corps or administration officials, actual practices in local
district offices could be far different. See Shallat (1994), Maas (1974/1951), and/or Ferejohn (1974) for
further discussion.
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waste of public funds should the expected demand never materialize. Furthermore,
river transportation was facing stiff competition from the railroads and diluting river
purposes among other functions could weaken the effort to promote and enhance
navigation. Critics claimed that the Corps‟s arguments had more to do with protecting
the agency‟s dominance over the nation‟s waterways than concern over broader
national interests. Regardless, the Corps found support in the members of their
Congressional oversight committees who did not want their influence eroded or shared
with other committees and agencies holding jurisdiction over other water purposes
(Hays, 1999/1959; Billington et al., 2005; Rowley, 2006; Pope, 2008).
The Corps would hold to its single-purpose perspective until forced to
incorporate flood control due to a series of devastating floods in the early 1900s and
the abject failure of its policy of relying on levees for protection during floods on the
Lower Mississippi in 1927. The final shift away from its single-use philosophy
occurred when the 1925 and 1927 River and Harbors Acts called on the Corps to study
opportunities for multiple uses, to include flood control and hydropower development,
on the nation‟s major rivers (Billington, et al. 2006).
The Corps‟s first improvements in the Columbia River began in 1868. It
opened an office in Portland (later the Portland District headquarters) in 1871 and
another in Seattle in 1896. These offices were organized under the North Pacific
Division established in 1901, originally located in San Francisco. The division
headquarters office would alternate between San Francisco and Portland until finally
settling in Portland in 1931 (Scheufele, 1969).
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Like the General Land Office, Forest Service, and Bureau of Reclamation the
Corps established close ties with the local business and trade associations built around
their activities. Steam ship companies and coastal fishing communities depended on
navigation improvements in order to carry out their business. Given their respective
places in the regional economy and their jurisdictional responsibilities on the
Columbia, both the Bureau of Reclamation and Corps would become major players in
future governance debates. Their projects would be at the center of the future
controversy between river development and the region‟s salmon fishery.
The Columbia River salmon and steelhead fisheries.
The seemingly limitless bounty of Pacific Northwest fish attracted a robust
fishing industry, especially with the advent of canning technology. The tribes, of
course, had fished the river and its tributaries for centuries. Tribal fishers also
provided all of the settlers‟ fish needs until a few white entrepreneurs began fishing
commercially in 1850. In 1861, the Territory of Washington granted two white men
exclusive gill net fishing rights in the lower Columbia. This seemingly simple act
symbolized the beginning of conflict among tribal and state fishery managers and a
profound transition from a fishery focused on regional subsistence to an integral part
of a capitalism-driven market. Industrial-scale fishing arrived in 1866 along with the
first cannery. By 1887, 39 canneries packed 42 million pounds of salmon per year
(Taylor, 1999).
The first hatchery was built in 1877 and was soon followed by others.
However, hatchery production could not keep pace with the loss of habitat upriver due
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to mining, timber, agriculture, and other development and ever-increasing harvest
levels by an essentially unregulated fishery. The fish also suffered severe natural
setbacks between the early 1860s and late 1890s from periodic redds-scouring floods
and stream-drying drought. The combination of upriver habitat degradation, over
harvest, and natural occurrences caused Columbia salmon runs to crash in the 1890s
with some predicting imminent extinction. The decline in the numbers of fish and
subsequent consolidation of the market drove many commercial fishermen out of the
market and closed a number of canneries. Control of the market soon shifted from the
Columbia to Alaska. The Columbia market rebounded briefly with an increased
military demand for food in the mid 1910s during World War I, largely met with
increased hatchery production, but it declined again soon after the War‟s end. It
eventually stabilized, largely dependent on hatchery-produced fish. An entire
institution evolved around the science of artificial propagation of fish for the purposes
of food production. Despite the hatchery effort, the fishery never regained the size it
enjoyed in its early heyday (Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).
The formation of a federal fisheries service was almost single handedly
accomplished by Spencer Fullerton Baird. Baird sent a letter to Congress laying out
his proposal for a federal fish commission. He recommended, “…careful, scientific
research be entered upon, for the purpose of determining what should really be done.”
The federal fish commissioner‟s duties included conducting such investigations and
“…perhaps, after conferences with the Fish Commissioners of the several states,
advise what action, if any, should be taken by the General Government alone or in
118

conjunction with the states…” (Baird, quoted in Cart, 2004, p. 4). Congress
forwarded a joint resolution establishing the U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission to
President Ulysses Grant who signed it on February 9, 1871. Grant appointed Baird as
Commissioner. The Fish Commission, located under the Department of Treasury, had
three duties:
Research oriented to preserving the commercial fishery.
Research into fish culture and artificial propagation.
Compilation of statistics and evaluation of the efficacy of fishing
methods.
The goal of Fish Commission research was production of fish as a marketable
commodity. Consequently, close ties developed between Baird and his subordinates
and promoters of hatcheries intended to increase sport and commercial harvest. The
stated goal of the fish culture research was to “make fish so abundant that they can be
caught without restriction” (Cart, 2004, p. 6.).
Although it opened investigations into the Alaska salmon fishery around 1890,
the Fish Commission‟s presence in the Northwest was initially limited. In 1903, the
Fish Commission lost its status as an independent agency when it was transferred to
the Department of Commerce and Labor and renamed the Bureau of Fisheries. The
Bureau opened a small office in Seattle in 1914 as the center for the Bureau of
Fisheries Pacific operations. In 1921, at the request of and in conjunction with the
Oregon Fish Commission, it initiated a study on Columbia River salmon. Although it
would push for regulation when needed, particularly with regard to salmon
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exploitation in Alaska, the Bureau of Fisheries in general cultivated close working
relationships with state fishery and hatchery managers (Cart, 2004).
Already stressed by overfishing and habitat loss, the Columbia salmon runs
now faced a new threat – the construction of dams in the Columbia mainstem.
Hydropower: the public – private power debate.
No issue of the early 1900s arguably held greater implications for the future of
the Columbia River than the debate over whether electrical generation and
transmission should be a public or private enterprise. Nationally, a backlash to the
electricity monopoly exercised by major trust and holding companies grew along with
the public‟s increasing concern over corporate power and other social inequities.
Private utilities and holding companies viewed electricity as a commodity
whose price and availability should be determined by the open market. Critics
contended that the electrical market was hardly “open.” By 1912, ten holding
companies owned 60% of the nation‟s hydropower with local monopolies setting rates
with limited, if any, competition or regulation. Private power interests dominated the
policy arena in the 1920s, supported by Republican majorities in Congress and an
administration generally hostile to public utility ownership and anti-monopoly
policies. As a result, there were few regulatory constraints and low permitting fees.
As a result, private waterpower development boomed until passage of the Water
Power Act in 1920 (Blumm, 1982).
Electricity became a political issue due to the growing recognition of its
potential to affect peoples‟ lives. Despite arguments that large companies would
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ensure low rates through economies of scale, greed and questionable business
practices often resulted in the opposite. Technology advances in communications and
transportation at the turn of the 20th century resulted in a nationwide transformation of
American business from predominately small, locally owned enterprises to
nationwide, multi-unit corporations. The complicated ownership structure of holding
companies that spanned multiple jurisdictions often rendered local regulation
meaningless. Frequently, company executives either bribed or ignored local
regulators. Monopoly power allowed companies to set prices without fear of
competition and to avoid expanding electrical service to areas deemed unprofitable,
such as rural communities (Ogden, 1949; Blumm, 1982; Brigham, 1998).
Private power advocates argued it inappropriate for the the government to be
involved in power production, transmission, or distribution. They pointed out that the
very existence of electrical power was the product of entrepreneurial experimentation
and innovation by private inventors such as Thomas Edison. In the late 1800s and
early 1900s, private power supporters heralded such individual examples as classic
success stories of American capitalism. They viewed public ownership as
“socialistic” and equated it to the confiscation of private property in order to place it
under “political management” (Brigham, 1998, pp. 108-109). Private power
supporters defended the consolidation of locally owned utilities into large holding
companies and interlocking corporations as an essential evolution necessary to ensure
economies of scale and low rates. As pressure for public ownership grew, privately
owned businesses and utilities reluctantly agreed to support locally regulated
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monopolies in order to protect investments and guarantee some level of return (Ogden,
1949; Brigham, 1998).
Conversely, Progressives and public power advocates viewed electricity as a
powerful social force that could raise the standard of living for everyone if made
affordable. They did not, however, speak with one voice. Those advocating outright
government ownership and operation of energy facilities and those who sought a
balance between the extremes of unconstrained markets and socialism split the
movement. Moderate Progressives argued less for government ownership and more
for regulation of private utilities, the use of cost-based pricing as a “yardstick” against
which to measure private rates, and “postage stamp” pricing that guaranteed customers
of similar service would pay the same rate regardless of location (Ogden, 1949;
McKinley, 1952; Brigham, 1998).
Public power had numerous successes at the local level, with municipally
owned utilities emerging in urban areas and energy cooperatives in rural areas,
especially in Washington. State measures were passed in California in 1913; Arizona,
Nebraska, and Montana in 1915; and several other western states between 1927 and
1930 (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Brigham, 1998). However, success at the local
and state levels did not translate into similar success at the federal level. The Federal
Water Power Act of 1920 affirmed federal jurisdiction over water power sites on
navigable rivers, limited licenses of private facilities to 50 years, affirmed the right of
the federal government to charge for private licenses, established public preference for
the power generated from federal projects, and authorized federal construction of
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hydroelectric projects as recommended by the Federal Power Commission. But
congressional support for federal licensing of hydropower projects was limited to
concern that uncontrolled dam building would impede navigation, and did not equate
to support for outright public project ownership (DeLuna, 1997). Although the 1920
Act established a uniform process for licensing private hydroelectric projects, it did
not provide any funds for planning those projects (National Research Council, 1999).
Furthermore, the small government and pro-market/pro-business administrations of
Warren Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover
(1929-1933) preferred that actual development be left in private hands. In their view,
the federal government role was to provide technical support and studies to inform
private entity development (DeLuna, 1997; Blumm, 1982).
The River and Harbor Act of 1925 directed the Corps of Engineers and Federal
Power Commission to estimate the cost for a comprehensive survey to study multiple
use development of the Nation‟s navigable streams, to include hydropower, flood
control, navigation, and irrigation. The Corps replied in 1926 with what became
House Document No. 308. The report identified 180 rivers for study, including the
Columbia. Congress responded with the River and Harbor Act of 1927, authorizing
the Corps to undertake comprehensive surveys and formulate general plans for water
resources development in the nation‟s major watersheds. The Corps responded in turn
with its 308 Report in March 1932. The 308 Report represented the nation‟s first
basin-wide development plan (Ogden, 1949 and 1997; Billington, et al., 2005;
National Research Council, 1999).
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The Hoover administration intended the 308 Report to guide private
investment in water resource development. It was not to turn out that way. The onset
of the Depression and the election of President Franklin Roosevelt shifted the publicprivate power debate decisively in favor of public power advocates. The next chapter
presents the impact of that shift for the Columbia.
Section summary.
By 1929, a large number of the institutional actors that would participate in
future governance activities were well established in the Northwest. These institutions
include the federal and state agencies, private businesses and trade associations, and
political supporters involved with land use, water use, river development, fisheries,
and early hydropower production. Each operated in a relatively autonomous manner
within their respective jurisdictions and often competed with each other for federal
funding, increased jurisdiction, and expanded missions (McKinley, 1952; Clarke and
McCool, 1996). Although their organizational roots originated in different eras of
American history, they all shared a common worldview grounded in market
capitalism.

Early Signs of Stress on Northwest Resources
By the late 1920s, the Pacific Northwest comprised about 9% of the United
States land mass but held only 2.5% of its population. Planners estimated it to hold
40% of the nation‟s timber and 40% of its hydropower potential. The region‟s mines
were leading national producers of copper, silver, lead, and zinc (Bessey, 1963).
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Fertile soil and plentiful water beckoned farmers to the Willamette Valley, and the
promise of irrigation made agriculture and farming viable in the dry areas east of the
Cascades (Bessey, 1963; Taylor, 1999). Pre-development salmon runs have been
estimated by some at between 6.2 and 12 million fish per year (Taylor, 1999;
Williams, 2006) with some estimates as high as 16 million (National Research
Council, 1996). Commercial fishermen harvested 20 to 40 million pounds of salmon
between 1875 and the 1920s (Taylor, 1999; Williams, 2006). Given this “unlimited”
bounty, it was extremely difficult to make a compelling case for restraint and
regulation.
Despite the relatively sparse population, negative impacts were beginning to be
felt as early as the late 1800s. The hard winter of 1886-1887 caused a massive die-off
of cattle from starvation. The overstocking of cattle, coupled with several subsequent
years of drought, devastated public grasslands (Wilkinson, 1992). The salmon
fisheries, while strong, were beginning a serious decline due to over harvest and the
destruction of habitat due to mining, timber practices, and the construction of dams in
Columbia tributaries (Bessey, 1963; Taylor, 1999). These declines caused Livingston
Stone, an agent of the U.S. Fish Commission in the Northwest, to call for a national
salmon park in 1892 to protect declining wild runs from the impacts of development
(Cone and Ridlington, 1996, pp. 332-334).
The effects of over grazing and fishery declines were the first indicators that
the region‟s rapid and virtually unconstrained economic development could have
significant long-term consequences. New political and social forces were emerging
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that would challenge the underlying premises upon which the region‟s institutional
arrangements were based.

The Progressive Conservation Movement
Unlike the east, where the Progressive movement carried strong support from
the population, Progressive reforms in the Northwest were more the work of
legislatures, political parties, and party leaders. More interested in visibility at the
national level, regional leaders enacted reforms for which the population often seemed
ambivalent, at best. Progressive reformers constantly struggled against the more
conservative strain of the Northwest population (Johansen, 1967).
More relevant to the Northwest was the Progressive Movement‟s strong
resource conservationist members. There were motivated by disgust at over-harvest of
timber, over-grazing of grassland, soil depletion through poor agricultural practices,
degradation of public lands due to mining, and water pollution due to factory waste.
For the public as a whole, the concern was less about environmental degradation than
the unfair advantage and heavy-handed tactics exercised by large businesses (Wiebe,
1967; Cortner & Moote 1999).
Viewing natural resources as an interconnected ecosystem was in its earliest
stages in the latter 1800s. John Perkins Marsh, largely credited with being the first to
record the impacts of development on natural processes, first published his
observations in 1864 (Marsh, 1965/1864; Dunlap, 2004). Two philosophical
conservation perspectives emerged to challenge the prevailing view of nature as an
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inexhaustible warehouse of marketable commodities, both of which had their origins
in the observations of Marsh. The “conservation” perspective was personified by
Gifford Pinchot for public land, C. Hart Merriam for wildlife, and Spencer Fullerton
Baird for marine fisheries. “Conservation,” as used in the context of the time, called
for management of natural resources in a way that ensured their long-term availability
for utilization. Under this view, failure to develop and use existing resources was
considered as wasteful as depleting them to a point where they could not be recovered.
A letter from James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, provided initial guidance
to Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the just-established Forest Service, and concisely
captured the Progressive conservation philosophy regarding natural resources.
Although written specifically for the newly established Forest Service (and written by
Pinchot for Wilson‟s signature55), the letter articulates the Progressive philosophy.
Public land was to be “devoted to its most productive use” for “the permanent good of
the whole people” as opposed to individuals or private companies. Water, wood, and
forage are to be “conserved and wisely used” to ensure “permanent and accessible
supply” in support the “continued prosperity of agricultural, lumbering, mining, and
livestock interests.” The letter directed that the new agency professionally manage its
assigned resources under “businesslike regulations” “under the eye of thoroughly
trained and competent inspectors” (Wilson, 1905).
As such, Progressive philosophy did not repudiate the concepts of private
markets and commercial utilization of natural resources. Instead, it introduced a new
55

For detailed discussion of the origin, significance, and far-ranging influence of the “Pinchot Letter,”
see Wilkinson (1992) pp. 127-130 and Steen (1976) p. 75.
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role for government. Professionally trained, apolitical civil servants would apply
scientific management principles to regulate against the excesses of the market. New
federal agencies established in part to curb the power and excesses of corporations on
public land through competent government stewardship (Wilson, February 1, 1905;
Wiebe, 1967; Steen, 1976; Wilkinson, 1992; Billington, et al., 2005).
The second perspective that emerged to challenge the market model placed an
inherent aesthetic value on natural resources independent from their economic value.
John Muir personified this “preservationist” perspective. Muir argued that the
wilderness had an intrinsic worth all its own that was worth preserving in its natural
state. Both the conservation and preservation movements established initial
beachheads into corporate and private exploitation of public land due in no small part
to the passion and energies of Pinchot, Merriam, Baird, and Muir and their support by
President Theodore Roosevelt.
The conservation perspective found expression through laws and policies
governing the use of wildlife, fisheries, forests and water under federal jurisdiction
and institutionalized through establishment of federal agencies such as the Bureau of
Biological Survey, U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission, Forest Service, and Bureau of
Reclamation. Establishment of the state and national park systems, starting with
Yosemite and Yellowstone, and creation of the National Park Service implemented the
preservation perspective (Cameron, 1929; Steen, 1976; Cortner & Moote, 1992;
Clarke and McCool, 1996; Cart, 2004; Dunlap, 2004). All of these agencies or their
successors would come to play dominant roles in future Basin governance systems.
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Opposition to the Progressive conservation and preservation movements came
mostly from westerners opposed to eastern-based interference with their prerogatives.
They saw hypocrisy from those preaching conservation principles that were too late to
implement in the already largely developed east (Steen, 1976) and a complete lack of
understanding by easterners of the challenges and hardships of settling the often brutal
conditions in the west (Wilkinson, 1992). Corporate interests used to all but
unrestricted access to the resources on public land were equally opposed to both
movements (Hays, 1999/1959; Wilkinson, 1992).
Despite the opposition from the west and large corporate interests, the
administration of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive conservationists in
government and in Congress successfully led and shaped the formal government
conservation and preservation policies of the era. The American public generally
supported these efforts, but not because of any affinity for environmental protection.
The direct experience of many nineteenth century Americans with nature presented
personal challenges and outright threats, especially in the west. Struggling against
harsh weather, floods, drought, predators, insects, and rodents they carved an oftenprecarious livelihood on small farms, ranches, mills, and homesteads (Cameron, 1929;
Wiebe, 1967; Wilkinson, 1992; Robbins, 1997). Often the actions and practices of
legions of individual homesteaders, prospectors, and ranchers resulted in
environmental consequences as severe as those of the industrialized giants (Hays,
1999/1959). Given the prevailing “legend of inexhaustibility,” many simply would
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not have believed that any restrictions on the pursuit of personal economic
advancement were necessary.
Attitudes shaped by a strong protestant ethic of individual work and distrustful
of the apparently unearned wealth, power, and corruption of large corporate entities
underscored public support for the Progressive cause. Values and lifestyles developed
in isolated small-towns and centered on natural resource extraction, agriculture, and
local factory working conditions left most Americans wary of monopolies, rising
waves of immigration, land speculators, and wealthy land-grabbers (Wiebe, 1967).
Progressive conservationism thus found public traction not because of any deep-seated
public belief in environmental values, but because of deep-seated skepticism over the
motives of moneyed interests (Cortner and Moote, 1992). The result was a partial but
significant shift in power from large corporate trusts and the market to the federal
government as exercised through public agencies over public resources (Hays,
1999/1959).

Regional Governance Systems up to 1929:
Regional natural resource governance up through the 1920s consisted of
private enterprises working in concert with supportive and relatively autonomous
federal agencies responsible for specific resource domains, constrained only by the
authorities and funds provided by Congress. Laissez faire policies left development to
the market and individual ingenuity and many in the Northwest felt that minimum or
no government equated to good governance. In addition, many had little patience with
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anyone, government or otherwise, interfering with their affairs or their rights to
resources (Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992). For example, Gifford Pinchot, then head
of the U.S. Forest Service, imposed a modest grazing fee on ranchers in 1906 to
attempt some control over the overstocking that led to the cattle disaster in the late
1880s. His effort outraged ranchers who had grown used to free grazing on public
land with no government oversight or controls. They pilloried him in the western
press as a “dictator and carpet bagger” (Wilkinson, 1992).
Progressives made some inroads in the laissez faire environment of the day by
establishing federal agencies charged with the responsibility to better manage public
resources. These agencies included the Reclamation Service, the Forest Service, the
National Parks Service, and the U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission (later the Bureau
of Fisheries). These new agencies joined those previously established, most notably
for this study, the Corps of Engineers, the General Land Office, the Office of Indian
Affairs, and the Department of Agriculture. Legacy effects from the nation‟s earlier
expansionist period and that era‟s policy emphasis on localism, support for
commercial development, and the transfer of public lands into private hands
established the traditions and cultures of the earlier agencies. Some of these agencies,
like the General Land Office and Office of Indian Affairs, had roots dating back to the
nation‟s colonial period (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; McKinley, 1952; Shallat, 1994;
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998; Pisani, 2002). Regardless of origin, all agencies
developed close ties with regional interests dependent on their respective programs
and services and for whom they had originally been largely established to support.
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Authorizing statutes and assigned jurisdictional oversight of specific policy
domains governed each agency. Agencies exercised decision-making in keeping with
their respective missions and authorizing statutes and regulations. Just as American
society was segmented into island communities at the end of the 19th century (Wiebe,
1967) so too were federal agencies segmented into island communities of policy and
program jurisdiction. Each agency was focused on a constituency that was dependent
on the agency‟s authorities and expertise and supported by constituency-centered
Congressional authorizing and appropriating committees. Political scientists variously
characterize these powerful triads of agency expertise, Congressional support, and
local constituencies as “subgovernments,” “policy whirlpools,” or “iron triangles” due
to their autonomy, strength, and resistance to reform (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961;
Heclo, 1978). But a dramatic alternative to functional-management-by-individualagency was evolving in the East on the Tennessee River.
Muscle Shoals is approximately the midpoint of the 600-mile long Tennessee
River. At this point, the river drops 134 feet over 37 miles creating a series of rapids
and waterfalls that long impeded the use of the river for navigation. The sharp drop in
elevation offered the opportunity for hydropower development and attracted the
attention of private corporations. President Theodore Roosevelt vetoed a bill to allow
the site to be privately developed in 1903. The National Defense Act of 1916
authorized the Corps to construct a dam, nitrate plant, and related temporary steam
generating plant near the site to support the production of munitions for World War I
and eliminate about 15 miles of rapids. The War ended before construction was
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completed, and project funding subsequently slowed. The Corps ultimately completed
the plant and Wilson Dam in 1925 (Norwood, c.1981; Conklin 1983).56
To thwart further private interest in taking over the site, Progressives
introduced a bill in 1922 to create a government corporation to run the nitrate plant
(ultimately retrofitted to produce fertilizer) and to be responsible for future
development. The bill failed. Although the public-private power debate was part of
the Muscle Shoals controversy since 1897 (Conklin, 1983), the 1922 bill made Muscle
Shoals a national focal point. Both President Coolidge in 1928 and President Hoover
in 1931 vetoed subsequent similar bills passed by Congress. The election of President
Franklin Roosevelt removed White House objections. Roosevelt signed the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act into law in 1933 (Norwood, c.1981; Conklin 1983).
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was destined to provide an inspiring
governance model for Northwest Progressives. However, as of 1929, management of
resources in the Columbia Basin meant governance through private corporations
operating independently on private land or in concert with supportive federal and state
agencies. Private companies and individual federal and state agencies exercised
decision-making in keeping with their individual objectives and priorities. This
combination of the laissez faire doctrine toward private businesses, weak government
regulation, and public agencies exercising “iron triangle”-type functional jurisdiction
over discreet policy domains characterized a market-oriented governance preference.
All involved, whether in the private or public sectors, shared a common worldview
56

Wheeler Dam was subsequently constructed to solve remaining Muscle Shoals navigation issues.
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regarding natural resources. There simply were no voices challenging the “rightness”
of whether the various programs and projects underway or under consideration should
be undertaken.
The sharing of a common worldview did not automatically translate to
cooperation. The division of federal agencies among four cabinet level departments,
the exercise of Congressional prerogatives by oversight committees, and strong
support from agency constituencies often drove agencies to compete rather than
cooperate (McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996). As the government grew in
size and complexity, a growing realization emerged among the major actors that better
coordination and control arrangements were necessary.

Chapter Summary
The situation in the Pacific Northwest stood as follows by 1929:
The earliest regional governance structures consisted of clan-based tribal
societies located on traditional tribal lands (Ruby and Brown, 1992). The
rules and regulations of large fur trading companies governed the earliest
white communities in the late 1700s and early 1800s. These in turn gave
way to provisional governments, followed by establishment of the Oregon
in 1848, later subdivided into the Territories of Oregon, Washington
(1853), Idaho (1864), and Montana (1868). County and municipal
governments were first established under the Territorial governments. The
states of Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Idaho Montana were admitted
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to the Union in 1859, 1889, 1889, and 1890 respectively (Schafer,
1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).
The role of Native American tribes in the development of policy in the
Northwest was dramatically mercurial. The role began with dominance in
the early 1800s but declined to a point of all-but-extinction from the mid
1800s to the mid 1900s. In essence, the tribes were simply not a relevant
voice in the early 1900s (Taylor, 1999; Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).
The West experienced a major demographic shift with the decline of Indian
populations and increase of Anglo-American settlers. The territorial
population was distributed among a few large cities and numerous small
towns. Isolated, “island” communities developed with economies centered
on agriculture, ranching, or resource extraction (Lyman, 1963/1917;
Wiebe, 1967; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992; Taylor, 1999).
National policy up to the 1860s was focused on helping fund the federal
government through sale of public lands to private individuals or interests;
thereafter the policy shifted to the transfer of public lands and resources to
private control through sale, grants, or patents (Conover, 1923; Wilkinson,
1992).
The Protestant-market-capitalism worldview dominated, modified in the
Pacific Northwest by unique attitudes toward western land and a selfconfidence bred by surviving the move westward. Disease, efforts to
civilize their culture, and displacement to reservations all but erased the
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tribal worldview (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986;
Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Hays, 1999/1959; Kline, 2000; Weber,
2002/1920; Wilkinson, 2005; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford,
and Williams, 2006).
The environmentalist worldview was in its infancy and expressed through
the tenets of Progressive conservatism (Kline, 2000; Dunlap, 2004;
Rosenbaum, 2005).
This dominant worldview held by policy makers and administrators
fostered localized decision-making. Communities, private businesses, and
federal agencies exercised a great deal of autonomy in determining what
they were going to do and how they were going to do it. Corporate
interests working alone or in partnership with federal agencies and
appropriate congressional committees provided the governance framework
for natural resource management (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Wilkinson,
1992).
The Northwest was a region rich in natural resources, with a large potential
for timber, agriculture, ranching, fisheries, mineral, irrigation, and
hydropower development. Exploitation of these resources was driven by a
“legend of inexhaustibility,” the lack of effective regulation, and the
opportunities for creation of private wealth. Natural resource development
was largely in the hands of large corporations and holding companies, such
as timber, railroads, and mining interests, supported by federal agencies
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(Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Lyman, 1963/1917; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson,
1992; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss,
Stanford, and Williams, 2006).
Federal agencies developed as policy autonomous “island communities”
with little cross-agency coordination or planning and frequent conflict over
turf and congressional attention (Cameron, 1928; McKinley, 1952; Steen,
1976; Shallat, 1994; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002).
Progressive era ideals of sustainable use and conservation-oriented public
management of public resources for the public good were very much part
of the political debate, but failed to overturn the prevailing belief in private
markets and the laissez faire doctrine of minimum government
involvement in private business activities. The Progressive goal was a
better life for average Americans through planning, scientific management
of natural resources, and provision of electricity through public ownership
or strict regulation of power production (Hays, 1957; Hays, 1990/1959;
McKinley, 1952; Steen, 1976; Norwood, c.1981; Cortner and Moote 1999;
Billington et al., 2005).
Commercial fishing on the Columbia began in 1850, growing to industrial
scale in 1866. The first hatchery was built in 1877. By 1887 the river
housed 39 canneries. Overfishing, habitat degradation, and a series of
naturally occurring floods and drought crashed salmon runs in the 1890s
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(Cone and Ridlington, 1996; National Research Council, 1996; Taylor,
1999).
Any debate over natural resource development was a debate over who
should own, control, or operate natural resource exploitation. There was
no question among the relevant parties as to the rightness of such
exploitation (Cortner and Moote 1999; Pisani, 2002; Billington et al., 2005;
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).
The Corps, acceding to the demand for multiple use waterway
development, was preparing its 308 Report on major rivers, a report that
would assess the feasibility for hydropower, navigation, and irrigation on a
scale not yet seen in the United States (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952;
Norwood, c.1981).
Such was the situation as of 1929. On October 29 of that year the stock market
crashed and dramatically “punctuated the equilibrium” (Gersick, 1991) of private
market dominance through laissez faire and symbolically marked the onset of the
Great Depression. The Depression proved “a major turning point in American history.
It changed the Nation‟s economic beliefs and attitude toward business. It revised
American politics and the Government‟s role. The laissez faire doctrine gave way to
public demands for government action to battle the depression [sic], and the policies
and special interests that contributed to its onset” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 34).
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CHAPTER 4
THE ONSET OF THE DEPRESSION (1929)

Introduction
The onset of the Great Depression presented the first critical situation that
induced changes to prevailing Basin governance systems. It created the conditions for
a dramatic shift away from a model of governance based on private market enterprises
working in concert with supportive federal agencies. Rejecting calls for consolidation
of federal agency missions under an authoritative valley authority, the region adopted
a new model characterized by state-led centralized planning. The onset of the
Depression also resulted in the creation of a model for Basin operations that was
characterized by cooperation among federal agencies.
The catastrophic economic collapse of the Great Depression ushered in a
decade of “persistent, continuing unemployment and unrelenting, grinding poverty”
(Norwood, c.1981, p. 30). Its wide effects significantly undercut the prevailing laissez
faire attitude toward unconstrained free markets and challenged the relatively
autonomous “iron triangle” arrangements among local interests, federal agencies, and
their congressional supporters. It created the conditions under which prevailing
market and agency-centric governance systems could be changed as the public looked
to government to restore the national economy. The changes in governance did not
eliminate the market role in the economy or fundamentally alter federal agency
missions. What changed was the autonomy under which these long-standing
institutions previously operated. Private corporations were subject to greater
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government regulation. Federal agencies in the Columbia Basin were required to be
more collaborative and inclusive in their discretionary decision-making.
In addition to Progressives who believed in a more activist role for government
was an influential group of advocates who embraced the concept of “regionalism.”
Regionalists critically looked at state and federal government structures seeking
criteria other than private markets or jurisdictional boundaries to suggest logical
administrative arrangements.57 The Tennessee Valley Authority exemplified this
thinking. TVA admirers saw the watershed of the Tennessee River as a more efficient
organizational concept than the political boundaries of the states, the market
boundaries of privately incorporated businesses, or the jurisdictional boundaries of
individual federal agencies (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007).
The concept of multi-state regions presented, among other challenges, two
fundamental questions. The first was the structure under which long-range planning
of regional resources was to take place. Regionalists and Progressives believed
planning to be the answer to the resource waste and inefficiency they saw as inherent
in the fractured decision-making processes for land, soil, water, timber, fish, and
timber development as practiced through unrestrained markets and uncoordinated
agencies (Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1952). The second question focused on
operational issues. The desires for rational region-scale planning to guide river
development and other resource use meant determining how responsibilities for
design, construction, and operations of resulting activities that crossed traditional
57

Ogden (1949 and 1997), McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), and Norwood (c.1981) all wrote from a
regionalist perspective.
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agency jurisdictional boundaries were to be allocated (McKinley, 1952; White, 1995;
DeLuna, 1997; Brigham, 1998).
This chapter identifies the Northwest governance systems proposed and
enacted to address these functional questions in the 1930s. It documents the social and
political context from which governance proposals emerged and the key issues in the
Northwest that influenced those proposals. The following four governance proposals
emerged in this period of which two were enacted:
The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC or
Commission), established in 1934 under the National Planning Board
to perform the planning function.
Proposals in 1935 to assign full responsibility for all purposes of the
dams, to include marketing and transmission of electricity, to either the
Corps of Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation (not enacted).
Proposals made later in 1935 for a Columbia Valley Authority modeled
after the Tennessee Valley Authority (not enacted).
Establishment of the five-agency Bonneville Advisory Board under the
Bonneville Project Act of 1937.

Social and Political Context
Franklin Roosevelt achieved a landslide electoral victory in 1932, winning 472
electoral votes to Hoover‟s 59. Democratic majorities were swept into Congress.
Democrats won 70% of seats in the House of Representatives and commanded a 22141

seat majority in the Senate (Norwood, c.1981). The Depression provided a catalytic
opportunity for a more robust government role in the economy, marking “the final,
inevitable collapse of an economy that had been beset for at least fifty years by
overproduction and an excess of competition” (Kennedy, 2009, p. 261).
The Depression presented a critical situation that opened opportunities for
change beyond regional governance systems. It also enabled responses to other
demands that had gained momentum in American society (Norwood, c.1981). The
1932 election was a clear public mandate to get the economy back on track. It was
also a mandate that was far more sensitive to Progressive ideals than its predecessor
and far more activist in pushing for both regulation and, in some limited cases, direct
government involvement in areas previously relegated to private markets (Norwood,
c.1981; Kennedy, 2009). Kennedy (2009) argued that the New Deal crowded more
social and institutional change into American society than at any comparable period of
time in its history, addressing issues such as social security for the elderly, the
financial desperation of small farmers (especially in the Midwest), health, and
housing.58 Although many of Roosevelt‟s specific organizational experiments did not
last long, the New Deal succeeded in creating a set of institutional arrangements
establishing unprecedented economic security for average citizens.
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One could argue that the periods of the Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction brought far greater
change given the abolition of slavery, the economic destruction and eventual recovery of the South, the
growth in power assumed by the federal government at the expense of the states, the emergence of
transportation and communications technologies, and the beginnings of national industrialization, all of
which presented major challenges to the traditional foundations of American society. See Hays 1957;
Wiebe, 1967; and Hays, 1999/1959.
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The New Deal brought dramatic reversals to private power interests. Building
on previous success at the state and local levels, public power advocates effectively
swept the national policy field in the early 1930s. With the support of President
Roosevelt and the congressional Democratic majorities, they were able to enact
legislation strongly regulating corporately owned activities and played a strong role in
passage of the Bonneville Project Act in 1937 (Hays, 1959/1999; Bessey, 1963;
Norwood, c.1981; Kennedy, 2009).
The New Deal created the belief in the minds of the American public that the
government had a major responsibility to ensure national economic health and citizen
welfare. This represented a major shift away from the laissez faire period that
preceded it. This shift notwithstanding, the New Deal did not challenge the
fundamental tenant of capitalism – the private ownership of production – and left the
nation‟s dominant market-capitalist worldview intact, if badly tarnished (Kennedy
(2009).
Kennedy additionally claimed that, excepting the Tennessee Valley Authority,
“no significant state-owned enterprises emerged in New Deal America” (Kennedy,
2009, p. 253). Whereas this generalization may be true on the national scale, it
overlooks the significant regional impacts that the New Deal had on the Northwest.
These impacts include the conceptualization of the Northwest as an administrative
entity oriented on the Columbia River (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007), establishment of
the Bonneville Power Administration, and expansion of the roles that the Corps of
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Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation were to play in the Columbia Basin following
federal dam construction (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1980).
The period also opened opportunities for major changes within the federal
bureaucracy. New agencies were created, such as the Public Works Administration
and its associated national planning committee,59 the Soil Erosion Service (later the
Soil Conservation Service), and the U.S. Grazing Service. Others were reorganized.
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, pursuing his vision of consolidating all natural
resource agencies into the Department of Interior, successfully acquired the Bureau of
Biological Survey from the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries
from the Department of Commerce in 1939. These were subsequently combined to
create the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940 (Clarke and McCool, 1996; Weber,
2002). Ickes also tried to acquire the U.S. Forest Service and the civil works function
of the Corps of Engineers. He failed in both due to those agencies‟ strong support
from their respective Congressional oversight committees and local constituents
(McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996) demonstrating that “iron triangle” type
arrangements were still very much in play with some agencies.60,61
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This “central planning committee” underwent several organizational changes between 1933 and
1943. It operated as the National Planning Board from 1933-1934; the National Resources Board from
1934-1935; the National Resources Committee from 1935-1939, and the National Resources Planning
Board from 1939-1943. See Bessey, 1963, pp. 48-52. This report uses the generic phrase “central
planning committee” to minimize confusion.
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Ickes frustration at being unable to overcome the bureaucratic and political power of the Corps and
Forest Service resulted in frequent invective against both agencies, invectives that were subsequently
cited in periodic calls for agency reform. For the Corps, see Ickes‟ introduction to Arthur Maas
(1974/1951) Muddy Waters, in which he describes the Corps as “lawless and irresponsible” and
Reisner‟s subsequent reference to those comments in Cadillac Desert (1993). For the Forest Service,
see Fromes‟s The Forest Service (1971) where he quotes Ickes as characterizing the Service as a
“bureaucracy run wild.”
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Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest
Two overriding policy issues influenced Pacific Northwest governance during
this period. The top national and regional priority, up until the United States‟ entry
into World War II in 1941, was economic restoration. New Deal programs addressed
the economic challenge through tighter regulation of markets, central planning, and
public works projects. Complementing the belief in planning and public works were
completion of the Corps 308 Report in 1932 and construction of the massive
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams across the Columbia. The emphasis on economic
restoration provided the backdrop for the governance proposals put forth during this
period. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the emphasis shifted to winning
World War II, an emphasis that finally achieved the economic recovery sought under
the New Deal.62 The need for electrical power to support the Northwest industries
engaged in the production of war materials forced an unprecedented level of
operational cooperation among the newly created Bonneville Power Administration,
Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation and tested the collaborative
governance arrangement between them called for in the 1937 Bonneville Project Act.
Economic development through centralized planning.
Bessey (1963) traces the roots of the Northwest‟s regional planning to the
watershed management philosophy of John Wesley Powell in the late 19th century and
61

See McKinley, 1952, pp. 411- 423.

62

Kennedy (2009) argued that it took the mobilization for World War II to create a context that
permitted levels of deficit spending that finally restored the economy. He further argued that such
deficit levels were “intellectually inconceivable” and politically impossible in the 1930s despite the
widespread unemployment and economic misery.
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the progressive conservation philosophy of the Theodore Roosevelt administration in
the early 20th century. Progressive goals were to be achieved through integrated
planning on a watershed scale to optimize use of all natural resources, especially
water. Advocates called for nationally coordinated planning commissions to design a
“rational distribution” of goods and services that would not be “hamstrung” by
interstate differences (Mumford, 1939). In the Northwest, the states of Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana were interested in finding ways to leverage federal
dollars for river development projects too expensive for state funding alone (Vogel,
2007).
Prior to the Depression, critics of government led planning undercut public
support by successfully associating it with rising totalitarian regimes in Japan, Italy,
and Germany following the First World War and the centralized five-year plans of the
communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
The onset of the Depression pushed those fears aside. The public demand for
economic relief engendered support for federal leadership and planning that, while
stopping short of the scope of the regimes rising in Europe and Asia, were far more
extensive than previously undertaken. The National Industrial Recovery Act put forth
a national blueprint for recovery in 1933. The Act created the Public Works
Administration (PWA), which in turn established its central planning committee.
Private sector advisors dominated this committee, supported by federally funded staff.
The central planning committee shared the belief that successful planning rested on
local and state initiative and that effective planning at those levels was essential to the
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national planning program. Consequently, the committee established and supported
state and local planning boards with technical assistance and funding. Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana organized state planning boards between 1933 and
1934. County, area, and city planning boards were established as well (Bessey, 1963;
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).
In addition to the state-level boards, the committee identified a need for two
interstate regional planning commissions, one in New England and the other in the
Pacific Northwest. The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC
or Commission) was subsequently established in 1934. The Commission would come
to play a major role in shaping both the form and nature of future regional governance
systems (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; Vogel, 2007). It also
solidified the concept of the Northwest as a unified region defined by the Columbia
River (Vogel, 2007).
The 308 Report.
The Corps produced its long awaited 308 Report for the Columbia River and
its tributaries in 1932. Elwood Mead, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Army‟s Chief of Engineers Major General Lytle Brown jointly endorsed the
report. In a letter of transmittal63 forwarding the report to the Secretary of War on
March 29, Mead and Brown identified ten locations in the Columbia Basin
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The Corps provided the Bureau of Reclamation the opportunity to review and comment on the final
report. Commissioner Mead provided General Brown with a letter generally concurring with the report,
the only exception being its treatment of irrigation as discussed below. General Brown incorporated
Commissioner Mead‟s letter into his own when forwarding the report to the Secretary of War.
Consequently, the two letters are referenced here as one.
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recommended by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors as the most
promising for waterpower facilities and, more important, provided economic
justification for their construction. The report characterized the Columbia River and
its tributaries as “susceptible of being developed into the greatest system for water
power anywhere in the United States.” The envisioned series of dams would provide
an estimated eight million kilowatts of installed hydro electricity. The report warned,
however, that power development should be done “in such increments as not to outrun
the demands of the market” and called for “close coordination of the entire power
industry in the region” to guard against over production (Mead and Brown, 1932,
March 29). The Government Printing Office subsequently published the Columbia
River portion of the report in 1934 under the title Columbia River and Minor
Tributaries (Ogden, 1997).
The report offered the opportunity for long sought after low-cost, high-volume
barge navigation from Bonneville Dam to the mouth of the Snake River. It claimed
that the “potential navigation on the middle section is of such value” as to “warrant the
assumption by the Federal Government of the entire cost of the necessary locks and
channel enlargement” provided they be constructed as an integrated part of each
hydropower project. By integrating a series of locks at the hydroelectric dams, the
report estimated a total of 600,000 tons of freight at a savings of over one million
dollars per year (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29).
The report noted the problem of flooding in the lower Columbia and stated that
the projects may be able to provide some incidental flood protection. Consistent with
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the still-lingering attitude within the Corps that flood control was a local or state
responsibility, the 308 Report identified this purpose as a “minor interest” best solved
“by local interests whenever the economics of the situation justify the building of
better levees”64 (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29; Ogden, 1949).
The 308 Report‟s recommendations on irrigation were somewhat ambivalent.
General Brown‟s portion of the transmittal letter noted that there were about two
million acres along the United States‟ portion of the Columbia that were susceptible to
irrigation. But the Corps questioned the economic feasibility of irrigating this much
farmland, citing cost and noting concerns by agricultural authorities that such
additional farmland would compete with “other lands already under cultivation.” The
Corps concluded that irrigation was “not an economical proposition at this time and
should await the future.” In any case, the cost of irrigation could only be justified in
conjunction with hydropower development. The Bureau of Reclamation‟s
Commissioner Mead concurred with the Corps that the cost of irrigation could only be
justified if subsidized by the revenues from power and that there was no current
demand for additional farms or crops. But he recommended irrigation development
begin anyway at Grand Coulee, arguing that the project would take at least ten years
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The Corps‟s position on flood protection methods varied over time. It adopted a policy of protection
through levees only in the 1860s, dismissing a visionary 1852 report recommending the use dams and
reservoirs in tributaries to prevent or manage floods on the Mississippi. Although dams for flood
control in the Sacramento River were supported by the Corps and included in the 1917 Flood Control
Act, in general the Corps opposed large federal investments in flood control. This attitude gradually
changed within the Corps in light of severe flood damage experienced in the lower Mississippi River in
the late 1920s and the demonstrated inadequacy of flood protection dependent solely on levees. Flood
control was subsequently included as an authorized purpose for those dams capable of large scale water
storage in the Columbia. For discussions of early Corps flood control policies, see Shallat (1994), pp.
174-176; Billington et al., (2005), pp. 314-315, and The Corps‟s official history (1998) pp. 47-51.
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for construction and another ten or fifteen after that for the region to absorb the
resulting electrical power. By then, Mead believed, projected population increases
would provide the needed market (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29; White, 1995;
Rowley, 2006; Pisani, 2002).
The Columbia River portion of the 308 Report thus provided a comprehensive
plan for a series of multipurpose dams on the Columbia. It was, by design, purely a
technical product, leaving open the questions of who should build, own, and operate
the completed projects (although Brown recommended in the transmittal letter that
hydropower development that local government or private investment should take on
the responsibility for hydropower development).65 Although expressly calling for
coordination with the power industry for hydroelectric development, it did not offer
any suggestions as to how or if the completed projects were to be managed in a
systematic way. In short, it was a blueprint for turning the naturally flowing Columbia
into a mechanism for commercial purposes. It did not – nor was it asked to – address
the complex social network inherently created with the system‟s completion, a
network of interests bound by common dependence on the Columbia‟s water and the
products and services that the use of that water would ultimately produce (White,
1995).
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For their part, private power companies balked at the capital investments needed for provision of
electricity to rural areas, especially if forced to sell the subsequent power at flat rates, and were
skeptical that a market demand for power from large projects would ever materialize (Pope, 2008).
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Construction of the first Columbia River mainstem dams.
On a campaign stop in Portland Oregon in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt had
promised to build the next large dam on the Columbia. To New Dealers such as
Roosevelt dam construction represented much more than just job relief. It was a
visible statement of the government‟s commitment to equitable distribution of national
resource wealth to the public as a whole and to improving the quality of life and
standards of living for millions of Americans. Central planning would ensure
efficiency and provide the maximum benefit to the people of the region (Ogden, 1949;
Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
True to Roosevelt‟s campaign promise, the government initiated construction
on Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams in 1933 (FCRPS, 2003). The Bureau of
Reclamation held authority for construction of Grand Coulee due to the project‟s
irrigation purposes and the fact that the dam would not have a navigation function.
Conversely, the Corps of Engineers designed and constructed Bonneville due to the
primacy of its navigation purpose. Both would provide hydropower, with Grand
Coulee also offering storage for flood control purposes (Billington, et al., 2006).66
Bonneville Dam was ready for power generation in 1938, with its first electricity
flowing over federal transmission lines to Cascade Locks and Portland in 1939. Grand
Coulee began generating power in 1942 (FCRPS, 2003).
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Bonneville Dam, like most of the dams built on the mainstem Columbia and Lower Snake Rivers,
was designed as a “run of the river” project. This means that water flowing into the reservoir flows out
through the dam‟s turbines or over its spillway.
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World War II in the Pacific Northwest.
The mobilization for the Second World War had a major impact on FCRPS
development with effects that extended into the post-war years. The war‟s production
effort would depend heavily on energy. Ships, planes, and land vehicles needed oil for
fuel. Defense industries needed electricity for war production (Norwood, c.1981).
The strategic role of electricity in modern war production first became
apparent during World War I. German submarine warfare had cut the supply of
nitrates from Chile upon which the United States depended for ammunition
production. This prompted the 1916 National Defense Act that authorized federal
construction of a nitrate plant and supporting electricity generation facilities at Muscle
Shoals on the Tennessee River. Military planners recognized the national energy
shortage with regard to munitions production and the implication of that shortage for a
sustained war effort. World War I ended before their fears could be realized, but they
captured the issue in a report presented in 1921 (Norwood, c.1981).
Norwood (c.1981) suggested that Franklin Roosevelt‟s support for public
power in the 1930s might have in part been due to the strategic near miss in the First
World War and a premonition of pending war due to rising tensions in Europe,
although he acknowledges that there is no evidence to support this.67 Regardless of
Roosevelt‟s level of foresight, his support of public power in the early 1930s proved
fortuitous. He used his successes in the public power debates to help build American
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See Norwood, (c.1981), p. 120 for further discussion.
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production capacity as Japan‟s aggression in Asia and Germany and Italy‟s aggression
in Europe increased between 1936 and 1938 (Norwood, c.1981).
In the Northwest, the expansion of industrial capacity in the late 1930s
translated into demand for expansion of federal hydropower capability. The
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), established under the 1937 Bonneville
Project Act to market the power produced at federal dams, often functioned, in effect,
as a “regional chamber of commerce” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 125) conducting industrial
site and economic surveys. This pre-war promotion resulted in new war-related
electrometal and electrochemical plants being quickly located in the region. The
electrical needs of mobilization “telescoped more than 10 years of normal growth into
a brief 5 years” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 123) in the Northwest. The federal transmission
system grew from zero to 2500 circuit miles between 1939 and 1944, with generation
capacity increasing from less than 100,000 kilowatts to over 1.3 million in the same
period. This growth in capability provided inexpensive electricity to the Pacific
Northwest‟s military installations, defense production industries, and, beginning in
1943, to the highly classified plutonium production facility at Hanford, Washington.
About 92% of federally produced hydropower went to support war production
industrial loads, of which up to 80% (prior to the Hanford project) went to aluminum
production in support of aircraft manufacturing (Norwood, c.1981; FCRPS, 2003).
Ogden (1949) argues that low electrical rates enabled by federal hydropower so
lowered the cost of aluminum production that the federal government saved the “entire
cost of the two dams in reduced aluminum prices alone” compared to what it would
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have spent had the aluminum industry been forced to purchase power from private
utilities (Ogden, 1949, p. 422).68
The Corps accelerated its schedule for generator installation at Bonneville
Dam, ensuring that by war‟s end all ten planned generators were on line (McKinley,
1952). The Bureau of Reclamation made similar efforts at Grand Coulee. BPA
constructed a transmission line between Grand Coulee and Bonneville between 1938
and 1940. This transmission line provided the infrastructure to move power to where
it was needed as well as enabling the expansion of the federal system that was to come
later. An executive order directed BPA to begin marketing Grand Coulee power upon
the transmission line‟s completion (Norwood, c.1981). 69
Although the war would not end until 1945, Allied victory was apparent by
1944. The Allies won in significant part through the United States superior production
capacity. This capacity remained intact even as war in Europe and the Pacific
destroyed the production capacities of the Axis nations and seriously damaged those
of America‟s European and Asian Allies. Planning ahead, BPA began promoting
Northwest hydropower resources as key to regional post-war development. The
agency published a prospectus report entitled Pacific Northwest Opportunities that
outlined the industries needed in the Northwest and how they could benefit from the
region‟s low cost power (Norwood, c.1981).
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Ogden cites the U.S. Congress, House, Interior Department Appropriations bill for 1948, p. 354, in
making this claim.
69

Executive Order 8526, dated August 26th, 1940.
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Resulting Governance Systems
The Roosevelt Administration used the 308 Report to justify federal
construction of the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams (Ogden, 1997). However,
construction of the two dams was well underway before any sort of system-wide
operational arrangement had been decided. With the pending completion of both
projects, the management issue had to be addressed.
Progressives and public power advocates envisioned and promoted a Columbia
Valley Authority (CVA) to plan and operate the system along the lines of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (Conklin, 1983; Lowitt, 1983). Others still believed in
free markets as the best arbiter of where, how, and by whom natural resources should
be developed. However, the jolt of the Depression and the political landslide enjoyed
by Roosevelt and his supporters swept aside the former dominance of private market
advocates in the policy arena (Kennedy, 2009).
The influence of individual agencies over their respective resource
jurisdictions, however, was relatively unaffected by the nation‟s economic situation
and proved far more resistant to reform. Consequently, the debate over Basin
governance centered on whether hydroelectric generation, transmission, and marketing
should be divided among existing agencies or assigned to new ones.
There was little debate that the planning function would be carried out by the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC). The management
issue was far more contentious. The two alternatives under early consideration were
the marketing of power by the existing dam-operating agencies (The Army‟s Corps of
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Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation) or establishment of a valley authority into
which some or all individual agency functions would be absorbed or at least
supervised. The PNWRPC produced a report offering several other governance
alternatives intended to resolve this debate. Given the urgency of coming to at least a
temporary solution before the two dams came on line, the parties to the debated agreed
to a compromise solution modeled after the PNWRPC recommendation. The
Commission, although favoring the valley authority idea, realized the political
impossibility of getting such a structure established in time. Instead, the Commission
recommended retention of project operation by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation and establishment of a new agency to market power. The compromise
also resulted in the region‟s first experiment with a governance system based on
federal agency collaboration, the Bonneville Advisory Board.
The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
Echoing White‟s (1995) later assertion that it was the FCRPS that united the
Northwest as a region, Bessey (1963) argued that “the Columbia River System [not
yet established, but envisioned in the 1932 308 Report] made for a strong interstate
community of interest in development” (p. 46).70 The PNWRPC provided the
institutional infrastructure to coordinate the efforts of that “community of interest.”
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McKinley also refers to this “community of interest” in his introductory chapter (McKinley, 1952, p.
2). Although not defined as such by either Bessey (1963) or McKinley (1952), their context is clearly a
community of economic and development interests as neither tribal nor fishery interests were
substantially addressed. Fishery proponent protests against dam construction beginning in the 1940s
demonstrated that this community of interests had its limits. Bessey and McKinley did not address
environmental interests either, understandable since both were writing before the environmental
movement had gained much traction in the public mind.
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The immediate need was to provide relief for unemployment and adjustments to
agricultural policy in order to address the acute economic distress in urban and rural
communities (McKinley, 1952).71 Bessey (1963) reports McKinley as believing that
“lasting success…would depend upon the degree to which interagency coordination in
this work can be secured” (Bessey, 1963, p. 49, emphasis added). The Commission
would conduct its planning effort based on the Corps‟s 308 Report (Ogden, 1949;
Bessey, 1963).
The PNWRPC was, by design, state-centric. Its membership consisted of the
chairs from each of the four state planning boards, a full-time executive director, and
staff (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Vogel, 2007). The part-time district chairman
of the national planning committee (like all national planning committee members, a
private citizen) served as Commission chair. Federal agencies were not Commission
members, although they supported the Commission and state board‟s technical teams
with staff and information (McKinley, 1952). The Commission‟s purpose was “to
advise and assist…in the development of comprehensive plans for public works, as
contemplated by the Recovery Act, for the regional area” (Bessey, 1963, p. 21). Its
functions were investigational and advisory, not operational. The Corps of Engineers,
Bureau of Reclamation, and other agencies retained operational decision authority for
their respective programs. Consistent with its Progressive roots, the Commission
made clear that its intent was to improve the regional economy through the best use of
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McKinley (1952) also states that the Commission chair believed in participation by “private civic
groups” in addition to state, regional, and local entities. Nongovernmental participation is not
mentioned by Bessey. See McKinley, 1952, p. 460.
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resources (Bessey, 1963). In effect, this arrangement relegated federal agencies to the
role of technical advisors and the executors of plans and priorities as established by
others.
Vesting supervision of the national planning effort under Secretary of Interior
Harold Ickes caused interagency cooperation at the departmental level to suffer.
Agencies not under the Department of Interior cooperated reluctantly at best. Disputes
were most prominent in Washington, DC but were reflected in the actions of regional
agency offices as well. The non-Interior departments and agencies were simply not
inclined to support the efforts of someone they considered a rival who had previously
campaigned to take over their programs. This problem was eventually resolved by
moving the planning function under the executive office of the President (McKinley,
1952).
Proposals for management by existing agencies.
While the Commission was getting its planning function organized, others
were calling the question as to how hydroelectricity from the soon-to-be-completed
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams was to be marketed and transmitted. In January
1935, Washington Representative Knute Hill introduced a bill in Congress that would
transfer Bonneville Dam to the Bureau of Reclamation upon its completion and assign
the Bureau full responsibility for Columbia River development and power marketing.
The Corps of Engineers, not surprisingly opposed this proposal (Norwood, c.1981).
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent a letter requesting the PNWRPC
provide recommendations on several issues, including a regional organizational
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system. Presumably with the intent of preempting whatever the Commission might
recommend, on July 29 Oregon Senators Charles McNary and Frederick Steiwer and
Washington Representative Martin Smith introduced bills in their respective houses of
Congress that would have the Corps of Engineers operate Bonneville Dam and market
its power. The bill also called for the Corps to build local transmission lines to serve
the Portland and Vancouver urban areas. The Corps‟s service area would be limited to
the lower Columbia River. The bill assigned rate-setting authority to the Federal
Power Commission. It specified the use of “railroad rates” which varied dependent on
distance from the point of generation. Proponents of this proposal included Oregon,
private power advocates, and local business owners (McKinley, 1952; Norwood,
c.1981). On its part, the Corps believed that the Northwest electricity market was
limited, and thus argued for building short transmission lines to service the Portland
urban area and industries near the river as the best use of public funds (Pope, 2008).
Opponents included public power advocates in general and much of the public
sentiment in the states of Oregon and Washington. Many still recoiled from memories
of the role that business leadership in public affairs had played in bringing about the
Depression. Washington‟s delegation in particular was comprised mostly of New
Dealers opposed to the McNary proposal and its tilt to private power interests
(McKinley, 1952). Because of this opposition, neither the Senate nor the House bill
went to hearings. However, they did help frame the debate between advocates of
single-agency management of the Columbia (by either the Corps of Engineers or the
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Bureau of Reclamation) and advocates of the proposed Columbia Valley Authority
(Norwood, c.1981).
Proposals for a Columbia Valley Authority.
For Progressives in the 1930s, the Tennessee Valley Authority represented the
epitome of government planning and service provision for the greater public good,
successfully protecting government resources from the clutches of rapacious corporate
interests. It thus served as an inspiration and guiding model for many in the ensuing
governance discussions in the Columbia (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Conklin,
1983, quote from p. 4; DeLuna, 1997).
Later in January 1935, after submittal of the Hill Bill favoring Bureau of
Reclamation management of the system, Senator James Pope of Idaho introduced a
bill in the Senate, with Washington‟s Hill agreeing to introduce an identical bill in the
House, to establish a Columbia Valley Authority modeled after the TVA. The CVA
would take over operation of Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams and administer
future development over the Basin (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).
Proponents of the Columbia Valley Authority proposal included Progressives
and New Deal liberals throughout government and public power advocates (Norwood,
c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997). Norwood (c.1981) adds the states of Idaho and
Washington as supporters, and DeLuna (1997) notes qualified support from the
Departments of Commerce72 and Interior.73 Opponents included the Corps, 74 private
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According to DeLuna (1997), the Department of Commerce favored a CVA but one bureaucratically
weaker than the TVA. Commerce supported a central authority for dam planning and building in order
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utilities, and a number of local chambers of commerce throughout the region,
including Portland‟s (Norwood, c.1981; Goodwin, 1983; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997).
Goodwin (1983), DeLuna (1997) and White (1995) state that the Bureau of
Reclamation was also opposed, with White stating that its opposition was muted in
order to not offend the Secretary of the Interior. Goodwin (1983) and DeLuna (1997)
also note opposition from the Department Agriculture due to concerns over potential
threats to the Department‟s land management authorities in the Forest Service and its
agricultural programs. In general, a belief in market forces, a more opportunistic
approach to development, and opposition to the general power such an organization
would wield regionally philosophically drove non-federal CVA opponents. For their
part, ever since the early 1900s, private power companies had been skeptical that a
market demand for power from large projects would ever materialize – a skepticism
shared by the Corps of Engineers. Federal agencies, especially the Corps, Bureau of
to provide cheap electricity in support of economic development. But it was wary of a central
bureaucracy with authority over a potentially broader array of policy arenas.
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Disagreement existed within the Department of Interior over whether valley authorities in general
should be under the supervision of DOI, the position favored by Secretary Ickes, or independent
(DeLuna, 1997).
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A general Corps of Engineers‟ policy position on valley authorities is hard to gauge. White (1995)
states that “the Tennessee Valley had no equivalents to the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of
Engineers, large bureaucratic players, on the river who [sic] could not be easily replaced” (White, 1995,
p. 65). White is correct insofar as the Bureau of Reclamation is concerned since the 1902 Reclamation
Act limited the Bureau‟s jurisdiction to the states west of the Mississippi. But his statement regarding
the Corps implies that, had the Corps been a stronger presence in the Tennessee Basin, the TVA may
not have been developed. But Conklin (1983) presents a relatively cooperative relationship between the
Corps and TVA promoters, with the Corps primarily interested in preserving its navigational
prerogatives through partnership. McKinley (1952, pp. 521-525) notes some tension in the dual
jurisdictional arrangement on the Tennessee but that the two agencies eventually developed protocols
and worked through it. With regard to the CVA proposal, it is not clear if Corps opposition represented
an institutional change of heart after the TVA experience, differing perspectives between the different
local Corps offices, or some other reason. Regardless, the Corps was staunchly opposed to establishing
a valley authority in the Columbia.
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Reclamation, and Department of Agriculture (led by the Forest and Soil Conservation
Services) were fearful of the potential for impingement on agency prerogatives
(McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Goodwin, 1983; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997;
Pope, 2008).
Compromise: the Bonneville Power Administration and Bonneville Advisory
Board.
In the spring of 1935, after the Hill and Pope Bills had been submitted, the
chair and the executive director of the PNWRPC and Senator Pope met with the
President to determine his preference for a Columbia Basin organizational system
(Norwood, c.1981). Roosevelt, though supportive of the TVA, “was not
precommitted to any particular plan or type” for the Columbia (Bessey, 1963, p. 25).
Roosevelt urged the three to study the problem with an open mind, cautioning that a
region‟s characteristics may make a valley authority approach unsuitable (Norwood,
c.1981).
Because of that meeting, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent a letter on
July 9, 1935, that requested the PNWRPC to develop a report on the future of the
Columbia Basin regarding planning, construction, and operation of public works in the
area. The study was to provide a holistic look at power generation and transmission in
the Northwest, as well as potential organizational systems (Bessey, 1963; Norwood,
c.1981).
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The Commission held seven meetings to collect regional views the following
September (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981). 75 Bessey (1963) stated that views were
collected from “official, commercial, industrial, utility, agriculture, forest, and
transportation interests.” He further stated that the resulting study confirmed the
“broad homogeneity and coherent regionality of the Pacific Northwest” (p. 30).
Neither Bessey (1963) nor Norwood (c.1981) mentions any participation by regional
Indian tribes or fishing interests. In fact, Norwood (c.1981, p. 57) states, “Chamber of
Commerce witnesses dominated the meetings.” Neither Bessey (1963) nor Norwood‟s
(c.1981) accounts clarify whether the region‟s Indian tribes and fishery interests were
not invited or chose not to attend. Regardless, the views of regional fishermen and
tribes, as future events were to demonstrate, were distinctly at odds with the views of
those who did participate.
Each of the four state Commission members, the Chair, and the executive
director signed the Commission‟s report (Bessey, 1963) and submitted it to the
National Resources Committee on December 28, 1935. The Committee wrote a
strong letter endorsement and published the report for public consumption in May
1936 under the title Regional Planning Part 1 – Pacific Northwest (Norwood, c.1981).
However, the Committee‟s endorsement did not carry the signature of the Secretary of
War, reflecting continuing opposition by the Corps of Engineers and its supporters
who opposed any recommendation that would take the construction of transmission
lines from Bonneville Dam and the marketing of power away from the Corps
75

These meetings were held in Helena, MT; Seattle and Spokane, WA; Portland and Pendleton, OR:
and Boise and Pocatello, ID. See Norwood, c.1981, p. 57.
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(McKinley, 1952). Two of the PNWRPC report findings of interest to this study were
its recommendations regarding the regional transmission grid and its analysis and
recommendations regarding regional organization.
The report proposed a “high-voltage, high-capacity, synchronized, constantvoltage network of lines, and switching and transformer stations” (quoted in Bessey,
1963). Initially, transmission lines were to run from the Puget Sound in western
Washington through Grand Coulee to Spokane; from Puget Sound south to the
Willamette Valley in Oregon; and from Grand Coulee through Bonneville Dam to
Portland. Future extensions would connect Spokane to western Montana and through
the Snake River Basin to southeastern Idaho and from Portland and The Dalles
southward through western Oregon (Bessey, 1963).
Organizationally, the report evaluated five alternatives:
Project operation and power marketing by both Corps and Bureau of
Reclamation for their respective projects,
Selection of either the Corps or Bureau to assume control of power
generation, transmission, and marketing for all or part of the Basin,
Creation of a new public agency to generate, transmit, and market power,
Establishment of a Columbia Valley Authority, or
Establishment of a new federal corporation to generate and market power.
The Commission favored creation of a regional valley authority of some kind or a
power agency paralleled by a regional planning and program-coordinating agency.
They chose the latter in recognition of significant opposition to the former. The
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Commission recommended creation of a federal corporation, and included multiple
staff studies as annexes in support of its analysis and recommendations. The
voluminous report and its annexes thus provided the administration a “carefully
evaluated proposal and supporting arguments” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 58)76.
The new corporation was to be overseen by a three-person board of directors
selected by the president and approved by the Senate, one of whom would also serve
as PNWRPC chair. The proposal allowed the Corps and/or Bureau to add a fourth
and/or fifth board member on temporary terms (Ogden, 1949). The Corps, Bureau of
Reclamation, Forest Service, and Resettlement Administration provided staff to collect
and analyze data and help prepare the report‟s recommendations (McKinley, 1952).
The Commission‟s recommendation for a statutorily constituted regional planning and
program coordination entity (presumably to be itself) was not acted upon (Bessey,
1963).77 Had it been, and assuming these functions were assigned to the PNWRPC,
the mission of the PNWRPC would have expanded from one of just planning into
operational oversight.
Norwood (c.1981) reports on the April 1937 testimony of Oregon Governor
Martin who complained of thirty-eight bills submitted in Congress on the Columbia
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It is not clear if fishery interests felt threatened by the pending river development at this early date;
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), and Norwood (c.1981) do not mention them one way or the other.
77

The recommendation for a statutorily supported regional planning entity was eventually implemented
upon passage of the Water Resources Planning Act in 1965 and establishment of the Pacific Northwest
River Basins Commission in 1967. These events occurred after publication of Bessey‟s work and are
discussed further in the next chapter.
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issue since 1935.78 At the end of the day, the debate resulted in a bill that, with the
exception of the planning and coordination entity, largely followed the
recommendations of the PNWRPC report. The bill called for establishment of a
government corporation to sell the power produced by the Corps and Bureau and
develop a transmission system to connect generation with markets. It was supported
by the Corps, provided the Corps retained operational control over the projects it
constructed. Oregon, Washington, and Idaho Congressional delegations and the
administration also supported it. The PNWRPC recommendation thus became the
basis for the 1937 Bonneville Project Act that established the “Bonneville Project”
under the Department of Interior (Norwood, c.1981; Blumm, 1982; White, 1995;
Pope, 2008).
Those engaged in the debate viewed the Bonneville Project Act as an interim
measure, driven by the Corps‟s construction schedule for Bonneville Dam and the
belief by public power advocates that an ultimate CVA-like system was inevitable
(Pope, 2008). In its initial form, it applied only to Bonneville Dam. The Act stated
that “the form of administration herein established for the Bonneville project is
intended to be provisional pending establishment of a permanent administration for
Bonneville and other projects in the Columbia River Basin (Bonneville Project Act,
1937, Section 2 (a)) (emphasis added).79 The Act also called for preference of sales to
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Norwood (c.1981) details these various proposals and the political debate around them in pp. 56-62.
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The provisional nature is further illustrated in that the Act did not name the new agency thus created.
Consequently, a lot of confusion was generated in the minds of the public as to the role of the new
Bonneville Project Administrator with regard to the role of the Corps in completing, operating and
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public utilities and required the power thus sold to be at uniform “postage stamp”
rates. It addressed transmission, but did not specify which agency was to actually
build and operate transmission lines (Bonneville Project Act, 1937; Norwood, c.1981).
It made clear that construction, operation, and future maintenance of Bonneville Dam
was to be the responsibility of the Corps subject to the Act‟s provisions regarding the
authority of the administrator (see Section 1). President Roosevelt signed the
Bonneville Project Act into law on August 20, 1937.
Long-standing public power advocate James D. (“J.D.”) Ross was appointed as
Administrator of the “Bonneville Project” the following October. Described by
Norwood (c.1981) as a “one-man whirlwind” (p. 66), Ross successfully pushed for a
policy of postage stamp rates to govern sale of federal power and strongly promoted
early construction of a transmission intertie between Bonneville and Grand Coulee
Dams. His premature death in March 1939 cut short his tenure. Paul J. Raver
succeeded to the administrator‟s chair the following September. Raver was to serve
until 1954. Just as Pinchot‟s drive and personality shaped the values and culture of the
Forest Service, so to would Raver‟s come to shape the values and culture of BPA
(Norwood, c.1981).
The Bonneville Project Act illustrates just how provisional the new agency was
intended to be in that it did not give it a name. The Act‟s title of Bonneville Project
Administrator generated confusion in the minds of the public as to the role of the new

maintaining the actual dam. This was finally resolved in 1940 when the agency was made permanent
and the Secretary of the Interior approved “Bonneville Power Administration” as the agency‟s name.
See Norwood, c.1981, pp. 68 and 124.
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agency with regard to the role of the Corps in completing, operating and maintaining
the actual dam. This was finally resolved in 1940 with amendment of the Bonneville
Project Act to make the new agency permanent and assign it authority to build and
operate transmission lines. Raver recommended, and the Secretary of the Interior
approved, the “Bonneville Power Administration” as the agency‟s name (BPA)
(Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997).
The Bonneville Project Act (1937) also established the first governance system
based on federal agency cooperation. It required that the administrator “… act in
consultation with an advisory board” to be named the Bonneville Advisory Board (the
Board). The Act specified the Board‟s membership, calling for representatives
designated by the Secretaries of the Army, Interior, and Agriculture and by the Federal
Power Commission (Bonneville, Project Act, 1937, Section 2 (a)). 80 General Theron
Weaver of the Corps of Engineers represented the Army; Reclamation‟s Robert
Newell represented Interior; the Forest Service‟s Robert Putman represented
Agriculture; and Lester Wing represented the Federal Power Commission (Bessey,
1963).
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The Bonneville Power Administration would come to establish other advisory groups, such as the
Bonneville Regional Advisory Committee, established 1944 – 1978, and the Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee, established 1946 – present. These were set up as advisory and/or sounding
boards to assist BPA in rate setting and other policy issues. Although federal agency members were
invited to sit in on the meetings, the organizations were not intended to implement policy or otherwise
directly participate in system management (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981). Additionally, the
Department of Interior instituted its Pacific Northwest Field Committee in 1946 as part of a
Department-wide effort to better coordinate regional Interior agency activities. BPA participated
(Bessey, 1963). These groups are not discussed in detail as they did not exercise Basin “governance” in
the sense used in this study.
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The Board‟s first meeting occurred on November 30, 1937. It held 11 more
between 1939 and 1946, meeting four times in 1943 to coordinate War requirements
(Norwood, c.1981). McKinley (1952) reports that the board‟s sessions were usually
held in Washington, DC, with Washington-level officers usually in attendance. Issues
addressed by the board included the rates to be charged by Bonneville Dam, funding
for transmission line construction, and plans for additional generators during the War
years. Eventually, the board came to agreement that there should be only a single
marketing agency for the electricity produced by Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams,
and recommended BPA be designated that responsibility through executive order.
President Roosevelt signed such an order in 1940 (McKinley, 1952).
Board participation dropped off after 1943 as war-related generation and
transmission construction efforts ended. In 1946, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee assumed its regional coordination functions (McKinley, 1952; Bessey,
1963; Norwood, c.1981).
The governance debates of the 1930s resulted in a rejection of the
decentralized, decision-oriented governance by the private market and iron triangle
arrangements that dominated the region prior to the Depression‟s onset. The debates
also resulted in a rejection of a more centralized valley authority type decision-making
system. Instead, the region agreed to two collaboration-based systems. The first was
the PNWRPC, a state led entity intended to provide centralized planning to guide
resource development in the Columbia River Basin. The second was the Bonneville
Advisory Board, a federal-agency collaborative body intended to inform the
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Bonneville Power Administrator in the performance of his duties and coordinate
operations. Establishment of both the PNWRPC and Bonneville Advisory Board
introduced a regional preference for collaborative versus decision-oriented governance
systems. Although specific governance systems would change in the years to come,
this preference for collaboration-based systems would prove enduring.

Chapter Summary:
The events and circumstances related to the Basin governance systems of the
period 1929 – 1945 can be summarized as follows:
The onset of the Great Depression ushered in sweeping Democratic
majorities in Congress enabling the New Deal Program of the Roosevelt
Administration. Economic restoration was the most visible priority during
the 1930s. The public expected the federal government to undertake a
direct role in economic recovery efforts. In response, new federal agencies
were created and existing agencies reorganized (Hays, 1959/1999; Bessey,
1963; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; Billington, et al., 2006; Kennedy,
2009).
Two precepts of the New Deal were centralized planning and regionalism.
The National Industrial Recovery Act authorized creation of the Public
Works Administration (PWA) and establishment of subordinate
organizations under the PWA. Its subordinate national planning committee
believed that successful planning for economic growth and resource
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development depended on regional, state and local participation.
Accordingly, the committee established regional, state, and local planning
boards (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981, Vogel, 2007).
Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana established state planning boards
between 1933 and 1934. The national planning committee established the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission in 1934 to provide
governance over regional planning. Although chaired by a part-time
representative of the national planning committee, it was a state-centric
system, comprised of members from the four Northwest states‟ planning
boards. Federal agency participation was relegated to provision of
technical advice and expected execution of Commission plans (McKinley,
1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
The Corps‟s 308 Report, released in 1932, provided a blueprint for future
development of the Columbia Basin. It presented technical and economic
analyses of multipurpose dam development but left unanswered
management questions regarding future design, construction, and
operations. President Roosevelt used the 308 Report to justify Bonneville
and Grand Coulee Dams the construction of which began in 1933 by the
Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, respectively (Ogden, 1949;
Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995).
Congressional bills that would keep management of hydropower
generation, transmission, and marketing in the hands of either the Corps of
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Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation were introduced in 1935 (Norwood,
c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008).
In the minds of many Progressives, the ideal governance system for river
development was the Tennessee Valley Authority. Proponents in the
Northwest promoted a similar valley authority for the Columbia.
Congressional bills to this effect were also submitted in 1935 (Ogden,
1949; Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1953; DeLuna, 1997; Billington, et al.,
2006; Pope, 2008)
The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission proposed a
compromise, eventually codified in the 1937 Bonneville Project Act. The
Act created the ambiguously named Bonneville Project as a government
corporation to market public power at cost to preferred public customers.
It also created the Bonneville Advisory Board to advise the Bonneville
Project administrator in the execution of his duties. Responsibility for
project operation would reside with the constructing agency. An
amendment to the Bonneville Project Act made the agency permanent and
renamed it as the Bonneville Power Administration in 1940 (Ogden, 1949;
Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008).
The region‟s potential for low-cost hydropower, coupled with aggressive
promotion by BPA in the mobilization for the War, attracted aluminum and
other electricity-dependent defense industries to the Northwest (Ogden,
1949; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008).
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Just as the PNWRPC was the region‟s first effort at multi-jurisdictional
planning, so to was the Bonneville Advisory Board its first effort at
collaborative governance to coordinate operations. Board members
included the regional executives of BPA, the Corps, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Forest Service, and the Federal Power Commission. The
Board did not possess a decision-making mechanism to resolve differences
among the agencies. This was not a major issue in the early 1940s due to
common interest in successful prosecution of the War effort. However,
once construction of the war-related transmission lines and project
generation facilities were completed and Allied victory imminent, interest
in Board participation fell off (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood,
c.1981).
The onset of the Depression thus created the opportunity for change to the
market and iron triangle governance systems that dominated up to the early 1930s.
The conceptual framing of Columbia Basin governance in the Northwest shifted from
one of isolated communities to a region unified by the potential of a developed
Columbia River (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007). New Deal policies asserted federal
authority to regulate private power, opened the door for federal ownership and
operation of power facilities, and encouraged cooperative arrangements between
federal agencies and with private industry (DeLuna, 1997).
By 1946 major Columbia River dams were under federal construction or
already online, and the region was struggling with how to manage the necessary
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cooperation between the federal agencies responsible for project purposes, private and
public utilities, and others impacted by project activities. Progressives and public
power advocates viewed the voluntary structure of the Bonneville Advisory Board as a
short-term situation, inherently unworkable and destined to ultimately collapse. They
continued to hold out and advocate for a Columbia Valley Authority arrangement to
direct, manage, and balance the production of electricity and other river purposes
(McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997).
The return of national prosperity following the end of World War II caused a
loss of support for expensive government-led programs, valley authority-type systems,
and centralized planning. A renewed confidence in private markets began to emerge
(Bessey, 1963; DeLuna, 1997). The end of the War provided the region‟s second
catalytic opportunity to change its governance arrangements.
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CHAPTER 5
THE END OF WORLD WAR II (1945)

Introduction
The end of World War II presented the region‟s second critical situation that
resulted in a shift between Basin governance models. The model of state dominance
in planning gave way to a return to systems of federal agency cooperation.
Meanwhile, the region again rejected renewed calls for governance under a centralized
valley authority.
The War ended for the United States in 1945. Three events occurred around
that time that collectively created the circumstances for change in Columbia Basin
governance systems. The first was the decision by Congress to cease funding for
national level planning in 1943 (Bessey, 1963). The second event was the surprise
reelection of Harry Truman as president in 1948 and a return of Democrat majorities
in both houses of Congress, majorities they had lost to the Republicans in 1946
(DeLuna, 1997). The third event was the end of the Depression. The buildup to
World War II, the War‟s prosecution, and the prosperity that followed in the War‟s
aftermath ended the nation‟s economic hardships. Prosperity brought a lessening of
support for the central role of government in the economy and a return to faith in
private markets (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997).
Regional issues events played out against this national backdrop. Key regional
issues affecting governance decisions included the rise in regional influence of the
Bonneville Power Administration, jockeying by the state governors to maintain a
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strong voice in Basin development, the rise of opposition by fishery interests to river
development, severe floods in the late 1940s, and the continued construction of dams
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
These changes brought an abrupt end to the Pacific Northwest Regional
Planning Commission and eventual disintegration of the Bonneville Advisory Board.
Whereas the Bonneville Advisory Board continued to exist, the completion of efforts
to expand hydropower generation and transmission coupled with growing confidence
that the Allies would win the War reduced the sense of immediacy regarding the
Board‟s purpose. Consequently, the Board operated in a rather desultory fashion until
1946 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970, Norwood, c.1981).
Congress, federal departments, and the states collectively originated eleven
governance system proposals during this period. Five systems were enacted, although
only three operated for any extended period. These proposed and enacted systems are
summarized below:
State led system proposals. Northwest states made three efforts to maintain
the state-centric nature of the PNWRPC in regional development. The first
was the Northwest States Development Association, established in 1943
upon the demise of the PNWRPC. It disbanded in either late 1943 or early
1944.81 The second was the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy
Committee. It was ostensibly set up in 1953 as a committee under the
CBIAC to implement the Eisenhower administration‟s partnership
81

The record on this point is not clear. The Association produced a report in December, 1943 and
disbanded “shortly thereafter.” See McKinley(1952), Bessey (1963), and Scheufele (c.1970).
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program. It disbanded in 1958. The third was an attempt at an interstate
compact. Negotiations began in 1949 but the proposal failed when state
legislatures refused to ratify the resulting proposal.
Valley authority proposals. Congress introduced five bills to again attempt
to establish some form of a Columbia Valley Authority. One was
introduced in 1945 and four others between 1947 and 1949. None was
enacted.
The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC). A regional
association of federal agencies, with invited state participation, established
in 1946. The federal agencies instituted the CBIAC based on a recognized
need for effective interagency coordination in Basin planning and
operations and as a counter to the renewed called for some form of
Columbia Valley Authority. It effectively assumed the planning function
of the PNWRPC and operational coordination function of the Bonneville
Advisory Board. It was replaced by the Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission in 1967.
The Committee on Fish Operations (COFO). Established in the 1960s to
better address the impact of Basin development on regional fish runs.
The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (PNWRBC). Federalagency centric successor to the CBIAC. Authorized by the Water
Resources Planning Act of 1965 and established by executive order in
1967.
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The remainder of this chapter discusses the social and political context outlined
above and the key issues and events in the Northwest that influenced the debates over
the various governance forms. It then describes the nature and structure of each of the
proposed or enacted governance systems.

Social and Political Context
The main national level developments that affected Columbia Basin
governance systems were the ending of funding for New Deal planning structures, the
reelection of Truman in 1948, and the return of national prosperity which brought with
it a resurgence of influence by private power interests.
The War, which ended for the United States with the Japanese surrender on
August 15, 1945 and subsequent signing of the surrender terms on September 2, had
destroyed or seriously damaged the economies of the major European and Asian
nations. Of the War‟s major participants, only the United States and Canada retained
functioning economic systems. The worldwide demand for post-war goods and
commodities for rebuilding greatly expanded the American economy and ushered in a
period of renewed national prosperity (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood,
c.1981).
Prosperity brought a renewed confidence in private markets and a decline in
support for many New Deal bureaucracies and programs. Congress, despite its
Democratic majority, ceased funding for the National Resources Planning Board (the
latest incarnation of the national planning committee) in 1943. This in turn led to the
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disbanding of state and regional planning commissions, including the PNWRPC
(McKinley, 1953; Bessey, 1963).
Executive Branch interagency planning and coordination may have lost favor
with Congress, but the affected agencies still believed in a need for some collaborative
mechanism to coordinate river basin operations and development. Northwest agencies
were also concerned about the greatly diminished but still simmering interest on the
part of public power advocates and New Dealers to install a valley authority in the
Columbia. Federal departments, reacting to the defunding of the National Resources
Planning Board, established the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee
(FIARBC, known colloquially as “Firebrick”) in1943.82 FIARBC resulted from a
voluntary agreement between the Chief of Engineers, the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Reclamation (on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior), the Secretary of
Agriculture, and the chair of the Federal Power Commission. The Secretary of
Commerce was added in 1947.83 Its purpose was to better coordinate the preparation
of reports dealing with multipurpose water projects, and the signatories agreed to
ensure their respective field offices would “communicate and confer” (McKinley,
1952, p. 90) regarding data and to avoid duplication of effort (McKinley, 1952;
Scheufele, c.1970).
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The accounts of Bessey (1963) and Scheufele‟s (c. 1970) differ as to the date of the FIARBC‟s
establishment. Bessey claimed it was 1943. Scheufele stated it was established in 1939, although he
mistakenly referred to it as a “commission” instead of “committee.” McKinley (1952) did not give a
date. The National Archives supported Bessey‟s account, so the 1943 date is used here. See
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/315.html#315.2.
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The Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare were apparently added later as well,
although not mentioned by McKinley (1952) or Bessey (1963). See the National Archives web site at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/315.html#315.2.
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The Eisenhower administration reorganized FIARBC as the Inter-Agency
Committee on Water Resources (ICEWATER) in 1954 (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele,
c.1970). ICEWATER continued the planning role of FIARBC but shifted from an
emphasis on federal leadership in centralized planning under Truman to a more
limited federal role under Eisenhower (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).
Despite the national trending toward a lessening of government role in the
economy, there were still progressives and New Deal supporters that held little faith in
the efficacy of voluntary cooperation among federal agencies. They continued to
believe that valley authority type entities best served the public‟s interests in regional
resource development. Valley authority advocates in Congress submitted bills to
establish some form of Columbia Valley Authority in 1945 and 1947. However, the
retirement of many New Deal senators and congressional representatives in the
election of 1946 and the increase in Republicans doomed those particular efforts. The
1948 reelection of Truman, who in part championed valley authorities during his
campaign, reenergized valley authority supporters (DeLuna, 1997).
Despite Democrats maintaining modest majorities in both Houses of Congress
in 1948 and retaining them in 1950, the post-War economic boom and the election of
the Republican Eisenhower administration in 1952 generated a resurgence of influence
by private power. Private power advocates worked with the administration to block
further efforts at public ownership and operation of electricity generation.
The Eisenhower administration‟s energy policy revolved around “partnerships”
between federal and private power entities. This policy, endorsed by private power
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interests as a way to undo pubic power advances in the 1930s, resulted in a variety of
relationships and arrangements. Few depended on federal funding, federal
construction, or federal operation of facilities. If private utilities were willing to make
the investments, they were free to develop new hydropower sites at locations
previously envisioned for federal projects (Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; Pope,
2008). However, the administration in general and Eisenhower in particular provided
little direct support to the partnership program. Democratic majorities in Congress
and the lukewarm support from the administration caused the partnership concept to
“sputter to a halt” during Eisenhower‟s second term (Scheufele, c.1970; Pope, 2008).
The ending of Congressional funding for New Deal planning structures, the
reelection of Truman, and the return of prosperity following the end of World War II
thus presented a wave of conditions that would lead to Columbia Basin governance
system changes. Within this national context were circumstances unfolding in the
Northwest.

Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest
This study identified five activities during this period that significantly affected
perceptions of governance needs within the region in the mid to late 1940s. These
were (1) the emergence of the Bonneville Power Administration as a major regional
institution; (2) state interest in maintaining their centrality in regional planning and
development following the dissolution of the PNWRPC, (3) the development of
opposition from fishery interests to further river development; (4) severe flooding in
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the lower Columbia River in 1949; and (5) continued construction of dams in the
Columbia and its tributaries. Each is discussed in turn.
Emergence of BPA as a regional institutional leader.
Paul Raver assumed the role of Administrator of the Bonneville Project in
1939 and served until 1954. His tenure would instill in BPA a set of values and
operating traditions that continue to this day. These values included the New Deal
ideals of rural electrification; cost-based rates for public power; the use of public
power as a yardstick against which to gage private pricing; and the use of “postage
stamp” rates84 to set federal prices. Under his leadership, BPA would rise to become
a major institutional actor in matters of regional development and energy (Norwood,
c.1981).
Upon assuming the job in 1939, Raver immediately set out to strengthen the
agency‟s administrative structure. He was instrumental in drafting the 1940
amendments that made the agency permanent and recommended the agency‟s name.
Organizationally, he opened field offices around the region to ensure close ties to
regional parties and interests. He led the effort to give BPA the authority to construct
and operate transmission lines and orchestrated the wartime expansion of generation
capacity at Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams. Over the course of his tenure he met
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The term “postage stamp” rates refers to the policy of charging the same rate for the same unit of
electricity, regardless of where in the service area the end-user resided. The term comes from the
postage rates for mail delivery as practiced by the U.S. Postal Service. The alternative, favored by
private utilities, were “railroad rates” which would be determined by the marginal cost of delivery.
Under a railroad rate policy, electricity sold to rural areas would cost significantly more than delivery in
urban areas due to the need to distribute the infrastructure and operating costs of generation,
transmission, and distribution over long distances among a relatively small population.
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continuously with electricity customers and public and private utilities throughout the
Northwest, building relationships and promoting BPA‟s regional role. Valuing their
input and support, he invited them to participate in numerous advisory bodies he
formed to help inform BPA decisions in response to regional circumstances.85 He
worked closely with the region‟s Congressional delegation and encouraged BPA staff
to think of the delegation as the agency‟s board of directors. He strengthened BPA‟s
office in Washington, DC to better keep Congressional members informed of regional
events and coordinate legislative initiatives. He also worked hard to establish close
working relationships with his fellow regional agency executives (Norwood, c.1981).
Regional public power advocates under Raver‟s leadership largely
outmaneuvered private power efforts to limit federal project development in the
Northwest. An example is BPA‟s response to the impact of the decline in regional
power demand at the end of World War II. Once the War ended, the region faced
huge layoffs as defense plants, airplane factories, and shipyards curtailed production.
Reduced demand for aircraft forced aluminum plants to lay off hundreds of workers
and created a corresponding reduction in electrical demand. The unrest generated by
the layoffs provided an opportunity for private utilities to reassert themselves. Four
private utilities issued a joint memorandum in January 1946 and later testified to
Congress that the region faced a power surplus of about a million kilowatts.
Consequently, in their view, there was no need for additional federal hydropower
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An example is the Bonneville Regional Advisory Council established in 1944 to advise BPA on
regional policy.
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dams (Norwood, c.1981). In effect, the private utilities hoped for a return to the preDepression market dominated governance model.
In response to the utility memorandum, Raver formed the Tacoma Conference,
later renamed the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee. This group
assembled the load forecasts of individual regional utilities and consolidated them into
a regional forecast. Rather than showing a surplus of capacity as alleged in the utility
memorandum, the consolidated report displayed a shortfall. Raver presented the
report in testimony to Congress (Norwood, c.1981).86 As they had in the 1930s, the
public power advocates won and additional multi-purpose federal dams began coming
on line in 1952. This effort was indicative of Raver‟s style throughout his time as
BPA Administrator.
Raver was also instrumental in laying the groundwork that finally resolved the
Northwest public-power debate. Pope (2008) argues that the Eisenhower
administration‟s “partnership” policy contained within it a fundamental paradox for
the Northwest. The envisioned partnerships implied decentralized operations within a
competitive market. But development at the major hydropower sites was too
complicated and expensive for all but the largest utilities to finance. Utilities therefore
had to work together in order to raise capital and develop markets by promoting
demand. Raver recognized this and worked to establish he institutional arrangements
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The Tacoma Conference‟s load forecasting effort was fortuitously assisted by an increase in
worldwide aluminum demand that began in 1947 and extended through the Korean War (Norwood,
c.1981); severe regional flooding in 1948 and the coincidentally released joint report of the Corps and
Bureau regarding Columbia River development (McKinley, 1952); and by record Northwest cold in the
winter of 1948/1949 (Ogden, 1949).
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that would eventually guide cooperation between private and public utilities. The
ultimate result was a more closely coordinated and centrally planned system than a
purely competitive market model would anticipate (Pope, 2008).
The upshot was that the structures and processes initiated by Raver largely
muted the public-private power debate by the end of the 1960s. The Corps, Bureau of
Reclamation, BPA, and regional utilities signed the Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement in 1964. At about the same time the United States signed a treaty with
Canada that doubled flood storage protection capacity to the United States in exchange
for hydropower benefits (Blumm, 1982; Ogden, 1997; Pope, 2008). The coordination
agreement and Canadian treaty codified Raver‟s vision of regional energy producers
operating together (Norwood, c.1981; Pope, 2008).
The foregoing illustrates Raver‟s belief in and efforts to establish structures
and relationships at the national and regional levels to improve coordination among
the multiple parties engaged in Northwest energy and development issues. It thus
explains his continued support for the otherwise dysfunctional Bonneville Advisory
Board and its more successful replacement, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee. Following in the tradition established by Raver, BPA would continue to
be a major participant in and shaper of the Basin‟s future governance systems.
State efforts at Basin governance.
The Northwest states strongly supported the purpose, functions, and state-led
nature of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission. Although nominally
a federal entity, it was designed to give maximum voice to its representatives from
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each of the state planning commissions. The federal coordinator at the time, like the
other members of the National Resources Planning Board, was not a federal
employees but a part time advisor engaged in his own business enterprises. This
arrangement, coupled with the relatively subordinate relationship of the federal
agencies to the Commission, meant that the states could guide plans that would
leverage federal funding and expertise in development that would benefit state
economies (Vogel, 2007).
This arrangement collapsed when Congress stopped appropriating federal
funds for the National Resources Planning Board and state and regional planning
commissions in 1943. The demise of the PNWRPC left the federal-agency-only
Bonneville Advisory Board as the sole multi-jurisdictional coordinator of Columbia
Basin development and operations. The states were not included as Board members
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
In 1943, the Bonneville Advisory Board began considering ways to increase
upriver storage in order to better regulate streamflow and allow for greater power
generation. One option was to increase the level of Flathead Lake in western Montana
by seventeen feet. This was not a new proposal as it had been a provision of the 1932
308 Report. However, the federal agencies did not vet the proposal local interests who
generated a storm of protest over the impact of changes in water level on those living
and working around the lake. The states reacted to the ending of the PNWRPC and
the Flathead Lake controversy by establishing the Northwest States Development
Association to ensure local and state interests were properly consulted in future
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development proposals (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood,
c.1981).
This was the first of three state-led efforts to assert a prominent state role in
Basin governance. Despite the support of state governors, all state-led systems faced
serious challenges in overcoming parochial state interests in favor of regional
priorities, obtaining funding and appropriate authorities from multiple state
legislatures, and the tendency of the bodies to serve as veto mechanisms over actions
perceived as contrary to the interests of state or local interests (McKinley, 1952;
Bessey, 1963). The experience of these efforts underscores the challenge to
governance presented by the tension among the states themselves and between the
states and federal agencies over who gets to decide regional priorities.
Fishing interest opposition to continued Columbia system development.
In 1943, the Senate Commerce Committee directed the Corps to extend and
revise the 308 Reports and prepare a plan for further development of the Columbia.
The Committee directed the Corps to complete the report by October 1948 (McKinley,
1952).
In 1944, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife requested that the Corps, as part of its
review, conduct a comprehensive investigation of the effects of federal dams on
Columbia River juvenile salmon. The Corps and Bureau of Reclamation agreed,
dedicated funds to this purpose, and launched an “elaborate research program”
(McKinley, 1952, p. 110).
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As the Corps study progressed, regional opposition to further large dam
construction arose despite fish passage facilities having been installed at Bonneville
dam and included in designs for proposed new projects (Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren,
2004). Sports and commercial fishers, Indian tribes, conservation groups objected to
the potential impacts on fisheries and natural character of the Columbia and Snake
Rivers. These groups forced a series of formal and informal hearings. The first, held
in The Dalles in 1945, provided a forum for fishery interests to protest plans for a dam
that would ultimately inundate Celilo Falls and destroy a tribal fishery that had existed
for centuries. Other hearings were conducted from 1946 through 1947, largely pitting
fisheries associations and tribes against regional development promoters (Robbins,
2004).
The objections voiced by the Fish and Wildlife Service to the Corps were not
resolved to the satisfaction of the Fish and Wildlife Service. In October 1946, the
agency, with the later support of the Office of Indian Affairs, protested in a memo to
the Secretary of the Interior the proposed construction of four dams planned for the
lower Snake River and the two Columbia mainstem dams proposed below the
confluence of the Snake and Columbia (McKinley, 1952). The agency recommended,
among other things, a ten-year moratorium on further dam construction on the
Columbia and lower Snake Rivers to study and better understand the impacts of the
dams on the rivers‟ fisheries (Robbins, 2004).
The Secretary of Interior invited both BPA and the Bureau of Reclamation to
comment and asked the Interior Department‟s Pacific Northwest Coordination
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Committee87 to address the question as well. The Committee submitted a report,88
backed by substantial technical analysis, detailing the conflicting interests at stake. It
established the threat to salmon runs of the existing Columbia dams and by the new
dams under consideration for the Columbia and Snake Rivers. It also pointed out the
pending loss of tribal fishing grounds, particularly at Celilo Falls, a fact that the Office
of Indian Affairs protested as a violation of 1855 treaty obligations. The National
Park Service joined the protest due to probable damage to sports fishing on the
tributaries of the Snake and Columbia. BPA, on its part in defending the new
development, noted the projected power demand increases for the region in support of
the proposed dams. Reclamation did the same with respect to projected irrigation
needs. Eventually the regional Interior agencies reached accord, producing a
consensus report that adopted the Fish and Wildlife Service‟s proposed ten-year
moratorium to give time to resolve the salmon and tribal issues, with additional funds
requested to do so. Interior‟s assistant secretary endorsed the report on March 6, 1947,
essentially presented a Department-wide critique of key provisions of the pending
Corps report (McKinley, 1952).
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The Pacific Northwest Coordination Committee was part of a Department of Interior effort to better
coordinate its programs and to provide Interior‟s representative to the Bonneville Advisory Board and
the later Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee. It was formally established by departmental order
in September, 1946 and consisted of the regional office chiefs from the BPA, Bureau of Reclamation,
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and newly created Bureau of Land Management. It
also included staff representatives from the U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau of Mines, and Office of
Indian Affairs. The executive director was Roy Bessey. A similar intradepartmental coordination body
had previously been established in the Department of Agriculture during the War years. Since the
purpose of these groups was intradepartmental coordination and to provide departmental positions to
the aforementioned interdepartmental structures, they are not considered as “regional governance
structures” for the purposes of this study. See McKinley (1952), pp. 411-479 and Bessey (1963), p. 65.
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The formal name of this report, if it had one, is not given by McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), or
Norwood (c.1981). It has not been determined as of this writing.
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News of the Department‟s position leaked and aroused immediate regional
opposition, especially from river navigation interests. The Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Office of Indian Affairs, and the National Park Service asked the Department to
release the full coordination committee report in order to get the committee‟s detailed
assembly of facts and analysis in front of the public. They wanted to preclude
regional condemnation before the facts of the conservation and tribal issues could be
made known. Instead, the Department referred the report to the interdepartmental
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee89 for resolution, only later releasing the full
report to the public (McKinley, 1952).
The CBIAC held hearings in Walla Walla, Washington, in June of 1947.
Hydropower, irrigation, inland-navigation, and urban development advocates testified
in strong opposition to the Interior position, especially the proposed ten-year delay in
further dam construction in the interests of fish impact studies. They questioned the
evidence as to whether the dams would do the harm that opponents argued, and,
regardless, hatcheries could make up any losses in fish numbers. Fishery advocates
testified in favor of the moratorium, arguing the economic value of the salmon fishery
to the region would be lost to regional electrical needs. They predicted extinction of
the salmon and ruination of one of the richest fisheries in the nation (Robbins, 2004).
Of interest to this study is the fact that these two generalized arguments, made
by a numerous pro-dam and anti-dam organizations and individuals, shared the world-
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The CBIAC is discussed in greater detail below.
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view of natural resources as market commodities. The argument was essentially over
which resource should take precedence in the name of economic development.
Testifying from an entirely different perspective was Tommy Thompson of the
Wyam Indian band, who said “I don‟t know how I would live if you put up a dam
which will flood my fishing places” (Robbins, 2004, p. 62). Although speaking
specifically about the fish as his only dependable food source, the context of
Thompson‟s comments spoke to the profound place salmon occupied in tribal society.
The CBIAC did not support the recommendation for a moratorium. Tellingly,
the two Interior Department members of the CBIAC (BPA and Reclamation) did not
support their department‟s position in discussions within the CBIAC despite the
supposed agreement reached by Interior agencies within the Coordination Committee
(McKinley, 1952). The CBIAC did, however, recommend protection of all fishery
interests below The Dalles. The CBIAC forwarded its recommendation to the Federal
Inter-Agency River Basins Committee, which provided its support in 1947 (Robbins,
2004).
Scheufele (c.1970) described the salmon issue as among the most contentious
faced by the CBIAC. Although it did not affect the debate over governance systems
following the end of World War II, the fish issue did result in the formation of the
Committee on Fish Operations to focus on the design of facilities to improve fish
passage at the dams. The overall frustration of fishery interests and continued declines
of Columbia salmon continued to mount. Although dissatisfied with the way the

191

CBIAC addressed fishery issues, fishery interests had no choice but to wait until an
opportunity to establish a more sympathetic governance system presented itself.
The Memorial Day Flood of 1949.
With the salmon debate seemingly settled, at least in the mind of the Corps of
Engineers, the Corps completed its draft report in October 1948. The Corps made
substantial revisions in the months just prior completing its final report due to
devastating flooding that occurred in late May and early June 1949. The so-called
Memorial Day Flood destroyed the city of Vanport, located on the lower Columbia
River between Portland and Vancouver, Washington, along with other communities
along the lower Columbia. The impact of the flood on the Corps report was to induce
a new basis for economic justification of flood protection and a completely revamped
plan for flood control. The report called for immediate Congressional authorization
for an integrated system of seven storage dams,90 a levee construction and renovation
program, and navigation improvements up into Idaho. It addressed some of the issues
raised by the Fish and Wildlife Service. For example, it called for salmon passage
improvements at new dams below Grand Coulee and fish restoration efforts in the
lower Columbia tributaries. It also called for irrigation and sub-basin development in
the lower Columbia and new transmission lines. The lower Snake River dams and the
dam at The Dalles remained over the objections of the tribes and fishery interests. The
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These dams were to be located at Libby, Albeni Falls, Priest Rapids, Hells Canyon, John Day, The
Dalles, and at Glacier View in Glacier National Park. With the exception of Glacier View, which was
dropped due to objections from the National Park Service, all of these dams were eventually completed
although the Priest Rapids and Hells Canyon projects were built by public utility and private utility
interests respectively. See McKinley, 1952, pp. 636 – 643.
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estimated cost for the full program was $3 billion (McKinley, 1952). The flood thus
effectively washed away, along with the city of Vanport, any hopes by opponents for a
construction moratorium on the proposed projects.
Continued system development.
Concurrent with the Corps‟s flood study was the Bureau of Reclamation‟s
Report on the Columbia River Power System, completed in 1947.91 At the height of
the 1948 flooding, before the Corps report was finished, the President requested the
Department of Interior to review and comment on existing long-range plans for the
Columbia in light of the flooding. Presumably, this meant review of the pending
Corps‟s revision to the 308 Report and the Bureau‟s report, although McKinley (1952)
does not specifically state this. The regional field offices of the Corps and
Reclamation entered into discussions to “harmonize the two separate comprehensive
reports for the river system” (McKinley, 1952, p. 638). They reached agreement in
early December a few days before DOI formally released its report, causing some
consternation within Interior as the offices had entered into negotiations before the
Department had agreed on a position (McKinley, 1952). Subsequent “harmonization”
discussions took place at the Washington DC level resulting in a joint letter signed by
the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the Corps of
Engineers, and the Commission of the Bureau of Reclamation on April 11, 1949. The
agreement included provisions on policy, project features, construction
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Ogden (1949) reported that the Bureau of Reclamation completed a comprehensive study in 1947
(see p. 425) as did Bessey (1963). McKinley (1952) did not give a date, ambiguously stating only that
the report was “recently prepared and about to be published” (p. 436) when speaking of events
occurring around 1947 and 1948.
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responsibilities, and construction scheduling. The Northwest now had a revised,
comprehensive planning document addressing the areas noted above plus watershed
protection, soil conservation, water supply, recreation, and pollution. It did not,
however, resolve the tribal treaty issues or fully address salmon conservation needs
(McKinley, 1952). Regional commercial development needs of electricity, navigation,
irrigation, and flood protection had sidelined tribal and salmon fishery issues.
In accordance with the agreed to plan, The Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation built major dams on the mainstems and /or tributaries of the Columbia,
Willamette, Yakima and Snake River Basins. Joining Bonneville and Grand Coulee
Dams on the Columbia main stem were McNary Dam (in service 1952),92 Albeni Falls
(1955), The Dalles (1957), Chief Joseph (1958), and John Day (1971). The Flathead
and Kootenai and Flathead tributaries to the upper Columbia saw completion of
Hungry Horse (1953) and Libby (1975) respectively. Dams built on Willamette93,94
tributaries were Big Cliff, Detroit, and Lookout Point (1953); Dexter (1954), Green
Springs (1960), Hills Creek (1962), Cougar (1963), and Foster and Green Peter
(1967). Chandler and Roza Dams came in service on the Yakima in 1956 and 1958,
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McNary dam completion was delayed by the DOI – Corps negotiations over the two plans
(McKinley, 1952).
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Whether the Willamette projects are actually a formal part of the FCRPS is a point of some
confusion. For purposes of the ongoing salmon litigation, the federal government has tended to not
count them as they are outside of the “action area” as defined by the action agencies and evaluated by
NMFS in their biological opinions. The same is true for projects in the Yakima and Snake River above
Hells Canyon. However, the dams on all of these tributaries are included in the joint BPA-CorpsReclamation brochure (2003) entitled the Federal Columbia River Power System. Consequently, they
are included here.
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No federal dams were constructed on the mainstem of the Willamette River.
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respectively. In the Snake Basin, Anderson Ranch (1950) and Palisades (1958) were
completed in the upper tributaries and Ice Harbor (1962), Lower Monumental (1969),
Little Goose (1970), and Lower Granite (1975). Dworshak Dam, on the Clearwater
River tributary to the lower Snake, came into service in 1973 (FCRPS, 2003).95 Lost
Creek on the Willamette was soon to follow, coming into service in 1977. Twenty-six
major dams were completed for hydropower, navigation, flood control, and other
purposes over twenty-five years. These, plus the five completed prior to 1946,
brought the FCRPS to 31 projects ultimately leading to a total federal hydropower
generating capacity of over 22,000 megawatts. All were constructed, operated, and
maintained by either the Corps or Bureau, with BPA marketing the electricity
generated (FCRPS, 2003). With the exception of Grand Coulee Dam, The Corps and
Bureau included fish passage facilities at all federal projects on the Columbia River
mainstem and lower Snake River (Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004).

Resulting Governance Systems
The abolishment of the national central planning committee and PNWRPC in
1943 and the weakness of the Bonneville Advisory Board at War end highlighted the
need for continued coordination and collaboration on Columbia development issues.
The states, reacting to the loss of the PNWRPC and the Flathead Lake controversy,
implemented the Northwest States Development Association in 1943. This state-only
effort collapsed in early 1944.
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All dates shown are the dates the projects came on line for hydroelectricity generation. These may
vary from the dates of construction or when other purposes became available.
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The vacuum in Basin governance highlighted in others the need for a more
robust governance entity. In 1945, new bills were introduced in the Senate and House
to resurrect and establish some form of Columbia valley authority. These bills failed,
but in response to them and in recognition of the need for more effective planning and
operational coordination, the regional federal agencies recommended establishment of
the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee in 1946. The CBIAC was formed as a
subcommittee of the national FIARBC. The CBIAC assumed the functions of both
the PNWRPC and the now replaced Bonneville Advisory Board (McKinley, 1952;
Scheufele, c.1970).
Continued concerns over the voluntary nature of CBIAC participation and the
lack of a decision making structure to overcome agency differences resulted in other
governance systems being proposed. There were several revised efforts between 1947
and 1949 to establish some form of valley authority for the Columbia. These efforts
failed due to a general nationwide collapse in support for powerful centralized
government entities in general, loss of public and political support for valley
authorities in particular (Goodwin, 1983), and lackluster support from the Truman
administration (DeLuna, 1997). The Northwest states made another effort to establish
a state-led system by initiating negotiations for a Columbia River Basin Interstate
Compact in 1949. This state effort was also inspired in part by the resurrection of the
valley authority idea and in part by the desire of the states to play a significant if not
dominant role in regional development (Bessey, 1963). While these negotiations were
underway, the states established a Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy
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Committee in 1953. This committee, ostensibly created within the framework of the
CBIAC for purposes of coordinating regional implementation of the Eisenhower‟s
partnership policy, was in reality an attempt by the states to assert a more influential
voice in regional development. When the partnership policy ended so too did this
committee.
Events surrounding the end of the War inspired these governance proposals.
Evolutionary changes within existing systems led to two other governance systems
being enacted that were not directly due to events occurring around the time of the
War‟s conclusion. Both were evolutionary improvements among existing systems.
One of these was the Committee on Fish Operations established in the 1960s in
response to growing agency concerns over the impact of the dams on regional salmon
runs. The other was the result of a proposal from the Truman administration‟s Water
Policy Commission to abolish the voluntary inter-agency committees and replace them
with congressionally authorized and statutorily supported river basin commissions.
Congress responded with the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 authorizing the
recommended commissions. The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission was
established in 1967 to replace the CBIAC. The states and federal CBIAC members
strongly supported the PNWRBC as a significant improvement over the CBIAC.
Further discussion of each of these eleven systems follows.
The Northwest States Development Association.
Following the dissolution of the national planning board and the PNWRPC in
July of 1943, five of the Pacific Northwest governors agreed to establish the
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Northwest States Development Association. Complaints by Montana over the
Bonneville Advisory Board‟s failure to consult with the state in its proposal to raise
Flathead Lake water levels prompted them to do so. The loss of the central role held
upon the PNWRPC‟s termination also motivated the governors. The Association‟s
purpose was to coordinate and correlate the plans of member states with regard to
interstate developmental issues. Its priorities were development of irrigation, power,
and flood control. The group produced one report on Basin development in December
1943, and then became inactive. It disappeared shortly thereafter due to conflicts over
state interests and priorities, changes in governors, and a general lack of public and
political interest (Bessey, 1960; Scheufele, c.1970).
Columbia Valley Authority: redux I.
The shortcomings of the Bonneville Advisory Board‟s cooperative structure,
including its lack of a decision-making mechanism and inability to manage
interagency rivalry became apparent once the war-related construction effort ended.
These limitations, coupled with the lack of access by non-federal interests, led to a
renewed effort to implement a Columbia Valley Authority (McKinley, 1952). Senator
Hugh Mitchell of Washington introduced a bill to that effect in 1945. His proposal
would transfer the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams and all future Basin
development responsibilities to a new public corporation, managed under a threeperson board of directors and under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. It
would also establish an advisory council of regional governors. Although the CVA
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was to conduct its operations in cooperation with other agencies, McKinley considered
this limitation “hortatory, rather than legally enforceable” (McKinley, 1952, p. 551).
That same year Congressman Walt Horan introduced a bill promoting a
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority. This proposal was a modification of the
original valley authority idea. It limited the authority‟s duties to planning,
development, and management of a single resource – water. Other than that, its
structure and provisions were similar to Mitchell‟s Senate bill, to include the transfer
of BPA to the new authority. A significant difference was its provisions for a
presidentially appointed corporate oversight board of which at least one member
would be from one of the regional states as recommended by that state‟s governor.
The proposal also called for an advisory council comprised of the state governors and
supported by a staff-level commission that would review all proposals for water
resource utilization. Like Mitchell‟s bill in the Senate, Horan‟s bill went nowhere,
especially in light of the Republican victories in 1946 (McKinley, 1952).
The Grange,96 labor, and public power leaders seeking more integrated river
management strongly supported the idea of a valley authority. However, even these
proponents disagreed with the centralized nature of Mitchell‟s proposal and demanded
greater local involvement in decision-making. The Grange, for example, opposed the
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The Grange was founded by Oliver Hudson Kelley. A farmer himself, Kelley was appalled by the
way carpetbaggers from the north were taking advantage of the plight of southern farmers in the
aftermath of the Civil War. Kelley joined with six others to form the Order of the Patrons of
Husbandry, the National Grange on December 4, 1867. The Grange‟s stated purpose was to unite
private citizens in improving the economic and social position of the nation‟s farm population. In the
Northwest, it proved an instrumental voice in the development of the Columbia for irrigation and
navigation purposes (Ogden, 1949; Gilliam, 1999).
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apparent surrender of state water law to federal authority and proposed alternatives to
Mitchell‟s provisions on irrigation and water rights (McKinley, 1952). Mitchell
submitted a second bill later in the year that contained “elaborate appointment
requirements and advisory council review” provisions (Ogden, 1949, p. 358).
Organized labor and farmers, the Washington governor, and public power advocates
supported these provisions, but others felt them to be too awkward for efficient
administration. Opposition to the new CVA proposal appeared almost immediately,
led by private power and reclamation associations such as the Northwest Development
Association, an influential lobbying group formed in 1945 to promote private-federal
agency partnerships and oppose CVA establishment.97 The CVA effort ultimately
failed with the temporary loss of Democrat majorities in Congress and Mitchell‟s
retirement in 1946 (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Scheufele, c.1970; Robbins,
2004).
The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee.
The Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee charter allowed creation of
regional “subcommittees.” FIARBC established the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee as one such subcommittee in 1946 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963;
Scheufele, c.1970; DeLuna, 1997). The CBIAC was the second regional
subcommittee so established, the other being in the Missouri River Basin (McKinley,
1952; Scheufele, c.1970). The CBIAC came at the urging of the heads of the regional
federal agency offices, based on the need for interagency cooperation after the
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Not to be confused with the by-then disbanded Northwest States Development Association, discussed
earlier.
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dissolution of the PNWRPC and in response to renewed proposals for establishment of
a Columbia Valley Authority-like agency (Scheufele, c.1970; Ogden, 1997).
FIARBC intended the CBIAC as a forum for regional field representatives of
federal agencies to exchange information and effectively coordinate their activities.
At the urging of BPA Administrator Raver, CBIAC federal membership was
established as the same as the former Bonneville Advisory Board. CBIAC members
thus included the Commander of the Corps‟s North Pacific Division, the Northwest
regional director of the Bureau of Reclamation, a representative from the Federal
Power Commission, a special field representative from the Department of Agriculture,
and the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration (Scheufele, c.1970).
The Department of Commerce was added in 1947 (McKinley, 1952) as was the
Department of Labor (Bessey, 1963).
Of interest was that Interior representation was limited to the Department‟s two
development-oriented agencies: BPA and the Bureau of Reclamation. The
conservation-oriented Fish and Wildlife Service, the preservationist-oriented National
Park Service, and the tribal-oriented Office of Indian Affairs were not members and
had to route their issues through the Departmental representative from the Bureau of
Reclamation. Passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act changed this in 1956,
at which time the Fish and Wildlife Service became Interior‟s third CBIAC member
(Ogden, 1997).
The states were not included as members in the original resolution, but the
governors of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Washington, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada
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were later invited to participate by jointly designating five representatives. The intent
for these representatives was to participate in regular meetings and advise the CBIAC
on state interests. The states never formally designated their five representatives.
However, from the outset, as a practical matter once they began meeting, the CBIAC
considered all seven state governors (or their designated representatives) as bonafide
members allowed to cast votes along with the federal agency representatives. Initially,
all but Washington accepted the opportunity to formally participate.98 Despite this
formal declination, once the CBIAC began to meet, Washington would participate in
an “observer” status at each meeting. It finally accepted formal membership in 1949
(McKinley, 1952; Scheufele, c.1970).
State contributions varied throughout the life of the CBIAC, however. To
some members, it appeared that the individual state representatives were more
interested in protecting state and local interests than contributing to region-wide
planning vision. The status of the states with respect to the federal members and state
interest in participating varied over time (Scheufele, c.1970).
The CBIAC chair rotated on an annual basis among the federal members.
Meetings were conducted at cities throughout the region in order to stay in touch with
local concerns, with part of each meeting was open to the public. There was no
dedicated funding for supporting staff; the Chair‟s agency provided any needed staff
98

According to McKinley (1952), the Washington governor‟s stated reason for declining was that
Washington had a predominate interest in the Columbia Basin and should not be considered an equal
with states of lesser interest. McKinley (1952) opined that the real reason was suspicion on the part of
Washington that the CBIAC was just a substitute for a CVA, to which the state was philosophically
opposed.
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support (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).99 The CBIAC
established several technical committees and produced numerous technical studies in
areas such as hydrologic data, power planning, stream flow, recreation, demographic
trends, noxious weeds, and fisheries.100
FIARBC intended their regional subcommittees to function as a coordination
forum between the federal agencies and participating states (McKinley, 1952; Bessey,
1963; Scheufele, c.1970). Bessey (1963) and Scheufele (c.1970) argued that the
CBIAC performed the coordination function quite well and served admirably as a
vehicle for keeping the Committee‟s members in touch with local regional needs and
the public informed of Committee activities. Oregon governor Mark Hatfield echoed
this feeling, declaring at a 1959 meeting, “In my opinion, the Columbia Basin InterAgency Committee has completely justified its existence under its present charter. It
has provided a forum for discussion and dissemination to the public of facts and group
thinking on various basin problems...It has, through its subcommittees and task forces,
developed much basic data of vital importance in planning activities” (Quoted in
Bessey, 1963, p. 111).
Nevertheless, the CBIAC was roundly criticized as well, mostly by valley
authority proponents. From the beginning, “will of its membership, always precarious
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McKinley (1952) claimed that this format did not work particularly well, arguing that “coordination
in the usual administrative sense of the term cannot be effectively practiced in the atmosphere of a
public hearing” (p. 471). Bessey (1963) was more supportive, claiming that the public hearing aspect
helped keep the region informed and the CBIAC in touch with local concerns.
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Many of these reports can be found online through a web search for “Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee.”
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and by the laws, policies, and practices of member agencies” (Scheufele, c.1970, p. 1)
could limit movement on any issue. The CBIAC was thus “notoriously silent on many
controversial issues, partly because one Federal [sic] agency hesitates to criticize
publicly the views and determinations of another such agency and partly because the
state and federal members are reluctant to take positions on which there is not
unanimity” (Mark Hatfield, as quoted by Bessey, 1963, p. 111). Hatfield‟s ultimate
point was the need for one, single comprehensive plan for water resource development
and utilization that all of the basin‟s entities would use to guide their respective
projects and programs. Such unified agreement apparently eluded the CBIAC even
after the Corps-Reclamation 1949 report was completed. Portland‟s Oregonian
editorially criticized the CBIAC as a “paper tiger” that was unable to arrive at a
comprehensive plan as long as it could not make decisions to resolve interagency
disagreements (Bessey, 1963, p. 111). Others criticized the CBIAC‟s cooperative
structure to call for its replacement by “a single agency not charged with the primary
responsibility of any one use of water” (Bessey, 1963, p. 112) – in effect, a valley
authority.
In his 1952 argument for a Columbia Valley Authority, McKinley cites the
failure of the CBIAC to adopt the Interior proposal regarding the dam construction
moratorium in 1946 as an example of the failure of the CBIAC process.101 McKinley
also notes “sharp conflict” (McKinley, 1952, p. 110) between the development-
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It‟s not clear if McKinley (1952) was critiquing the process in general or the outcome of this
particular decision.
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oriented CBIAC and conservation-oriented Fish and Wildlife Service (and presumably
the Office of Indian Affairs) as well among CBIAC members in general. For
example, the CBIAC was unable to resolve a conflict between BPA and the Bureau of
Reclamation when the former wanted to extend its transmission system into southern
Idaho in 1946 (McKinley, 1952).102 Neither the CBIAC nor its parent FIARBC had
an authoritative decision mechanism to resolve such differences (McKinley, 1952).
Scheufele (c.1970) was more forgiving, noting that the harshest critics tended to base
their criticism on what they thought the CBIAC ought to do, rather than evaluating it
against the reasons for which it was actually established. When assessed from the
perspective of its originating resolution, Scheufele (c.1970) declared the CBIAC
remarkably successful.
Despite its weaknesses, the CBIAC functioned for a little over twenty years.
During that time, it was the only intergovernmental regional entity active in resource
planning and development (Bessey, 1963). It held its last meeting in 1967 at which
point it amiably transferred its responsibilities to the Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission (Scheufele, c.1970).103
Columbia River Basin Interstate Compact.
In 1949, regional governors asked the governor of Washington to lead an effort
to establish an interstate compact for Pacific Northwest states. Each interested state
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See McKinley, 1952, pp. 210-224 for further discussion of the southern Idaho issue.
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Norwood (c.1981) stated that the last meeting occurred in 1966. Ogden (1997) agreed with
Scheufele (c. 1970) that the date of the last CBIAC meeting was in 1967. As Scheufele (c.1970) based
his report upon review of CBIAC records, it is his 1967 date that is used here.
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was to name a delegate to participate in a commission to negotiate an interstate
compact. Delegates from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming met in
1950. Utah and Nevada would later join for the first formal meeting of the Columbia
Interstate Compact Commission in 1952 (Bessey, 1963).
This was the second state effort (after the Northwest States Development
Association) intended to carve out a larger regional planning role for the states
(Bessey, 1963) and to provide a forum for resolving upper and lower Columbia Basin
water allocation issues (National Research Council, 2004). Myriad other motives
energized promoters both for and against the effort in the region (Bessey, 1963). The
governors opposed establishment of a federal-centric valley authority, although
opinions on this point varied sharply among their respective state officials and
legislatures (Bessey, 1963). Much of the compact negotiations focused on publicprivate hydropower issues with arguments among the states with a history of private
power development and those with a history of public power (National Research
Council, 2004). Ogden (1997) says that negotiations collapsed in the late 1950s due to
opposition by public power advocates and the state of Washington, who came to see
the effort as an attack on the federal hydropower system. Bessey (1963) noted the
effort as still alive though unresolved at the time of his writing. The National
Research Council (2004) says negotiations continued up to 1968, at which point the
state compact commissioners finally signed a Columbia River Basin Compact.
Congress approved the Compact the same year. The effort collapsed, however, when
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the legislatures of Washington and Oregon refused to ratify it (National Research
Council, 2004).
Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy Committee.
The third state effort at regaining a central role in development planning came
in 1953. President Eisenhower‟s partnership program anticipated replacing reliance
on the federal bureaucracy for natural resource planning and management with joint
venture type arrangements among federal agencies, state and local governments, and
private interests (Scheufele, c.1970). In response, the Northwest governors proposed
at the September CBIAC meeting that a subcommittee be formed to implement this
new policy direction. At least one governor saw this subcommittee as an interim
measure pending ratification of the Columbia River interstate compact then under
negotiation among the states. Federal members saw it as a veiled attempt to wrest
control over regional resources - especially the hydrosystem - away from the federal
agencies and transfer it to state or private entities. In time, this committee all but took
over the role of the full CBIAC, operating as an independent group led by the
governors. As a result, participation in CBIAC meetings dwindled to just about the
point of collapse (Scheufele, c.1970).
The Governors‟ group produced seven technical reports before disbanding by
mutual consent in 1958. The group suffered from the same interstate conflicts that had
doomed the Northwest States Development Association. It did not help that the
administration‟s “partnership” policy was poorly defined, never well received
politically, and enjoyed little support from the administration especially in the latter
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half of Eisenhower‟s second term. The partnership policy died around 1958 taking the
Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy Committee with it. With the demise of
the governors‟ committee, members renewed their participation in the CBIAC
(Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
Columbia Valley Authority: redux II.
The Columbia Valley Authority idea was resurrected in three variants between
1947 and 1949. The first, introduced in the House 1947 and entitled the Columbia
Interstate Commission, was essentially a resubmitted version of Horan‟s 1945
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority. It envisioned a public corporation similar to
the CVA but with its jurisdiction limited to water resources and hydroelectricity. The
second was a reintroduction the CVA along the lines of the revised 1945 Mitchell bill
submitted to the Senate in 1947 and House in 1948. The third was a proposal for a
Columbia Valley Administration, backed by the administration to the degree that it
eventually completely eclipsed discussion of the other proposals (McKinley, 1952).
The election of 1946 “retired” a number of New Deal congressional
representatives and senators, including many in the pro-public power state of
Washington. In their place were elected Republicans that were more conservative. As
a result, the “political stock of the CVA movement took a drastic tumble” (McKinley,
1952, pp. 561-562). The banner of CVA leadership thus passed from the now-retired
Senator Mitchell of Washington to Congressman Walt Horan of Washington and
Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho.
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In 1947, Horan revised his 1945 Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority
proposal in deference to the pro-business sympathies of the Republicans. He
introduced a House bill calling for establishment of a Columbia Interstate
Commission. This agency would be the same as contemplated in his earlier bill but
limited water resource development to only those activities not suitable for private
development and restricted transmission and sale of electrical energy to wholesale
markets only (McKinley, 1952). It too failed.
Taylor of Idaho introduced his Columbia Valley Authority bill to the Senate
later in 1947. It retained the major components of the second 1945 Mitchell bill. A
significant modification was a joint federal-state-private interest advisory structure to
review unified plans and major policy proposals and advise as to which programs were
suitable for private development. “Though there was little serious hope” that the 80th
Congress would pass this bill, it served “to keep the [CVA] idea alive in the region”
pending the return of a more supportive political environment (McKinley, 1952, p.
564).
The surprise reelection of the Truman administration in 1948 brought new
hope to Columbia Valley Authority proponents (DeLuna, 1997). Congressman Henry
“Scoop” Jackson took the opportunity rendered by the election results to reintroduce
the second Mitchell CVA bill in the House in 1948, supporting Taylor‟s effort in the
Senate the year before. President Truman sent a special message to Congress in April
1949 in support, urging establishment of a CVA (McKinley, 1952).
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Shortly thereafter, the administration established a team under one of the
president‟s personal aides to create a legislative plan for the Columbia. Senator
Warren Magnuson of Washington introduced the resulting bill in April 1949. Debate
over this bill took “center stage” in the valley authority discussions, essentially
sidelining the previous Jackson and Taylor proposals (McKinley, 1952).
The newly proposed agency was entitled the Columbia Valley Administration
(CVAd). Like the Horan proposals, it limited operating responsibilities to water
resources, power generation, and power transmission. Unlike other CVA proposals, it
would not transfer land management functions of the Department of Agriculture or the
lands, minerals, and wildlife functions of the Department of Interior unless Congress
otherwise appropriated funds especially for that purpose. In effect, the CVAd would
take over the regional water resource responsibilities of the Bureau of Reclamation,
BPA, and the Corps of Engineers, eliminating the first two from the Pacific Northwest
and limiting the Corps civil functions to the coastal tributaries and operation of the
Columbia navigation system (McKinley, 1952).
As originally proposed, the CVAd would be a government corporation with a
general manager appointed by a board of directors. This board was to be comprised of
the regional agency leaders and the governors of the Northwest states. The board was
to develop unified plans and programs for the President to submit for approval to
Congress. Proponents within the Administration claimed that this granted no new
authorities to the federal government, just “relocated” the decision-making power
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from old agencies to this new entity that was answerable to a board with substantial
regional representation (McKinley, 1952; DeLuna, 1997).
In addition to the New Dealers, supporters included the state agency staff and
most legislators from Washington and Oregon, farmers, public utilities, and the
Department of the Interior. Opponents saw this as a thinly disguised version of the
CVA. In contrast to their agency staffs, the governors of Oregon and Washington
opposed the measure, as did governors from Utah, Idaho, and Nevada. Their reasons
were the same as their opposition to the CVA – relinquishment of local control over
natural resources, especially water, to a central federal decision-maker. Additional
opponents included the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, private power
advocates, and many local towns and jurisdictions. The Department of Agriculture
voiced neutrality (DeLuna, 1997).
The CVAd represented the final attempt by New Dealers to impose a stronger
decision-making system over Northwest resource development. Its purpose was to
serve as a balance between the decision-by-consensus model of the CBIAC and the
authoritative CVA. It failed due to tepid support from the Truman administration
coupled with strong opposition from federal agencies and regional governors. Its
demise effectively ended serious efforts to establish a central federal authority to
oversee federal natural resource programs in the Northwest (DeLuna, 1997).
Committee on Fish Operations.
The Committee on Fish Operations was established in the 1960s to find ways
to operate the FCRPS in order to address the impact of the system on fish and
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wildlife.104 COFO consisted of state fish and wildlife managers and federal operators
and regulators. It apparently evolved into a committee of apparently narrower focus
entitled the Water Budget Implementation Work Group under some association with
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council soon after passage of the 1980 Power
Act (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996). COFO coexisted
alongside the CBIAC and the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission. It is not
clear at the time of this writing if COFO was a component of one or the other or
established independently of these other two systems.
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission.
In 1950, the presidentially appointed Water Resources Policy Commission
issued a report on water resources development. Although the commission believed
that empowering a single federal agency to oversee water development was the
preferred alternative, it realized after the defeat of the administration‟s CVAd effort
that Congress would not support such an approach. Instead, they proposed that
FIARBC‟s regional subcommittees be reconstituted as congressionally created
“commissions.” The commissions were to consist of the federal agencies involved in
the given river basin. The President would appoint an independent chairman
answerable only to him. A board of review established within the executive branch
104

The only reference to COFO found in the course of this study was a brief mention in the Mainstem
Operations Work Group Revised Draft dated 1996 and found on the Northwest Power and Planning
Council‟s website. It is not clear whether COFO was established as a committee under the CBIAC
(Scheufele, c.1970, does not mention it). It does not appear in any of the other sources reviewed for this
study. Its exact dates of origin and termination and its exact membership were not identified. It is also
not clear if its “fish and wildlife managers” membership included tribal representation or was limited to
state and federal agencies. There are several COFO participants still active in regional fish and
hydropower issues, however. Further information could likely be obtained through interviews with
them.
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would provide oversight. States would be consulted but would not be formal
commission members. The board recommended changing the congressional
authorization and appropriation‟s processes for each individual agency to be
supportive of the commission concept. Unresolved was the issue of whether
commission chairs would be empowered to authoritatively resolve agency disputes
(DeLuna, 1997).
Congress acted on this proposal through passage of the Water Resources
Planning Act in 1965.105 The Act established a Water Resources Council to be
comprised of cabinet level representatives from the Departments of Interior, Army,
Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and the
Federal Power Commission (later the Department of Energy). It further authorized
establishment of river basin commissions upon recommendation from a state governor
or from the Council. In a major departure from the inter-agency committees, it also
authorized federal funding for regional basin commission staff, supplies, and office
space (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965; Ogden, 1997).
Executive Order 11331 subsequently established the Pacific Northwest River
Basins Commission on March 6, 1967 (National Archives, undated). Consistent with
the recommendation of the 1950 commission report, the PNWRBC chair was a federal
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The circumstances surrounding passage of this Act in 1965 could arguably serve as another critical
situation in governance paradigms for this paper. However, the lack of published secondary
information and analysis regarding the formulation of this act and the resulting river basin commissions
made such a division hard to define. Additionally, in practice, the PNWRBC does not seem to present a
significant departure from the purpose and function of the CBIAC. Its formation was supported by
most if not all CBIAC participants and its membership was identical to that of the CBIAC (Bessey,
1963; Scheufele, c.1970). Consequently, for the purposes of this study, its passage is considered an
evolutionary improvement to the CBIAC rather than a forced change under a critical situation.
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appointee. Federal members included the Corps of Engineers; Department of
Agriculture agencies Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, and Economic
Research Service; Department of Interior agencies Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of
Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries,106 and Water Pollution
Control Administration; the Federal Power Commission; the Department of Housing
and Urban Development; and the Bonneville Power Administration acting as a
separate agency (Ogden, 1997). Later, some agencies were replaced due to
reorganizations and other, newly created, agencies added. The Department of Energy
replaced the Federal Power Commission. The Department of Commerce absorbed the
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and reorganized it to the National Marine Fisheries
Service, which in turn joined the Commission. The Environmental Protection Agency
joined upon its establishment under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(Ogden, 1997).
In contrast to the 1950 recommendation, there were no adjustments made to
congressional authorizations or appropriations. Established congressional authorizing
and appropriating committees would continue to oversee the agencies charged with
implementing the statutes under committee jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 1965 Act
specifically retained each agency‟s decision-making prerogatives. Participants were to
make a “reasonable endeavor” (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965, section 203 (d))
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Weber (2002) stated that the bureaus of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife and Commercial Fisheries
were created in 1956 as subordinate bureaus of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Clarke and McCool
(1996) stated that they functioned more as independent entities. The fact that Ogden (1997) identified
them separately implies they acted in their own right with regard to PNWRBC business.
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to reach consensus, and, failing consensus, dissenting views were to be included in
Commission reports (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965).
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and Nevada were eligible to
send representatives although, in practice, Nevada was not an active participant. The
states could choose the Commission‟s vice-chair from among their representatives
(Ogden, 1997). The PNWRBC was authorized its own staff, funded under Water
Resources Council appropriations. It had responsibility for comprehensive planning
for water and related land resources planning. During its time, it completed a
comprehensive report on the Columbia River Basin and several studies on individual
subbasins (Ogden, 1997). Similar to the CBIAC, it produced numerous technical
reports covering fish, power, nuclear energy development, the Columbia River
estuary, and water requirements, among others. 107
There was no indication in the material reviewed for this study as to who
supported or opposed the river basins commission concept. Apparently, no one has
yet written general history of the 1965 Water Resources Planning Act or the
PNWRBC. Regardless, on September 30, 1981 President Ronald Reagan terminated
the PNWRBC by Executive Order 12319. Congress never repealed the statutory
authorization, however and, theoretically, the President could reestablish the
commissions by executive order (Ogden, 1997; National Archives, undated).
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These topics were derived from the titles of multiple reports, published under the name of the
PNWRBC or its committees, obtained through a web search for material related to the PNWRBC.
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Chapter Summary
The events surrounding the end of World War II and their impact on regional
governance can be summarized as follows:
The return of economic prosperity following the end of World War II
resulted in a lessening of support for large governmental bureaucracies and
a return of confidence in private markets. As a result, the National
Resources Planning Board lost its congressional funding and the Pacific
Northwest Regional Planning Commission and associated state planning
commissions were disbanded (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Goodwin,
1983).
Eleven proposals to establish governance systems were made to replace the
PNWRPC and address the weaknesses of the Bonneville Advisory Board.
Five were enacted, of which three lasted for any length of time. Those
three were the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (1946 – 1967), its
successor the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967-1981),
and the Committee of Fish Operations (1960s – early 1980s) (McKinley,
1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997;
Ogden, 1997).
Northwest states made three efforts to reestablish the central role they lost
with the demise of the PNWRPC. Two (the Northwest States
Development Association and the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power
Policy Committee) were enacted but short lived. State legislatures did not
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ratify the third, an initiative to establish an interstate compact even though
agreed to by the governors and supported by Congress. These efforts
succumbed to interstate rivalries, lack of funding, and diminished public
and political interest (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981;
DeLuna, 1997; Ogden, 1997).
Congressional proponents of a Columbia Valley Authority renewed their
efforts in 1945 and 1947. The surprise reelection of Harry Truman in 1948
reenergized them, leading a series of valley authority bills up through 1949.
All failed to pass as public and political support for the valley authority
idea dwindled ((McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Goodwin, 1983; Ogden,
1997; DeLuna, 1997).
In the Northwest, the Bonneville Power Administration developed as a
major regional institutional actor under the leadership of Administrator
Paul Raver. Raver‟s aggressive promotion of close collaboration with
regional utilities, fellow federal agencies, and the regional congressional
delegation strengthened the agency‟s position in the region and established
a tradition within BPA that exists to this day (Norwood, c.1981, Blumm,
1982; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008).
Opposition to planned construction of mainstem dams by commercial,
sport, and tribal fishery interests appeared in the mid 1940s, represented by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Office of Indian Affairs. Efforts to
impose a moratorium on dam construction pending more research on the
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effects of the dams on fish failed (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963;
Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; Robbins, 1997).
Although the Northwest salmon issue made its way onto the governance
agenda beginning in the mid 1940s, the efforts of the governance systems in place –
comprised almost exclusively of development-oriented agencies – failed to satisfy the
concerns of fishery managers. However, pressure for change was building. A tribal
sovereignty movement emerged in the 1950s to restore tribal culture and promote
tribal interests. Backed by major court victories in the 1970s, the tribes sought to
obtain a greater voice in regional decision-making. In addition to the emergence of
the tribes as regional actors, the nascent American environmental movement was
gaining traction beginning in the 1960s. Environmentalists voiced concerns about the
impact of development on Northwest resources but, like the tribes, could not find
traction in the region‟s governance systems.
The development-oriented institutions controlling Basin policy decisions
continued to see management of Columbia Basin issues through the lens of
commercial benefit. The agencies perceived the governance challenge to be a
balancing of federal agency prerogatives with the interests of the states and nongovernmental trade associations dependent upon the system‟s commercial uses of
navigation, power, irrigation, water supply, recreation, land, timber, and fish harvest.
The competing interests of a relatively limited set of participants all of whom shared
the same general commercial market-oriented worldview thus effectively guided
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governance decisions. As of 1976, tribal members and environmentalists holding
different worldviews had not yet obtained a seat at the regional governance table.
The opportunity for them to do so came with the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis
of the 1970s. A mixture of miscalculations and overconfidence by energy planners led
to a major financial crisis in the 1970s and presented the region with its third critical
situation. It resulted in a governance system that offered those holding worldviews
based on tribal culture and environmental values their first foothold in regional
decision making.
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CHAPTER 6
THE HYDRO-THERMAL CRISIS (1976)

Introduction
The region‟s hydro-thermal crisis, symbolized by the notice of insufficiency
issued by the Bonneville Power Administration in 1976, provided the catalyst for the
Basin‟s third major change between governance models. The resulting Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 (Power Act) created
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (NPPC or
Council) that shifted the locus of Basin developmental decision-making away from the
federal cooperation model back to a state-centric model. The pressure for change this
had been building over the previous thirty years.
Several national trends set the social and political context for events in the
Northwest. A tribal sovereignty movement began in the 1950s in response to a new
national policy to terminate Indian treaties, end the tribal trust relationship with the
federal government, and assimilate Indian people into mainstream American culture.
This movement resulted in improvements in tribal capacity for self-government, a
renewed confidence in asserting their rights, and a partial return to traditional tribal
culture and beliefs (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005). In addition to the tribal movement
was the American environmental movement. Events such as publication of Rachel
Carson‟s Silent Spring, the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire in Ohio, and the first Earth Day
in 1970 propelled environmentalism into the national consciousness (Dunlap and
Mertig, 1992a; Kline, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2005). Finally, the election of Ronald
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Reagan to the presidency in 1980 brought with it a philosophy of smaller government
and an emphasis of the prerogatives of local government and private enterprise.
Four regional developments converged with national trends and led to the
governance provisions of the Power Act. The first was the region‟s hydro-thermal
program and resulting financial crisis provided the proximate cause for the Power
Act‟s passage (Pope, 2008). The second was the continuing decline in regional
salmon runs. The decline continued the opposition to the dams by fishery interests
that began in the 1940s. It also led to a coalition of commercial, sport, and tribal
fishery managers with environmental activists. Although operating from three
dramatically different worldviews, the impact that dams were having on regional fish
united them in opposition to existing management systems and structures
(Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999). The third regional development was two major
court victories won by regional tribes regarding their trust and treaty rights to fish
(Wilkinson, 2005). The fourth, related to the third, was the decision by the tribes of
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Nation, and the Nez Perce tribe to unite in a coalition to promote tribal
fishing rights and manage intertribal fisheries (CRITFC, 2010).
Absent the the regional salmon decline, the common opposition to dams by
environmentalists and regional fishery interests, and the growth in tribal influence, the
1980 Power Act would likely have only addressed regional electric power issues in
response to the hydro-thermal financial crisis. Instead, it established a new
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governance system oriented on resource conservation as well as power production and
insisted that the Basin‟s fish and wildlife receive equal consideration with the region‟s
electricity needs (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; Bodi, 1995).
Coincident with the establishment of the Council was the disbanding of the
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission, along with almost all of the other river
basin commissions, by executive order in 1981. The termination of the PNWRBC had
more to do with the philosophical leanings of the Reagan administration than specific
issues in the Northwest. Its disestablishment and the apparent dissolution of the
Committee on Fish Operations at around the same time left the state-led Council as the
Basin‟s governance system for the next several years. No other governance systems
were proposed at this time.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the national social and political trends
and the regional issues and events outlined above that led to the Council‟s creation. It
also describes the Power Act‟s provisions regarding the Council and the Council‟s
organization and operation.

Social and Political Context
Two national trends that would come to effect regional governance included
the rise of the tribal sovereignty movement and the rise of the American
environmental movement. In the case of the tribes, the renewed interest in traditional
Indian culture meant a reestablishment of the tribal worldview toward resources. The
environmental movement generated a third worldview. It provided a critique of the
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dominant market-oriented capitalist system and called for greater stewardship of
resources. Each would prove influential in the writing of the 1980 Power Act.
The rise of the tribal sovereignty movement and reestablishment of the Indian
worldview.
By the early 1900s tribal society had descended into what Wilkinson (2005)
describes as an “abyss.” The Bureau of Indian Affairs, assigned to manage federal
trust and treaty obligations to the tribes, pressured tribes to abandon their traditional
ways. Unemployment far exceeded the national average. A program to educate
Indian children in white public schools began to systematically erase tribal culture and
promote Indian integration into white society. A traditional economy built on hunting,
fishing, gathering, and gift giving was transformed through federal programs to one
built on farming (Wilkinson, 2005).
Despite treaties with the federal government, northwest state governments
imposed restrictions on tribal fishing practices in the name of conservation. The
public generally supported the states‟ actions, believing that non-Indian sport and
commercial fisheries were important to the economy. There was also an underlying
resentment felt toward the tribes holding “special privileges” (Wilkinson, 2005, p.
151).
However bad conditions were locally, policy at the national changed abruptly
in the early 1930s in a direction interests that were more sensitive to tribal. There
were several reasons for this shift. The Depression all but eliminated demands for
further confiscation of Indian land due to the general lack of financing for
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development. Additionally, publication of the Brookings Institution‟s influential
Meriam Report in 1928 made the public aware of the abysmal conditions of life on
tribal reservations through. This study documented the “extreme poverty, devastating
epidemics, inadequate food, and inadequate education” resulting from previous federal
policy (Pevar, 2002, p. 10).
Roosevelt responded by appointing a new Commissioner of Indian Affairs
more sympathetic to the tribes. At the new Commissioner‟s urging, Congress in 1934
passed the Indian Reorganization Act designed to “rehabilitate the Indian‟s economic
life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of
oppression and paternalism” (Pevar, 2002, p. 10). The Act prohibited further
allotment of tribal land, encouraged tribal constitutions for purposes of selfgovernment, gave Indians preferential hiring within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
established a revolving credit fund to provide tribal loans (Pevar, 2002). However
welcome these changes may have been to reservation life, traditional tribal culture was
barely on life support. Missionary and government efforts to erase Indian culture
coupled with the reservations‟ poor conditions took their toll, sapping confidence and
hope. In their weakened state, the tribes had little voice to challenge the extensive
changes taking place within the Columbia Basin in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.
Federal policy toward the nation‟s Indian tribes did two about-faces between
1949 and the 1960s. The compassionate attitude toward tribal culture reflected in the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act was relatively short lived. The Hoover Commission
Report, issued in 1949, recommended the integration of Indians into white society,
224

asserting once again that assimilation was in the best interests of tribal peoples. It
further argued that the federal government could save money by ending Indian
programs. When the Eisenhower administration came to power in 1953, federal
policy took the Hoover recommendations to heart, changing official policy from
promoting tribal self-government to the outright termination of the tribal trust
relationship with the United States (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).
Termination meant ending the federal trust relationship along with federal
benefits and support services. It also meant dissolution of tribal governments and the
closing of reservations. For tribal governments so terminated, tribal land and property
was to be distributed among tribal members or to a tribal corporation. The states were
to acquire full jurisdiction over terminated reservation land. Between 1954 and 1966,
Congress terminated 109 tribes, most of them in Oregon and California. Public Law
83-280 further extended state jurisdiction over reservations in Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin by subjecting reservation residents to
state criminal law (Pevar, 2002). Nationwide, “termination affected at least 1.3
million acres and 11,000 people, diminishing tribal trust lands by 2.5 percent and
cutting off federal services to 3 percent of all federally recognized Indians.” As a
result, “every terminated tribe floundered” (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 81).
Whereas the 19th century relocation from traditional homelands to reservations
had been brutal, and the Indian Reorganization Act programs less successful than
hoped for in relieving reservation misery, the termination policy meant cultural
extinction. Termination served as a tribal rallying cry, although the organizational
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challenges were substantial. Tribal society possessed little tradition in intertribal
cooperation, and, in several cases, the federal government had deliberately collocated
tribes with histories of conflict on the same reservation. Wilkinson (2005) credits a
handful of leaders and writers with providing the intellectual energy for the tribal
sovereignty movement and inspiring others to regain long-promised rights.
The Johnson administration supported the tribal efforts. It shifted federal
policy once again, repudiating the previous administration‟s termination policies. The
Nixon administration followed suit, with the president stating in 1970 that, “[t]his,
then, must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people: to
strengthen the Indian sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.”
Congress subsequently promoted tribal sovereignty and autonomy through legislation
and programs directed toward enhancing the capacity for tribal self-rule and economic
development. Examples include the prohibition to states from acquiring any new
authorities over Indian reservations in 1968; development of the Indian Business
Development Fund; and passage of the Indian Financing Act and Native American
Programs Act to create and provide financing for commercial opportunities.
Particularly important from the cultural perspective was the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, allowing tribes to administer health, law
enforcement, education, and social service programs on the reservation (Pevar, 2002,
quote from p. 12). These efforts did not solve all tribal social problems, but they did
begin to reverse previous efforts to eradicate the tribal worldview and provided a
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tribally run social infrastructure within which traditional Indian culture could at least
be partially reestablished.108
The rise of the American environmental movement and worldview.
The worldview of environmentalism has a seemingly paradoxical parentage,
with deep roots in Western Judeo-Christian biblical teachings, Progressive
Conservatism, and market capitalism (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Kline, 2000;
Rosenbaum, 2005). It emerged as a powerful critique of the market capitalist
worldview in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Motivated by Euro American aesthetic
values regarding natural beauty, the impacts of pollution on human health, and
concerns over challenges to ecological stability that many came to think threatened the
continued existence of the human race (Hays, 2000), environmentalists faced a
monumental challenge in reversing the market worldview. Thomas Dunlap (2004)
captures the essence of this challenge. Echoing – but not citing – Max Weber‟s
(2002/1920) theory about the connection between religious belief and protestantmarket-capitalism Dunlap states,
…defenders of the [market oriented] status quo gaze in rapture on the
goodness of the market and the gross domestic product, which
distributes benefits to all who strive – for they are the virtuous. They
look on the market as the Hand of God, endless economic growth as the
path to the Earthly Paradise, and the conquest of nature, human destiny
… Because society accepts these propositions as self-evident truths and
rational descriptions of the universe, other views – ecological
interdependence as the Hand of God, a sustainable economy as the path
to the Earthly Paradise, and living as citizens of the biotic community
108

The spiritual aspect of the traditional tribal worldview did not recover to pre-contact levels within
Indian society. Almost a century of white efforts to move Indian peoples away from their traditional
beliefs had achieved many of its objectives. Current tribal religious affiliations among reservation
residents present a mix of various Christian denominations and traditional beliefs.
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as human destiny – look like emotional arguments, unworthy of
consideration (Dunlap, 2004, p. 165).
It would take time for the concept of a “biotic community” to crystallize.
Similar to Progressives‟ treatment of water, timber, and wildlife as independent
entities, early environmental protection focused on protection of individual
components of the environment, such as air, water, and soil. It evolved to a belief in
the interconnectedness among nature‟s components (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a; Hays,
2000; Dunlap, 2004). In this, it was similar to the tribal worldview with an important
distinction. Rosenbaum (2005) states that environmentalism “assumes that humanity
is part of the created order, ethically responsible for the preservation of the world‟s
ecological integrity” (p. 39). Thus humankind, while part of the greater whole, is the
senior partner within the whole. It is in control of, capable of, and responsible for
managing its actions to minimize negative impacts and making improvements as it
can. The tribal worldview, in a subtle but important contrast, held humans as integral
and equal components within nature. Although a vocal minority – termed “deep
ecologists” (Rosenbaum, 2005) - adopted a view of man as an integral and equal
member of the natural order, the mainstream environmental movement viewed
humans as being above the rest of nature with a responsibility to minimize their
impact on the environment and mitigate for damage already done.
In 1962, Rachel Carson‟s Silent Spring put forward the dangers posed by
modern technology on human health and welfare in clear, non-technical language.
Inspired by Carson‟s book, environmental interest groups like the Sierra Club and
228

National Wildlife Federation initiated campaigns for public education and awareness.
Highly publicized events such as the Cuyahoga River fire near Cleveland in 1969
punctuated their message. The upshot was that by Earth Day 1970 there was within
the country a growing consensus that the concept of conserving resources for
sustainable development alone was not enough. A national view of environmentalism
emerged which focused on the interrelationships and interdependencies between man
and nature. Environmentalism thus became the dominant natural resource policy
paradigm (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992b).
The mainstream leadership of organized environmentalism was concentrated in
a small number of nationally recognized organizations. Referred to by some as “The
Group of Ten”109 (Rosenbaum, 2005; Mitchell, et al, 1992), this group represented
some of the oldest and best-established lobbying organizations in America. The three
oldest date back to the Progressive Era and followed the preservationist philosophy of
John Muir. These were the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and the
National Parks and Conservation Association founded in 1892, 1905, and 1919
respectively. Groups that are more recent include those formed during a widespread
expansion in the number of interest groups that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.
Examples are the Environmental Defense fund established in 1967, the Natural
Resources Defense Council in 1970, and the Environmental Policy Institute in 1972
(Dunlap and Mertig, 1992b).
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The “Group of Ten” included the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, the National
Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund, the
National Parks and Conservation Association, the Izaak Walton League, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, and the Environmental Policy Institute.
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The wide range of environmentally oriented groups resulted in emergences of a
variety of perspectives as to goals, methods, and priorities. Most sought to work
within the framework of the American political and legal systems (Rosenbaum, 2005).
Some believed that American democratic capitalism was not up to resolving the
environmental crisis facing humankind and called for a complete restructuring of the
American political system (Ophuls and Boyan, 1992). Others believed tighter
government regulation and control unnecessary and that the environmental movement
was nothing more than a hoax intended to extend government control over private
property. In this view, society could depend on market mechanisms alone to preclude
resource extinction (Simon, 1999).
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw an unprecedented array of environmental
legislation. Most of the legislation focused on discrete classes of resources. The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) (enacted 1966; revised 1973), the Clean Air Act
(1970), the Clean Water Act (CWA) (1972), the Pesticides Control Act (1972), the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972), and the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (1977) are a few of many statutes passed to address complex but
relatively distinct environmental problems. These laws replaced earlier, largely
ineffective attempts that relied on partnerships between the federal government and
often hostile or disinterested states that tried to treat pollution issues as local problems.
Broader in nature was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed by
Congress in 1969 and signed into law in 1970. NEPA imposed public involvement
and the requirement to address environmental impacts on agency decision-making
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(Cortner and Moote, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005). The result were strong, enforceable
policies that produced measurable results in cleaning up the nation‟s air and water,
identified and protected endangered species, and fundamentally changed behaviors in
federal resource agencies.
The environmental worldview brought about significant changes in the formal
institutions of federal government. These changes included the creation of new
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency created under NEPA in 1970.
Established agencies received new environmental responsibilities. For example, the
Endangered Species Act assigned regulatory jurisdiction over listed species to the Fish
and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service – both of whose origins
lay in promoting sport and commercial fishing. All agencies were required under
NEPA to consider the impact of new programs and activities on the environment and
publish the results in publicly reviewable environmental impact statements. Agencies
not in compliance with the provisions of these environmental statutes were subject to
suit. Consequently, environmental legislation had a profound effect on the process
and substance of agency decision-making (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Rosenbaum,
2005).
Once labeled a fad that would run its course by the mid 1970s, the
environmental movement grew to enjoy broad public support. It successfully
deflected efforts by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s to overturn or undermine
the laws noted above, despite Reagan‟s personal popularity (Dunlap and Mertig,
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1992b). By the 1970s, environmentalism was institutionalized as a core value of
American society and an influential force in American politics (Rosenbaum, 2005).
That influence of both the tribal sovereignty and environmental movements
would be felt in negotiations over the 1980 Power Act.

Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest
Anticipations of regional growth coupled with rising demand for electrical
energy led to a plan to integrate the Northwest‟s hydropower dams with the
construction of new nuclear plants. Misjudgments by the Bonneville Power
Administration and Northwest energy utilities in the program‟s planning and
execution resulted in a regional financial crisis that began in 1973. In 1976, events
forced BPA to issue a notice that it might not be able to meet its statutory obligations.
This crisis occurred coincident with a worldwide energy crisis, stagflation, and a
growing movement away from nuclear power (Pope, 2008).
Champions of greater involvement in regional power decisions by tribal,
fishery, and environmental interests seized the opportunity presented by the crisis.
They sought to ensure that the resulting policy not only created a mechanism for
public involvement and oversight of future electrical load and capacity projections but
also a fish and wildlife program to mitigate for the environmental effects of the dams
in the Columbia. Thus, the hydro-thermal crisis provided the catalyst for fishery,
environmental, and tribal voices to finally gain influence in Basin governance. The
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result was the Northwest Electrical Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 that
created the Council (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983).
Three regional events directly affected regional governance. The first was
termination of the Pacific Northwest Regional River Basins Commission by executive
order in 1981. The second was the apparent dissolution of the Committee on Fish
Operations at around the same time. Both have already been discussed to the degree
relevant to this study and nothing further will be added here. The third and most
significant issue was region‟s hydro-thermal program and resulting financial crisis that
led to passage of the 1980 Power Act. Strongly related were the continued declines in
regional fish runs; significant tribal court victories regarding tribal fishing rights; an
increase in capacity for self-governance by regional tribes; and the negotiations
leading up to the Power Act.
The hydro-thermal program.
Never supportive of public power, the Eisenhower administration slowed
construction of federal hydropower dams in the Northwest prompting public and
investor owned utilities to build their own facilities in the face of the expected demand
increases. In 1956, the administration sought to sell the Tennessee Valley Authority.
The State of Washington and regional public utilities feared the administration might
also try to sell BPA‟s transmission grid (Pope, 2008).
The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) was formed in part to
present a joint operating agency of public utilities that could pool resources to
purchase the transmission lines should that become necessary. A secondary purpose
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was to provide the capacity to build new generating plants. WPPSS was state
approved as a joint operating agency in 1957. The Washington governor appointed
the WPPSS leadership. PUD representatives made up the members of an oversight
board. As such, WPPSS had no direct accountability to or oversight from voters or
ratepayers. In essence, WPPSS represented an organization grounded in the
democratic ideals of the Progressive era but that lacked any public accountability
(Pope, 2008).
A belief in supply side, construction-oriented policies by the Northwest energy
community marked the period from the 1950s through the 1970s. A 1958 update by
the Corps to the 308 Report found that regional demographic growth would eventually
exceed the supply provided by the hydropower system. The report implied that, if the
region provided additional energy supply, then regional development and economic
growth would follow. In effect, BPA, WPPSS, and private utilities would promote
regional growth in the interest of increasing the demand for power. Planners would
then use the estimates of projected growth to justify additional generation capability
through new plants. This somewhat circular logic led to adoption and publication of
the hydro-thermal program in 1969 (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008).
There were no effective mechanisms for those outside the power planning
interests to challenge this logic. National oversight waned with the demise of the
national planning apparatus in 1943 and was limited to annual testimony to
congressional appropriations committees. Furthermore, BPA enjoyed exemption from
the Administrative Procedures Act. Consequently, policy and program development
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plans and the non-federal utilities and related trade associations were not subject to the
same level of public scrutiny and review applied to other federal agency decisions.
This included review by the utility customers and bondholders who would eventually
be responsible for the costs incurred by BPA and WPPSS decisions. This lack of
oversight, coupled with power promotion through industrial use, led to the impending
crisis (Blumm, 1982).
The resulting Ten Year Hydro-Thermal Power Program for the Pacific
Northwest (the hydro-thermal program) envisioned a twenty-year program, projecting
that by 1990 the region would need the equivalent of the power produced from twenty
nuclear plants of 1000 megawatt capacity each, plus one coal fired plant of 1400
megawatts. The nuclear and coal thermal projects would provide the region‟s base
load, with the federal hydropower dams meeting peaking needs. The federal
contribution consisted of completion of those hydropower projects underway,
planning for new projects, and expansion of the regional transmission grid. The
hydro-thermal program anticipated a tripling of electrical output within the Pacific
Northwest from all sources between 1970 and 1990. Interestingly enough,
environmental groups (most notably the Sierra Club) who believed nuclear power to
be less environmentally destructive than large dams and less polluting than fossil-fuel
plants initially applauded the program (Norwood, c.1981; Pope, 2008).
The initial plan was to build three nuclear plants (projects 1, 2, and 3) at the
federal nuclear site at Hanford, Washington. The Hanford site had originally been
built to produce the uranium that went into the atomic bombs that ended World War
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II. BPA financially guaranteed the projects, planning to finance them through a
process termed “net billing” (Pope, 2008).
Prior to 1974, the law precluded BPA from owning generation capability or
buying power from non-federal power plants. Net billing involved a complicated
process to bypass this restriction.110 In essence, BPA combined the high cost of
nuclear plant construction with the low cost of hydropower production and set “net”
rates based on a blending of the two. In effect, regional hydropower customers
subsidized the construction costs of the WPPSS utilities engaged in nuclear power
development. This ensured that the high nuclear plant costs were not directly billed to
WPPSS utilities‟ customers. If those costs had been directly billed during
construction, the utilities would have to impose significantly higher rates until the new
plants came on line and began generating revenue. The theory was that once the new
plants came on line, rates would significantly drop throughout the region and everyone
would benefit (Pope, 2008).
The legality of net billing was never really tested. Its legal justification rested
on advisory opinions from the DOI solicitor‟s office and the GAO office of counsel
and a letter from the chair of the congressional subcommittee overseeing BPA. It
never received formal legislative approval or subjected to public scrutiny (Pope,
2008).
The risks were substantial, if not fully understood at the time. The utilities
priced power from net-billed projects well below its marginal cost of production,
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See Pope (2008) for a detailed explanation of the net billing mechanics.
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encouraging consumption. The arrangement ignored or dismissed any elasticity of
demand for electricity. It also ignored the risk that if a net-billed nuclear plant failed,
then BPA would still have to distribute the costs of the failed plant to ratepayers
without any revenue in return. In effect, BPA assumed the risk of construction nonperformance on behalf of the utilities nuclear program (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008).
Net billing ended in 1973 when it became apparent that delays to the nuclear plant
construction schedule and increases in cost would render the process under the current
rate structure insolvent by 1981. If this were to occur, the result would be a dramatic
increase in regional rates – the exact circumstance that net billing was created to avoid
(Pope, 2008).
Ever-increasing estimates of demand led WPPSS to determine that two
additional plants (projects 4 and 5) were needed. However, Bonneville would not
provide the same financial guarantees for these plants they had for projects 1, 2, and 3.
Instead, BPA encouraged WPPSS to issue bonds to cover construction costs of the two
newly proposed projects, threatening that the agency would be forced to issue a
“notice of insufficiency” if they did not do so. An NOS is a statement whereby
Bonneville declares an inability to meet demand from its public preference
customers,111 thus requiring rationing of federal hydropower and forcing public
utilities to purchase the difference on the open market (Pope, 2008).
The utilities were slow to react, and BPA issued its NOS in June of 1976.
Later that year, 88 public utilities signed a participants‟ agreement that resulted in
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issuance of $2.25 billion in bonds to fund projects 4 and 5. Eventually, the entire
financial structure collapsed. The utilities defaulted on the bonds, costs soared,
schedules expanded, and the actual market demand for power fell far short of
predictions (Pope, 2008).
Pope (2008) diagnosed the causes of the financial fiasco as self-delusion,
misdiagnosis, mismanagement, and over-optimism over demand forecasting.
Additionally, he described BPA as an agency not historically oriented to open
collaboration. However, Pope‟s assessment regarding BPA‟s collaborative history is
at odds with BPA‟s history with the Bonneville Advisory Board and other
collaborative forums initiated to inform agency decision making. McKinley (1952)
probably offers a more accurate albeit inadvertent assessment when he defended
BPA‟s decision to keep those not in agreement with BPA‟s basic mission from
participation in the Bonneville Regional Advisory Council, designed to serve as a
sounding board for BPA policy. Regardless, Pope (2008) accurately claimed that
BPA and WPPSS throughout the process tended to dismiss concerns expressed by
ratepayers and environmentalists.
At the time, the WPPSS bond default was the largest in United States history.
The default, BPA‟s 1976 NOS, the worldwide oil shortage brought about by an
embargo by countries in the Middle East, and economic stagflation set the stage for a
new national energy policy (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008) This opened the door for
those heretofore excluded from direct participation in governance decision making to
claim a seat at the governance table. Among those were regional fishery interests.
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The continued decline in salmon runs.
The commercial salmon fishery continued to suffer from the legacy effects of
over-fishing and habitat degradation due to mining, timber harvest, and agriculture.
To these were added new threats from development as the region‟s population
expanded and with the completion of the federal hydropower system dams (National
Research Council, 1996). As predicted during the hearings of the 1940s and by
Interior‟s Pacific Northwest Coordination Committee, salmon returns continued to
decreased as new dams were completed. As measured by fish harvest, the average
annual salmon fishery yield dropped from 24 million pounds in the 1940s to 11
million pounds in the 1950s. By the early 1980s, the average yield dropped to 1.2
million per year (National Research Council, 2004). Not reflected in these numbers is
the impact on naturally spawning fish. Since the late 1800s, an ever-increasing share
of the commercial fishery came from hatcheries. However, regional hatcheries were
failing to live up to their earlier promises of being able to sustain virtually unlimited
levels of harvest despite other economic development (Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich,
1999).
The decline in numbers of fish underscored a long simmering conflict among
sports, commercial and tribal fishery institutions. Recreational fishing was largely a
pastime for middle and upper income Americans. They looked to nature as a source
of solace and renewal and reveled in the personal scale of catching fish one at a time.
In contrast, commercial fishermen were part of a large-scale industrial effort to collect
food. The work was manual and often dangerous. Tribal fishing represented more
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than food collection; it was a fundamental social and religious component of tribal
life. As fish numbers dwindled, each institution looked at the other as competition to
their respective interests. Conflict was common over allocations of catch among the
groups and each often criticized the fish-catching technologies of the others as
wasteful and unfair (Taylor, 1999).
The newly developed river of the 1930s held additional consequences for the
region‟s iconic salmon runs. Although private, state, and federal entities constructed
dams in Columbia tributaries since the late 1800s, none would have the impact on fish
of the mainstem dams. The dams modified the ecological organization of the
Columbia at the expense of naturally spawned fish. Fishery interests argued to
moderate the damage, but “their combined numbers and strongest arguments paled
before the bureaucratic might, popular appeal, and Progressive ideology” (Taylor,
1999, p. 226) that drove the dam construction projects of the Bureau of Reclamation
and Corps of Engineers. The cold fact was that most regional institutional leaders
perceived the salmon fishery as less valuable than the combined potential benefits of
hydropower, navigation, irrigation, and flood control (White, 1995; Taylor, 1999).
Fishery interests proved unable to mount any effective opposition to early river
development. Nor, for the most part, were they sufficiently motivated or organized to
do so. Some tried. For example, Miller Freeman continually criticized the impacts of
dams and the reliance on hatcheries in the Pacific Fisherman, a publication he founded
in 1902 and remained associated with it until his death in 1955 (Cone and Ridlington,
1996). But a 1937 report on the salmon impacts of Bonneville Dam prepared by the
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U.S. Commissioner of Fisheries better illustrated the general tone. The report
dutifully noted the many problems salmon were experiencing but concluded that
further study and technological improvements would in all likelihood resolve those
problems (Cone and Ridlington, 1996; Lichatowich, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha,
Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).112
Taylor (1999) suggested two reasons for the early lackluster involvement of
fishery managers in governance. First, the legacy of commercial development
(timber, mining, settlement, agriculture, and dams) may have been perceived as
unstoppable, especially since the role of the federal government, based on past
practice, was to facilitate and support such development. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, prior to the later enactment of federal environmental statutes, the states
had sole jurisdiction over fisheries in state waters and controlled most hatchery
production. Therefore, the policy focus of white fishing interests centered more on
state, not on federal, activities and decisions.
Additionally fishermen, like everyone else in the region, operated on the
widespread belief that hatcheries and other technical measures could and would make
up for lost habitat (White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; McConnaha,
Williams, and Lichatowich, 2006). Consistent with the 1937 Fish Commission report,
and in response to the decline in naturally spawning salmon, Congress passed the
Mitchell Act in 1938. The act intended to provide for conservation (in the Progressive
sense of the term) of the salmon and steelhead fishery resources of the Columbia River
112
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to serve tribal, recreational, and commercial needs. It authorized the construction of
hatcheries, fish ladders, screens for irrigation intakes, restoration and mitigation
projects, and studies. Ultimately, the program would come to fund 25 hatcheries and
produce over 100 million juvenile fish before Endangered Species Act concerns
caused it to be scaled back (Cone and Ridlington, 1996; NMFS, 2009b).
Tribal court victories.
U.S. federal courts consistently upheld tribal treaty rights since the early
1900s. US v. Winans (1905) and US v. Winters (1908) form the legal foundation for
tribal fishing and water rights Winans upheld the tribes‟ rights to take fish at their
usual and accustomed places, even if those places were now privately owned or
surrounded by privately non-Indian owned land. Winters recognized tribal water
rights as reserved on reservation land (National Research Council, 2004; Wilkinson,
2005). Despite Winans and Winters, northwest state governments routinely ignored
treaty provisions and imposed restrictions on tribal resource gathering in general and
fishing in particular.
The states asserted that state fish and game laws applied to Indian fishermen
whether on or off the reservation, especially during the termination years, despite
federal court decisions to the contrary. In the 1960s, tribal fishermen faced dozens of
prosecutions in county and state courts in Oregon and Washington. Juries seldom
convicted, but state departments of fish and game continued to prosecute on the belief
that tribal fishing methods were wasteful and contrary to state conservation laws.
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Commercial and sports fishing organizations often prompted these prosecutions to
minimize competition (Wilkinson, 2005).
The dispute moved to federal court in 1968 when the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a lawsuit on behalf of David Sohappy, a Yakama tribal member, in the
Federal Court of the District of Oregon. Washington arrested and jailed Sohappy for
three days for violation of state fishing law. Sohappy believed the treaties protected
him from state prosecution. The Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce
tribes joined as interveners.113 The court consolidated several similar cases, rendering
the states of Oregon and Washington as joint defendants. Ruling in 1969, Belloni held
tribal treaty provisions as valid; that state regulations did not apply to treaty tribes; and
that the tribes had a legal right to a share of the fishery. In this, he broke new ground.
He did not specify what that share might be, expecting the states to negotiate an
allocation with the tribal governments. The decision caused an immediate and angry
response from sports and commercial fishing interests concerned that dedicating a
percentage of harvest to the tribes would potentially put many of them out of business
(Wilkinson, 2005).
A suit filed in 1970 on behalf of seven tribes in the District Court of
Washington followed the Belloni decision. Ruling in 1974, Judge Boldt took
Belloni‟s decision a step further by finding that the tribes were entitled to a 50-50
share of fish that moved through recognized tribal fishing grounds in the state of
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Initially, the Yakama tribal government refused to support Sohappy as he tended to be equally
dismissive of tribal fishing regulations. See Wilkinson (2005), pp. 164-166.
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Washington. Like the US v. Oregon decision, the Boldt ruling set off an angry and
prolonged reaction among non-Indian fishermen. Many openly defied Boldt, fishing
on tribal land and refusing to recognize the court‟s decision. The Washington
Supreme Court further complicated matters by ruling that the state fish and game
agencies could not legally enforce the provisions of Judge Boldt‟s decision. The U.S.
Supreme Court finally settled the matter in 1979, ruling to uphold Boldt. The court‟s
key findings were that the tribes were entitled to fish in their usual and accustomed
places; that the states had the right to set harvest limits within state waters in the
interests of conservation and sustainability; that all fish caught by Indians counted
against the tribal share; that all fish caught by non-Indians counted against the nonIndian share; and that Indians had exclusive use of fishing sites on their reservations
(National Research Council, 2004: Wilkinson, 2005).
The Belloni and Boldt decisions engendered increasing confidence on the part
of tribes to assert their rights in federal court, especially in the wake of federal
termination efforts. The decisions also created a new governance system made up of
representatives from the state, tribal, and federal governments, under continued court
supervision, to manage the fishery (Wilkinson, 2005; personal knowledge and
experience of author).114 Success in court motivated the tribes to a new assertiveness
in reminding federal agency members of federal trust and treaty responsibilities and
looking for opportunities to more proactively engage in the regional decisions that
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This system, known as the U.S. v. Oregon Process, is oriented solely on setting and overseeing
fishery allocations and related hatchery issues. Consequently, it is outside the scope of this study.
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could affect them. They improved their capacity for interacting with federal agencies
by establishing intertribal coalitions to promote their collective interests.
Establishment of multi-tribal governance coalitions.
For generations, the tribes had relied on traditional social arrangements and
tribal authority to manage tribal fisheries (Johansen, 1967; Taylor, 1999; CRITFC,
2010). One such authority was the "Celilo Fish Committee." This committee
regulated fishing practices to ensure that the salmon resource would flourish and
always exist (CRITFC, 2010). These traditional practices proved successful in
sustainably managing tribal harvest (Taylor, 1999; CRITFC, 2010).
Traditional management could not work, however, in the face of removal to
the reservations and the construction of dams and other obstacles to salmon migration.
In 1977, the tribes of the Warm Springs, Yakama, and Umatilla reservations and the
Nez Perce tribe, all holding treaties with the United States, joined together to renew
their authority in fisheries management. The tribes established a coordinating and
technical organization to support their joint and individual exercise of sovereign
authority. Entitled the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), this
organization served as an intertribal representation body for purpose of regional
planning, policy, and decision-making (CRITFC, 2010) and greatly increased the
visibility and influence of lower Columbia tribal perspectives within the Basin
(personal experience and observation of the author).
Concerned and inspired by the influence that CRITFC was beginning to
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exert on fishery policy issues, particularly over water releases from reservoirs
serving upper river fisheries (personal knowledge of author), the upper Columbia
River tribes soon mimicked the strategy of the lower river tribes by forming their
own coalition to protect their interests. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Kalispel Tribe of
Indians, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho and the Spokane Tribe of Indians joined to
establish the Upper Columbia United Tribes (UCUT) in 1982. The Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation joined in the mid 1990s (UCUT, undated).115
Commercial and sport fishery, environmental groups, and the tribes each had
their own goals and objectives and operated within their own worldview. This led to
conflicts among them. For example, recreational, commercial, and tribal fishermen
had long disputed each other‟s fishing methods and the allocation of catch among
them (Taylor, 1999). The tribes and environmentalists were at odds over hatchery
policy, specifically the marking of hatchery fish for selective fishing, a dispute that
continues as of this writing (personal knowledge of author) and different factions
within the environmental movement differed over priorities and policy approaches
(Rosenbaum, 2005). Upriver and downriver tribes often split over legal standing,
water issues, and fish catch allocations. Those tribes with treaties with the United
States argued that the federal government should accord their concerns greater
deference than the concerns of non-treaty tribes. But what united this disparate
group was their common opposition to the impact of major dams on the river‟s fish
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Tribes living in the Snake River Basin (Shoshone Paiute, Burns Paiute, and Shoshone Bannock)
formed a similar coalition through compact in 2006 creating the Upper Snake River Tribes (USRT).
Since that event occurred outside the period covered by this history, it will not be further discussed.
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runs (McKinley, 1952; Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004; Crampton and Espenson,
2009). The hydro-thermal crisis and Congressional efforts to forge a new Northwest
energy policy provided the opportunity for tribal and environmental group concerns
over dam impacts addressed in a new governance system.
The 1980 Power Act.
BPA‟s exemption to the public review procedures of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) insulated the agency from critical public examination of its
policy and program development. Its method of operation, in concert with public
and private utilities, was to develop a unified front over a particular course of action
and present an essentially completed product for pro forma comment by the public.
As such, BPA had no institutional capacity to deal with critical public review of its
actions (Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).
BPA issued its notice of insufficiency in 1976. In 1977, the agency was
transferred from the Department of the Interior to the newly created Department of
Energy. The agency was now subject to the rule-making procedures of the federal
Administrative Procedures Act as well as the public review provisions of NEPA
(Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008). A lawsuit filed under NEPA enjoined BPA from
pursuing the hydro-thermal construction program until it completed an
environmental impact statement (EIS). Hemmingway (1983) argues that BPA‟s lack
of experience in dealing with true public involvement extended the time needed to
complete its EIS.
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Meanwhile, private utility rates rose sharply upward. In response, the
Oregon state legislature created the Oregon Domestic and Rural Supply Authority in
1977. Always more dependent on private power than the state of Washington,
Oregon planned to create a public power entity in order to lay claim, under the 1937
Bonneville Project Act‟s preference clause, to a share of electricity from the federal
hydrosystem. This would create additional demand that the system was not prepared
to meet, especially with the supply contracts BPA had signed with local aluminum
and other industrial customers for its “excess” power. Oregon‟s demand for cheap
federal hydropower threatened to spark a regional “civil war” over power allocations
(Blumm, 1982).
The completion of the dams under the Canadian treaty doubled the Columbia
Basin‟s reservoir storage capacity, providing flood protection to the lower river
(especially Portland). It also disrupted the natural flow of the river, depriving
downstream fish of much of the natural spring freshet juvenile salmon depended on
to flush them to sea. The hydro-thermal program‟s plan to shift the hydropower
system from meeting relatively steady base loads to peak loads would further disrupt
the natural flow of water. Fishery interests believed that this would lead to even
further declines in fish returns. They argued that fish and wildlife losses caused by
hydrosystem operations were in effect subsidizing power production (Blumm, 1982).
Regional power interests first attempted to rewrite the 1937 Bonneville
Project Act in the 1950s. Their objective was to get BPA self-financed through
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power sales as opposed to being subject to the unpredictable nature of Congressional
appropriation funding. Those efforts failed, but growing concerns over the budding
hydro-thermal crisis led to a renewal of effort. The Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee (PNUCC) took the lead in coordinating and drafting a new
legislative proposal. After several failures, PNUCC completed an acceptable draft in
1977. Washington Senator Jackson subsequently introduced it as a bill in the House
(Blumm, 1982).116 Meanwhile, prompted by environmental interests, the National
Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initiated a process in
1978 to review the biological status of upper Columbia salmon and steelhead and
determine whether the fish warranted listing under the Endangered Species Act
(Bodi, 1979).
Fishery interests found a champion for their cause in Congressman John
Dingell of Michigan. Dingell chaired the House Commerce Committee. Upon
receiving the Jackson bill, Dingell‟s committee staff, working with an ad hoc
committee117 of utility, industry, fishery, and tribal representatives, wrote into it
extensive fish protection and public involvement measures. Responding to tribal and
fishery manager concerns, Dingell‟s provisions would require public input with
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Jackson, who was first elected to Congress in 1940 and had introduced a CVA bill upon Truman‟s
election in 1948, left the House upon election to the Senate in 1952.
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The ad hoc Pacific Northwest Power and Fisheries Committee was formed from the regional
confluence of power and fishery interests. The committee was a compromise worked out between the
Columbia River Fisheries Council, representing state and tribal federal fishery managers, and the Public
Power Council. The Public Power Council represented utility concerns that fish mitigation language
being considered in the new legislation could present an “open checkbook” from regional ratepayers.
See Crampton and Espenson, 2009, pp. 29-30.
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respect to regional energy planning and fish and wildlife mitigation efforts.
Although opposed by power interests, Dingell‟s seniority and strong position in the
House ensured that a new bill would not pass without addressing the impacts of the
dams on regional salmon and other wildlife (Hemmingway, 1983; Bodi, 1995).
President Jimmy Carter signed the resulting Power Act into law on December
5, 1980. Among its purposes was to provide for conservation and energy efficiency
and “provide for participation and consultation of the Pacific Northwest states, local
governments, consumers, customers, users of the Columbia River System." These
users specifically included federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes,
and the public at large (Power Act, 1980, section 2.(3)).
Several converging interests brought the Power Act about. NMFS and the
Fish and Wildlife Service were considering ESA protection for Basin salmon, an
action that would place the fish stocks so listed under the primary jurisdiction of
federal regulatory agencies (Bodi, 1979; Blumm and Simrin, 1991), a situation the
region very much wished to avoid. Bonneville customers sought a legislative
solution to allow better access to agency decision-making. Oregon‟s threat to create
an unsupportable demand on the federal hydrosystem aligned with the corresponding
interest of BPA and utilities to allow BPA to buy power on the open market to meet
load. In addition, tribal and fishery interests sought a way to address the impacts of
the dams on regional fisheries. The Power Act passed because it benefited all
affected parties. It minimized rate disparities by giving private utilities access to
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federal power. Although overall rates increased, the Power Act gave industrial users
long-term contracts to protect them from future rate fluctuations. Bonneville
received its long sought market purchase authority. Fish and wildlife advocates
gained access to decision-making and the guarantee that federal hydrosystem
revenues internalized into regional electrical rates would pay the cost of mitigation
efforts. In addition, the region was given a new governance system designed to
ensure the Power Act‟s purposes and provisions were met (Blumm, 1982).
Confidence in the Act was so high that NMFS terminated its ESA review process
(Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Wright, 1995; Bodi, 1995).

Resulting Governance Systems
Based on a recommendation by the Water Resources Council, and in
accordance with the provisions of the Water Resources Planning Act, President
Reagan disbanded the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission along with five
similar commissions by executive order on September 9, 1981 (Executive Order
12319, 1981). The Committee on Fish Operations appears to have become inactive at
about the same time, perhaps in response to the passage of the Power Act.118 With the
loss of the PNWRBC, responsibility for Basin governance transferred to the Pacific
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The sole reference found regarding COFO does not explain why the group ceased to function.
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Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council upon its establishment
in 1981. No other systems were proposed or enacted at this time.119
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council
The Power Act defined the Council as to be comprised of two members each
from Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Idaho appointed by their respective
governor. The Council was authorized an executive director and staff. The Power Act
assigned the Council two broad responsibilities. The first was to develop a regional
energy plan to guide electrical planning. The second was to establish a program to
“protect, mitigate, and enhance” fish and wildlife impacted by the hydrosystem
(Power Act, 1980, section 4.(h)(1)(A)). Experts hired to the Council‟s staff would
develop the energy plan. The Fish and Wildlife program, in contrast, was to solicit the
active involvement of the public and regional interests (Power Act, 1980).
The Power Act required that proceeds of the sale of federal electricity by BPA
pay Council expenses. Decisions were to be made by majority vote “of members
present and voting” (Power Act, 1980, section 4.(c)(2)) with a majority of members
constituting a quorum. This potentially precluded the inability of the previous CBIAC
and PNWRBC to reach decisions due to their dependence on full consensus. There
were exceptions to this general majority vote rule, however. The regional energy plan
and amendments to the fish and wildlife program required a majority plus a vote from
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As far as the author can determine, the timing of President Reagan‟s executive order and enactment
of the Power Act were purely coincidental. Had the Power Act not been enacted, or it had been delayed
for any period of time, the region may have been without any form of interjurisdictional governance
structure in the Basin for the first time since 1934. However, the history of the region suggests that
some form of federal cooperation system would likely have formed, similar to the manner in which the
CBIAC formed following the disbanding of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
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at least one member of each state or agreement by at least six members of the eight
members (Power Act, 1980).
The Act did not change the missions or authorities of federal agencies, states,
or local governments (Hemmingway, 1983). It did, however, require federal agencies
to exercise their responsibilities “consistent with the purposes of this Act and other
applicable laws” with regard to fish and wildlife impacts (Power Act, 1980, section
4.(h)(11)(A)(i)). It further required federal agencies to “take into account…to the
fullest extent practicable” (Power Act, 1980, section 4.(h)(11)(A)(ii)) the Council‟s
program when exercising discretionary decision-making.120 Due to the multi-state
nature of the Council‟s area of jurisdiction, lawsuits against the Bonneville Power
Administration were to bypass federal district courts and be filed directly with the
federal 9th Circuit Court of Appeals (Power Act, 1980, section 9.(e)(5)).
The Council has had its critics. Utility rate payers and BPA staff complained
that, rather than produce a coherent strategy for fish mitigation, the Council more
frequently “buys off” regional interests by paying for poorly thought out actions and
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Council members frequently complained that federal agencies, especially the Corps and
Reclamation, did not take this provision seriously and essentially ignored the Council‟s fish and wildlife
program provisions in making agency decisions. The Council recommended repeatedly that the
language of the Power Act be strengthened. See, for example, NPPC, 1996, p. 5, and option 3 in the
attachment to Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998. For their part, the agencies argued that the
language in Power Act section 10. (h) specifically stated that the provisions of the Power Act were not
to “affect the rights or jurisdictions of the United States” or other entities over waters of any river or
stream. They further argued that, regardless, the sovereignty clause of the Constitution precluded the
states from dictating actions to federal agencies. The issue was settled in court by Federal Magistrate
Leif Erickson in 1999. Erickson, in a case involving water releases from dams in Montana designed to
help downriver fish, ruled that the Power Act‟s requirements for agencies to take fish and wildlife
provisions into account at each relevant stage of decision making did not contravene federal law. In
effect, Erickson ruled that the Power Act required that Corps and Reclamation operational decisions
should comport to the Council program unless there were reasons not to and that, if such reasons
existed, they be documented and justified. See NPPC, 1999.
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exercising little or no oversight of project quality (personal experience of author).
Ogden (1997) notes that the Power Act‟s singular focus on the water resources for fish
and wildlife does not allow for integration of those issues with other regional resource
planning needs such as land use, irrigation, fishery harvest, and recreation.
Furthermore, its scope of authority is limited to the geographic boundaries of the
Columbia River basin. Hemmingway (1983) notes the limited authority over the
actions of federal agencies. The Army Corps of Engineers, The Bureau of
Reclamation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and BPA, while required to
consider Council plans, are not necessarily required to follow them. Despite these
shortcomings, no alternative governance proposals were forthcoming until the ESA
listings of 1991.

Chapter Summary
Events leading up to the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis, the resulting passage of
the 1980 Power Act, and establishment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and
Conservation Planning Council can be summarized as follows:
Nationally, the tribal sovereignty movement gave new confidence to Indian
tribes in asserting their rights in the policy arena and in court. It resulted in
a renewed tribal interest in traditional Indian culture and beliefs and
expansion of tribal governance capacity (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).
The American environmental movement transitioned from its roots in
Progressive era conservationism to an ecological based worldview toward
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natural resources. The movement resulted in multiple environmental
statutes and regulations promulgated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It
brought the impacts of unrestrained resource development and pollution
into the public consciousness and institutionalized itself as a core national
value (Hays, 1999/1959; Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a; Dunlap, 1992;
Rosenbaum, 2005).
BPA and utility estimates concluded that the federal hydropower system
alone could not meet projected regional demand growth. The hydrothermal program was developed and designed to integrate the regional
hydropower system with new coal and nuclear generation plants
(Hemmingway, 1983; Luce, 1996; Pope, 2008).
Faulty predictions, mismanagement, program cost overruns, delays due to
environmental lawsuits, and the fact that the anticipated electrical demand
did not materialize in the time predicted caused Bonneville to at first
threaten and then issue a notice of insufficiency on June 24, 1976. The
NOS declared an inability to meet the demand of its preference customers
and perhaps its Treasury payments. The region needed a new energy
policy to address the causes of this problem (Hemmingway, 1983; Luce,
1996; Pope, 2008).
The resulting financial crisis provided the catalyst for long-excluded
fishery interests to gain access to regional decision-making (Blumm, 1982;
Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).
255

Regional salmon runs, already stressed by overfishing, the legacy effects of
mining, timber harvest, and agricultural practices continued their decline
due to the construction and operation of additional mainstem dams in the in
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Fishery and tribal advocates protested the
river‟s development but to no avail (McKinley, 1952; Taylor, 1999;
Robbins, 2004; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams,
2006).
The need for a new Northwest energy policy to deal with the hydro-thermal
crisis, coupled with pressure from fishery and tribal interests, resulted in
passage of the 1980 Power Act and creation of the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council. The Council,
comprised of appointees from the four states governors, was responsible
for development of an energy plan and fish and wildlife mitigation program
(Power Act, 1980, Blumm, 1982, Hemmingway, 1983).
NMFS first considered listing Columbia and Snake River salmon and
steelhead in the late 1970s. They terminated this effort in the belief that the
fish and wildlife provisions of the Power Act would lead to fish restoration
(Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Blumm and Simrin, 1991).
The Power Act represented a turning point in Basin governance and planning.
For the first time, tribes and fishery interests were in a position to influence the actions
of federal system managers (Harden, 1996). It was also the first time that the impacts
to fish and wildlife by the dams were to be given equal footing with hydropower with
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substantial revenues generated by electricity sales directed to fund mitigation efforts
(Hemmingway, 1983; Volkman, 1997). In addition, the Act precluded, at least
temporarily, ESA listing of Basin salmon in the belief that the Power Act‟s provisions
would result in meaningful recovery plans (Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Bodi, 1995).
The Council developed its first fish and wildlife program in 1982. Initially,
fish runs rebounded although that was more likely due to a period of favorable ocean
conditions than any results from the embryonic restoration efforts. Mid Columbia
stocks improved from about 12,000 fish in 1980 to over 100,000 a few years later, and
Snake River spring fall chinook jumped from 9-10,000 to about 50,000 over the same
period121 (Wright, 1995). The period 1982-1991 was one of great hope for fish
interests. The state-centric Council‟s program led many to believe that the region had
finally found an effective counterweight to the influence of the electrical power and
commercial river user communities on federal agency decision-making (Bodi, 1995).
Despite the Council‟s program, fish returns crashed in the late 1980s. Wild
Snake River spring and fall chinook fell to less than 10,000 by 1990 and Snake River
fall chinook numbered just 78 wild fish in 1990 and 318 in 1991 (Crampton and
Espenson, 2009). NMFS subsequently reopened its status review process under the
ESA in 1990 and listed Snake River Sockeye in 1991, the very action regional
interests had hoped the Power Act would preclude. Listings of Snake River
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In a conversation with the author regarding the early period of the Council and the early apparent
improvement in fish returns, Angus Duncan, Oregon Council representative from November 1994 –
October 1995, quipped, “It looked like this [fish and wildlife restoration] was going to be a lot easier
than we thought.” Angus‟ father, Robert, was among the Council‟s first appointees (NPPC, 2007).

257

spring/summer and fall chinook followed in 1992. These actions by NMFS prompted
an “elaborate series of discussions” seeking revised strategies for averting ESA
listings (Blumm and Simrin, 1991, quote from p. 660) the most notable of which was
Senator Mark Hatfield‟s “Salmon Summit” of state, federal, and tribal fish managers
in 1990 (Cone and Ridlington, 1996).
These ESA listings would present the region with it fourth critical situation and
once again shift the prevailing governance model. The governance dominance of the
states enjoyed through the Council would shift back to a federal cooperative model led
by the National Marine Fisheries Service. The ESA listing and resulting governance
changes are the subjects of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
THE FIRST ESA SALMON LISTINGS (1991)

Introduction
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) halted their review of
Columbia Basin salmon stocks in the belief that the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife
Program would render listing under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) unnecessary
(Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Blumm and Simrin, 1991). However, Basin salmon and
steelhead numbers continued their decline and confidence in the Council‟s program
waned. In 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation petitioned
NMFS to list Snake River sockeye salmon. NMFS subsequently listed Sockeye as
endangered in November 1991.122 Additional listings of Snake River chinook salmon
and steelhead soon followed. The ESA listings starkly highlighted the need for an
even greater governance emphasis on fish. They reopened the debate over regional
governance systems, resulting in the greatest variety of alternative governance
proposals since the debates of the 1930s and 40s as federal agencies and the Council
tussled over which would lead salmon restoration efforts. The federal nature of the
ESA all but preordained a federally coordinated effort. As a result, the locus of Basin
governance-decision making shifted away from the state led Northwest Power and
Conservation Council and back to regional federal agencies – most notably the
National Marine Fisheries Service.
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Under the Endangered Species Act, an “endangered” species is one that is at risk of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range. A “threatened” species is one that is likely to
become endangered in the foreseeable future. See ESA sections 3(6) and 3(20).
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The listings highlighted another important shift as well. Beginning with 1930s
era planning efforts, the focus for FCRPS construction and operation was on
harnessing commercial benefit from the Columbia River (White, 1995; Harden, 1996).
As fish issues evolved from the first protests in the 1940s up through the ESA listings
in the 1990s, the priority for dam operations gradually shifted from a sole focus on
commercial benefit to an ever-increasing emphasis on mitigation for environmental
impacts. The Basin‟s governance systems slowly began to respond, beginning with
the CBIAC (Scheufele, c.1970). Whereas the Bonneville Power Administration had
led the federal agency collaboration during the years of the FCRPS‟ initial
development, the ESA listings caused the federal leadership role to shift from BPA to
the National Marine Fisheries Service. Additionally, an ever increasing share of
revenue generated by hydropower sales would eventually fund fish mitigation
measures such as hatcheries, habitat restoration, predation reduction, and improved
juvenile and adult fish passage facilities and programs at the dams costing hundreds of
millions of dollars per year (Vogel, 2007; FCRPS, 2010). Not surprisingly, the
Basin‟s governance debate became ever more focused on fish related issues as well.
The election of William Clinton as president in 1992 and his subsequent
reelection in 1996 shaped the national political context. Clinton ran in part on a
platform friendly to environmental goals in stark contrast to the policies of the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush administrations that preceded it (Rosenbaum, 2005).
Although the Clinton administration maintained an active interest in the Northwest
salmon issue and established an interdepartmental-level oversight team led by the
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Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), it delegated much of the
leadership on the issue to its appointee to the regional NMFS office.
The biggest regional issue was the ESA salmon listings. NMFS followed
those listings with biological opinions regarding FCRPS operations. The biological
opinions in turn initiated what became a long-running sequence of litigation.
Additional regional issues were the structural weaknesses of the Council as exposed
by the salmon crisis, the Council‟s efforts to retain control of the salmon issue, and
Oregon Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new regional governance process.
Nine governance systems were proposed during the period between the first
salmon listings in 1991 and the establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum in
1999. The Council proposed most of them, recommending ways to amend the Council
and/or the 1980 Power Act in order to strengthen Council authority over the salmon
issue. Of these nine proposals, three were enacted. The proposed and enacted systems
were the:
Fish Operations Executive Committee. Formed as provision of the
Council‟s 1992 Fish and Wildlife Program. Brought fishery managers (to
include the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries
Service) into a Council committee to advise on salmon issues. Apparently
assumed the membership and functions of COFO. Merged into the
Regional Forum in 1995.
Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum). Created as provision
of NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion on FCRPS operations. Included
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executives and staffs from the states, Basin Indian tribes, and federal
agencies. Absorbed the members and functions of the Fish Operations
Executive Committee. Introduced a new governance model in which the
Basin‟s sovereign entities would engage as partners, albeit within the
context of the federal Endangered Species Act.
Columbia River Administration. Essentially, a revised Columbia River
Valley Authority that would consolidate federal resource management
agencies into one department. Recommended in 1997 by Dan Ogden. Not
enacted.
Three Sovereigns Process. Proposed by Governor John Kitzhaber in 1997.
Developed further by the Council in 1998. It was included among five
options presented to the region in a memo signed by the governors of
Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. Called for a full partnership of
Basin federal, state, and tribal sovereigns to address a wide array of Basin
issues. Not enacted.
Expansion of Northwest Power and Conservation Council. Option to
expand the Council membership to include tribes. Proposed by the Council
in 1998 as an alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of
five options in a memo signed by the four governors to the region. Not
enacted.
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Regional Resources Council. Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a
memo signed by the four governors to the region. Not enacted.
Northwest Rivers Commission. Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a
memo signed by the four governors to the region. Like the Council, this
commission would consist of two members appointed from each state plus
tribal representatives. Would be legislatively empowered with jurisdiction
over regional Endangered Species Act issues. Not enacted.
Comprehensive River Agency. Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a
memo signed by the four governors to the region. A river basin
commission modeled after the Delaware River Basin Commission. Not
enacted.
Columbia Basin River Forum. Established in 1999 as an outgrowth of the
debate over the five proposals identified in the governors‟ memo.
Collapsed in 2000.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the national context outlined above and
the key issues and events in the Northwest that influenced the debates over the various
governance forms. It then describes the nature and structure of each of the proposed
or enacted governance systems.
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Social and Political Context
The Clinton administration‟s approach to the salmon crisis and the goals of the
ESA set the context for this period immediately following the salmon listings. In
passing the ESA, Congress found and declared that “various species of fish, wildlife,
and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation” and that “these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historic, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people.” The purposes of the ESA are thus to “provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species” and to meet the provisions of international conservation-related
treaties and agreements (Endangered Species Act, 1973, section 2). The ESA carried
strong, legally enforceable mandates to ensure federal actions would not cause further
harm to species already on the brink of extinction.
Bill Clinton campaigned in part on an environmental platform, aggressively
promoted by vice presidential nominee Al Gore. Election of the Clinton-Gore
administration in 1992 raised the hopes of the nation‟s environmental community for a
reversal of the anti-environmental agenda of the Reagan administration and the
lackluster environmental record of the George H.W. Bush administration. However,
the Clinton administration never quite lived up to environmentalist expectations.
Faced by Republican majorities in Congress and Clinton‟s personal attention being
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drawn to other issues, the hoped for renaissance of new environmental policies and
legislation never materialized (Rosenbaum, 2005).
Environmental groups did enjoy far greater access to the Clinton
administration than they had their predecessors (Rosenbaum, 2005). Once litigation
commenced over the Northwest ESA salmon listings, environmental groups initiated a
coordinated campaign to nationalize the issue seeking to exercise influence over the
government‟s position in court and regional agency decision-making. The intent was
to generate political pressure on Congress and the administration to achieve salmon
policy objectives through the Endangered Species Act and legislative action. The
most dramatic of these objectives was partial removal of four federal dams on the
lower Snake River in order to restore that portion of the river to a more natural
condition.123
The administration assigned responsibility for coordinating federal salmon
policy to the president‟s Council on Environmental Policy. The CEQ was established
under NEPA. Among its assigned responsibilities were to develop and promote
policies to improve environmental quality. CEQ‟s influence on presidential policy
enjoyed its zenith under the Carter administration and then suffered a dramatic decline
in influence during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Rosenbaum (2005) argues
that the election of the Clinton administration did not greatly increase CEQ‟s influence
on policy, despite the hopes of the environmental community. Rosenbaum writes,
“[t]he CEQ remains, but it has long ceased to be a major player in White House
123

These dams were Little Goose, Monumental, Lower Granite, and Ice Harbor, all operated by the
Corps of Engineers.
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Politics” (2005, p. 89). Whereas Rosenbaum‟s argument may be true from a broad
national perspective, the CEQ came to play an influential role in the Northwest salmon
issue.

Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest
On April 2, 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe petitioned for the listing of
Snake River sockeye salmon under the Endangered Species Act. Environmental
groups soon followed suit, filing petitions for listing of Snake River spring-summer
and fall runs of chinook salmon and lower Columbia River coho salmon (National
Research Council, 1996). Responding to the Shoshone-Bannock petition, NMFS
listed Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered on November 20, 1991. More
listings followed, with NMFS listing Snake River fall and spring-summer chinook as
threatened on May 22, 1992 (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
The listings resulted in the National Marine Fisheries Service assuming a
dominant role in federal salmon efforts, eventually eclipsing the state-led NPPC effort
with each additional listing (Crampton and Espenson, 2009). The ESA listings also
provided greater advantage for the environmental community and tribes through the
Act‟s enabling of “citizen suits” by third parties who believed that provisions of the
ESA were being violated or not carried out.124
The listings thus created conditions that resulted in a series of proposals for
new governance systems. Several regional events and circumstances influenced the
124

See Endangered Species Act, 1973, section 11 (g).
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debate over the choice of a new governance system. The biological opinions by
NMFS regarding the effect of FCRPS operations on listed fish and the lawsuits that
followed the salmon listings were most prominent. Additional issues included the
manner in which the Clinton administration chose to address the salmon issue and
efforts by the Council to address its weaknesses and retain control over the salmon
problem. Each of these issues is discussed in turn.
The ESA biological opinions and lawsuits.
NMFS listed fourteen additional species of salmon in the Pacific Northwest
and along the California Coast following the 1991 Snake River sockeye listing
(NMFS, 2009a). The listings were a major disappointment to regional state and
federal fishery managers. Up until that point, it was believed that the NPPC fish and
wildlife program would preclude such an outcome (Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Bodi,
1995; Wright, 1995).
In a biological opinion issued in 1992, NMFS determined that the operation of
the FCRPS would not jeopardize the survival and recovery of the listed salmon. In
May 1992, a coalition of environmental, tribes, and fishing groups led by the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund, sent a 60-day notice of intent to sue under the ESA to
federal dam operating agencies (Buchal, 1998). Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit federal
District Court on August 4, 1992. Plaintiffs contended that the primary cause of the
decline of listed salmon was the construction and operation of the region‟s dams. The
suit ignited a “legal free-for-all” (Crampton and Espenson, 2009, p. 9) with suits,
claims, and cross-claims filed by power users, irrigation interests, navigation interests,
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tribes, sports fishers, commercial fishers, and environmental groups joining the case as
plaintiffs, plaintiff-interveners, or defendant-interveners. Litigation proceeded
through several phases and a series of biological opinions (Crampton and Espenson,
2009). NMFS followed its 1992 biological opinion with another in 1993: the court
found both deficient remanded them back to NMFS. NMFS voluntarily withdrew its
third opinion in 1994 in order to reinitiate consultation and revise it. NMFS issued its
revised opinion in 1995, which the district and appeals courts upheld (Crampton and
Espenson, 2009).
Litigation continues as of this writing. It is not the intent to capture the full
history of the litigation here. What is of interest here is the juxtaposition of interests
and worldviews and the seemingly incongruous coalitions that formed within the
litigation crossfire.
The listings unleashed what Taylor (1999) labels the region‟s “centrifugal
forces,” forces that had been building for decades. It is to these forces that Oregon
Governor Kitzhaber referred when noting the balkanization of the Northwest over the
salmon issue in his call for a new governance system (O‟Bryant, September 24, 1999).
This study groups those forces under three general categories. These were
salmon harvesters; the power, irrigation, and navigation interests that commercially
benefited from the presence of the dams; and environmental interests.
The region‟s commercial and sports fishery advocates represented salmon
harvest as an important region‟s history and culture and a rapidly disappearing
foundation of the economy, although they often clashed over harvest allocations
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(Taylor, 1999). Lower river Indian tribes, while sharing a commercial interest in
harvest, were more concerned with the depleted fish runs‟ impacts on their culture and
the roles played by salmon in their sense of identity and ways of life. Although often
bitterly opposed to the goals and objectives of each other (Taylor, 1999) and often
litigation adversaries (Pevar, 2002), this three-way harvest community were united in
their blame of the impacts of the dams as a primary reason for declining fish numbers
(Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004).
To those dependent on the dam‟s commercial benefits, the dams were symbolic
of the region‟s economic health and a guarantor of public safety through flood control.
The electricity produced by the dams provided inexpensive power to fuel the region‟s
economy; the irrigation system supported the region‟s agricultural community; and
waterborne navigation provided an inexpensive means to move timber and agricultural
products to market (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963). To them, the moralistic
arguments of the fishery community were a self-serving and disingenuous attempt to
subsidize an anachronistic fishing industry under pressure from natural changes in
ocean conditions, rising global competition, and an inability to curb their own historic
excesses. As with the members of the fishery community, there were deep
disagreements among members of the economic development community.
Nevertheless, they all shared a belief in the economic and symbolic importance of the
dams and related to them as a sign of the region‟s historic economic development and
growth potential (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999;
Wilkinson, 2005).
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The third category was the growing interest in restoring naturally viable
populations of wild fish for their own sake. This value is embodied in national and
state environmental protection statutes in general and the Endangered Species Act in
particular (Dunlap, 1992; Taylor, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005). Environmental
organizations interested in raising national political interest in the case further
promoted this value. The ESA‟s emphasis on “esthetic” and “ecological” values is
consistent with the worldview of the environmental movement. However, up until the
1992 lawsuit, ecological values were rarely, if ever, invoked in the regional debate.125
Rather, the debate had previously centered on the commercial interests of those
whose livelihoods depended upon the dams and those whose livelihoods depended
upon the fishery harvest. It was essentially a debate that occurred among adherents to
a worldview embracing commercial markets and resource commoditization. Dam
defenders blamed overfishing, poor hatchery practices, and natural conditions over
which humans had little control (Buchal, 1998). Fishery, tribes, and environmental
groups blamed the existence and operation of the dams (Blumm, et al., 1998). Taylor
(1999) cogently summarizes the situation by stating, “…each perspective sees the
[salmon] problem lying elsewhere” (p. 247).
The Clinton administration‟s response.
The environmental community‟s efforts to nationalize the salmon debate
captured the attention of the Clinton administration. The administration delegated the
coordination of the federal response to the Council on Environmental Quality. The
125

Ecological restoration, when called for, was advocated in the interest of a means of increasing the
fishery for purposes of harvest, seldom as a value in its own right.
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CEQ chair organized a team of departmental assistant- and under-secretary level
officials from the Department of Army, Department of Interior, Department of
Agriculture, and Department of Commerce. Also included were the Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Management and Budget, and attorneys from the
Department of Justice. This group would eventually be designated the Salmon Policy
Team (personal knowledge of author).
Although the Salmon Policy Team would pay close attention to events in the
Northwest, the administration delegated the lead in devising a solution to the crisis to
its newly appointed regional administrator for the NMFS‟s Northwest Region,
William W. Stelle, Jr. Appointed in 1994, Stelle arrived in the northwest with
administration backing to preside over development of a revised salmon policy and
coordinate the actions of the other regional federal agencies. Whereas during the era
of the FCRPS‟s development the BPA administrator exerted a leadership role among
federal agencies, Stelle assumed that role as the agencies struggled to get the FCRPS
into compliance with the Endangered Species Act (personal knowledge of author).
Although the biological opinions issued under Stelle stopped short of requiring dam
breaching, they squarely raised that once unthinkable possibility should other
mitigation efforts fail to reverse the salmon decline.
Under Stelle, NMFS issued a new Biological Opinion in 1995 that declared
jeopardy on listed salmon due to FCRPS operations and called for a series of actions
and studies under a “spread the risk” strategy. The intent was to issue a revised
opinion in 1999 that would address the system‟s most serious issues. Crampton and
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Espenson (2009) characterized the period 1995 to 1999 as the “interim” and “sound
science years” as fisheries scientists, economists, and bureaucrats conducted research
and compiled information to inform the decisions expected in 1999. They also
represent a period where the region reengaged the debate on governance systems in
order to keep regional decision making out of the courts and within the region (Batt,
Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, 1998).
NPPC efforts to regain control of the salmon issue.
The NPPC continued to function, although its role as salmon restoration leader
would gradually be eclipsed by the federal government efforts led by NMFS. In 1995,
Congress requested, through language in its energy and water appropriations
legislation, that the Council prepare a report outlining options for more effective
management of regional salmon conservation efforts. The Council provided the
requested report on May 15, 1996. Upon conclusion of a process that occurred
between November 1995 and April 1996, involving “extensive discussion” (NPPC,
1996, p. 4) within the region, the Council reported “widespread agreement” on the
need for a single fish and wildlife plan as opposed to the multiple plans then in
existence. It further called for a responsible, accountable, and transparent decisionmaking system for implementation; independent scientific input into decision-making;
and a watershed-up versus top-down decision-making approach (NPPC, 1996).
The report offered three general recommendations. The first called for federal,
state and tribal fish and wildlife efforts to be consistent with each other. The report
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notes improved and constructive collaboration to this effect.126 But it goes on to say
that, if this cooperative effort should fail, either legislation or an executive order
directing federal implementation of the Council’s program may be needed (emphasis
added). The second recommendation was that, if such legislation was needed, the
Corps, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, NMFS, and
the Fish and Wildlife Service be required to act consistently with the 1980 Power
Act‟s Fish and Wildlife Program (again, emphasis added). Third was a
recommendation for direct funding by BPA to a monitor and evaluate programs to
better determine the results of actions undertaken (NPPC, 1996).
The report also offered a concise and astute summary of the institutional
challenges that led to so much conflict over governance in the Basin‟s far and recent
history. This section of the report opens as follows:
“The fact that the salmon declines resumed even after passage of the
Northwest Power Act, the Magnuson Act, the Salmon and Steelhead
Conservation Act and the U. S. - Canada Salmon Treaty inevitably raises
questions about the efficacy of these remedial measures. For purposes of
this review, it is important to focus specifically on institutional questions
that arise in fish and wildlife governance on the river” (NPPC, 1996, p. 7,
emphasis added).
The institutional questions dealt with the limitations on effective planning posed by
the Council‟s lack of authority over river uses other than power and fish and wildlife,
the nature of Council membership, the diffusion of responsibility for policy
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The structure under which this improved cooperation was occurring was not specified in the report.
Note that the Regional Forum, discussed below, was only just being established.
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formulation and implementation among multiple regional entities, and the inability to
balance Council program needs with those of other agency programs.127
The report goes on to highlight important differences between the requirements
of the Endangered Species Act and the Power Act. These include the federal-only,
internal decision making structure of the ESA versus the open public process of the
Power Act; the lack of attention to non-listed species under the ESA; the lack of ESA
consideration for economic and community impacts; and the lack of explicit protection
of tribal treaty rights in the language of the ESA. According to the report, these issues
lead to one of three conclusions:
“Some conclude that the Endangered Species Act and the Northwest
Power Act can complement each other, each shoring up the other‟s weak
points. From this perspective, the question is not whether one law should
be implemented at the expense of the other but how to make the two work
better together.
Others conclude that the Endangered Species Act listings have knocked
things out of balance. They argue that regardless of whether the two laws
could work together in principle, in fact the Endangered Species Act
dominates decisions on the river and leads to decisions that insufficiently
reflect the region‟s values and concerns. These voices do not necessarily
argue for changes in the Endangered Species Act, but they do suggest that
the region play a more prominent role in Endangered Species Act
decisions.
Yet a third possibility is that neither the Endangered Species Act nor the
Northwest Power Act strikes the right balance among species, ecosystems
and economic development. They should be replaced by a single law that
properly accounts for these interests” (NPPC, 1996, p. 9, emphasis added).
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See NPPC, 1996, pp. 7-8 for a complete list and discussion.
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This analysis implicitly underscored Council and others‟ concern over the potential
shift in regional decision making from the Council to the federal government resulting
from the ESA listings.
The report is relatively modest in its identification of new governance systems.
It presents five alternative approaches to Basin decision making. Two specifically
address governance arrangements; two suggest potential revisions to the Power Act
and/or ESA; and one suggests merely reinterpreting existing law. Of the systemoriented approaches, one called for an inter-agency federal agreement to implement
the Council‟s program or explain why not. The other called for replacement of the
Council with a new entity comprised of state, tribal, and federal representatives
(NPPC, 1996, Table 1, p. 28). These recommendations were to find a more definitive
form in the governance alternatives prepared for the governors‟ memo released to the
region in 1998.
Instead of pushing immediately for new systems and structures, the Council‟s
report outlines recently adopted processes and procedures and asks that they be given
time to mature. Among the recently adopted measures identified in the report was
creation of a revised charter in 1994 for the Independent Science Group, first
established in 1992. Another was the implementation in 1995 of a prioritization
process to align proposed fish and wildlife projects within a prescribed budget. Yet
another was the recent creation of the Regional Forum (NPPC, 1996). In substance
and tone, the Report presented a thoughtful, insightful, and guardedly optimistic status
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of the governance and salmon recovery situations. Current institutional arrangements
should thus be allowed to continue pending evidence of failure.

Resulting Governance Systems
The optimism of the Council‟s 1996 Report did not last long. The
collaborative framework hoped for in the NPPC report and embodied in the NMFS‟
Regional Forum collapsed in 1997. Frustration over the lack of progress led to
Oregon Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new governance system later that year, the call
that sparked establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum as recounted in
Chapter 1. The Council offered a leadership role in the development and
dissemination of alternative governance structures for consideration by the public,
albeit by ignoring the institutional questions they so carefully presented in 1996 and
focusing instead on legislative proposals to expand the scope of the 1980 Power Act
(NPPC, 1996).
The limitations of the NPPC (Hemmingway, 1983; Ogden, 1997; Blumm and
Simrin, 1991) and ESA inspired lawsuits and listings caused many to rethink the
options for regional governance. Industrial groups and political leaders felt the
economic benefits enjoyed by the region‟s inexpensive hydropower were seriously at
risk and sought ways to prevent its loss. Multiple proposals were put forward, with
new efforts at joint federal-state-tribal decision making enacted.
The nine Governance systems proposed following the salmon listings included
creation of a committee of federal and state fishery managers under the auspices of the
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Council, a Regional Implementation Forum called for in NMFS‟ 1995 biological
opinion, a new call for a valley authority, Governor Kitzhaber‟s proposed “Three
Sovereigns” process, various proposals to revise and expand the Council, and the
Columbia River Basin Forum.
Fish Operations Executive Committee.
Following NFMS‟ 1991 and 1992 ESA listings of Snake River fish, the
Council released its 1992 Fish and Wildlife Program. Section 3 of that program called
for creation of a Fish Operations Executive Committee (FOEC) to be comprised of
“senior management representatives of the Council, as well as power and fishery
interests.” In practice, the FOEC seems to have adopted the membership and
functions of the previous COFO (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft,
1996).128 The Council‟s 1994 program carried forward the language of section 3.
Under both plans, the FOEC was to produce a detailed implementation plan for and
resolve conflicts concerning such issues as flow, spill, juvenile fish transportation, fish
passage, and other “mainstem passage matters” as found in various regional plans and
programs (NPPC, 1992 and 1994/95). FOEC was a creation of the Council, and,
therefore, viewed by the Council as subordinate to it. This changed with NMFS‟ 1995
Biological Opinion and establishment of the Regional Implementation Forum.

128

The Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996, also mentions a “Water Budget
Implementation Work Group” that succeeded COFO. Other than this passing reference, even less
information on this Work Group was found in the sources reviewed for this study than was found for
COFO. Consequently, it is not included as a governance system.
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The Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum).
In his 1994 court ruling, Judge Malcolm Marsh struck down NMFS‟ 1993
biological opinion, declaring that “the process is seriously flawed, significantly
flawed” in that it favored the status quo of river operations through small incremental
actions and that “The situation literally cries out for a major overhaul” (Marsh, quoted
in Crampton and Espenson, 2009, p. 110). In response, NMFS issued a revised BiOp
in March 1995. In addition to its enhanced biological provisions and spread-the-risk
strategy, the new BiOp called for an adaptive management structure involving states,
tribes, and federal agencies (NMFS, 1995; Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
This system envisioned an “Executive Committee” consisting of top policy
makers from the regional federal agencies, state governors‟ offices, and tribal
governments. Unlike the FOEC, which was organized under the Power and
Conservation Council, NMFS regional administrator Will Stelle chaired this
committee. The Executive Committee introduced a new model of governance to the
Columbia Basin. Previous governance system membership was limited to federal
agencies and representatives from the state governors‟ offices. The Regional Forum
was the first system to seat the tribes, states, and federal governments as co-managing
equals, albeit with a limited focus on implementation of the 1995 biological opinion.
Under the Executive Committee was an “Implementation Team” comprised of
senior managers and policy advisors from the same entities as represented on the
Executive Committee. The Implementation Team subsumed the membership of the
FOEC (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996). Although the
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membership was unchanged, this revised organization was now answerable to the
federal agencies under the auspices of the Endangered Species Act as opposed to the
Council under the authorities of the 1980 Power Act.
Under the Implementation Team were three technical teams. The Technical
Management Team (TMT), comprised of staff from participating entities, served to
advise the dam operators on day-to-day operations. TMT members could submit
systems operating requests to the action agencies, which could be negotiated or taken
under advisement. If the TMT members could not agree on the operation, they
referred the issue up to the Implementation Team. Disagreements within the
Implementation team were in turn referred to the Executive Committee. The other
two technical teams consisted of a Systems Configuration Team to recommend and
assist in prioritizing physical changes to the dams and a Water Quality Team to
address dam-related issues of water temperature and dissolved gas (Interim
Procedures, 1997; Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
Participation for all parties was voluntary, and the Regional Forum did not
impose any obligations on individual agency decision-making beyond the provisions
of the 1995 BiOp. As such, it had no decision-making authority beyond items upon
which the parties could agree (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
The lack of authority was a source of friction among some parties. Others
criticized the Forum for its lack of clear guidelines, its lack of participation by the
public, the erratic attendance by participants, its lack of a dispute resolution
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mechanism, and, finally, the little or no explanation offered regarding resulting
decisions (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).129
Judge Marsh ruled in favor of the 1995 BiOp in 1997, albeit with a large
degree of pessimism over whether it would work.130 This ruling in effect shifted the
locus of salmon recovery planning away from the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife
Program and to NMFS‟s BiOp provisions and the implementation-oriented Regional
Forum (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
The Regional Forum‟s executive structure did not last. Suspicious of Oregon,
NMFS, and tribal designs on water from upriver reservoirs and lacking the confidence
in NMFS‟ Regional Forum to “integrate the needs of Snake River salmon with other
resource needs,” Montana withdrew from the Executive Committee shortly after
Marsh issued his ruling. Montana held that the Power and Conservation Planning
Council was the more appropriate forum with which to address resource management
issues. A month later the lower river tribes (Nez Perce, Yakama Nation, Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Indian Reservation) followed Montana, stating that the NMFS process was
flawed in that it failed to properly recognize tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. The
tribes also objected to the use of technical committees to resolve operating issues
instead of the government-to-government consultations they felt were obligated by the
129

Criticism over procedures, transparency, and dispute resolution would be partially answered in a set
of interim operating procedures produced in 1997 and a revised set of guidelines agreed to in 2002.
130

American Rivers and other plaintiffs appealed Marsh‟s ruling to the 9 th Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals in January, 1999. The Appeals Court issued its opinion later that year, upholding Marsh. See
Crampton and Espenson, 2009, pp. 34-35.

280

treaties. Despite the collapse of the Executive Committee, the Implementation Team
and technical teams continued to meet and advise on day-to-day operations and policy
issues (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).131 The federal members of the Executive
Committee continued to meet occasionally, however, to resolve disputes elevated from
the Implementation Team and to discuss interagency issues related to BiOp
implementation (personal experience of author).
The Regional Forum was a significant departure from past governance systems
in that it invited direct participation by tribal leaders in discussions with state and
federal leaders over Basin decisions. The context of those discussions was the
Endangered Species Act listings, with NMFS retaining final jurisdictional decision
authority over ESA related issues. Despite its short tenure, the state-tribal-federal
structure of Executive Committee would inspire further attempts at joint sovereign
decision-making. The departure of Montana and the tribes from the Forum‟s
Executive Committee was the proximate cause of Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new,
“Three Sovereigns” process. While that proposal gained momentum, other
governance models were being proposed as well.
Columbia River Administration (CVA III).
In 1997, Dan Ogden presented a paper calling for a new structure capable of
comprehensive river basin planning and authoritative governance. His proposal was
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These teams continued to meet up until 2009, at which time the Implementation Team was abolished
and the technical teams subsumed into the Regional Implementation Oversight Group (RIOG). As the
RIOG was established after the period covered in this report it will not be further discussed here
(personal knowledge of author).
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sweeping in its scope, offering a nationwide framework for restructuring national
resource management.132 Consistent with the Hoover Commission‟s recommendation
in 1948 and McKinley‟s in 1952, Ogden recommended consolidation of federal
resource management agencies into one department. This consolidation would include
all bureaus within the Department of Interior, the civil works function of the Corps of
Engineers, the Department of Energy, the Forest Service, the Small Watershed
program of the National Resources Conservation Service, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(including NMFS), elements of the Coast Guard, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
They would be combined into a newly created Department of Natural Resources.
The new department would be internally organized along functional lines at the
departmental level. Subordinate field bureaus would be organized on a watershed
basis, with an “Administration” for each major river basin. He specifically proposed a
Columbia River Administration, encompassing both the drainage area of the Columbia
plus Northwest coastal streams and rivers. The chief of the Administration would be a
career civil servant with responsibility to “plan and manage the river, and also smaller
basins, for all purpose in a carefully balanced, multiple purpose manner” (p. 16).
States, tribes, organized interest groups and other interested parties were to participate
through a permanently established advisory council. He called upon Congress to
reorganize its committee structure accordingly.

132

It is not clear if Ogden prepared this paper with knowledge of the Congressional request to the
Council for new governance proposals or whether it was prepared in response to the Council‟s 1996
report.
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Ogden‟s proposal was, in effect, a resurrection of the valley authority concept
the region consistently in years past. Although Ogden presented his proposal at
several public forums at which he was respectfully received (personal experience of
author), his idea garnered apparently even less support than had previous valley
authority efforts. It is not clear whether the Council formally considered his
recommendation when they pulled together their 1998 governance alternatives in
response to Governor Kitzhaber‟s 1997 Three Sovereigns proposal. Regardless,
neither Ogden‟s Columbia River Administration nor any other valley authority
proposal was included among the Council‟s proposed governance alternatives.133
Ironically, his proposal did an arguably better job of addressing the seven institutional
questions identified in the Council‟s 1996 report to Congress, although perhaps
inadvertently, than most of the Council‟s own proposals.
The Three Sovereigns Process and Columbia Basin River Forum.
As recounted in Chapter 1, Governor Kitzhaber proposed his Three Sovereigns
process in October 1997 (Crampton, 1998, October 16). Chapter 1 of this study
covered the ensuing process, culminating in the signing of the Columbia River Basin
Forum Memorandum of Agreement in January 1999, in detail.
Recall from Chapter 1 that, as the draft CRBF MOA was about to be released
for public comment, power, agriculture, and other river user interests criticized the
Three Sovereigns process as being poorly defined and lacking in non-governmental
participation. In response to these criticisms, the Council developed and presented
133

Not surprising, given the regional governors‟ historic opposition to any valley authority system.
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five alternatives for governance reform. A letter “to interested parties” jointly released
by the governors of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana on July 15, 1998
forwarded the alternatives for regional consideration and discussion. The five options
were entitled (1) The Three Sovereigns, (2) an expansion of Council membership to
include the tribes, (3) a Regional Resource Council, (4) a Northwest Rivers
Commission, and (5) a Comprehensive River Agency (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and
Locke, 1998). 134 Three of the proposals were sketchy at best. None, as written,
addressed all of the very profound governance challenges within the region outlined in
the Council‟s 1996 report.135 All emphasize a greatly increased state and modestly
increased tribal role in decision-making. In effect, the proposals represented an effort
by the Council and regional fishery managers to move decision-making away from the
federally centric ESA BiOp related process, represented by the now federal-agency
heavy Regional Forum, and back to either a statutorily enhanced Council or a
muscled-up replacement.
Council alternative 1: the Three Sovereigns.
The intent of this system was to establish a “principal-level forum” consisting
of four states, thirteen tribes, and one federal representative.136 A senior staff level
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The paper Models for Columbia River Governance was distributed under the governors‟ letter dated
July 15th, 1998 but is archived separately on the NPPC website. The letter is found at
http://www.nwppc.org/fw/3sov; the Models attachment at http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/3sov/
models.htm.
135

This statement refers to the proposals as written. Presumably, the authors of those documents would
disagree with this characterization. This could be confirmed through interviews with those authors.
136

Presumably, these principals were envisioned to be the four governors, the chairs of the tribal
governments, and a DC level federal member, perhaps the Chair of the President‟s Council on
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committee consisting of four state, four tribal, and four federal representatives would
support the principals group. This system required no change in existing law and was
to be established by memorandum of agreement signed by participating sovereigns.
The proposal envisions “collaborative decision-making” plus “different approaches for
different issues and processes” without specifying what those approaches might be. In
making its decisions, the sovereigns recognize the ultimate “decision-makers‟ legal
obligations” inferring that the principal forum could not require federal agencies to do
anything contrary to their federal statutory obligations (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and
Locke, 1998, quotes from p. 3 of the Models attachment). This model is essentially
the same as “Approach 1” identified in the Council‟s 1996 report to Congress (NPPC,
1996, table 1, p. 28).
This proposal addressed the problems for which the Regional Forum‟s
Executive Committee was first envisioned. It called for participants to unify the
multiple fish and wildlife recovery plans then vying for attention, including a salmon
recovery plan produced by CRITFC entitled the Spirit of the Salmon, the NMFS draft
1994 recovery plan for Snake River fish stocks, and the Council‟s 1994 Fish and
Wildlife Program. Somewhat naively, given the recent experience of the Regional
Forum, this proposal was based on the that the assumption “that shared information,
process and commitment to finding solutions will foster consensus….If the Three
Sovereigns agree on a recommendation, the recommendation will continue to carry
significant weight” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, quotation from Models
Environmental Quality. The proposal, however, did not specify. See Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and
Locke, 1998, model option 1.
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attachment, p. 4). As discussed in Chapter 1, the CRBF MOA incorporated this
general approach. The Council‟s Three Sovereigns option required no legislative
changes, implying that ultimate decision-making, in the absence of consensus, would
remain with the agency or entity holding jurisdiction over the issue at hand (Batt,
Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 1).
Council alternative 2: expansion of Council membership to Indian tribes.
This option called for the governors to appoint tribal members to the Council.
This alternative proposed no changes to the Council‟s state makeup as specified under
the 1980 Power Act. Rather, the proposal expanded Council membership to include
appointments made “from the ranks of the region‟s tribes” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber,
and Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 5).
This proposal explicitly assumed that the primary problem with the existing
Council was its lack of participation by the tribes. It called for no changes to the
Power Act and assumed that existing Council authorities are sufficient to facilitate
collaborative efforts. It made no provision for federal participation, and was silent as
to how including tribal participation would address issues with federal agency
discretionary decision-making. In this, it ignored several of the profound governance
issues identified in its 1996 report to Congress (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke,
1998, Models option 2).
Council alternative 3: the Regional Resources Council.
The Regional Resources Council alternative envisioned a “more broadly
representative and authoritative new council” that would replace the Power and
286

Conservation Council. This proposal is very similar to the Council‟s “Approach 3”
alternative in its 1996 report excepting the new Council‟s role under the ESA. The
1996 report stated that an “expanded council” would exercise unspecified
“Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power Act responsibilities” (NPPC, 1996,
table 1, p. 28). Under the 1998 proposal, this new council would “participate in
federal agency consultations under the Endangered Species Act, not supplanting
existing federal agency authorities, but ensuring the council an opportunity to assert a
system-wide perspective in hydropower operations” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and
Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 7).
This new council would be authorized by revisions to federal statue and/or a
congressionally approved interstate compact to develop “an integrated resource plan to
offset the effects of the hydropower facilities on anadromous fish, resident fish and
wildlife in the Columbia River Basin.” The council would “integrate fish and wildlife
obligations, power system operations, energy conservation and resource needs” (Batt,
Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 5). Unstated
was whether the council would also influence other federal water resource issues such
as harvest, hatcheries, flood control, irrigation, navigation, and water supply.
Membership would consist of “some number of state and tribal
representatives” with a super-majority vote required for major decisions. Federal
agencies, though not members, would be required to “act in a manner consistent with
the resource council‟s integrated resource plan, as Bonneville is now obliged to do
under the Northwest Power Act.” The proposal stated that this authority would be
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limited, however, due to the need to comply with federal law, with no federal agency
required to contravene its legal authorities. In this, the proposal addressed the
criticism that federal agencies frequently ignored the NPPC Fish and Wildlife program
provisions (Blumm and Simrin, 1991). The council would be an entity unto itself,
developing its own program based on its own analysis as opposed to the current
Council‟s requirement to develop its program based on recommendations from fish
and wildlife agencies and tribes. The Regional Resource Council would fund its
program by overseeing federal funds from whatever source (both appropriated and
ratepayer generated) and federal project expenditures were to be consistent with the
overall plan (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 3).
Council alternative 4: the Northwest Rivers Commission.
This proposal called for a ten-person Northwest Rivers Commission comprised
of two governor appointed members from each state and two tribal members
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. An advisory council would assist through
establishment of subcommittees oriented on river operations, fish resources and
facilities (presumably hatcheries), fish harvest, agriculture and irrigation, and public
lands management.
This commission would assume most Endangered Species Act functions, to
include making jeopardy determinations, developing recovery plans, approving
incidental take permits, and developing habitat conservation plans. It is not clear from
the proposal if this Commission would replace the Power and Conservation Council or
operate alongside of it. It is also not clear if the commission would assume the
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responsibilities of the Power Act.137 It sees the primary problem facing the region as
the manner in which federal agencies implement the ESA, and suggests that a joint
state-tribal entity could do better.
The proposal did not explain why four states should be given eight
representatives to the commission while the thirteen basin tribes are limited to only
two. Nor does it explain how ESA responsibilities would be transferred from NMFS
and the Fish and Wildlife Service to the commission. It does not provide a role for
federal agencies; presumably, they would participate in the advisory and technical
subcommittees and, in effect, become implementers of decisions rendered by the
commission (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 4).
Council alternative 5: a Comprehensive River Agency.
Although entitled “A Comprehensive Agency,” this proposal was in effect a
modified river basin commission, patterned after the Delaware River Basin
Commission. Unlike the more expansive Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission, participation would be limited to the states of Oregon, Idaho,
Washington, and Montana and “one or more” presidentially appointed federal
representatives. The tribes would be afforded membership, although the allocation of
tribal seats was not specified. This new river agency would prepare long range and
annual plans recognizing the “hydrologically and ecologically integrated” nature of
the river system (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models attachment, p. 9).

137

The proposal somewhat ambiguously states that “it is possible that the Northwest Power Planning
Council could comprise the eight state members of the commission” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and
Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 9).
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Federal law would apply to the river agency as if it were a federal agency.
This represented a substantial change from the 1980 Power Act that specifically
described the Council as not being a federal entity. Unlike the other models, this one
focuses on “broad and evolving” interests in the river and would not focus solely on
fish and wildlife issues. The alternative did not specify the role of the federal
agencies, again implying that they act to implement the river agency‟s plans and
decisions (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 5).

Chapter Summary
Events surrounding the first ESA listings and the impacts on Basin governance
can be summarized as follows:
The initial salmon listings under the ESA precipitated a bevy of legal and
administrative actions, including four biological opinions from NMFS and five
court challenges. They also resulted in an institutional tug of war over whether
regional decision-making would reside in systems designed around the
federally centric ESA or state centric Power Act (Crampton and Espenson,
2009).
The limitations of the NPPC and the ESA inspired listings and lawsuits caused
a rethinking of options for regional governance (Hemmingway, 1983; Ogden,
1997; Blumm and Simrin, 1991).
Under its 1995 BiOp, NMFS established a “Regional Forum” to oversee the
implementation of BiOp provisions. This Forum consisted of an Executive
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Committee comprised of leaders from federal agencies and regional state and
tribal governments. It was supported by a policy level Implementation Team
and three technical teams. Although the Executive Committee dissolved with
the departure of Montana and the four lower river tribes in 1997, the rest of the
system continued to operate into 2009 (NMFS, 1995a; Interim Procedures,
1997; Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
In 1995, Congress requested a review of regional governance systems by the
Power and Conservation Council. The Council‟s ensuing report identified
seven “institutional questions” upon which any governance proposal would
need to focus. Rather than call for immediate changes to existing
arrangements, the Council‟s report highlighted recent advances in regional
cooperation and recommended that the new tools and processes be given a
chance to work. If success was not achieved, changes to legislation and
structure may become necessary (NPPC, 1996).
In response to the collapse of the Regional Forum Executive Committee,
Governor Kitzhaber proposed a “Three Sovereigns” process for regional
decision-making (Crampton, 1998, October 16).
Opposition to the government-only nature of the original Three Sovereigns
proposal by river users prompted a regional discussion, led by the Power and
Conservation Council, to identify governance alternatives. The Council
identified five, forwarded to the region under a letter signed by the governors
of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Washington in July 1998. All of the
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Council‟s proposals were state centric, with varying degrees of federal and
tribal involvement. As a result, none fully addressed the seven “institutional
questions” the Council identified in its 1996 report to Congress. Several called
for legislative changes to the 1980 Power Act and/or the Endangered Species
Act (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998).
In 1997, Dan Ogden prepared a proposal for a Columbia River Administration,
essentially resurrecting the valley authority concept last promoted in 1949
(Ogden, 1997). The Council and governors‟ 1998 letter to the region did not
include this proposal (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998).
Instead of uniting regional decision-making under one structure, the turmoil
caused by the lawsuits and sequence of biological opinions resulted in three coexisting
systems. These were the continuation of the Northwest Power and Conservation
Council as first envisioned under the 1980 Power Act, the establishment and
continuation of the Regional Forum minus its originally envisioned Executive
Committee, and the fledgling Columbia River Basin Forum.
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CHAPTER 8
FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
This study report began by introducing the following seeming paradox in
Columbia Basin governance as illustrated by the Columbia River Basin Forum
(CRBF) experience: whereas prominent northwest political and institutional leaders
believed some form of regional governance system necessary, those same leaders
failed to enact systems with the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the
issues that led them to think such systems were needed in the first place. The study
study sought to determine why this phenomenon seemed to repeatedly occur.
This study investigated this paradox using an historical approach. It used the
institutions involved in the development and implementation of Basin governance
systems as its unit of analysis. The institutions examined included Basin Indian tribes,
federal and state agencies, and private enterprises involved with land and water use,
river infrastructure development, and the salmon fishery within the geographic area of
the Columbia River Basin. The report emphasized the role of federal agencies in the
interest of time and given the scope of federal responsibility for management of Basin
resources.
Research proceeded through three steps. The first step documented the history
of the rise, operation, and collapse of the CRBF. Chapter 1 presented the results of
that effort. From this came a research framework around which a history of Basin
governance was constructed. The components of that framework were the events or
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circumstances that created the opportunity for change to existing systems and
structures; the governance systems proposed or enacted in response to the perceived
changes in circumstance; the locus of decision making for each governance system
proposed or enacted; the political and social context surrounding the points in time at
which change occurred; salient Northwest issues; the institutional participants; and the
positions, interests, agendas and general worldviews held by the institutional
participants.
The second step used that framework develop an institution-level historical
overview of past Basin governance efforts primarily relying on previously published
work. Chapters 3 through 7 provided the results.
The third step inductively analyzed the findings from the historical record to
identify the themes and conclusions as may be relevant in explaining the Basin‟s past
approaches to governance and inform future governance decisions. This chapter
presents those findings and conclusions.
The subsequent five sections present the study‟s findings organized under the
following headings:
The complexities of Columbia Basin governance.
The role of law and legal structure.
Columbia Basin governance systems and models.
Patterns of change between systems and models.
The regional preference for collaboration-oriented systems.
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The study‟s conclusions follow the findings. A closing section introduces a theoretical
framework to address the limitations of the institutional approach and guide further
research.

The Complexities of Columbia Basin Governance
Each enacted system had to address a wide array of substantive and structural
issues, issues that rendered any effort at governance an enormously complex
undertaking. The success and longevity of each enacted system was to a large degree
dependent on how they chose to address these issues. These issues are summarized
below under the following headings:
The scope of substantive issues to be addressed.
The legacy effects of the region‟s settlement and development.
Structural issues.
The impact of differing worldviews.
The scope of Columbia Basin management issues.
In one sense, the scope of Basin governance grew easier over the years. The
primary focus of the Basin‟s first governance system was planning. The original
purpose of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC,
established 1934) was to create comprehensive long-range plans for development and
management of all basin resources to foster economic growth. The array of issues
addressed by the PNWRPC included hydropower development, agriculture, ranching,
water use, mining, land use, navigation, flood control, and recreation (Bessey, 1963;
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Vogel, 2007). Consequently, the scope of planning potentially touched the interests of
just about every institution in the Basin.
This vision of multipurpose planning continued with establishment of the
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC) and Pacific Northwest River
Basins Commission (PNWRBC). However, this broad-scope approach to planning
came to an abrupt end with the termination of the PNWRBC by executive order in
1981 (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970). In its place came the state led Pacific
Northwest Electrical Power Planning and Conservation Council (NPPC) and later the
federally led Regional Forum. The Council‟s mandate under the 1980 Power Act was
limited to power planning and development of a fish and wildlife program (Power Act,
1980; Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; NPPC, 1996) whereas the Regional Forum
concentrated on the effects of the hydropower system on salmon and steelhead listed
under the Endangered Species Act (NMFS, 1995; NPPC, 1996). In effect, holistic
regional planning became “easier” because the region simply stopped doing it.
Multijurisdictional governance entities took up planning for discrete resource domains
such as fish and power only to the degree mandated under law.138 Planning for those
domains not so mandated (agriculture, grazing, mining, recreation, hunting, timber,
water) were left to the discretion of those state, federal, tribal or private institutions
under whose control they lay.

138

Other examples include the management of timber under the Northwest Forest Plan due to the ESA
listing of spotted owls and the management of state-tribal harvest under the US v. Oregon process.
Both of these examples, however, are outside the scope of this study.
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As the scope of Basinwide planning decreased the scope of Basin operations
became much more complicated. The 1990s saw a culmination of a long-building and
profound shift in the focus of FCRPS operations. Planning for and construction of the
dams in the 1930s focused primarily on the commercial benefits of electrical power,
irrigation, flood control, and navigation. However, over time, operations to mitigate
the dams‟ impact on fish and wildlife gradually assumed an ever-increasing share of
budget, time, and staff from FCRPS management agencies. It also gradually assumed
an ever-increasing dominance on the governance agenda (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele,
c.1970).
Meanwhile, the region‟s demographic and economic growth resulted in
increased demands for electrical power, water, recreation, and transportation. National
and global growth increased demand for regional timber and minerals. Absent a
mechanism for holistic long-range resource planning to guide development, the
challenge of balancing competing demands was left to operational managers. The
challenge of operational governance over the conflict between the commercial benefits
provided by Basin dams and their impact on fish became one of the region‟s most
pronounced.
The Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Indian Affairs, commercial fishermen,
and tribes first raised concerns over the impact of dams on salmon in the 1940s.
Requests from Department of Interior and fishery and tribal interests for a moratorium
on dam construction until the impacts on salmon runs could be further studied were
denied. These initial efforts by fishery and tribal interests failed to halt or delay plans
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for further dam construction, especially following the devastation of the May Day
flood in 1946 (McKinley, 1952; Robbins, 2004).
Early river development agencies anticipated (although badly underestimated)
the impact that the envisioned system of dams would have on fish runs. The Corps of
Engineers included adult and juvenile passage facilities as part of the initial design for
Bonneville and subsequent dams on the Columbia and its tributaries (Arndt, Stroud,
and Mogren, 2004).139 The Corps and other development interests believed these
technical adaptations, coupled with agreements to improve habitat in the lower
Columbia River and the construction of hatcheries, to be enough (McKinley, 1952;
Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).
As the years progressed and the toll that dams and other Basin commercial
development enacted on fish became clearer, the Corps, BPA, and other agencies
made additional investments in mitigation. They improved fish bypass facilities,
barged juvenile fish around the dams, restored habitat, constructed hatcheries, reduced
predation, adjusted flow and spill, and took other actions at the expense of hydropower
production. By the late 1990s, Council and agency programs were spending millions
of dollars each year in to mitigate the effects of the dams. Frustration mounted,
however, as these investments failed to reverse the downward spiral in numbers of

139

Fish passage facilities were ultimately included in all federal and nonfederal mainstem dams in the
Columbia and Snake Rivers except Grand Coulee and Hells Canyon. The early efforts were
rudimentary and often not particularly effective – especially for juvenile fish passage. However, as
studies were made and the lessons learned applied to each succeeding generation of projects, salmon
survival improved. See Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004.
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returning fish (Buchal, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004;
Williams 2006).
Furthermore, the bevy of environmental legislation enacted in the 1960s and
1970s meant FCRPS operators had to contend with a slew of new environmentally
oriented regulations and requirements affecting more than just fish. The 1996 report
to Congress prepared by the Northwest Power and Conservation Council and the 2004
Government Accounting Office report illustrated just how complex operations had
become. Both reports delineated the region‟s federal, state, and tribal institutional
actors and myriad laws, treaties, executive orders, court decisions, and operating plans
and programs that defined and guided agency responsibilities (NPPC, 1996; GAO,
2004).
Adding to this complexity is the fact that dealing with standing and new
governance challenges is more than an intellectual exercise in rational analysis of
objective data to solve the current problem of the day. The multiple institutions
charged with managing the Basin‟s resources and the constituencies dependent upon
them have interests and perspectives shaped by their respective histories. The legacy
effects of the region‟s settlement hold strong influence over the way current issues and
problems are perceived, rationalized, and addressed.
The legacy effects of regional settlement and development.
Settlers arriving in the Northwest in the mid to late 1800s almost exclusively
immigrated from the American Midwest. Many carried with them a belief in the
American political system as divinely ordained. They saw the resources of the land as
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a gift given presented by Providence to secure individual liberty through the
generation of individual wealth and to promote social virtue through hard work and
self-reliance. National policy further enabled this belief through its focus on on
putting public land and natural resources into private hands for beneficial use
(Conover, 1923; Cameron, 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986).
The settlers that flowed into the Northwest in the 19th century dispersed
throughout the region, creating a few large cities and numerous small towns. Isolated,
“island” communities developed with early economies centered on agriculture,
ranching, or resource extraction (Lyman, 1963/1917; Wiebe, 1967; Dodds, 1986;
Vogel, 2007). A Protestant-market-capitalist worldview dominated, modified by
unique attitudes toward western land and resources and a self-confidence bred by
surviving the arduous move westward (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds,
1986; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Hays, 1999/1959; Kline, 2000; Weber,
2002/1920; Wilkinson, 2005; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams,
2006).
This worldview coupled with the dispersed nature of the settlements fostered a
localist approach to decision-making. Communities and private businesses exercised a
great deal of autonomy in determining what they were going to do and how they were
going to do it. This sense of localism pervaded the region and became well
entrenched. The key point for the purpose of this study is that the dispersed nature of
regional communities, the self-confidence of the population, the belief in resource
development as a means to foster social virtue, and a tradition of localism combined to
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breed a suspicion of and resistance to strong centralized government, centralized
planning, and centralized decision-making140 (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson,
1992; Vogel, 2007).
The historic pattern of regional settlement affected the legacies of government
agencies as well. The new arrivals found the Northwest to be rich in natural resources.
They saw opportunities to make their fortunes through timber, agriculture, ranching,
fisheries, or mining. Exploitation of these resources was driven by a “legend of
inexhaustibility,” the lack a perceived need for effective regulation, moral attitudes
regarding the role of development in promoting social virtue, and simple greed. The
federal and state governments established agencies to support national, regional, and
state economic development (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Lyman, 1963/1917; Dodds,
1986; Wilkinson, 1992; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss,
Stanford, and Williams, 2006). Local interests and private corporations working alone
or in partnership with state and federal agencies and appropriate congressional
committees emerged as “iron triangle”-type governance structures for natural resource
management (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Clarke and McCool, 1996). These clusters
of relationships among agencies, local interests, and congressional committees
developed into relatively autonomous island communities of policy with little crossagency coordination or planning and frequent conflict over turf and congressional
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The structure of the state governments reflects this regional aversion to strong centralized authority.
Many Northwest state agencies and institutions, rather than reporting directly to the governor, either
report to an appointed board of citizens or are elected in their own right. Consequently, Northwest
governors hold limited direct authority over many state agencies.
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attention (Cameron, 1928; McKinley, 1952; Steen, 1976; Shallat, 1994; Clarke and
McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002).
The physical isolation of communities, the nation‟s laissez fare attitude toward
private business, and the political insularity of federal policy and agency establishment
resulted in Northwest institutions putting down strong roots and achieving a large
measure of economic and political strength. Powerful private and public institutions
developed around water, land use, fisheries, agriculture, ranching, timber, river
navigation, irrigation, and – eventually – hydropower. Whereas national Progressive
era ideals of sustainable use and management of public resources for the public good
were very much part of the national political debate, these ideals made relatively few
inroads against the prevailing belief in private markets and laissez faire in the
Northwest until the early 1930s (Hays, 1957; Hays, 1990/1959; McKinley, 1952;
Johansen, 1967; Steen, 1976; Norwood, c.1981; Cortner and Moote 1999; Billington
et al., 2005).
As a result, the region‟s institutions were well entrenched when proposals for
multi-domain governance entities with more holistic planning and operational
responsibilities and authorities were first made. Many eventually recognized the value
of working together to further common purposes or to preclude imposition of a
stronger governance form that may work against institutional prerogatives (McKinley,
1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970). Examples include the alignment of private
and public electrical utilities in signing the Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement
under the single utility concept (Pope, 2008) and the creation of the Columbia Basin
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Inter-Agency Committee to better coordinate federal responsibilities (Scheufele,
c.1970). The recognized need for institutional cooperation grew as institutional
interests and issues expanded and intertwined.
However, this growing recognition of the value of institutional cooperation did
not extend to surrendering institutional prerogatives in the interest of more efficient
decision-making. The conflictual desires for better coordination and retention of
institutional decision authority greatly complicated the design of governance system
structures.
The challenges of structure.
Giddens (1984) refers to the formal and normative rules that govern the
internal operation of any social system as system structure. This study found four
significant issues of system structure in its examination of the Columbia River Basin
Forum (CRBF) experience. As the CRBF was the only governance system whose
internal structure was examined in any depth in this study, the findings from the CRBF
are used here. The challenges identified from the CRBF experience were the difficulty
of agreeing to a common purpose, generating institutional commitment to that
purpose, funding, and decision-making.
Competing institutional interests, perspectives as to priorities and the nature of
the problems to be addressed, and lack of trust confounded the CRBF‟s initial simplesounding task of defining a common vision and sense of purpose. Even when CRBF
parties finally agreed on language defining the group‟s vision and purpose,
disagreements still arose over what the language meant and how it applied to given
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issues(“Montana, Idaho won‟t Sign on to Northwest Salmon Plan,” 1999; Espenson,
Feb 5, 1999; Espenson, Mar 12, 1999). Reaching agreement over any system‟s goal
and purpose is a fundamental step for system effectiveness.
Related is the difference between agreeing to a statement of purpose and
obtaining true commitment to that purpose. From the beginning, participants
approached the CRBF with varying degrees of enthusiasm. All voiced commitment to
the process, but the lack of support to address key issues, the failure for all parties to
sign the MOA, and the failure to appoint individuals to all positions served to
aggravate existing senses of distrust over other parties‟ motives (Espenson, Feb 5 and
Mar 12, 1999; Meeting Minutes, May 27, June 24, and October 1999).
Whereas the MOA (1999) called for each participant to contribute an equitable
amount of funds for CRBF operations, only the Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA) and, to a lesser degree, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did so. Holding
participants to the funding terms of the MOA could have potentially accomplished
several things. It would have signaled the commitment of each participating
government to the process, would contribute to the sense that the deliberations of the
group were “real” to its participants, and would have likely sustained attention of the
region‟s elected leadership. None of these occurred since BPA managed ratepayer
dollars predominantly funded the CRBF. Consequently, none of the participants other
than BPA had a financial stake in ensuring process efficiency (Meeting Minutes, April
29, July 21 and October 11, 1999; Fazio, July 2, 1999).
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Finally and perhaps most importantly was the cumbersome and ineffectual
decision-making process called for in the CRBF‟s MOA. The process required almost
complete agreement before the Forum Committee could even discuss and issue, let
alone resolve it. The results of this decision-making process were not binding, even if
strong majority agreement existed, in that anyone disagreeing with an outcome could
simply veto it (MOA, 1999; Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, July 21, and
September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).
Every governance system established with the Basin faced the governance
challenges posed by the scope of planning and operational issues within the Basin, the
legacy effects of regional settlement, and the need to agree to acceptable rules and
operating procedures. However, only recently did systems need to account for an
additional confounding layer of complexity posed by the differing worldviews of
governance participants.
The impact of differing worldviews.
A number of the sources reviewed for this study (Harden, 1996; White, 1996;
Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and
Williams, 2006) argue the profound impact worldviews have on the way people
interpret the world around them, structure social systems, and define acceptable
behavior. For example, many accounts of Columbia River development either begin
with or eventually refer to early descriptions of the river as it existed at the time of
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early Anglo-American arrival.141 Such descriptions cited the journals of the Lewis and
Clark expedition, letters and journals of early white settlers, and/or traditional Indian
accounts. These accounts portrayed a river of awesome power that supported an
abundance of fish and wildlife. Wild rapids, waterfalls, and dramatic and
unpredictable changes in flow volumes characterized the river. To the original tribal
inhabitants, these conditions were statement of a natural order within which humans
were spiritually entwined. To the initial white settlers, they represented either
problems to be conquered (flooding, dangerous and erratic river navigation,
agricultural aridity) or opportunities for commercial exploitation (mining, commercial
fish harvest, navigation, irrigation, recreation, hydropower). To Progressive
conservationalists and preservationists and the more recent environmentalists these
conditions constituted a natural treasure at risk and in need of government regulation,
management, and protection. Regardless, the worldviews held by members of the
region‟s dominant institutions shaped the region‟s governance history as those
institutions debated, enacted, or rejected various governance systems.
This study identified three worldviews relevant to Columbia Basin governance
choices. The first and oldest is the worldview of Native American tribes and their
beliefs regarding man‟s place in the natural order (Trosper, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999;
Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich et al,, 2006). The second is Euro American market
capitalism (Weber, 2002/1920; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Kline, 2000;
Lichatowich et al., 2006) as leavened by Northwestern attitudes toward natural
141

For example, see Norwood (c. 1981) pages 9-10, Wilkinson (1992) pages 175-187, Harden (1996)
pages 15 and 59-64, Robbins (1997) pages 50-54, and Lichatowich (1999) page 44.
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resources (Cameron, 1928 and 1929) and the virtues of American republicanism
(Lyman, 1963/1917; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986). The third and newest is American
environmentalism as injected into issues of governance (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a;
Hays2000; Dunlap, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2005).
From the mid-1800s up to the 1970s, adherents to the market-capitalist
worldview dominated Northwest resource development. The tribal sovereignty
movement, coupled with tribal court victories and an increase in governance capacity,
reintroduced the tribal perspective – albeit modified by years of effort to Christianize
the Indians, erase tribal culture, and assimilate tribal people into mainstream American
society (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005). Passage of the National Environmental
Protection Act, Endangered Species Act, and other environmentally oriented
legislation injected the environmental perspective into regional decision-making. The
addition of these differing worldviews added an additional layer of complication to
those of issue scope, developmental legacy, and governance system structure. No
longer were debates limited to how best to manage the system or distribute
developmental benefits. Rather, adherents to the tribal and environmental worldviews
challenged previously taken for granted assumptions over whether the dams and
associated commercial infrastructure of the Columbia should ever have been built, let
alone allowed to operate as they had in the past.
In recent years, environmental perspectives became well entrenched in major
population centers such as Portland and Seattle and held significant sway in the
regional policy discourse. Both states cite with pride their signature environmental
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legislation, such as Oregon‟s so-called bottle bill regarding recycling and
Washington‟s establishment of salmon recovery boards. However, rural parts of the
region often derided the environmental worldview as elitist and more interested in
preserving natural conditions for their own recreational interests at the expense of
rural community economic health (Harden, 1996; Taylor, 1999).
Both the environmental and tribal worldviews gained some measures of
influence over governance through court victory. The environmentalist perspective
won a major victory over timber interests in obtaining through the courts the ESA
listing of the Northern spotted owl and significantly altering timber practices on
federal lands (Swedlow, 2003) and in litigation over salmon (Crampton and Espenson,
2009). In a similar vein, the tribal worldview made major inroads in governance
decisions regarding fishery management through litigation success in the US v.
Washington and US v. Oregon lawsuits. Tribal voices are now major players in
decision making through the court supervised US v. Oregon governance process
(Pevar, 2002; personal observations of author). However, environmental and tribal
perspectives have been far less successful until recently in gaining direct participation
in FCRPS related governance systems.
Both the spotted owl and tribal fishery cases, however bitterly fought, involved
a relatively limited number of regional interests. In both cases, the plaintiff
complaints represented very strong legal positions. In the spotted owl situation, the
defendant market worldview (represented by timber interests) went up against an
environmental worldview armed with the rigorous regulatory provisions of the
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Endangered Species Act. In the tribal fishery cases, defendant commercial and sports
fishery interests, backed by state fishery agencies, went up against the treaty
provisions guaranteed by the federal government. In both instances proponents of the
market worldview lost.
In contrast, the commercial benefits of the FCRPS take in a large number of
regional institutional interests and affect far greater numbers of people. Utility and
energy proponents often describe be the federal electricity generation and transmission
system as the backbone of the regional economy. To them and other commercial
beneficiaries the dams represent as much a regional icon as do the historic salmon
runs. The river navigation system moves petroleum, timber, and agricultural cargo
between Lewiston Idaho, the farthest inland seaport in the country, and the Pacific
Ocean. Water from system reservoirs supports regional agriculture and provides
domestic and municipal water supply. As a result, decision-making processes for the
FCRPS attract a greater variety of divergent interests than did either the spotted owl or
fishery issues.
The worldview of tribal and state fishery managers obtained a measure of
influence over hydropower operations through passage of the 1980 Power Act and its
provisions regarding the process by which the Northwest Power and Conservation
Council is to develop its Fish and Wildlife Program (Power Act, 1980). However,
decisions rendered by the Council under the 1980 Power Act are not necessarily
binding on federal agencies and, in any event, only address power, fish, and wildlife.
The Power Act claims no jurisdiction over navigation, flood control, recreation,
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irrigation, water supply, hatcheries, or fishery management (Power Act, 1980; NPPC,
1996). Federal agencies govern these areas under their discretion as authorized by
federal law. Consequently, although the Power Act requires input from regional
salmon managers in the development of the Council‟s fish and wildlife program,
fishery voices hold less influence over these other river uses.
The environmental worldview exerted even less influence with regard to the
FCRPS. Environmental interests were successful in forcing listings of Columbia
Basin salmon and steelhead under the ESA and ensuring fish and wildlife concerns
were included in the 1980 Power Act. But environmentalists have been markedly less
successful to date in getting the courts to significantly alter the system to the degree
many believe is necessary to restore the Columbia‟s ecological health (Crampton and
Espenson, 2009). As a result, debates over governance systems for the FCRPS have
more often than not taken place within the conceptual framework of the capitalist
market worldview (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006),
characterized by fishery interests‟ opposition to the initial construction and later
operation of Columbia dams. Prior to the ESA listings, the debate was framed
characterizing the fish as a market commodity instead of a critical component of the
region‟s ecology and thus reduced to comparison of economic value relative to other
commercial river uses (Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha,
Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006). There was little or no success with arguments
made in favor of fish restoration strictly for the purposes of ecological health.
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The scope of issues to be addressed, the legacy effects of early regional
settlement and resultant strength of regional institutions, the established lines of
conflict among those institutions, the scope of issues to be addressed, the challenges of
system structure, and the differing worldviews held by governance participants frame
the complexities that every enacted governance system had to face. The success of
any chosen system was therefore dependent on the manner in which the system dealt
with those complexities. But regardless of whatever structure was ultimately agreed
to, each system had to operate within the confines of federal and state law, a legal
framework that added yet an additional layer of complexity and has both hindered and
enabled Basin governance efforts.

The Role of Law and Legal Structure
The Government Accounting Office report released in June 2004 highlighted
the legal structure within which regional institutions operate. It noted the oftenoverlapping jurisdictional boundaries of the Northwest states, Indian tribes, and
federal agencies engaged with Basin issues. The report identified the “multilayered”
collection of laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions that defined and
guided federal agency responsibilities for mission authority and operations, fish and
wildlife mitigation, and tribal relationships (U.S. Government Accounting Office,
2004). Consequently, a central challenge of any governance system is the mediation
of the often-inconsistent goals and requirements imposed by these myriad directives
and statutes.
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The provisions of these legal mandates can be roughly divided into two
categories. The first constitutes mandates that federal and state agencies are required
to meet. Examples from this group include Congressional and state authorizations and
appropriations for agency programs; mandates imposed on agency programs by
federal or state environmental statutes; water allocations per state water law; and
fishery allocations per the treaties with Canada and the Indian tribes. In essence, these
provisions define what agencies are supposed to do. This category will not be further
discussed.
The second category defines or informs the manner in which federal, state, and
tribal agencies interact with each other. Examples include the U.S. Constitution‟s
provisions regarding the relationships among the federal, state, and tribal
governments; the consultation requirements of the Endangered Species Act; the
federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes; and the degree of discretionary decisionmaking allowed by each agency‟s authorizing statutes and regulations. These
examples illustrate the importance of the law in creating the standing of government
agencies to act within their scope of authority within the various governance systems
and with its member partners. Consequently, the remainder of this section addresses
this process-centered (authorizing) legal category.
Regional governance under the U.S. constitutional framework.
The U.S. Constitution sets up a federal system of government whereby the
people of the Nation delegate certain rights and powers to the national government.
The states or the people reserve any power not so delegated (U.S. Constitution, 10th
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Amendment). In addition to this vertical dispersion of power, the Constitution shares
power laterally among the executive, judicial, and legislative functions of government.
The concept of a regional governance system sandwiched between the national, state,
and tribal governments, although not expressly prohibited, does not easily fit within
this paradigm.
The Constitution also defines the relationships among the federal government,
states, and tribes. Article I section 10, Article IV, and Article VI establish the
supremacy of the Constitution, federal law, and treaties over the states. Within this
framework of federal sovereignty, Amendment X recognizes state sovereignty by
reserving those powers not delegated to the United States to the states. The
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes is defined by section 6
of Article I, which Congress the power to regulate commerce with the tribes; section
10 of Article I, which prohibits the states from forming their own treaties, and Article
6, which establishes the supremacy of treaties established by the federal government.
Although the interpretation and enforcement of these provisions by the federal
government has varied dramatically over time (Pevar, 2002), and, despite past efforts
by the states to encroach on tribal rights with regard to fishing, hunting, and taxation
(Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005), the courts have affirmed the federal responsibility
regarding tribal treaty rights and federal government trust obligations. They have also
affirmed state limitations regarding tribal resources.
The constitutional framework thus severely constrains establishment of a state
or tribal led decision-oriented governance system, defined as governance system in
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which one agency has the authority and power to direct the actions of others.
However, constitutional constraints alone cannot explain the success or failure of the
various governance systems dependent on voluntary collaboration among parties that
the Basin has employed.142 A number of systems identified in this study established in
the face of these same challenges functioned relatively successfully for extended
periods. Examples include the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
(nine years), the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (twenty-one years), the
Regional Forum (less the executive committee) (fourteen years) and the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council (thirty years and running). Alternatively, several
collaboration-oriented systems collapsed after relatively short periods. Examples
include the the Northwest States Development Association (less than a year), the
Regional Forum executive committee (less than a year), and the Columbia River Basin
Forum (thirteen months). In each of the long-term cases, participants agreed to an
initial framework of rules and procedures, modified them through experience and
institutionalized them over time. Consequently, the creation a workable governance
framework is not solely a function of the Constitution‟s framework.
Legal standing of federal and state agencies.
Federal and state statutes authorize the legal existence of most federal and state
agencies, respectively. For example, the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802
established the Corps of Engineers; the Reclamation Act of 1902 established the
Bureau of Reclamation; and the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 the Bonneville Power
142

A further discussion of decision and collaboration-oriented governance systems is provided later in
this chapter.
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Administration. In some cases, federal agencies were established by executive order,
as was the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970. Similar laws or orders
established all state and federal agencies, granting them the legitimacy and authority to
carry out the duties and programs for which they were created. In many cases,
original agency authorities were expanded by subsequent legislation. For example, the
originally authorized duties of the Corps of Engineers were to “constitute a military
academy” at West Point and to “do duty in such places, and on such service, as the
President of the United States shall direct” (Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802,
Section 27). This mission was initially construed as the teaching of engineering at the
Military Academy, construction of military coastal fortifications, and the surveying of
roads and canals (Shallat, 1994; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998). Examples of
added missions include navigation improvements in the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers
in 1824, management of the Washington DC water supply in 1853, flood control in
1936, and regulation of dredging and dumping in U.S. waters in 1972, and many
others (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998). All federal and state agencies in the
Columbia Basin operate under similar law granting them authority for prescribed sets
of activities within their respective domains of responsibility.
Statutes themselves provide but the broadest framework within which a field
office of a given agency must operate. Agency rules and regulations supplement the
statutes and govern internal operations. They also can define, to some degree, the
discretionary authority delegated to each field office. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to describe the details of each law and regulation governing Northwest agencies.
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Rather, the point here is that the combination of law and regulation establishes
boundaries within which agencies must operate and the degree of discretionary
decision-making delegated to regional office leaders and managers.
Statutory support for Basin governance systems.
Each of the decision-oriented governance system proposals identified in this
study included recommended legislative proposals to either grant broad decision
authority to an existing agency or transfer authority to a new agency. In 1935,
Representative Hill introduced a bill in Congress that would transfer Bonneville Dam
to the Bureau of Reclamation upon its completion and grant the Bureau authority to
manage future federal Columbia River development and power marketing. Later that
year, Senators McNary and Steiwer and Representative Smith introduced bills in their
respective houses of Congress that would expand Corps of Engineers authority to
include the marketing of power construction of transmission lines in the lower
Columbia. Subsequent multiple proposals for a valley authority-type system also
carried legislative proposals to define decision authorities and reorder agency
relationships (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981). While none of these proposals was
enacted, they underscored the necessity of legally reordering agency authorities and
reporting relationships if an effective decision-oriented governance system model
were to be established.
Several of the collaboration-oriented systems enacted enjoyed statutory
support. The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 created the Bonneville Advisory Board
consisting of the administrator of the Bonneville Project (later the Bonneville Power
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Administration), the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Forest
Service, and the Federal Power Commission. The 1965 Water Resources Planning
Act authorized creation of the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission
(PNWRBC), established by executive order in 1967. The 1980 Power Act established
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (the Council). Collaborative systems
supported by statutes enjoyed marked benefits, such as a dedicated stream of funding
for internal operations and staff and a defined relational framework. For example, the
1965 Water Resources Planning Act authorized appropriated funds for an inter-agency
executive director and staff for the PNWRBC. The 1980 Power Act directed that the
Council staff be funded by funds generated through the sale of federal hydropower as
collected by the Bonneville Power Administration (Power Act, 1980, section
4(h)(10)(A)). In some cases, these statutes helped define the relationships among
regional institutions, such as the provision in the 1980 Power Act that requires
managers of federal hydropower operations to take the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife
mitigation program into account in rendering decisions (Power Act, 1980, section
4(h)(11)(A)).
However, federal statutory support for collaborative systems is no guarantor of
system effectiveness or even establishment. The effectiveness of the Bonneville
Advisory Board, although mandated by the 1937 Bonneville Project Act, dissipated
upon completion of the generation and transmission projects needed to support World
War II industrial production due to a lack of purpose and personality conflicts
(Norwood, c.1981). After almost twenty years of interstate negotiations, Congress
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authorized creation of an interstate Columbia River Basin Compact in 1968. The
effort subsequently failed, however, when the Oregon and Washington legislatures
refused to ratify the agreement their appointed commissioners so carefully negotiated
(Bessey, 1963; National Research Council, 2004). The limited jurisdiction afforded
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council under the 1980 Power Act is
frequently critiqued for its inability to address impacts on fish and wildlife other than
those imposed by the hydropower system (Blumm, 1981; Bodi, 1995; NPPC, 1996;
Crampton and Espenson, 2009). Statutory support does thus not necessarily guarantee
governance success.
Conversely, two collaborative systems enjoyed both effectiveness and
longevity absent any statutory support. The Columbia Basin Interagency Committee
(CBIAC), established in 1946, existed until its transition to the PNWRBC in 1967.
The CBIAC and its parent the Federal Interagency River Basin Committee were
created through the exercise of agency discretionary decision-making and interagency
agreement. Although criticized for its inability to resolve tough interagency disputes
(McKinley, 1952), it generally met the purposes for which it was established (Bessey,
1963; Scheufele, c.1970). Although the federal-state-tribal Executive Committee of
the Regional Forum collapsed shortly after being established in 1995, the Regional
Forum‟s policy-level Implementation Team and technical-level System Configuration,
Technical Management, and Water Quality teams went on to function through the
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period of this study.143 Although called for in NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion on the
hydropower system, the Regional Forum and its subordinate teams functioned entirely
on the basis of interagency and inter-institutional coordination and cooperation.
In summary, the nation‟s legal framework both enabled and constrained the
agencies involved in Basin governance. Agency existence, mission, and authority are
grounded in statute. Discretionary authority is shaped by both statue and regulation.
Interagency relationships can be defined by both statute and agency discretion.
Responsibility over resource domains is relegated to specific agencies based on legal
authorizations, and agency decision authority is granted to them within the boundaries
of those domains. The law imposes constraints on institutions wishing to encroach on
a single agency domain or on the sovereign prerogatives of the federal government,
states, or tribes. Consequently, governance system effectiveness is dependent on both
the degree of latitude perceived in the law (Constitution, statute, executive order, rule,
court opinion, etc.) and the personal proclivities of and relationships among
institutional leaders.

Columbia Basin Governance Systems and Models
Prior to 1929, a private market-oriented governance system dominated, with
natural resource decisions essentially rendered by private enterprises often assisted by
supportive agencies with jurisdictional authority over individual resource domains.
Examples include the relationships among commercial and sport fishermen and state
143

The Implementation Team and three technical teams were absorbed into the Regional
Implementation Oversight Group (RIOG) in 2009.

319

fish and wildlife agencies, timber harvesters with the U.S. Forest Service, the
navigation community with the Corps of Engineers, and agricultural interests with the
Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Agriculture agencies.
Among the many New Deal programs initiated in response to the Depression
was a national planning board to oversee regional planning commissions. The Pacific
Northwest Regional Planning Commission was subsequently established in 1934
(Vogel, 2007). Between then and 1999, this study found twenty-six governance
systems that were proposed for the Basin of which eleven were enacted.
This study characterized each proposed and enacted systems as either decision
oriented or collaboration oriented. As the names imply, decision oriented systems
were structured to make decisions while collaboration oriented systems are structured
for the inclusion of the greatest number of relevant parties. There is an inherent
tension between the two. Decision-making becomes more difficult with larger
numbers of participants due to the increased number of interests and worldviews to be
taken into account. Decision-oriented systems favored efficient, authoritative
decisions at the expense of inclusiveness. Collaborative systems favored inclusion at
the expense of authoritative decision-making. This study characterized nine of the
twenty-six governance proposals identified as decision-oriented in nature. None of the
decision-oriented systems was enacted. There were seventeen collaboration-oriented
proposals. All eleven enacted systems were drawn or negotiated from these seventeen
collaborative proposals.
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This study further categorized the decision-oriented and collaboration-oriented
systems under different models distinguished by the entity or entities holding control
over each system. This study identified three models for the decision-oriented systems
and three for the collaboration-oriented systems. The decision-oriented models were
termed the Market Model, the Iron Triangle Model, and the Valley Authority Model.
The study categorized collaborative systems under models termed the Federal
Cooperation Model, the State Cooperation Model, and the Three Sovereigns Model.
The following sections discuss each of these models in turn and tabulate the systems
categorized under each. Each table presents the name of each system, a short
description, system institutional supporters and proponents (when identified) and a
short discussion of the system‟s outcome.144
The Market Model.
Governance systems under the Market Model vested natural resource decisionmaking to private firms. The fur companies that arrived in the Pacific Northwest
beginning in the late 1700s represent the earliest and extreme forms of this model.
The British Hudson‟s Bay Company, Canadian North-west Fur Company, and
American Pacific American Fur Company all exercised the functions of government in
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There is a seventh potential model as well: governance through court supervision. Such a model has
been used elsewhere in the region. For example, a “Court Supervision” system resulted from the United
States v. Oregon litigation and now guides Basin fishery allocations between the states and tribes. State
and national political leaders and the federal agencies have generally (Oregon being an occasional
exception) been as opposed to the application of a “Court Supervision Model” for the FCRPS as they
have been to proposals for a valley authority. In the past, the threat of system operation under court
oversight has prompted better coordination between regional parties. This is evidenced by the regional
reaction to the first ESA salmon listing in 1991, the support for the Regional Forum implemented under
NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion, and reaction to more recent court directions.
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addition to pursuing their business objectives (Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967;
Dodds, 1986). The the strength of the early fur company position is evidenced by
Hudson‟s Bay Company actively campaign that almost blocked formation of the first
provisional government in the Northwest Territory in the belief such a government
could eventually hamper company discretion and autonomy (Lyman, 1963/1917;
Shafer, 1943/1918; Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).
The advent of American industrialization in the 1860s saw creation of large
corporate trusts that owned companies of finance, railroad, timber, electrical utility,
and mining. Each corporation operated the governance system over its respective
resource domain, often operating in cooperation with supportive federal and state
agencies. Examples include the railroads and land developers cooperation with the
General Land Office, navigation interests working with the Corps of Engineers, and
organized agricultural interests working with agencies of the Department of
Agriculture. The nation‟s belief in private markets and the doctrine of laissez fare
conferred legitimacy to market resulting decisions (Conover, 1923; Hays, 1957; Hays,
1999/1959; Wiebe, 1967; Wilkinson, 1992; Shallat, 1994; Pisani, 2002).
The influence of these corporate giants reached its zenith in the late 1800s
under a governmental doctrine of laissez faire. The Depression of 1873 presented the
first challenge to this all-but unfettered influence and in part inspired the Progressive
movement. The primary relevance to Northwest governance is the impact on
governance of the private-public power debates of the 1920s and 30s. The onset of the
Depression in 1929 and imposition of New Deal legislation and programs caused the
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collapse of this model as the Northwest‟s dominant resource governance system
(Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Wiebe, 1967; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995;
Robbins, 2004).
The Market Model never regained the dominance it enjoyed in the 19th and
early 20th centuries although its precepts have enjoyed periodic resurgence, usually
under Republican administrations. Corporations and trade associations trade
associations continued to play a role in mustering political support for or against
particular governance systems or policies. Examples include the halt to federal
hydropower construction under the Eisenhower administration, the transfer of the
Hells Canyon dams from federal to private purview, and efforts at environmental
deregulation and government downsizing supported by the Reagan and Bush
administrations. In recent years, calls for the privatization of the FCRPS or the sale of
federally produced hydropower at market rates echo the Market Model (Ogden, 1949;
McKinley, 1952; Wiebe, 1967; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; Munson, 2001;
Robbins, 2004).
Table 8-1 summarizes Northwest governance systems under the Market Model.
In the interests of space, and because the purposes of this study would not be served by
listing each regional corporation over history, individual corporations are not shown.
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Table 8-1.
Governance Systems under the Market Model
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Governance
System
The Hudson‟s
Bay Company,
the North-west
Fur Company,
and the
American
Pacific Fur
Company all
vied for
dominance
over the
regional fur
trade.
Laissez faire
doctrine;
primacy of
relatively
unregulated
commercial
markets in
resourced
development.

Description
Private corporations whose networks
of posts and forts established the
first systems of white governance in
the Northwest, providing social
organizations for defense, trade, food
production, administration of justice,
and other regulations over day to day
life.

Supporters
British, Canadian, and
American governments and
associated business
partners.

Opponents
Opposition came from the
competition among firms
for dominance of the fur
trade and by the
governments supporting
their respective
companies. Later opposed
by settlers that favored a
more pro-settlement
provisional government
modeled after the
American governmental
system.

Federal policy in early-late 1800s
was to transfer public lands into
private ownership. Goal was to turn
western land over to individual
farmers and entrepreneurs. But the
enormity of the task and fraud
resulted in large tracts of land going
to large corporate trusts such as
railroads, private power, timber
corporations, and mining interests.
State regulation proved largely
ineffective.

Individual settlers, private
trusts and developers.

Progressive reformers
concerned about extensive
degradation on public land
by large scale industrial
exploitation.
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Outcome
The Hudson‟s Bay
Company bought out the
North-west Fur Company
in 1821. American Pacific
Fur went out of business
following the War of 1812
when in Northwest
holdings were seized. Fur
company influence
gradually declined with
the collapse of the fur
trade and creation of the
region‟s first provisional
government in 1841.
Stock market crash of
1873 undermined public
trust in large corporations;
Progressive era agencies
imposed government
control over resources on
public land; 1929 crash set
stage for stronger
government role in the
economy. Echoes of the
market model are heard in
calls for privatization of
BPA and for sale of
federal hydropower at
market rates.

The Iron Triangle Model.
Coincident with the rise of the Market Model was the rise of the Iron Triangle
Model. Although some agencies, notably the Corps of Engineers and General Land
Office, were first established in the early 1800s, a large number of state and federal
agencies came into being in the late 1800s and early 1900s during the Progressive era.
Progressives intended many of these agencies to counter the severe impact the Market
Model was having on public lands and resources. The states and Congress created
state and federal agencies to research and apply scientific management practices to
fisheries, wildlife, forests, waterways, agriculture, and public lands. Few of these
agencies were regulatory in nature beyond their assigned jurisdictions. Each often
developed close working relationships with the private entities engaged in their
respective policy domain and with the congressional committees overseeing their
authorities and appropriations (Conover, 1923; Cameron, 1929; Steen, 1976;
Wilkinson, 1992; Shallet, 1994; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Weber, 2002; Cart, 2004).
These co-called “iron triangles” exercised almost exclusive decision-making
within their respective domains and gained strong institutional and political support
from their supported constituencies. The locus of decision-making under this model
rested with the individual agencies, working in cooperation with local constituencies
and the agency‟s congressional oversight committees. Examples include relationships
among commercial fishermen, state fishery agencies, and the federal Bureau of
Fisheries; timber companies and the Forest Service; and water resource developers and
the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation. Garnering the support of
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legislative committees and meeting local needs conveyed legitimacy to the decisions
made (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Steen, 1976; Heclo, 1978; Shallat, 1994; Weber,
2002; Pisani, 2002).
“Iron triangle” relationships existed in just about every resource domain in the
Northwest. However, as in the case with the individual corporations of the Market
Model, listing each iron triangle relationship that existed prior to the 1930s would not
contribute to the purposes of this study. There are, however, two examples that
directly affected the earliest debates over Basin governance. In the 1930s, in response
to proposals for creation of a Tennessee Valley Authority-type agency in the
Northwest, congressional proponents of agency prerogatives introduced bills in
Congress that would delegate the oversight of Basin hydrosystem operations to either
the Corps of Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation. The debate between proponents of
iron triangle and valley authority governance led to the compromise that created the
Bonneville Power Administration and Bonneville Advisory Board (Ogden, 1949;
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).
Table 8-2 summarizes the systems promoted under this model.

326

Table 8-2.
Governance Systems under the Iron Triangle Model
Governance
System
“Iron Triangle”
oversight by
federal
agencies over
individual
resource
domains
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Description
Relatively autonomous arrangements among
federal agency, congressional committees, and
local interests. Earliest example is Corps of
Engineers, established 1802, and its relationship
with navigators and ports. Other examples
include USFS and timber interests, USBR and
irrigators, Bureau of Mines and miners, Bureau
of Fisheries and commercial fishing interests, and
USFWS and recreational fishers and hunters.

Supporters
Progressives and
agencies.
Private industry
supported those
agencies designed to
provide technical
assistance and
planning.

System
operation by
Bureau of
Reclamation

Proposed in 1935 House bill (Hill). Bill called
for transfer of Bonneville Dam to the Bureau of
Reclamation upon completion and assigned the
Bureau full responsibility for Columbia River
development and power marketing.

Bureau of
Reclamation
Private power
Valley authority
opponents

Power sales,
transmission,
and operations
by Corps of
Engineers

Proposed in 1935 (McNary, Steiwer, and Smith).
Bills would have the Corps operate Bonneville
Dam, build local transmission lines to serve the
Portland and Vancouver urban areas and
industries along the river, and charge “railroad
rates” in a service area limited to the lower
Columbia. The Corps would market power with
rates set by the Federal Power Commission.

Corps of Engineers
State of Oregon
Private power
advocates
Portland-Vancouver
chambers of
commerce and
business owners
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Opponents
Private industry
whose felt interests
being challenged.
Initial opposition
often overcome
through outreach
(example: USFS and
timber).
Environmentalists and
others by mid 1960s.
Corps
Portland area
businesses
Public power
advocates
Valley authority
proponents
Public power
advocates
State of Washington
Public sentiment in
Oregon and
Washington

Outcome
These arrangements
still exist although
much less powerful
than in the past due to
the the New Deal and
the later rise of issue
networks,
environmental statutes,
and other government
reforms.
Not enacted.

Not enacted.
Succeeded, along with
the Bureau bill, in
framing the debate as a
choice of structures
between a valley
authority and existing
agency. This framing
led to the 1937
compromise and
creation of Bonneville
Power Administration.

The Valley Authority Model.
The Valley Authority Model is the third decision-oriented governance model
identified by this study. Whereas Market and Iron Triangle Model systems exercised
decision-making on a decentralized basis, proposals for Valley Authority systems
called for consolidation of individual agency functions into one agency or
subordination of individual agency decisions to a supervising administrative structure
(McKinley, 1952).
Many Progressives were wary of the power of iron triangle relationships and
the close relationship exercised between agencies and private entities and staunchly
opposed to the resulting corruption and abuses of public resources. Progressives were
supportive of centralized planning as the best means to ensure the greatest public good
from regional resources. In keeping with this belief, they favored creation of a new
regional agency for the Northwest with broad planning and operational authority. This
agency would assume the resource management functions of existing agencies,
although exactly which agencies affected varied between proposals. In general, these
proposals were modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority. However, proposals
varied with regard to scope of responsibility, degree of participation by state and nongovernmental entities, and whether the proposed systems would supplant or supervise
existing agencies. The common thread of all valley authority proposals was that new
statutes would vest decision-making authority in the new agency. Despite the model‟s
apparent success in the east, Northwest institutions that did not want their previously
enjoyed prerogatives encroached upon vigorously opposed them. Consequently, the
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Northwest as a whole never supported any version of this model (Ogden, 1949;
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Conklin, 1983). Calls in recent years to establish
a “salmon czar” with undefined authority to direct the actions of regional federal
agencies with respect to the hydrosystem and fish restoration efforts echo the Valley
Authority Model.145
This study found seven varieties of valley authority proposals made during the
period covered by this study, none of which were enacted.146 These were:
A Columbia Valley Authority, patterned after the Tennessee Valley
Authority, jointly introduced in the Senate by Pope and in the House by
Hill in 1935.
A modified version of the 1935 proposal introduced in the Senate by
Mitchell in 1945.
A revised version of Mitchell‟s 1945 bill, submitted by Mitchell later in
1945. Taylor introduced this same proposal in the Senate (with some
revisions) in 1947; Jackson did likewise in the House in 1948.
A proposal for a Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority introduced in the
House by Horan in 1945.

145

Suggestions for appointment of a “salmon czar” to direct federal agencies toward more salmonfriendly operational decisions emerged under the Clinton administration in the 1990s. To the author‟s
knowledge, the idea was never fleshed out as a formal proposal. Consequently, it is not included as a
governance system in this study.
146

McKinley‟s 1952 book Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest presents an argument strongly
supportive of some form of centralized decision authority over natural resource development in the
Pacific Northwest. However, the author clearly states that his intent is not “to outline a complete plan
for rationalizing the national executive organization” (p. 573). As such, his book is taken by the author
to offer general support for any valley authority-type proposal and is not therefore considered a separate
proposal in its own right.
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A proposal for a Columbia Interstate Commission introduced in the House
by Horan in 1947. This bill offered a revision of Horan‟s 1945 proposal.
A proposal for a Columbia Valley Administration proposed by the Truman
administration in 1949.
A proposal for a Columbia River Administration proposed by Dan Ogden
in 1997.
Table 8-3 summarizes proposals made under the Valley Authority Model.
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Table 8-3.
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model
Governance
System
Columbia
Valley
Authority 1

331
Columbia
Valley
Authority 2

Description
Modeled after the TVA. Submitted in 1935
following bills to assign future development to
either the Corps or Bureau. Introduced in the
Senate by Pope and House by Hill. The CVA
would take over operation of Bonneville and
Grand Coulee Dams and administer future
development over the Basin. Would centralize
Columbia decision-making on river system
planning, construction, operations, and, in some
cases, land management under one administrative
structure.

Supporters147
Grange (with
reservations)
Labor groups
Public power
advocates
Progressives/New
Dealers among some
state agencies
ID and WA
DOI (if new agency
assigned under DOI)

Introduced in the Senate by Mitchell in 1945.
Modified the 1935 proposal. Would transfer the
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams and all future
Basin development responsibilities to a new
public corporation, managed under a threeperson board of directors and under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior.
Would also establish an advisory council of
regional governors. Included unenforceable
provisions calling for the new agency to conduct
its operations in cooperation with other agencies.

Same, except Grange,
labor, and public
power opposed
centralized nature of
decision-making.

147

Opponents143
Federal agencies,
(Corps, Department
of Ag, UFSF, SCS,
and (quietly) USBR)
State governors
Reclamation
associations
Navigation interests
Private utilities
Railroads
TVA
Chambers of
commerce
Same

Outcome
Not enacted.
Resulted in
1937
compromise
creating the
Bonneville
Power
Administration.

Not enacted due
to Republican
majority in ‟46
and Grange,
labor, and
public power
concerns.

The full array of local, regional, and national supporters and opponents of each valley authority proposal is too complex to be provided in a simple table.
See McKinley (1952), pp. 556-566 for a more in-depth discussion.
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Table 8-3. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model
Governance
System
Columbia
Valley
Authority 3

332
Columbia
Valley
Cooperative
Authority

Description
Second Mitchell bill introduced 1945. Revised
earlier bill to include elaborate appointment
requirements and advisory council review
provisions requested by labor, the Grange, and
public power advocates.
The second Mitchell proposal was reintroduced
in the Senate by Taylor in 1947 and House by
Jackson in 1948. Both retained the major
components of the second 1945 Mitchell bill. A
significant modification in Taylor‟s version was
a joint federal agency – state – private interest
advisory structure to review unified plans and
major policy proposals. Thus, existing agencies
would still have a role even though their river
development management responsibilities were
transferred to the new agency.
Introduced in 194 5 (Horan). Modified the valley
authority idea in that it limited the authority‟s
duties to planning, development, and
management of a single resource – water. Other
than that, its structure and provisions were
similar to Mitchell‟s 1945 CVA bill. A
significant difference was its provisions for a
presidentially appointed corporate oversight
board of which at least one member would be
from one of the regional states as recommended
by that state‟s governor. An advisory council
comprised of the state governors and supported
by a staff-level commission that would review all
proposals for water resource utilization.

Supporters
Same; Grange, labor,
and public power
supported revisions.

Not identified.
Presumably similar to
supporters for the CVA.
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Opponents
Same.

Outcome
Not enacted due
to opposition
from
Republicans.

Not identified.
Presumably similar to
opponents of the CVA.

Not enacted due
to Republican
congressional
victories in
1946.

Table 8-3. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model
Governance
System
Columbia
Interstate
Commission
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Columbia
Valley
Administration
(CVAd)

Description
Introduced in 1947 (Horan). Essentially a
revised, more pro-business version of the 1945
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority. This
agency would be the same as contemplated in his
earlier bill, but limited water resource
development to only those activities not suitable
for private development and restricted
transmission and sale of electrical energy to
wholesale markets only.

Supporters
Not identified.
Presumably similar to
supporters for the CVA
plus business and private
developers.

Opponents
Not identified.
Presumably similar to
opponents of the CVA.

Proposed by the Truman administration in 1949
to respond to concerns over CVA. Introduce in
the Senate by Magnuson. Promoted as improved
organization for federal programs, and not as an
extension of federal power. Would limit
operating responsibilities to water resources,
power generation, and power transmission. Did
not transfer land management functions of
Agriculture or the lands, minerals, and wildlife
functions of Interior. In effect, the CVAd would
take over the regional water resource
responsibilities of Reclamation, BPA, and the
Corps. Envisioned as a government corporation
with a general manager to be appointed by a
board of directors. The board was to be
comprised of the regional agency leaders and the
governors of the Northwest states. Responsible
for developing unified plans and programs to be
recommended to the President and submitted for
approval to Congress.

Progressives and New
Dealers; similar support as
for CVA.

States, private utilities,
manufacturing interests,
Corps, Bureau of
Reclamation, BPA, and
irrigators opposed it as
thinly veiled CVA.
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Outcome
Not enacted.
Overcome by
the unexpected
reelection of
President
Truman in 1948
and renewed
calls for a more
robust valley
authority.
Died in
committee;
never enacted.
Echoed in late
1990s and early
2000s with calls
for a regional
“salmon czar.”

Table 8-3. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model
Governance
System
Columbia
River
Administration
(CVAd)

Description
Proposal by Daniel Ogden in 1997 in response to
regional governance debates following ESA
salmon listings.

Supporters
Unknown

Opponents
Unknown

Outcome
Not enacted.
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Was not
included in the
array of
governance
proposals
presented to the
Northwest by
four governors
in 1998.

Proposal called for single agency capable of
comprehensive river basin planning and
authoritative governance. Recommended
consolidation of federal resource management
agencies into one department. They would be
combined into a newly created Department of
Natural Resources.
The new department would be internally
organized along functional lines at the
departmental level. Subordinate field bureaus
would be organized on a watershed basis, with an
“Administration” for each major river basin. He
specifically proposed a Columbia River
Administration, encompassing both the drainage
area of the Columbia plus Northwest coastal
streams and rivers. Other interested parties were
to participate through a permanently established
advisory council. Recommended that Congress
to reorganize its committee structure accordingly.
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The Federal Cooperation Model.
The Federal Cooperation Model is one of three collaboration-oriented models
identified in this study. The Federal Cooperation Model emerged from the debate
between advocates for system management by individual agencies and the 1935
proponents of a Columbia Valley Authority. The 1937 Bonneville Project Act created
what became the Bonneville Power Administration as a temporary compromise to
market power from the federal dams at Bonneville and Grand Coulee and to construct
transmission lines from federal projects to local energy markets. The Act also
required establishment of an advisory board to assist the new agency‟s administrator in
carrying out his duties. This board, called the Bonneville Advisory Board, was
comprised of the Administrator of the Bonneville Project, the Corps of Engineers, the
Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Forrest Service, and the Federal Power Commission
(Bonneville Project Act, 1937; Norwood, c.1981). The provisions of the 1937
Bonneville Project Act thus ensured that collaboration would be hard-wired into
FCRPS decision making. The Bonneville Advisory Board was the Basin‟s first
experience in cooperative decision making among federal agencies.
Under the Federal Cooperation Model, each agency retains its decision
authorities but agrees to coordinate its discretionary decision making with other
agencies and to take their concerns and issues into account. These cooperative
systems were thus essentially strategies adopted by the federal agencies to both better
manage the Basin as well as to ward off imposition of a more authoritarian valley
authority-type system (Scheufele, c.1970).
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At times Federal Cooperation systems opened participation to other Basin
entities. For example, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (1946 – 1966)
and the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967 – 1981) expanded
participation to include the states, and the Regional Implementation Forum (1996 –
2009) included state and tribal participants.
This study categorized six governance systems as belonging under this model,
all of which were enacted. These were:
The Bonneville Advisory Board, 1937 – 1946.
The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, 1946 – 1967.
The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission, 1967 – 1981.
The Committee on Fish Operations, c.1960s – c.1980s.
The Fish Operation Executive Committee, 1992 – 1996.
Regional Implementation Forum, 1996 – 2009 (Executive Committee
disbanded in 1997).
Federal Cooperation governance systems are summarized in Table 8-4.
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Table 8-4.
Governance Systems under the Federal Cooperation Model
Governance
System
Bonneville
Advisory
Board
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Columbia
Basin InterAgency
Committee
(CBIAC)

Pacific
Northwest
River Basins
Commission
(PNWRBC)

Description
Called for in the1937 Bonneville Project Act that
“temporarily” established Bonneville Power
Administration. Members were BPA, Corps
(representing Department of Army), Bureau of
Reclamation (representing Interior), USFS
(representing Agriculture) and Federal Power
Commission. Preserved individual agency
authorities and prerogatives. Required cooperation
among federal agencies; no one agency has
directive authority over another.
Prompted by renewed calls for a valley authority in
1945 and a recognized need for agency cooperation.
Served as forum for coordination among federal
agencies and states. Rotating federal chair.
Participants included Corps, Department of Interior,
Department of Agriculture, Federal Power
Commission, and Bonneville Power
Administration. Commerce and Labor added in
1947; USFWS in 1956. Governors of OR, WA, ID,
MT, WY, UT, and NV were invited to attend.
Meetings open to public. No separate funding;
activities donated by participating agencies.
Authorized by Water Resources Planning Act and
constituted by executive order in 1967. Chaired by
federal appointee. Consisted of same
representatives as CBIAC, less UT. Appropriation
funded. Function was regional water resource
planning. No operational authority over agency
projects or decision-making.

Supporters

Opponents

Compromise between supporters of
single-agency and valley authority
proposals.

Valley
authority
opponents
Federal
agencies at
regional and
departmental
levels
States

Not identified
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Not
identified;
presumably,
valley
authority
proponents

Not identified

Outcome
Held 12 meetings
between 1937 and 1946.
Participation waned as
War effort wound down.
Suffered from lack of a
decision-making
structure and agency
disagreements.
Replaced in 1946 by
CBIAC.
Operational 1946-1967.
Criticized for inability to
resolve disagreements,
address tough issues, and
produce a
comprehensive river
plan.
Held 138 meetings until
replaced by the Pacific
Northwest River Basin
Commission in 1967.
Operational 1967 to
1981. Terminated by
executive order. Its
congressional authority
to exist, however, was
never withdrawn.

Table 8-4. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the Federal Cooperation Model
Governance
System
Committee on
Fish
Operations
(COFO)
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Fish Operation
Executive
Committee
(FOEC)

Regional
Implementation
Forum
(Regional
Forum)

Description
Established in the 1960s to find ways to operate the
FCRPS to better address the impact of the system
on fish and wildlife. Consisted of fish and wildlife
managers and federal operators and regulators,
although exactly who is not clear. Apparently coexisted with the CBIAC and the later Pacific
Northwest River Basin Commission. It is not clear
if COFO was established as part of one of these
other systems or existed independently.
Called for under the NPPC 1992 Fish and Wildlife
Program. Comprised of “senior management
representatives of the Council, as well as power and
fishery interests.” The policy level committee
consisted of federal agency executives, regional
Indian tribal leaders, and appointed Council
members. The purpose was to coordinate federal
obligations following ESA listings of salmon
Created by National Marine Fisheries 1995 FCRPS
Biological Opinion. Constituted 1996. Purpose
was to ensure a unified approach to recovery of
ESA listed stocks. Essentially replaced the NPPC
Fish Operation Executive Committee. Multigovernment in nature, with Executive Committee
consisting of regional agency executives, governor
representatives, and regional tribal leaders.
Established policy level implementing team (IT)
and three technical subcommittees for technical
coordination of system operations.

Supporters
FCRPS
agencies
Fish and
wildlife
managers.

Opponents
Not identified

Outcome
Established in the 1960s,
although exact date is not
clear. Apparently
became the Water Budget
Implementation Work
Group under the NPPC
sometime after passage
of the 1980 Power Act.

Not identified

Not identified

Established in 1992 upon
request by the NPPC.
Ceased to exist upon
establishment of
Regional Implementation
Forum.

Initially supported
by states, federal
agencies, and upper
and lower river
tribes.

Montana left
group over
disagreements
regarding upper
Columbia water.
Lower river tribes
soon followed.

Operational 1996 – 2009.
Difficulty in reaching
consensus among states
and tribal interests as to a
regional recovery plan.
Executive Committee
ceased to exist in 1997.
IT and technical teams
continued until functions
assumed under a new
system in 2009.
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The State Cooperation Model.
The State Cooperation Model encompasses systems structured either under
agreements among Northwest states or federal statute in which the states have the lead
in planning, development, and – under some system proposals – operational decisions.
State Cooperation systems sought to leverage federal agency resources to meet
regional needs as defined by the participating states and to ensure federal agency
decision-making reflected state interests.
This study found nine State Cooperation Model systems proposed over the
period covered by this study, of which four were enacted:
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, 1934-1943.
Northwest States Development Association, 1943-1944.
Columbia Basin Interstate Compact, negotiations initiated in 1949, not
enacted.
Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, 1953-1958.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (later
the Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Council), 1981-present.
Alternative governance system proposed by the the Council developed in
1998 to expand NPPC membership to include tribal representatives. Not
enacted.
Regional Resource Council, an alternative governance system proposed by
the the Council developed in 1998. Not enacted.
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Northwest Rivers Commission, an alternative governance system proposed
by the the Council developed in 1998. Not enacted.
Comprehensive River Agency, an alternative governance system proposed
by the the Council developed in 1998. Not enacted.
These nine systems are summarized in Table 8-5.

340

Table 8-5.
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model
Governance
System
Pacific
Northwest
Regional
Planning
Commission
(PNWRPC)

341

Northwest
States
Development
Association
Pacific
Northwest
Governors‟
Power
Planning
Committee
(PNWGPPC)
Columbia
Basin Interstate
Compact

Description
First attempt at regional governance; outgrowth of
New Deal efforts to use public works to invigorate
the national economy in response to the Depression
and develop plans to implement National Recovery
Act. Comprised of four state planning board chairs,
with part time federal chair who reported to DC level
planning board. Federal agencies not included at
regional level due board member interest in
protecting state prerogatives; agencies effectively
relegated to technical support role. Functions were
investigational and advisory, not operational.
Established by the governors of the Northwest states
(not clear exactly which states were involved) as a
replacement of the PNWRPC to coordinate interstate
issues.
Initially organized in 1953 as a subcommittee of the
federal centric Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee. Ostensibly formed to assist in
implementing the Eisenhower administration‟s
partnership program. Led by state governors.
Consisted of public and private power interests,
federal agencies, and others.
Effort initiated in 1949. Intent was to provide a
larger role for the states in regional planning,
partially motivated by renewed calls for a valley
authority and partially by weaknesses in CBIAC.
Planning commission comprised of representatives
from Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Washington was
organized to promote the effort. Utah and Nevada
joined in 1952.

Supporters
Not identified;
presumably New
Deal and public
power advocates

Opponents
Not identified;
presumably New
Deal opponents
and private power
interests

Outcome
Established 1934 – 1943.

Northwest
states; others not
identified

Not identified

Governors‟
offices
Electrical power
utilities and
interests

Not identified

Governors‟
offices
Valley authority
opponents

Public power
advocates
Washington
and Oregon
legislatures

Operational from July
1943 – early 1944.
Disbanded after
production of one report.
Established 1953.
Almost supplanted the
CBIAC. Produced at
least seven influential
technical reports.
Interest waned, and
members agreed to
disband in 1958.
Effort failed when
Washington withdrew its
support over public
power concerns
regarding threats to
federal hydropower and
the Oregon legislature
refused to ratify.
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Terminated in 1943
when the Republicans
won the majority in
Congress and ended
funding for numerous
New Deal programs,
including national and
regional planning.

Table 8-5. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model
Governance
System
Pacific
Northwest
Electric Power
and
Conservation
Planning
Council
(NPPC)

342

Tribal
members on
Power and
Conservation
Council
Regional
Resources
Council

Description
Product of 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act. Council comprised
of two representatives from each of the four
northwest states. Charged with developing regional
power plan and a fish and wildlife program to
balance needs of energy and fish. Agencies must
consider Council programs in making decisions but
are not bound by them. Name subsequently changed
to Northwest Power and Conservation Council
(NPPC).
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter
to the region. Called for the governors to allocate
some of the seats on the Power and Conservation
Council to tribal members. Proposal called for no
changes to the Power Act. No federal members.
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter
to the region. Would replace the Power and
Conservation Council, exercising ESA and Power
Act responsibilities. Membership of state and tribal
representatives with no federal members. Federal
agencies would be required to act consistent with
council plans.

Supporters

Opponents

Power Act was a compromise between
regional power customers and utilities
seeking legislative response to the
region‟s hydro-thermal crisis and
fisheries advocates.

Outcome
Operational 1981 to
present.

Not identified.

Not identified.

Influence in broader
governance issues
somewhat marginalized
by the Council‟s
relatively limited scope
and upon the first salmon
ESA listings in 1991.
Not enacted.

Not identified.

Not identified.

Not enacted.
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Table 8-5. (Continued)
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model
Governance
System
Northwest
Rivers
Commission

343

Comprehensive
River Agency

Description
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter
to the region. Called for a ten-person commission
comprised of two governor-appointed members from
each state and two tribal members appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior. An advisory council would
assist in river operations, fish resources and facilities
(presumably hatcheries), fish harvest, agriculture and
irrigation, and public lands management. Not clear
if this Commission would replace the Power and
Conservation Council or operate alongside of it.
Proposed in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter to the
region. Patterned after the Delaware River Basin
Commission. Participation would be limited to four
PNW states and one or more presidentially appointed
federal representatives. Membership would include
tribes, although the allocation of tribal seats was not
specified. Purpose to prepare long range and annual
plans recognizing the integrated nature of the river
system. Role of the federal agencies was not
specified, implying that they act to implement the
river agency‟s plans and decisions.

Supporters
Not identified.

Opponents
Not identified.

Outcome
Not enacted.

Not identified.

Not identified.

Not enacted.
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The Three Sovereigns Model.
The Three Sovereigns Model was a direct outgrowth of the growing awareness
of the wide-ranging impacts of that ESA salmon listings in the 1990s were going to
have throughout the basin. The model name is borrowed Governor Kitzhaber‟s 1997
suggestion to implement a “Three Sovereigns” process of state, federal, and tribal
leaders to oversee policy and development of the Columbia Basin. What separates this
model from the others was the inclusion of regional Indian tribes as co-equal
management partners.
Arguably, the Regional Implementation Forum established under NMFS‟ 1995
biological opinion represented the first system under this model. The Regional Forum
envisioned an Executive Committee of state, federal, and tribal leaders to oversee the
biological opinion‟s implementation. However, the scope of the Regional Forum‟s
structure was more oriented to implementation of federal agency actions than
oversight of Basin policy in general. Consequently, this study considered the Forum
under the Federal Cooperation Model.
This study categorized two proposals under this model, one of which was
enacted. These are listed below and summarized in Table 8-6:
The Three Sovereigns Process proposed by Governor Kitzhaber in 1997
and included in the Council‟s list of governance alternatives in 1998. Not
enacted.
The Columbia Basin River Forum, established 1999-2000.
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Table 8-6.
Governance Systems under the Three Sovereigns Model

Governance
System
Three
Sovereigns

345
Columbia
River Basin
Forum (CRBF)

Description
Proposed by Governor Kitzhaber in 1997 and
fleshed out as a governance proposal by the NPPC
in 1998. Envisioned as a “principal-level forum”
consisting of representatives from the four PNW
states, thirteen tribes, and one federal
representative. Principal group to be supported by
a senior staff-level committee with four seats each
allocated to the states (one per state), federal
agencies, and thirteen tribes. No change required in
existing law; would be established by memorandum
of agreement among participating sovereigns. In
effect, proposal mirrored the purpose and structure
of the Regional Forum Executive Committee but
broadened its scope of activities.
Established in response to the Oregon governor‟s
“Three Sovereigns Process.” Established under a
memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. Intent
was to establish consensus-based collaborative
decision-making process pending legislative action
on a new governance system (which never
materialized). Existed alongside the Regional
Forum and Northwest Power and Conservation
Council.

Supporters
Governors and
regional
congressional
delegation generally
supportive of new
governance system.
Supported “Three
Sovereigns” as
starting point for
discussion.

Opponents
Nongovernmental
river users such as
irrigation
associations,
navigation
interests, and
utilities.

Compromise between federal agencies
and proponents of governance models
favoring stronger state control over
FCRPS operations and fish restoration
efforts.
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Outcome
Not enacted; modified to
in response to river user
concerns; became the
CRBF.

Effectively ceased to
exist in 2000 due to
inability to reach
consensus, funding
issues, and loss of
interest by participants.

In addition to identifying the specific systems and models debated and adopted
within the Basin, this study also analyzed them for patterns. The purpose of this
analysis was to determine if such patterns existed that could inform both this study‟s
research question on the apparent paradox of governance and future regional
governance efforts. As it turned out, this study found two such patterns to exist.

Patterns of Change between Systems and Models
This study characterized changes in governance systems under two general
patterns. The first pattern concerned changes in systems within a given governance
model. This category included instances where system participants recognized
structural weaknesses within the system and voluntarily acted to improve upon them.
Examples included the non-conflictual rolling of the Bonneville Advisory Board into
the Columbia Inter-Agency Committee. Weaknesses in decision-making and the lack
of a statutory basis for dependable CBIAC funding led in turn to creation of the
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (DeLuna, 1997; Ogden, 1997).
This category also included situations where structural weaknesses within a
system were recognized but for which participants lacked compelling reason to
change, resulting in system termination. Examples included the non-controversial
dissolution of the Northwest States Development Committee in 1944, the disbanding
of the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee in 1958, and the
collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum in 2000 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963;
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Norwood, c.1981). This pattern is not further discussed here as it did not offer much
insight into this study‟s primary research question.
The more interesting and informative is the pattern identified for changes
between models. These changes were most often conflictual in nature as institutional
actors who believed their interests and aspirations were not being adequately
addressed under existing system(s) sought opportunities to challenge the status quo.
In each case, the opportunities for change presented themselves through situations of
such critical significance to challenge existing governance arrangements and establish
new ones established in their place.
This section examines this second pattern in some depth. It begins by
identifying the critical situations that allowed dramatic change between governance
models to occur. It then maps the evolution of the systems and models identified in
the previous section in relation to the critical situations experienced. It concludes by
presenting a model of governance system selection as determined from the findings of
this study.
The catalytic role of critical situations.
Giddens (1984) defines critical situations as those situations where the
“established modes of accustomed life are drastically undermined or shattered” and
“circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial
numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of
institutionalized routines” (Giddens, 1984, p. 60-61). Under Giddens‟ construct,
critical situations are identified by their practical effect and are therefore only apparent
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in hindsight. This point is important in understanding the failure of the CRBF in
particular and the nature of Basin governance change in general.
Recall that the reasons given for the need for the CRBF included concerns over
the pending NMFS biological opinion, collapse of the Regional Forum Executive
Committee, the potential for Snake River dam removal, and energy industry
deregulation coalesced in the period 1996-1997. Regional leaders saw any or all of
these as risking a loss of regional control over decisions regarding salmon and all or
part of the FCRPS and its attendant benefits. Consequently, regional leaders deemed
them critical enough to warrant a new decision-making governance system.
However, the perceived threat never materialized to the degree necessary to
inspire significant change. All either proved to be less threatening than originally
feared or were resolved through process other than the CRBF. Consequently, by
definition, those circumstances did not pose a critical situation in the sense used by
Giddens (1984). The CRBF thus failed in part due to lack of a sufficient crisis that
would cause its members to structure it in a way to ensure its continuation over the
long term.
This study identified four critical situations that challenged the status quo to
the point where opportunities for change opened not just between existing governance
systems but also between models. The onset of the Great Depression (as symbolized
by the stock market crash of 1929), the end of World War II, the issuance of BPA‟s
notice of insufficiency (symbolizing the hydro-thermal financial crisis), and the first
listing of Snake River salmon under the Endangered Species Act provided those
348

opportunities. These situations framed the narrative presented in Chapters 4 through
7. This study found that changes between models could be either conflictual or nonconflictual in nature.
In three cases, the transition between governance models was decidedly
conflictual. The onset of the Depression resulted in a bitter debate among Market
Model, Iron Triangle, and Valley Authority model proponents that resulted in the
compromise that created the Bonneville Power Administration and introduced the
Federal Cooperation model through the Bonneville Advisory Board. The hydrothermal crisis of the 1970s provided an opening for fishery, tribal, and environmental
interests to challenge the federal-centric Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission
and establish the state-led Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation
Planning Council (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Norwood, c.
1981; Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008; Crampton and
Espenson, 2009). The ESA salmon listings in 1991 reopened tensions between
proponents for state-led and federal-led efforts and resulted in reestablishment of a
federal lead in governance initially through the Fish Operation Executive Committee
and later the Regional Forum.
Governance changes brought about by critical situations did necessarily
involve conflict. Whereas events around the end of World War II precipitated
significant changes in Columbia Basin governance systems, those changes were
relatively conflict free. Congress eliminated funding for New Deal programs that
resulted in the termination of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission in
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1943. This was a Congress still holding slender Democrat majorities in both houses,
indicating a joint recognition between both parties that the need for expensive New
Deal programs and agencies was nearing its end. Shortly after abolishment of the
PNWRPC, the federal agency participants agreed to establish the CBIAC and invited
the continued participation by the states that had been PNWRPC members. A
recognized need for interagency cooperation in managing the hydropower system,
coupled with the weaknesses of the Bonneville Advisory Board and the nascent threat
of some form of valley authority system imposed by Congress, led the Board‟s federal
members to create interagency committees at the federal (Federal Inter-agency River
Basin Committee) and regional (Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee) levels in
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c. 1981; DeLuna, 1997). This change
from a State Cooperation based system (PNWRPC) to a Federal Cooperation based
system (CBIAC) appears to have occurred without major controversy.
The genealogy of Columbia Basin governance systems.
Figure 8-1 illustrates the trajectory of the Basin‟s governance history and the
causal relationships between critical situations and governance systems and models.
The figure maps the evolution of the various governance systems and models
identified in this study and maps them in the general chronological order in which they
were proposed or enacted. Critical situations are shown in the vertical scale on the
left. Solid line arrows indicate where direct evolutionary linkages were found between
systems. The figure demonstrates two important findings. First is the fact that the
Basin has continuously employed some form of inter-jurisdictional governance system
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since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission was in
1934. The second is the connection between each system enacted with its
predecessors. In effect, Figure 8-1 presents the CRBF‟s institutional family tree.
Figure 8-2 illustrates the relationship among the social and political context of
the the periods leading up to each critical situation, regional issues, and relevant
participants to the governance systems enacted. The figure summarizes the key issues
and participants that influenced governance system debates and selection as discussed
above.
The trajectory of governance system evolution discussed above and illustrated
in Figures 8-1 and 8-2 suggests a recurring pattern that the region seems to follow.
The pattern of Columbia Basin governance structuration.
The six governance models reflect a long-running four-way struggle among
proponents for the prerogatives and authorities of individual federal agencies, valley
authority proponents, advocates for state control over regional resources; and
commercial interests advocating market mechanisms as to which system provides the
best allocator of resource values and optimum economic development. Historically,
the commercial interests have generally allied with state and federal agencies holding
jurisdiction over their resource area of interest (such as navigation interests and the
Corps; irrigation interests and the Bureau of Reclamation; public power interests and
the Bonneville Power Administration; fishing interests and state departments of fish
and game) in favor of Market or Iron Triangle Model systems.
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Figure 8-1.
Governance Models, Systems, and Critical Situations
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Figure 8-2.
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Figure 8-3 illustrates these historic lines of tension. Historically, commercial
interests resisted the creation of a centralized valley-authority system that could
impinge on their plans for economic development or encroach on the prerogatives of
supportive individual agencies. Proponents of state control sought greater influence in
regional decision-making, often proposing systems that would require federal agencies
to operate consistent with state plans and programs. Proponents of strong, central
federal authority cited the exploitation of natural resources by market forces, the
inefficiencies of resource management by individual agencies, the lack of coherent
central planning, and the lack of alignment between the political boundaries of the
states and ecological boundaries of watersheds. The systems enacted at any given
point in time (displayed in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 above) were more often than not
compromise solutions among these competing perspectives.

Figure 8-3.
Traditional Lines of Tension in Columbia Basin Governance
Market
Proponents

Proponents of
Centralized
Federal
Authority

Proponents of
State Primacy
over Regional
Resources

Proponents of
Individual
Agency
Prerogatives
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The historic record in general and the CRBF experience in particular reveal a
pattern to governance structuration as illustrated in Figure 8-4. The box on the left
indicates the traditional participants in Columbia Basin issues as identified in this
study. It portrays status quo governance systems and the relationships and lines of
conflict among regional institutions, thus further elaborating on the lines of conflict
introduced in Figure 8-3. These relationships and systems existed in some form of
stability until faced one of the four critical situations identified earlier.
The emergence of a critical situation may or may not result in conflict. If it
does, it reopens the standing lines of regional conflict among the Basin‟s major
institutional actors. Regional political and/or institutional leaders then initiate a series
of steps that have been repeated to the point of ritual in the Northwest. Institutional
leaders and representatives engage in calls for rational processes to resolve the crisis,
convene meetings, initiate negotiations, and sometimes litigate. Over time, they reach
agreement on one or more new system. These new systems eventually become
stabilized pending emergence of the next critical situation.
This concludes this study‟s findings regarding the pattern that regional leaders
seem to follow when confronted with challenges to existing governance systems. Of
particular interest is the tendency of this process to yield relatively consistent results.
Regional leaders have consistently settled on one of the collaboration-oriented models
and have historically rejected models with authority to render final decisions. The
next section presents the study‟s findings with regard to this phenomenon.
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Figure 8-4.
The Historical Pattern of Basin Governance System Establishment
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The Preference for Collaboration-Oriented Governance Systems
McKinley (1952) described that in 1944, BPA Administrator Paul Raver
invited twenty select community leaders to discuss with him the impact of the BPA
program on the life of the region. This call was the beginning of the Bonneville
Regional Advisory Council, 148 designed to provide a two-way communication
between the Administrator and regional leaders regarding system policies and for
those leaders to provide recommendations on system operations. Council participation
was by invitation only, with Administrator Raver limiting admittance to those holding
“a friendly acceptance of the basic policies established by Congress for the BPA. In
choosing the council members, the administration has regarded such acceptance as an
essential common denominator in obtaining useful advice. Consequently, this
advisory group excludes any person who has actively opposed the Bonneville
program.” (McKinley, 1952, p. 200). McKinley (1952) goes on to justify this
exclusionary practice by stating, “After all, an administrator could hardly expect to
obtain useful advice from people in basic disagreement with his job” (p. 200, emphasis
added). McKinley (1952) underscores a fundamental truism: it is far easier to reach
agreement on complex issues if you limit the discussion to those sharing a common
worldview and value set with regard to the issue in question.
It also underscores the centrality of worldview and values as held by
participants in the governance discussions. Up until the establishment of the

148

This committee is not to be confused with the Bonneville Advisory Board mandated in the 1937
Bonneville Project Act. This committee was advisory only and did not execute governance functions as
defined for this project. It was not, therefore, identified as a governance system for the purposes of this
study.
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environmental and tribal sovereignty movements as viable forces in the Northwest,
meaningful participation in decision-making was limited to those holding the “market”
worldview. As previously discussed, adherents to the tribal and environmental
worldviews, although scoring victories in some areas were historically unable to affect
FCRPS decision making to the degree that they wished.
In establishing governance systems, the region has had to face the tension
between establishing decision-oriented systems with a capacity for problem solving
and those that would allow greater inclusion of regional worldviews and values. The
historic trend has been to select systems from that favor inclusion over decisionmaking. Of the eleven systems enacted, six were formed under the Federal
Cooperation Model, four under the State Cooperation Model, and one under the Three
Sovereigns Model. None was enacted from the decision-oriented systems offered
under the Market, Iron Triangle, and Valley Authority models. Why? The historical
record and CRBF experience suggest the following reasons.
First is the sheer number of competing interests directly or indirectly involved
with the FCRPS. In contrast, as bitter and hard-fought as they were, the debates
between timber interests and environmentalists over the spotted owl and between state
and tribal fishery managers over salmon harvest involved a relatively small number of
affected players. Conversely, the scope of interests affected by the hydrosystem
system includes almost every major social entity in the Pacific Northwest. Efforts to
establish governance systems over the system unveiled fault lines of conflict among
fishery and energy interests; fishery and development interests; the states; states and
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tribes; individual tribes; federal agencies; urban and rural communities; upriver and
downriver interests; public and private power advocates; and others. These groups
were represented by hundreds of interest based organizations and associations of
organizations. These groups have been disinclined to give up some aspect of their
core interests to benefit another. Regional parties agreed to the collaborative systems
selected because they pose the least threat to established interests, practices, and
arrangements.
Second, and related to the first, is the role of worldviews. Prior to the
hydrothermal crisis of the 1970s, the dominant voices in the region controlling
governance processes were members of the commercial market worldview. These
entities were comprised of interests that benefit from commercial development of river
resources, such as manufacturers, irrigators, navigators, hydropower proponents and
sports and recreational fisheries managers. Debates within this group primarily
involved disputes over goals and interests. These debates all took place within the
paradigm that the commercial exploitation of the river was acceptable, inevitable, and
morally supportable based on economic growth. It was not until the late 1960s and
early 1970s with the regional hydro-thermal crisis, the increase in environmental
legislation (especially NEPA and the ESA), and the rise of the tribal sovereignty
movement that parties with a different value set began to challenge the premises under
which the river had originally been developed. These other parties emphasized respect
for tribal treaty rights and argued for operational adjustments and/or dam removal in
the interests of improving fish harvest and for the intrinsic ecological value of a
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natural river system. Entities not sharing the same market-oriented worldview sorely
tested the Basin‟s traditional approach to development, such as when the tribes were
included in the Regional Forum and Columbia River Basin Forum. Holders of one
worldview have proven reluctant to submit to a regional governance system dominated
by adherents to another.
Third is the fact that the FCRPS is a federally owned and operated system.
The sovereignty and appointments clauses of the United States Constitution State
frequently confounded state and tribal efforts to assert greater control. The language
of the 1980 Power Act this reflects this reality with its provision that, should a court
hold the Council to be unconstitutional, it be reformed as a federal agency with
Council members to be appointed by the Secretary of Interior. Absent supporting
federal legislation that realigns existing agency authority and prerogatives,
establishing a decision-oriented system would prove constitutionally problematic.
Fourth is the federal agencies‟ historical experience that cooperation and
coordination provide their best defense against external imposition of a more robust
valley authority type arrangement. The region‟s states and commercial interests have
generally shared agency interest in avoiding a robust decision-oriented system.
Regional institutions held different reasons for supporting such an approach:
Federal agencies: Federal agency goals were to protect discretionary
authority and preclude oversight over core functions by a valley authoritytype structure (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970) and to provide for
coordination for more efficient operation of the FCRPS (Scheufele,
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c.1970). This is not to say interagency competition did not exist
(McKinley, 1952; Reisner, 1993; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002)
but that regional federal leaders frequently rose above parochial disputes in
the interest of better coordination of the hydropower system and its related
purposes.
Northwest States: The states based their support for governance on
protecting state interests affected by the operation of what is in fact a
federal system (Ogden, 1997). Prominent among these interests was
ensuring that the benefits of the hydropower system and its multiple
purposes remain in the Northwest and maintaining access to federal
programs and resources to advance state interests (Vogel, 2007).
Regional Indian Tribes: This study found mixed tribal motivations
regarding regional governance. Some tribes like the Nez Perce, insisted on
the paramount nature of their treaties and argue that the only appropriate
governance relationship for treaty tribes is with the federal government as
trustee of Indian resources. Others, such as the Spokane, argue that the
only way the region can address its natural resource issues is through joint
decision-making forums of the federal government, states, and tribes
meeting as co-equals. Confounding tribal participation is a history that
undermined trust due to fluctuations in federal Indian policy (Pevar, 2002),
fishery disputes with the states (Taylor, 1999; Dompier, 2005, and longstanding disputes with other tribes over land and resource access.
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Non-governmental entities: Representatives of private commercial
interests and non-profit organizations (such as environmental groups)
varied widely regarding governance model preferences. In general, they
tend to support systems that minimize encroachment into the discretionary
or mandated decision-making by supportive agencies and constrain the
actions of agencies whose missions do not align with organization goals.
As a result, regional institutions have tended to see collaboration-oriented governance
systems as more in keeping with their core interests than more decision-oriented
systems.
Fifth is recognition of the practical need by the federal hydropower agencies to
coordinate their various programs with regard to the Columbia. This started shakily
with the Bonneville Advisory Board in 1937 then progressed and improved with
establishment of the CBIAC, PNWRBC, and later Regional Forum.
The 1937 Bonneville Project Act in effect construed what became the FCRPS
as a shared operation by BPA, the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation,
Federal Power Commission, and Forest Service. The subsequent level of agency
involvement and cooperation has varied. The Bonneville Advisory Board and
Committee on Fish Operations enjoyed participation from a relatively small number of
the Basin‟s federal agencies, whereas the PNWRPC, PNWRBC and CBIAC saw
support from almost all of them. The broad plans produced by the PNWRPC,
PNWRBC, and CBIAC were endorsed by all member agencies.149 In time, the
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It is not clear from the sources used in this report as to the degree to which single regional plans
developed by the PNWRPB, CBIAC, and PNWRBC influenced individual agency programs. In other
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agencies came to see some degree of cooperation as being in their collective best
interest.
Sixth is the consistent reluctance of the federal government to reorganize itself
along lines more conducive to efficient resource management. Such realignments have
been proposed in the pass, most dramatically illustrated by calls to consolidate resource
agencies under a Department of Natural Resources with subordinate field offices
organized around watersheds (Ogden, 1997). Related to this is the historic reluctance of
Congress to change its authorization and appropriation procedures to be more supportive
of regional institutional arrangements, despite at least two formal reports recommending
they do so.
As a result, collaboration-based systems are the historically preferred alternatives
for the Northwest. They provide a framework for institutional dialogue and have a history
of some achievement. They also do not threaten institutional interests with the authority
to make decisions contrary to in institutional goals and programs. The preference for
collaboration-oriented models thus partially explains the paradox of Northwest
governance.
This concludes discussion of the findings regarding the regional preference for
collaborative governance systems. This study‟s conclusions, drawn from the previously
discussed findings, are presented below.

words, not clear that projects agency constituents promoted, but were either not included or received
low priority in favor of more regionally advantageous projects. This is an area of further inquiry in
order to determine the efficacy of centralized planning absent a supportive congressional authorization
and funding process.
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Conclusions
The findings presented above lead to six general conclusions. These are listed
below and discussed in further detail in the sections that follow:
Regional leaders will continue to support multijurisdictional governance
systems.
The apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s
preference for a collaborative approach to governance.
Third, statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system success.
Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a
sufficient condition for any decision-oriented system that the region may
desire to establish.
The region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decision-oriented
governance system.
Critical situations will continue to emerge and provide catalytic opportunities
for change between models and systems.
The institutional analysis used in this study proved inadequate to fully
understand the paradox of Basin governance.
Regional leaders will continue to support multijurisdictional governance systems.
On the surface, establishment of a multi-jurisdictional governance system may
seem a superfluous waste of time and money. The region has multiple federal, tribal,
and state agencies assigned to manage regional resources and staffed with competent,
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skilled public servants. These agencies are generally well supported with sufficient
funding by their respective legislatures. All are well established. Meanwhile, other
regions of the country seem to get by without the myriad sorts of governance systems
found in the Columbia River Basin.
Yet the region clearly perceives a need for some form of multijurisdictional
governance system. The Columbia River Basin has had at least one system
continuously in place since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning
Commission under the New Deal in 1934. Many of these systems enjoyed the support
of regional leaders and existed successfully for many years. Examples include the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (ten years), the Columbia Basin
Inter-Agency Committee (twenty years), the Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission (fourteen years), The Northwest Power and Conservation Planning
Council (thirty years and counting) and the Regional Forum (fourteen years, less
Executive Committee). This fact is by itself evidence of a perceived regional need on
the part of institutional leaders.
Records and accounts available for the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee (Scheufele, c.1970), Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPPC,
2007) and the Columbia River Basin Forum (press accounts, meeting notes, and
facilitator notes) provide reasons for this broad institutional support. From these
accounts can be concluded the following:
Regional leaders seek multijurisdictional governance systems that
transcend individual federal and state agency and tribal jurisdiction in order
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to objectively resolve (or preclude) problems of competing interests among
regional institutions.
The intent of regional leaders is to reach joint decisions through rational
discussions inclusive of all relevant regional parties.
The apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s consistent
choice of a collaborative approach to governance.
The historic regional preference for collaboration-oriented governance systems
is not likely to change. There is an inherent tension between the desire for
inclusiveness and the desire for decision-making. The greater the degree of
inclusiveness, the greater the likelihood of conflict among participant interests and/or
their respective worldviews. In essence, the desire for better decisions through
inclusiveness works against the intent to resolve or preclude problems.
Prior to the 1930s, regional natural resource-related decisions were made either
through uncoordinated commercial enterprises responding to market supply and
demand (the Market Model) or by individual federal agencies often working in concert
with constituencies and Congress but independently of each other (the Iron Triangle
Model). These were decision-oriented systems, with decisions made to meet the goals
and objectives of those who made them. Progressive and New Deal proponents sought
to curb the cumulative waste and excesses of those models through more rigorous
government regulation and greater governmental involvement in regional resource
planning. The interest in centralized planning resulted in creation of the state-centric
PNWRPC in 1934, the region‟s first experiment with the State Cooperation Model.
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The interest in greater central control of resource decisions resulted in
Progressive and New Deal proposals for a Columbia Valley Authority patterned after
the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Valley Authority Model represents a third
decision-oriented model that the regional historically rejected. The compromise
between valley authority proponents and proponents of decision by individual agency
resulted in the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, creation of the Bonneville Power
Administration, and establishment of the Bonneville Advisory Board – marking the
first experiment the Federal Cooperation Model. Thus, the collaboration-oriented
approach was hard-wired into the Basin‟s first two governance systems.
Ever since the region has relied on systems oriented toward the inclusion of
multiple parties. Up until the 1970s, “inclusiveness” was largely limited to parties
sharing the commercial-market worldview of natural resource development. Since the
1970s, parties holding dramatically different worldviews gained access to governance
decisions due to due to the tribal sovereignty and environmental movements. Whereas
earlier debates over basin resource development were based on economic priorities
and allocation of benefits, these new worldviews questioned whether such
development should be allowed at all.
From this discussion the following suite of conclusions may be drawn:
The region derives value and benefit from collaboration-oriented systems
established under the Federal Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three
Sovereign models. Despite recurring frustration over the inability of such
systems to solve the region‟s more intractable problems, regional leaders
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find that living with those weaknesses is preferable to the risks to core
institutional interests posed by decision-oriented model alternatives.
The concept of “relevant parties” has evolved over time. Originally
including only development-oriented agencies and state governors‟ offices,
it has grown to include fishery interests, be more sensitive to environmental
concerns, and to a willingness to include regional tribal leaders as co-equal
management partners.
The region will likely continue its tradition of establishing new governance
systems from the Federal Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three
Sovereign models. The emergence of the tribes as a recognized relevant
party will likely mean a preference for finding a workable Three
Sovereigns system.
The success of collaboration-based systems in solving difficult problems
will be limited.
Frustrations over the inability of collaboration based systems to resolve
significant issues will likely result in future system and model changes as
participants take advantage of critical situations to emplace systems more to
their liking.
The necessity and sufficiency of system statutory support.
Of the eleven collaboration-based governance systems enacted in the Columbia
Basin between 1934 and 2000, three – The Bonneville Advisory Board, The Pacific
Northwest River Basins Commission, and the Northwest Power and Conservation
368

Council – were established in law as detailed above. One system – the Northwest
Interstate Compact – was authorized in federal law but never established. A fifth
system – the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission - enjoyed indirect
statutory support through the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which created
the Public Works Administration (PWA). It authorized the PWA to establish
additional planning agencies, among which was the central planning committee (a
committee that underwent numerous name changes during the course of its existence).
This committee went on to establish state and regional planning boards, of which the
PNWRPC was one. Thus, although authorized by law, it was not specifically
established in law as were the Bonneville Advisory Board or Northwest Power and
Conservation Council. The remaining seven enjoyed no statutory support but were
established instead through voluntary agreement among participants.
There is some correlation between system effectiveness and system support in
law, if one judges effectiveness as the accomplishment of the goals specified for a
given organizational entity. . The PNWRPC, PNWRBC, and NPPC all existed for
extended periods of time and produced reports and plans enjoying broad institutional
support (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1980; Vogel, 2007). Alternatively, the Bonneville
Advisory Board essentially ceased to function upon completion of its World War II
related tasks, although it nominally existed until replaced by the CBIAC in 1946. The
Northwest Interstate Compact, although negotiated over a span of almost twenty years
and authorized in law by Congress, failed to win ratification in the state legislatures
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(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1980). Consequently, support in law
does not guarantee collaborative system success.
Systems established through voluntary agreements among participants enjoyed
similarly mixed records of achievement. The Columbia Basin Interagency Committee
and the Committee on Fish Operations, which later became the Fish Operations
Executive Committee and later yet the Regional Forum, all enjoyed extended periods
of cooperative existence and were successful within the parameters of their formation.
Conversely, the Northwest States Development Association, Pacific Northwest
Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, and Columbia River Basins Forum existed
for only short periods of time and produced little of consequence (Bessey, 1963;
Scheufele, c. 1970; Norwood, c.1980).
Thus, the absence of statutory support does not preordain collaborative system
failure. Instead, almost by definition, collaborative systems are dependent on the good
will of participants, the support of their parent institutions, the degree of rapport
among members, and their willingness to compromise within the bounds of their
statutory authority. They require voluntary cooperation to resolve differences in
agency interests and mediate differences in institutional values.
In contrast to collaboration-oriented governance systems, statutory support is
necessary for adoption of a decision-oriented governance system. This is because of
the fragmented nature of Basin institutions and the myriad laws, regulations, and
directives guiding regional institutional activities (NPPC, 1996; GAO, 2004).
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All of the decision-oriented system proposals found in this study carried with
them recommendations to substantively reorder existing institutional relationships.
For example, the bill by Washington Representative Knute Hill in 1935 transferred
responsibility for Columbia River development exclusively to the Bureau of
Reclamation, assigning to the Bureau responsibilities previously authorized to the
Corps of Engineers. Bills by Senators Charles McNary and Frederick Steiwer and
Representative Martin Smith submitted the same year would expand Corps of
Engineers‟ authority to include power marketing and transmission in the Lower
Columbia. The bill by Senator James Pope and Representative Hill, also submitted in
1935, proposed to establish a Columbia Valley Authority that would transfer the
authorities and responsibilities from multiple Basin federal agencies to the jurisdiction
of an entirely new agency. The bill submitted by Senator Warren Magnuson in 1949
would subordinate Columbia Basin federal functions of water resources, power
generation, and transmission under the supervisory structure of a Columbia Valley
Administration. Daniel Ogden offered a more sweeping proposal in 1997, calling for
reordering of not just regional agency offices, but a restructuring of the national
departments and congressional committee structure as well. The key point is that any
system intended to render final decisions must be empowered with the authority to
reconcile and, if necessary, override the interests and proclivities of individual
regional institutions. Such a system would also require support at the national level –
either voluntarily provided or enacted through statute - to preclude departmental or
congressional actions that may undermine the system‟s goals and priorities
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(McKinley, 1952; Ogden, 1997). Historically, regional institutional leaders, state
political leaders, congressional representatives, and federal agency heads have never
collectively supported such a step.
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions:
Statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system effectiveness.
Rather, collaborative systems by their nature are dependent on the
relationships among institutional participants.
Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a
sufficient condition for establishment of a decision-oriented governance
system. The authorities and prerogatives of state, federal, and tribal
governments and agencies and, to some degree, the relationships among
them are all established in law. Any system with the authority to direct
agency priorities and prerogatives must therefore have statutory authority
to do so. The degree to which institutional relationships among regional
agencies, federal departments, and the congressional committee structure
are defined in any new authorizing statute will determine the degree of
voluntary cooperation that may still be needed.
An institutional reordering of the magnitude needed for an effective decisionoriented system would invest that system with enormous power and influence over the
Basin‟s residents and institutions. Under what conditions could such a reordering be
supported? How likely is it to occur?
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The region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decision-oriented
governance system.
Calls for greater centralized decision-oriented systems have consistently been
made since the 1930s. Recent examples include the suggestions for a “Salmon Czar”
to oversee Basin salmon recovery efforts during the Clinton administration and Dan
Ogden‟s 1997 proposal for a Columbia River Administration.150 Calls for greater
market control have come in the form of proposals to privatize the federal hydropower
system or sell it electrical power at market rates (see Munson, 2001). Regional
Institutional and political leaders have consistently rejected all of these decisionoriented proposals.
Even if regional leaders were to agree to a valley authority system, they would
have to overcome significant structural challenges if such a system were to be
effective. Political leaders would have to address the constitutional provisions
regarding the sovereignty of federal agencies. They would have to address respective
agency authorizing statutes at the federal and state levels. Congress would need to
revise their fractured oversight of federal agencies by multiple committees in both
houses. Absent any of these steps, the resulting body would default to a collaborativesystem in that it could only advise and not direct federal action.
Consequently, only a governance body that is empowered through legislation,
executive order, court order, and/or a binding compact among the states and tribes
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The “Salmon Czar” suggestion, though frequently made, was never to the knowledge of the author
developed into a coherent governance proposal. Consequently, it was not considered in this study.
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with the legal authority to override parochial opposition will be able to render
decisions or come to compromise on significant differences.
From this discussion come the following conclusions:
Based on the region‟s history, institutional leaders are not likely to enact a
robust, authoritative system unless a threat emerges of such magnitude that
sovereign political leaders and their constituents are convinced that such a
system better serves their interests than otherwise.
An event of such magnitude is highly unlikely. None of the region‟s
previous critical situations – the Great Depression, the end of a world war,
the hydro-thermal crisis, or the 1991 ESA salmon listings - was sufficient to
put a more decision-oriented system into place. It is hard to imagine one of
greater criticality that would.
Imposition of such a system from outside the region, say by legislative
action or Executive order, is equally unlikely given the democratic nature of
American decision making, likely state opposition, and the entrenched nature
of regional interests and institutions.
Critical situations will continue to emerge and provide catalytic opportunities for
change between models and systems.
Regardless of how inclusive and collaborative future governance systems prove to be,
parties excluded from the process or who believe the extant system is not meeting their
needs will likely take advantage of future critical situations to force change. Future
governance model and system changes will likely follow the historic pattern illustrated
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in Figure 8-4 and generalized below in Figure 8-5. Opportunity for change may occur
through a critical situation that either reopens traditional lines of conflict as institutions
vie for influence or causes leaders to meet on a less conflictual basis. Regardless, there
will likely be calls for public meetings, negotiations, testimony to state and/or federal
legislators, representatives to meet in negotiation, and other ritualistic exercises
intended to arrive at a new system. If successful, these newly adopted systems will
eventually institutionalize as the new status quo pending appearance of the next critical
situation.
This study bases its conclusion regarding the likelihood of future conflictual
changes in governance systems the complexities of the region‟s issues, the large number
of institutional interests affected by activities within the Basin, and the region‟s
governance history. 151

151

A possible candidate for the next critical situation is the pending decision by Judge James Redden
regarding the litigation over the NMFS 2008 Biological Opinion and operation of the FCRPS. Should
Judge Redden rule against the government and order future operations under court supervision, it would
(1) introduce a new model of governance for the FCRPS (a Court Supervision model, perhaps similar to
tht operating under the Unites States v. Oregon process for basin fisheries) and (2) initiate thresolution”
rituals to determine what the form and structures of the new system will be.
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Figure 8-5.
Generalized Model of Basin Governance System Establishment
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Limitations of the Institutional Approach
Using an institutional level of analysis provided a workable methodology for
exploring the history of regional governance. It offered insights into institutional
interests over time, the social and political context and issues that shaped governance
choices, and the governance systems and models that subsequently emerged. It also
provided a basis for establishing governance and trends, allowing for development of
the models provided in Figures 8-1 through 8-5.
The institutional approach only partially explained the region‟s governance
paradox. It did not provide for full explanation as to why some systems failed and
others succeeded, even when faced with a relatively similar array of issues and
challenges. For example, both the Columbia River Inter-Agency Committee and
Columbia River Basin Forum were collaboration-oriented systems created by
voluntary participants. Both faced participant conflict over fish and hydropower
system priorities. Arguably, the CBIAC faced the more difficult challenge in that it
faced a broader scope of activities, such as public land use planning for timber,
mining, and grazing. Furthermore, funding for the CBIAC came solely from
participant contributions, while the CRBF received additional funds for facilitation and
staff support and tribal participation from BPA and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Yet
the CBIAC operated relatively successfully for fourteen years while the CRBF
collapsed in a little over one.
Moreover, while the institutional approach was able to identify institutional
interests, it could not explain the passion that regional participants attached to those
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interests. It could not explain the close identity that individuals felt toward
organizational purposes, goals, and objectives. Nor could it explain why different
participants interpreted established facts so differently. To get to a more complete
answer requires research in areas not available in the historic record.
This study identified three worldviews operative in the Pacific Northwest. It
concluded, based on the material reviewed, that differences over the values that
underlay those worldviews may be as important in regional resource conflicts as
tangible competition over resource use. It has alluded to the influences of
organizational culture (Schein, 2004) and organizational and social identity (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Hogg and Terry, 2001). However, it
has done so in the abstract, not providing any empirical link between the values of any
given institution and the decisions and actions of that institution‟s representative
agent(s) in governance forums.
The theoretical concept of “agency” (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) suggests
the importance of such a link. Agency represents the capacity to make things to
happen. Agents are knowledgeable individuals acting alone or as a group to defend,
modify, or replace existing systems and structures. Individuals exercise agency.
Agency manifests through individual decisions and action and it is through agency that
social organization occurs. As Sztompka explained it:
“If we think of any empirical event or phenomenon in a society, anything
that is actually happening, is it not always, without exception, a fusion of
structures and agents, of operation and action? Show me an agent who is
not enmeshed in some structure. Show me a structure which exists apart
from individuals. Show me an action which does not participate in
societal operation. Show me societal operation not resolving in to action.
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There are neither structureless agents nor agentless structures” (Sztompka,
1991, p. 92).
A greater understanding of agency and the ways in which institutional values and
personal principles influence the decisions of institutional representatives may provide
greater insight into the workings of collaboration-based models. Furthermore,
empirically supported findings that organizational identity is malleable (Gioia and
Thomas, 1996; Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000) suggest that conflict over values
may not be as intractable as they so often appear. An understanding of the influences
that motivate individual agents and the degree to which institutional values contribute
to those motivations would complete the understanding as to why more robust regional
governance systems have not been brought about. It could also suggests strategies to
develop systems and structures that instill their own sense of identity in participants,
potentially transcending competing attachments to parent groups and offering a more
sophisticated approach to regional conflict resolution.
A situation that to a stronger system does not even register in the organizational
consciousness may pose an existential threat to systems with weak senses of identity
and culture, weak affinity between organizational values and individual principles,
weak alliances with external stakeholders, and/or weak psychological bonds between
the system and its participants. The implication for governance is that establishing
senses of organizational identity and creating psychological bonds between individual
members and system principles enhances the potential for system success. The
circumstances of the negotiations over the CRBF MOA provide a unique opportunity
for this sort of research.
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Framework for Additional Research
The Columbia River Basin Forum adopted a collaborative process based on the
belief that, if reasonable leaders from the region‟s key stakeholders could rationally
discuss the issues at hand they would reach reasonable compromises. This approach
underestimated the deep differences in values within the region. By ensuring that
every representative reserved veto authority over any collective position not in accord
with the interests of their respective constituency, participants in the CRBF had no
institutional incentive to address substantive issues. As observed by Russell Linden
(2002) in his book on collaboration, “the forces that pull people apart are very strong,
some of them wired into the very DNA of organizations, and it takes far more than
good intentions and kind-hearted people to make collaboration work” (Linden, 2002, p.
36).
Theory states that belief patterns embedded in institutional identity and culture
condition the members of those institutions as to how to perceived and interpret events
around them (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Schein, 2004). The
tendency for institutions to evolve into groups of like-valued individuals exacerbates
this phenomenon (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In the case of
the CRBF, those influences resulted in the adoption of the MOA designed to preclude
any real decision making.
The operative question is “why?” Determining the processes by which agents
internalized institutional values, what those values were, and how they played in the
negotiation of the CRBF MOA and the CRBF‟s subsequent activities a research
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framework beyond the review of historical literature and primary sources presented
heretofore. However, the historical record discussed in Chapters 3 through 7 and the
analysis in Chapter 8 suggests the following set of hypotheses to guide development of
such a framework:
The organizations and institutions participating in the development of the
CRBF MOA and subsequent CRBF activities held interests and aspirations
(both stated and unstated) they wished to defend and/or pursue. Theses
institutional interests and aspirations were functions of the institution‟s tangible
goals and objectives as well as its worldview, organizational culture and sense
of social identity.
Representative agents from each participating institution each held their own
set of personal principles, goals, and plans. These principles, goals and plans
were functions of the individual‟s upbringing and reflective of the institutional
values with which the agent most closely identified.
The “macro” influences of worldview, culture, and identity coupled with
individual principles shaped the way agents construed information, perceived
the issues at hand, and interpreted the motivations of other participants to the
process.
Agents selected to represent organizations in negotiations and CRBF activities
were expected to either win a governance system that would further parent
institutional interests and validate parent institutional values or, at a minimum,
prevent the adoption of a system that could threaten those interests and values.
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Consequently, organizations selected representatives who identified with and
believed in the inherent “rightness” of institutional interests, values, and
positions.
The circumstances that drove regional leaders to believe that t new system of
regional governance was necessary turned out to be of insufficient magnitude
to either transcend individual principles and beliefs or threaten institutional
interests or existence.
The lack of an overwhelming threat coupled with deeply held principles and the
expectation to defend institutional goals and objectives translated into position
taking that limited opportunities for compromise and rendered achievement of
the rational decision making system sought by regional leaders extremely
difficult to achieve. A general lack of trust between parties and a lack of
common purpose was hard-wired into the CRBF MOA, thus preordaining its
failure.
Appendix B presents a theoretical framework under which these hypotheses may be
tested.
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APPENDIX A
EXPANDED LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This study research the history of governance from works in five literature
domains. These were:
Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives,
Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest,
Columbia River Basin commercial development,
The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs, and
The American environmental movement.
These domains were reviewed using a content-analysis approach as
recommended by Neustadt and May (1988) and Ritchie and Spencer (2002).
Specifically researched were insights into the worldviews held by the major regional
institutions and for elements of governance suggested by the Columbia River Basin
Forum experience in order to construct the history presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
Those elements were:
The name and nature of governance systems proposed or enacted.
The locus of decision making for each governance system proposed or
enacted.
The critical situations or catalytic events that created the opportunity for
change to existing systems and structures.
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The political and social context of the periods as framed by the dates of the
selected critical situations.
The salient issues in the Pacific Northwest that the proposed or enacted
system was intended to address.
The institutional participants and their positions, interests, and agendas.
The worldviews held by the institutional actors.
The governance systems both proposed and enacted within each period and
their supporting structural components (to the degree recorded).
Additional information as available. Such information included the
duration of enacted systems, types of products produced, effectiveness, and
any other material as may be relevant to the research question.

Domain: Regional Native American Tribes and the Tribal Worldview
The literature reviewed here was selected for two purposes. The first was to
present the events and circumstances of the tribes‟ and their cultural role in the
Northwest from the early 1800s up through the period of the CRBF. The second
purpose is to identify the worldviews and perspectives that tribal participants later
brought to the governance discussions. Trosper (1995) provides a summary of Indian
cultural precepts that he generalizes from his study of native peoples nationwide.
Pevar (2002) also takes a nationwide perspective, focusing on the legal and political
evolution of tribal rights. Wilkinson (2005) traces the history of the tribal sovereignty
movement. Ruby and Brown, in two books, (1981 and 1992) provide an
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encyclopedia-like overview of the tribes and bands of the Pacific Northwest, while
Clark (1953) transcribes traditional Northwest Tribal stories that provide Indian
interpretations of the creation and man‟s relationship with nature. Finally, portions of
Lichatowich (1999), Williams (2006) and Taylor (1999) present, compare, and
contrast the tribal worldview with the worldview of the Northwest‟s Anglo-American
settlers and the regional implications of those differences; the review of these three
accounts is provided in the discussion of the regional salmon crisis further below.
Ronald L. Trosper is a researcher and professor at the School of Forestry and
Department of Applied Indigenous Studies, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff,
Arizona. He has written numerous articles on tribal economic culture and traditions.
His Traditional American Indian Economic Policy was published in 1995. In this
paper, Trosper defines and generalizes traditional Indian views and compares them
with western societal views for purposes of deriving policy implications. He begins
by noting the danger in generalizing about Indian culture since tribal societies vary
significantly in time and space, and therefore the elements discussed may not apply to
all tribes equally. However, he argues that the four fundamental components he
presents are sufficiently present across Indian culture to offer a general philosophical
understanding of tribal economic perspectives.
Trosper argues that traditional Indian culture is based on respect for the natural
world in which man lives. This notion of respect contains four basic components:
Community: People are members of a community that includes all beings,
living and non-living. Each has its proper role, and each has obligations to
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others. The sacred aspect is that all beings have a spirit. The economic
aspect is that reciprocity in exchange must exist; for everything that is
taken, something must be given back.
Connectedness: Whereas community provides a source of obligation and a
guide as to how people ought to behave, the concept of connectedness is a
description of how things are. All elements of the earth are connected to
each other, and one cannot violate the principals of community without
having some negative impact on the natural order.
Seventh Generation: Past human generations left a legacy and people have
a duty to pass it on so it will be present seven generations hence.
Humility: Humanity should be humble in its actions. The natural world is
powerful and well able to cause trouble if not treated properly.
These four components result in an Indian economic perspective that is
dramatically different from the Anglo-American tradition. For example, “high
grading” (taking best first – such as old-growth trees) is not allowed since respect for
the 7th generation means leaving enough of the best to be enjoyed by that generation.
Connectedness and humility dictate that there is an upper bound on consumption. In
addition, the notions of community and connectedness require that ecosystem health
be maintained.
Trosper further argues that these components guided development of tribal
social institutions. For example, private real property ownership as understood by
Anglo-Americans did not exist. People had a right of use of what was on the land but
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not of ownership of the land or its resources. The concept of individual property rights
as applied to land, water, and wildlife was all but incomprehensible within the tribal
concept of community.
Central to Northwest tribal economies was the practice of what Trosper calls
“reciprocal exchange” as practiced through the potlatch. The potlatch was a gift
giving and barter event in which collective wealth was shared and redistributed. It
modeled what the natives interpreted as the natural process; soil gave seeds the
opportunity to produce plants; plants fed the animals; some animals fed other animals;
and in death the animals fed the soil. It was a natural cycle in which no element was
dominant, not even humans, and in which each element depended on the others.
Under the concept of reciprocal exchange, anything received had to be returned in
equal or greater measure – to included gifts among individuals.
Not everyone agrees with Trosper‟s construct. Environmental historian
Samuel Hays (2000) notes that “…the Native Americans engaged in practices little
different for those of the Europeans who displaced them.” After listing examples such
as Indian use of fire for land clearing; the use of land for agriculture, hunting, fishing,
and edible plant gathering; and irrigation in the Southwest, Hays concludes that
“These practices reflect not a people „in harmony with nature‟ but a native people who
used their immediate environment intensively.” (p. 6). Hays attributes the differences
in environmental impact of the two cultures to the tribes‟ relatively small numbers
dispersed over an immense landscape in comparison to the all-but unlimited number of
Anglo-Americans with their advanced technologies. William Robbins (1997) makes a
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similar point. Pointing to archaeological studies, Robbins states that tribal peoples
deliberately manipulated the natural landscape in support of their subsistence
activities. Their primary technology was fire, strategically set to stimulate new growth
for browsing by wildlife and waterfowl, to enhance development of a variety of plant
foods, to assist in hunting, to maintain clearings for travel, and, once horses were
acquired, to provide graze.
Stephan Pevar‟s The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Authoritative ACLU
Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights (3rd edition) (2002) is one of a series of writings
published by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to help inform individuals
about their rights under the law. The author is an attorney for the ACLU, lecturer, and
former adjunct professor at the University of the Denver School of Law. His purpose
is to present the unique nature of federal Indian law.
Pevar (2002) begins with a just-the-facts review of federal Indian policy. He
provides an overview of the estimated number of tribal nations prior to European
arrival, aspects of their general culture, and the consequences of contact with whites.
Pevar characterizes, based on evidence of policy, the fluctuations in official policy
positions with regard to American Indians during periods of time as:
Tribal independence (1492 – 1787).
Agreements between equals (1787 – 1828)
Relocation of the Indians (1828 – 1887)
Allotment and assimilation (1887 – 1934)
Indian reorganization (1934 – 1953)
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Termination (1953 – 1968)
Tribal self-determination (1968 – present)
Pevar (2002) then methodically and objectively lays out the fundamentals of
Indian law, beginning with basic definitions and moving from there through the
federal trust responsibility, the nature and role of tribal treaties, the relationship
between the tribes and states, issues of criminal and civil jurisdiction on tribal
reservations, and other aspects. He carefully cites his work back to statute or treaty
language or the determinations of relevant litigation. Relevant statutes are included as
appendices. The book provides an accessible and straightforward reference for issues
regarding the legal status of the tribes and their relationship with the federal and state
governments.
Whereas Pevar (2002) concentrates on policy and law, Charles Wilkinson‟s
2006 book Blood Struggle: the Rise of Modern Indian Nations traces the rise in tribal
capacity for self-governance. Wilkinson is a professor of law at the University of
Colorado and former attorney for the Native American Rights Fund, specializing in
American Indian law. While providing a summary background history of United
States policy toward its Indian peoples, he concentrates on the period from the midtwentieth century onward. Writing from a national perspective, he notes the poverty
and despair that pervaded Indian reservations in the 1940s and 50s. Government
policy toward Indians varied over the nation‟s history from severe to expansive with
regard to native rights and enforcement of treaty provisions. By the 1950s, the mood
in Congress was to end federal subsidies to tribal people, sell of tribal land, and more
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aggressively assimilate Indians into mainstream American society. The policy of
“termination” was formally announced through House Concurrent Resolution 108.
Passage of this resolution was a catalyst for tribal action. Wilkinson (2005)
recounts the tribal efforts at defending their rights and land in the courts. Within the
next forty years tribal leaders succeeded to a degree few would have predicted. For
this study, Wilkinson (2005) is used for its background on key legislation regarding
fishing and land rights, insights into tribal perspectives, and the development of tribal
governance.
Two books by Robert Ruby and John Brown provide an archeological overview
of regional tribes and their history and interrelationships. Indians of the Pacific
Northwest: A History (1981) and A Guide to the Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest
(1992) together provide an exhaustive (but by the authors admission still incomplete)
description of the tribes and bands found in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and western
Montana. The authors provide excellent summary histories of individual tribes,
collected through research in older narratives, documents, and tribal oral histories
where they could be found. Ruby and Brown do not try to interpret or evaluate the
meanings of the tribal practices and social structures they record. As such, they do not
provide the cultural insights offered by Trosper (1992), Lichatowich (1999), Taylor
(1999), or Williams (2006). What Ruby and Brown do offer is an encyclopedic
account of tribal groupings, maps, photographs, outlines of reservation governance, and
descriptions of tribal life. They seemingly (there are few citations used) base their
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work on primary source material and their own interviews with tribal leaders and other
historians.
Ruby and Brown‟s (1981 and 1992) sorting of Northwest tribes and artifacts is
complemented by the transcription of traditional Northwest tribal stories in Ella
Clark‟s 1953 Indian Legends of the Pacific Northwest, the first of four books she
wrote to capture native American traditional stories. Like Ruby and Brown, Clark
only recorded the stories she had heard; she offers no attempt at interpretation or
sociological insight as to the stories meanings to tribal peoples. Her intent is to
“prepare a collection of Pacific Northwest myths and legends that the general reader
will enjoy, either as entertainment or as information about an American way of living
strange to him” (p. 1). Her sources include accounts “tucked away in obscure” books
(p. 1), government documents, reports of anthropologists and folklorists, pioneer
manuscripts and journals, and her own discussions with tribal members during visits
to fourteen reservations.
The stories Clark (1953) records include tribal traditions regarding the
creation, natural phenomena, and origins of tribal people and regional geographic
features. She also includes Wasco and Chinook/Clatsop stories regarding the first
native encounters with white people and their ships on the Oregon coast. Mindful of
Schein‟s (2004) admonition that such stories should be treated as “artifacts” whose
meanings are often not obvious to those outside the culture, this study leaves
interpretations to others. Rather, Clark is used to help illustrate the close relationship
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that regional tribal people felt with the natural world as demonstrated by their
characters and story lines.

Domain: Euro-American Exploration and Settlement of the Pacific Northwest153
Literature in this domain was research for insights into the worldviews brought
to the Pacific Northwest by Euro-American settlers and for facts and circumstances of
the region‟s early white exploration and settlement.
Four authors were reviewed whose works captured the origins and nature of
the worldviews brought by settlers to the Pacific Northwest. These were Max Weber
(2002/1920), Henry Nash Smith (1950), Jenks Cameron (1929), and Gordon Dodds
(1986).
Weber (2002/1920) argued that the growth of western capitalism is directly
attributable to and derived from Protestant religious beliefs. The essay was based on
Weber‟s observations and research in Germany in particular and European countries
and the United States in general. Weber observed that, in developed capitalist
countries, business leaders, the owners of capital, senior factory managers, and the
more highly skilled members of the work force were predominately of Protestant
religious denominations. He further noted that the percentage of Protestants in
positions of leadership far exceeded the percentage in the general population.
Furthermore, Protestants tended to pass on larger estates to their heirs and to favor
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Settlers pushing west over the Alleghenies and into the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri River
valleys were a mix of several European nationalities. Those who later moved to the Northwest from the
Midwest were largely of British descent. See Smith (1950) and Dodds (1986). Consequently, “EuroAmerican” is used when speaking of western settlement in general and “Anglo-American” when
speaking of settlement to the Pacific Northwest.
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higher education, especially in the sciences, math, and other technical fields. By
contrast, Catholics tended to end their education earlier and concentrate in liberal arts
fields. In the work force, he noted that even poorer Protestants tended to strive to
exceed to a greater degree than their Catholic counterparts, often moving from cottage
crafts to city factories in which they moved up in either managerial or skilled labor
occupations. Catholics, on the other hand, seemed predisposed to stay at the crafts, at
best working up to master craftsman. Weber (2002/1920) believed that these differing
occupational choices were due to “distinct mental characteristics which have been
instilled into them by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of their
locality and home background” (p. 4, emphasis in original). Weber‟s (2002/1920)
argument challenged the prevailing belief that rejection of the feudal economic model
opened the door to challenges to other traditional authorities, such as the Catholic
Church. Weber argued the opposite – it was the challenge to Church authority by the
Reformation that led to a revolution in the way people perceived the relationship
between their worldly existence and the accumulation of individual wealth. Weber
attributed Protestant success to “distinct mental characteristics which have been
instilled into them and indeed by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of
their locality and home background” (p. 4, emphasis in original). He further notes the
distinct “points of view” (p. 9) held by members of the Catholic Church and the
various Protestant denominations.
Weber‟s (2002/1920) argument draws from his study of the formative writings
of early and influential leaders of various Protestant sects. He traced the evolution
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from the belief in the Middle Ages that one‟s place in life and material circumstances
was a preordained part of God‟s plan, through the Protestant Reformation, to the
eventual Protestant belief in social progression and wealth creation through hard work
and individual effort.
Smith‟s book Virgin Land: the American West as Symbol and Myth (1950)
studied the impact of the vast lands of the western United States on the consciousness
of Americans. He traces that impact on the literature and social thought at various
periods of American history. Smith notes the change in the way Americans thought
about America, offering as evidence the way the west was portrayed in fiction and
written accounts. Up through the early 1800s, America viewed itself as a sea power in
the tradition of Europe in general and Great Britain in particular. Under this view, the
way to national prosperity was through seaborne trade, initially with Europe and later
with Asia. This view created the global (and national) obsession with the long sought
for passage to India believed to exist across North America. For the United States,
finding that passage meant true independence from England and would symbolize
national greatness. But by the late 1800s, American thinking changed. They began to
think of the vast expanse of land between the east and west coasts as the basis for an
American continental empire. Free land to the west was seen as the way to ensure
individual liberty and prosperity, and a vehicle to eliminate poverty.
Smith (1950) further argues that the exploration and settlement of the frontier
assumed a romantic conceptualization captured in the feats of fictional heroes, such as
James Fenimore Cooper‟s Leatherstocking and pulp fiction hero Dead Eye Dick and
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the fictionalization of the lives of living frontiersmen, such as Daniel Boone and
William Cody. These symbolized and celebrated the values of frontier independence
and individualism. He also presents the political implications of western settlement,
the organization of regional economies in the Northeast, Southeast, and West, and the
impact on the Civil War. He also examines the consequences when idealized notions
of the west came up against actual conditions on the frontier. However, for the
purposes of this study, it is his capturing of the perspective of the western settler that is
of primary interest.
Turn-of-the-century western perspectives on natural resources were captured
by Jenks Cameron‟s introduction to his 1928 The Development of Governmental
Forest Control in the United States and his 1929 The Bureau of Biological Survey: Its
History, Activities and Organization. In addition to his work on federal forest policy
and the Bureau of Biological Survey, he produced the Brookings Institution‟s service
monographs for the National Park Service (1922) and Bureau of Dairy Industry
(1929). His book on federal forest policy was apparently highly regarded and is cited
in Forest Service histories (see, for example, Steen, 1976).
Cameron‟s Forest Control traces the origins of federal involvement in U.S.
forest policy. Most relevant to this study is his first chapter. It focuses on the
worldview held by early explorers and settlers that the resources of the North
American continent in general and timber in particular, were inexhaustible.
Cameron‟s (1929) Bureau of Biological Survey was one of a series of monographs on
U.S. government agencies prepared in the 1910s and 1920s. The monographs were
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prepared by the Brookings Institution in response to a charge from President William
Taft to examine the missions and structures of all the federal agencies of the time in
order to create a framework for more an efficient and economical approach to the
conduct of government business.
His primary purpose was to present the history of the Bureau of Biological
Survey in keeping with Brookings Institution guidelines, which he does. In this work,
he also does something much more. As he did in his study of forest policy, he
provides in Bureau of Biological Survey a rich cultural and social context within
which this Bureau and other agencies emerged during the Progressive era. This is a
context he did not provide in his earlier monograph on the National Park Service and
is not found in the other Brookings Institution monographs reviewed for this study.
Although studiously avoiding any subjective judgments regarding the Bureau, he does
offer his impressions of his and the public‟s thoughts regarding the relationship
between the natural order, agriculture, and economics. He seems to celebrate in tone
what he sees as the impending eradication of wolves, cougar, bobcat, and lynx. He
notes that bears are not predators, per se, but occasionally become “…addicted to a
diet of lamb, goat, steer, or colt. Once they do this, they are killers for life and can
only be shunted from their evil ways by complete elimination.” (p. 51, emphasis
added) and supports rodent control as a means of disease reduction. He decries
“sentimentalists” who refuse to see the practical aspects of wildlife management
through lethal take. Underscoring Weber (2002/1920) and Kline (2000), he further
notes that the history of the Bureau underscores the “inevitability of economics” and
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believes economics to be “…a force that could no more be withstood than the force
that pulls the tides.” (p. 63). In a departure from the just the facts tone of other
monographs (to include his 1922 monograph on the National Park Service), he seems
to support the promotion of economics development as guided by principles of
scientific conservation. Thus, he writes in the vein of Pinchot and other progressive
conservationists. He seems to either ironically miss or disagree with the findings of
his own research where he describes the interconnectivity between species, the
“harmony” of nature, and the consequences of upsetting the natural balance.154
The implications of Weber‟s (2002/1920), Smith‟s (1950), and Cameron‟s
(1928 and 1929) arguments and the manner in which the cultural forces they describe
influenced settlement in the Northwest is found and amplified in Gordon Dodds‟ 1986
book The American Northwest: A History of Oregon and Washington. The author‟s
intent was to provide an introductory history to settlement in the Pacific Northwest.
Dodds claims that, at the time of writing, it was the “first book to do so in almost
twenty years” (p. ix). The author concentrates on major regional economic, social,
political, and cultural events. His discussion of regional governance focuses on the
establishment of the territorial, state, and, to a limited degree, county government
systems; he does not discuss regional governance in the sense used in this study. The
book is organized by major periods of time, tracing the arrival of the region‟s earliest
inhabitants in c.15,000 BC, first European contact in 1542, British and AngloAmerican settlement in the 18th and 19th centuries, and subsequent regional
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development up through the mid 1980s. His primary argument is that the region‟s
natural wealth led to a relatively easy life for Northwestern residents – especially
whites. Consistent with the agrarian social theory of the early 19th century (Smith,
1950), the region offered lots of room with ample supplies of water (at least in the
western part of the region and along the region‟s rivers), fertile soil, timber, and
minerals combined with a temperate climate.
Dodds (1986) is valuable for his careful chronicling of key dates and events,
his insights into regional culture and identity, and his careful articulation of the
historical social, political, and cultural trend. He also offers the insight that the
region‟s vast resources allowed for institutions to develop and take root absent serious
competition, at least initially. When they later came into conflict (such as fisheries
versus hydropower development), the by-then well-established institutional senses of
identity and culture made agreement difficult. He also adds to the worldview of
American settlers to the Northwest. Noting that they for the most part originated in
the Midwest, they were already convinced of American exceptionalism. He describes
the newcomers to the Northwest as an energetic and conservative people, imbued with
the premises of Manifest Destiny that in part proclaimed American democracy as part
of God‟s divine plan for the advancement of humankind. American values of political
democracy, economic opportunity, social mobility, and religious freedom were
considered self-evident truths the spreading of which justified the establishment of a
continent-wide empire.
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Dodds (1986) does not discuss governance other than the establishment of
formal political entities such as territories, states, and, to a limited degree, counties.
His main argument regarding Northwest “complacency” and ill preparedness for
change proved prescient in that the difficulties the regional faced in resolving conflicts
between the region‟s economic dependence on resource extraction and environmental
concerns came were just beginning to come to the fore at about the time of
publication.
In addition to Smith (1950) and Dodds (1986), Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman
(1963/1917), Hays (1957), Wiebe (1967), Johansen (1967), and Meinig (1968) provided
the facts and circumstances surrounding white western settlement.
Joseph Schafer published his A History of the Pacific Northwest in 1905 and
updated it in 1918. His work was reprinted in 1943, which is the edition reviewed
here. His only stated purpose was to update his earlier work. In style and
organization, his intent seems to have been to provide a textbook on Northwest
history. As such, he presents a factual and straightforward account of Northwest
exploration and settlement from the early 16th century up to 1917. This study used
Schafer primarily for information on the region‟s early settlement and to cross check
material presented by Lyman (1963/1917) and Johansen (1967).
Adding color commentary to the Pacific Northwest‟s history of settlement is
William Lyman‟s (1963/1917) Columbia River: Its History, Its Myths, Its Scenery, Its
Commerce, first published in 1909. Lyman, who died in 1920, produced his book‟s
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second and third editions in 1911 and 1917 respectively. The fourth edition was
edited, updated, and expanded by someone only identified by the initials “L. K. P.”
Lyman‟s stated intent was to present a history and description of the Columbia
River. He wished to convey “a lively sense of the romance, the heroism, and the
adventure” of the river‟s white settlement and development. He further wished to
“breathe into the narrative something of the spirit and sentiment which we call
„Western‟ – a spirit and sentiment more easily recognized than analyzed (Lyman,
1963/1917, p. iii, apparently using the forward from the original 1909 publication).
L.K.P. updates Lyman‟s work with the results of research not then available to Lyman
and makes other factual corrections to the text, mostly through footnotes. He also
adds a section on development, contrasting the pristine conditions eloquently
chronicled by Lyman with the river‟s subsequent development up through the early
1960s – most notably the construction of the river‟s mainstem dams.
Lyman (1963/1917) is presented in three sections. The first presents a regional
history from early geologic formation up through the late 1910s. The second is a
narrative of a journey down the river taken by Lyman. Lyman states that his sources
are other books supplemented with his own observations of the river and
conversations held with original pioneers, hunters, steamship crewmembers, and tribal
members. Unfortunately, the book is absent any bibliography for Lyman‟s original
work. The third section is L.K.P.‟s update regarding dam construction and other river
development, supported by a bibliography. Of these, only the first section is used
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here, as L.K.P.‟s third section has been superseded by additional dam construction and
more recent accounts.
What Lyman (1963/1917) adds to Schafer (1943/1918) and Dodds (1986) is a
very human component to historical events. For example, he includes tribal legends
regarding the first arrival of whites and tribal perspectives on subsequent settlement.
Quoting from transcripts of the time, he puts life into the region‟s historical founders.
For example, he details the issues and positions of Oregon founders in his account of
the political issues and debate behind the establishment of a provisional government
for what became the Oregon Territory in 1848, an account L.K.P. rightfully critiques
as being “4th of Julyish.” In fact, there is a strong tone of patriotic and regional pride
throughout Lyman‟s account, a tone counterbalanced by Dodds (1986) more objective
presentation.
Hays‟ 1957 The Response to Industrialism 1885-1914 focuses on the impact of
industrialization on the lives of people throughout the United States. His interest is on
the transition from a society of “relatively stable, local business affairs” to one of
“intense nationwide competition that rendered [the individual‟s] way of making a
living far less secure” (p. i) regardless of whether he was a manufacturer, merchant,
laborer, or farmer. He argues that industrialization led to the growth of large cities
with an urban culture that slowly encroached into the countryside, replacing traditional
networks of personal relationships with more impersonal forces of efficiency and
competition. These new forces threatened the familiar order with an indifference to
tradition and a community‟s sense of identity. It also resulted in a large influx of
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foreigners seeking work. Hays‟ intent is to examine the ways in which the people of
the United States responded to these drastic changes in their lives.
Hays (1957) disputes the accepted historical argument that the unifying theme
of history between 1885 and 1914 was a populist attack against corporate wealth in
which a discontented public sought to curb corporate influence through government
action. He sees this argument as simplistic and incomplete. More fundamental, in his
view, was the social reaction to industrialization and the multiple ways in which both
industrialization and the reaction to it changed American life. In essence, it
represented a clash between the values of the price-and-market economy and the
values of the intimate, interpersonal community relationships.
Wiebe (1967) provides a social and political context to the American social
order in the early 1900s. In The Search for Order 1877-1920, Wiebe outlines a
dramatic social transformation of society that began at the end of the post-Civil War
reconstruction period. His purpose is to describe the breakdown of informal, ruralagricultural American society and its eventual replacement with a more hierarchical
urban-industrial model.
Dorothy Johansen and Charles Gates first published their Empire of the
Columbia: A History of the Pacific Northwest in 1957. Johansen produced a second
edition in 1967, and it is that edition used here. Her stated intent with the second
edition was to put more effort on the flow of events and on the interaction of politics
and economics on the first half of the 20th century. Like Schafer (1943/1917), Lyman
(1963/1918) and Dodds (1986), Johansen provides a straightforward, textbook-like
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account of Northwest settlement and history. Of particular interest for this study was
her work on early settlement and development (which corrected some of the material
presented by Lyman) and her discussion of the Progressive movement in the
Northwest.
Weber (2002/1920), Smith (1950), Cameron (1928 and 1929), Wiebe (1967),
Hays (1957), Dodds (1986), Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen
(1967) and Meinig (1968) all write solely from the perspective of white Americans.
Lyman (1963/1917), although he includes tribal traditions in his narrative, does so in
the context of white exploration and settlement. Together they illustrate both the
worldview of Anglo-American settlers to the Northwest and the implications of that
worldview in shaping events. Equally important to a discussion of regional
governance, however, is the worldview held by the region‟s original inhabitants and
its implications.

Domain: Columbia River Basin Commercial Development
This next body of literature examines the commercial development of the river.
The works reviewed are grouped by four general themes. These are memoir accounts
of efforts at regional planning and economic development; histories of the Federal
Columbia River Power System; legal and political histories; and – given its centrality
to the most recent attempts at regional governance – histories of the region‟s salmon
fisheries and attempts at salmon restoration. This literature is central to the purposes of
this study as it was the expanding efforts in developing the basin‟s resources that
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brought various resource users into conflict and gave rise to the need for governance
systems and structures.
Memoir accounts of regional planning and development.
Four works that were reviewed were written by men with active roles in
regional developmental policy and governance in the 1950s and „60s. As such, they
offer personal perspective, insight, and context.
Charles McKinley served as consultant to the Northwest Regional Planning
Commission, the Hoover Commission Task Force on Natural Resources, as a
researcher for the President‟s Water Resources Policy Commission, and a consultant to
other various Northwest agencies and commissions.155 He also served as a faculty
member of Reed College. He authored several papers on New Deal planning (Bessey,
1963). In 1952, while at Reed, he published Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest:
Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River Valley. He presents
a critical administrative and political history of federal “field agencies” (regional
offices) that manage and develop natural resources in the Pacific Northwest. His intent
is to describe the relationships between regional federal entities and the impact of those
relationships on public administration and policy. In effect, he presents an argument
favoring an authoritative Tennessee Valley Authority-like governance structure for the
Columbia, citing what he views as the inadequacies of the voluntary collaborative
approaches put in place following World War II, particularly the Columbia Basin InterAgency Committee. Although his description of agency missions and inter-agency
conflict is dated, (for example, the jurisdictional competition between the Corps of
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Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation over yet-to-be-built dams) much of his
critique of collaborative decision making rings true today.
A contemporary of McKinley was Roy Bessey. Bessey was commissioned by
the state of Washington‟s Department of Conservation to chronicle regional resource
planning from 1933 to 1963. His pamphlet, Pacific Northwest Regional Planning: a
Review was the result. Bessey wrote as a strong advocate of regional planning. His
over 50-year career included work with government and private consulting firms in
the fields of engineering, resources development, planning, and programming.156 He
was active as a consultant during the period covered in his book. As such, and like
Ogden and McKinley, Bessey writes with the insights of an insider who had a frontrow seat and was actively involved in the planning activities he documents.
Bessey‟s intent is to provide a study of the regional experience in resource
planning, noting the lack of such literature for the Pacific Northwest (as opposed to the
Tennessee Valley Authority). He states his purpose as “…to give a reasonablyconnected narrative account of a regional planning movement from the necessarily
limited perspective of a single witness” (p. viii). He does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive, detailed, or definitive investigation of the whole PNW planning effort.
Rather, he provides “…a reasonably-connected narrative account of a regional
planning movement from the necessarily limited perspective of a single witness” (p.
viii).

156

From the forward to Pacific Northwest Regional Planning: a Review, written by Earl Coe, Director,
Washington Department of Conservation on September 10, 1963.
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Although presented as administrative history, Bessey writes with a strong bias
to central government planning. Comparing the Tennessee Valley experience with the
Columbia, he argues that, “[t]he parallel Pacific Northwest effort obviously has fallen
short of that of the more innovational TVA in a number of respects – notably as to
integration of program, impacts upon the region, and world attention and interest
engendered” (Bessey, 1963, p. vii).
Bessey provides an excellent source of early efforts at multi-agency
cooperation and governance (although the word “governance” does not appear). He
organized his book into periods defined by key events that changed the planning
paradigm nationally and regionally. The first period is 1933 – 1943, marked by the
Great Depression at one end and the outbreak of World War II on the other. Bessey
characterizes this period by the strong leadership from the national level and support
for centralized resource planning from the national to local levels in order to overcome
the effects of the Depression. The second period is 1943 – 1953, during which the
nation was focused on winning World War II and the Korean War. This period,
according to Bessey, is characterized by abolition of the New Deal‟s National
Resources Planning Board that had provided the “heart and life blood” for the
planning movement. The result was fragmentation of the New Deal‟s centralized
governmental planning effort and its replacement with voluntary arrangements and
compliances. The federal role shifted from central planning to technical analysis, and
the pre-Depression policy of laissez-faire begins to reassert itself. Bessey‟s third
period is from 1953 to 1963, a period of strong economic growth, with
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correspondingly less support for strong government involvement in the economy.
Bessey‟s model of defining historic periods by points of “punctuated equilibrium”
(Gersick, 1991) or “critical situations” (Giddens, 1984) is used in this study as the
organizational model for Chapter 4. Of direct interest to this study are Bessey‟s
insights into the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC), with
which he personally worked.
Roy Scheufele served as executive assistant to the Commanding General of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers North Pacific Division, a position from which he
retired in 1963. He completed his History of the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency
Committee: the Story around 1970 (the work is undated). The history was
commissioned by unanimous resolution at the last meeting of the Committee and
funded through pooled agency funds.
The Columbia Bain Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC) was formed through
voluntary agreement among the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation,
Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Forest Service, and Federal Power
Commission in 1946. It was later joined by the Departments of Labor and Health,
Education, and Welfare, and functioned until replaced by the Pacific Northwest River
Basins Commission in 1967.
Citing primary material drawn from CBIAC meeting files, Scheufele (c. 1970)
provides a history and critique of the CBIAC‟s origins, operation, problems,
accomplishments, and failures. He also provides occasional glimpses into other
governance systems that came into being around the same time, in some cases being
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the only references to those organizations found during the research for this study.
Examples of these other systems include the Northwest States Development
Committee and the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, all
discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. Scheufele organizes his work into three
sections. The first deals with the genesis of the CBIAC, recounting the region‟s
history in resource planning back into the 1800s. The second is a chronicle of CBIAC
meetings. The third is his candid and insightful critique of the Committee‟s
operations, accomplishments, and weaknesses. The value of this critique is its general
applicability to subsequent governance systems organizes around the concepts of
voluntary cooperation and consensus-based decision-making.
Gus Norwood published his book Columbia River Power for the People: a
History of the Policies of the Bonneville Power Administration apparently in 1981,
although the work itself is undated. Norwood was the first executive director of the
Northwest Public Power Association from 1947-1967. As such, his history is written
from a pro-public power point of view. He also offers the perspectives of one
personally involved with many of the policies of which he writes. As noted in the
forward by Sterling Munro, BPA Administrator at the time the book was published,
“…this is not a safe and sanitized bureaucratic exercise. It is written from a
perspective and a point of view” (Norwood, c. 1981, p. v.).
Norwood was hired by BPA (who published his book) to review the history of
BPA‟s policies and examine that history‟s relevance to the agency‟s future. He
presents a history of the policies of the Bonneville Power Administration. His
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guidance from Don Hodel, BPA Administrator at the time the project began and
Munro‟s predecessor, was to (1) “follow the facts wherever they lead, or the history
will not have credibility” and (2) “where appropriate and feasible, evaluate the policies
for their relevance to the future” (Norwood, c. 1981, p. viii).
Norwood adopted a three-step approach to the project. First, he identified
BPA‟s major policies and, from these, selected those he felt were most significant to
the purposes of the study. Second, he traced each policy back to its genesis, many of
which had roots that preceded the agency‟s creation. Third, he described the setting
and political context at the time each policy was adopted. Norwood organized his
findings into ten parts, arranged chronologically. The first three discuss the national
and regional context within which the conservation and public power movements in
the Northwest evolved, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.
Underlying the entire book are three themes. Most prominent, and captured in
the title, is the provision of economic electrical power to the public at large. Policies
on federally built and operated transmission facilities, cost-based postage stamp rates,
anti-private utility monopolies, public preference for federally produced hydropower,
industrial and economic development, and rural electrification underscore the New
Deal belief in the social power of electricity to improve people‟s lives. Second is the
regional nature of the transmission system. The nation‟s largest at the time of
Norwood's writing, the grid system opened the door for power management beyond
the marketing of federally generated electricity. Third, and of greatest interest to this
study of regional governance, is the institutional evolution of BPA as a member of “a
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pluralistic, regional electric system of public, cooperative, and private utilities, and
large industrial customers, with major inter-regional and inter-agency relationships”
(Norwood, c. 1981, p. ix).
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), and Norwood (c.1981)
all offer first-hand insights into the issues of which they write. They also, albeit
inadvertently, exemplify a perspective favoring a worldview of economic
development, accepting as a given the dominant use of natural resources for
enhancement of the regional economy. Ogden (1949) and McKinley (1952) do not
address tribal or environmental issues other than in passing. Scheufele (c.1970) does,
but limits his discussion to the conflict between fishery managers and river developers.
Scheufele writes from the perspective of salmon as a market commodity, the harvest
of which was effected by the construction of dams and other commercial impacts on
fish habitat. Bessey (1963) makes passing acknowledgement of the impact on the
environment and fish, but makes little mention of tribal concerns. Norwood (c.1981)
discusses both, writing at about the time that the Northwest Power Planning and
Conservation Act with its mandates for fish and wildlife protection were enacted.
However, Norwood can only introduce the topic as he was writing at the time the
Council was only just getting organized and before it fully developed its program.
Interestingly, although all four were directly involved with the governance
systems of their day, only Scheufele‟s (c.1970) work is specifically devoted to
chronicling any given system. McKinley (1952) provides an overview and analysis of
the role played by federal agencies in resource development and management and
426

argues that the fractured nature of federal management should be replaced with a
valley authority-type agency. Bessey (1963) documents the history of regional
planning efforts. Norwood‟s (c.1981) interest is the administrative history of the
Bonneville Power Administration. Whereas the experiences of each offer insights into
the region‟s development, other sources are needed to fully establish the social and
political contexts from which the region‟s various governance systems emerged.
The Federal Columbia River Power System.
The Columbia Basin‟s commercial development is most vividly exemplified
by its integrated system of federal and non-federal hydroelectric dams. The federal
dams and related transmission grid are jointly operated by the Corps of Engineers,
Bureau of Reclamation, and Bonneville Power Administration. Among the earliest
accounts of federal hydroelectric development is the unpublished PhD dissertation of
Daniel Ogden, written in 1949, entitled Development of Federal Power Policy in the
Pacific Northwest. In later years, Ogden became an active participant in the region‟s
governance systems, serving in multiple administrations and positions and being a
frequent lecturer and writer on regional issues. Ogden‟s intent in his dissertation was
to trace the historical basis for federal involvement in Columbia River hydropower.
Using primary source documents and interviews with many of the key individuals
involved with the development of the Columbia‟s hydropower system, Ogden presents
an in-depth history of that development and the policies and issues that drove it.
Ogden argues that the origin of the system were the twin demands for irrigation in the
arid land east of the Cascades and a safe and economical means of river transportation
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through the Columbia‟s falls and rapids as an alternative to high railroad prices.
Neither, by themselves, would justify the necessary expense on the part of the
government. Hydropower was added later as a component of the public power
movement; as a public works employment program during the Depression; to promote
regional economic growth, and to provide inexpensive electricity as a counterweight
to high private utility prices, especially to rural areas.
Of interest to this study are (1) the regional context of the period prior to and
through the New Deal; (2) the development of what became strong regional support
for federal ownership and operation of hydroelectric dams in the Northwest; and (3)
his detailed discussion of the policy issues of the day and how they translated into
various planning and operational structures. He also discusses in some detail the
debate over creation of a Columbia Valley Authority; the option to allow the Corps of
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation to market power from their projects; and the
policy issues behind the 1937 Bonneville Project Act.
Whereas Ogden‟s dissertation presents a detailed litany of events, dates,
personalities, and motivations written from largely an economic perspective, Robert
White‟s The Organic Machine: the Remaking of the Columbia River (1995) provides
a view of the Basin‟s development through the lenses of social and environmental
history. He argues that it was the Columbia River dams that made the Pacific
Northwest a region, connecting the states through a network of hydroelectricity,
irrigation, and river navigation. In so doing, the Columbia was remade from a natural
ecological system to an industrial- scale machine designed for production of
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commercial and social goods and services. His underlying theme is that this
industrialization came at the cost of both the environment and the personal
relationship that native tribes and the earliest Euro-American settlers had with their
environment.
White (1995) argues that, prior to industrialization man‟s relationship with
nature was measured by his personal labor. Man knew nature through the labor it took
to overcome and live with it. It was direct and personal. The impacts of human action
on the natural environment were immediately felt and vice versa. Interactions
between humans and nature occurred on a very personal scale (examples: farming,
tribal fishing, families rafting down rapids of The Dalles to get to Portland, and the
predictable seasonal threat of flooding.) While industrialization reduced or eliminated
many of the very real threats to personal safety and property inherent in this personal
relationship, it did so by turning what had been, in White‟s eyes, romantic and
majestic into a sanitized, tightly managed suite of commodities. But he over does it.
White‟s romanticized description of the pre-development river and his if-only-we‟dknown-we-would-never-have-done-it tone seems to dismiss or trivialize the very real
threats posed by the natural Columbia to those trying to build communities and
livelihoods from the river‟s resources. It also ignores the worldview assumed by the
region‟s Anglo-American settlers and developers that guided their responses to those
threats. Their conceptual framework would simply not allow serious consideration of
non-development options.
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Romanticism notwithstanding, the value of White‟s work for this study is his
presentation of the history of the social organizations employed by the Basin‟s
societies at various periods and the impact of technology and culture on those
organizational forms.157 He helps illustrate the differences between the tribal and
Euro-American worldviews. His review of organizing structures includes the
Columbia Valley Authority, PNWRPC, and Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee
and the context from which they emerged. He also provides a concise synopsis of the
private-public power debate, the influence of the Progressive era‟s conservation
movement, and the counterintuitive lack of early involvement by salmon harvest
managers as issues of governance as the system was being planned and developed.
Eve Vogel presented a study of Northwest regionalism in her 1997 doctoral
dissertation, The Columbia River‟s Region: Politics, Place, and Environment in the
Pacific Northwest, 1933-Present. Vogel studied the role of regional institutions in
fostering the regionalist ideal in the 1930s. Her thesis is that this ideal was
institutionalized in the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, established
in 1934. She argues that the NPWRPC was conceived as a way to avoid political
conflict over Basin development by creating an inclusive process to accommodate
interests that otherwise were likely to come into conflict. She evokes and extends
White‟s (1995) argument regarding the Columbia River as the basis for Northwest
regionalism. In her argument, it was not so much the river as the interest in the low
cost hydropower the river could produce and the institutionalization of that low cost
power through creation of the Bonneville Power Administration.
157

In this sense, White (1995) closely follows the logic of Sztompka (1984) and Giddens (1991).
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The region‟s institutional methods for estimating power needs, its efforts to
integrate nuclear power with the hydrosystem, and resulting economic catastrophe of
the 1970s are the subject‟s of Daniel Pope‟s 2008 Nuclear Implosions: the Rise and
Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System. Pope‟s goal is to explore the
recently revived interest in nuclear energy in the U.S. He attributes this interest to
rising oil and gas prices and a growing concern about the impacts of carbon emissions
on climate. As a result, the author believes that public opinion is shifting in greater
favor of nuclear energy. Furthermore, growing numbers of environmentalists are
seeing the value of nuclear energy in the face of climate change. The author‟s
objective is to inform this current discussion by using the Northwest experience as a
case study to illustrate both the perils and promise of nuclear development. He does
this through a detailed chronological historical narrative beginning with the first
efforts to harness the river‟s energy and carrying it through the nuclear era. He writes
from an economic perspective. He focuses on the relatively closed set of institutions
involved in power planning development and how regional utilities, often led by the
Bonneville Power Administration, evolved into hierarchical organizations that
emphasized centralized and professionalized long-term planning. Pope‟s primary
thesis is that poor planning, closed circuit thinking, and misjudgments that led to one
of the largest public bond defaults in United States History.
Political and legal histories of Basin development.
Five histories of Columbia Basin political and legal events were reviewed.
Each deals with the policies and politics a specific periods. Jay Brigham (1998) and
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Phyliss DeLuna (1997) present academic studies based on historical research. Like
Ogden, Norwood, Bessey, and McKinley, and unlike Brigham and DeLuna, Michael
Blumm and Roy Hemmingway were both close observers and participants in
Columbia Basin power issues and provide firsthand accounts of their observations and
resulting insights. Writing from a more detached perspective are reporters Bill
Crampton and Barry Espenson who focus almost exclusively on natural resources
issues in the Columbia Basin.
In his 1998 book Empowering the west: Electrical politics before FDR, Jay
Brigham presents the rise of the public power movement prior to the New Deal.
Franklin Roosevelt‟s election in 1932 represented the culmination of efforts begun in
the early 1900s to use government to counter the excesses of private industry. The
1932 election brought people into power with a predilection to use government to
solve social problems. The public power movement, which began in the 1920s, was
only one of these social issues.
The author notes that American business was in a state of transition at the turn
of the century. Echoing Wiebe (1967) and Hays (1957), Brigham (1998) argues that
the nation was moving from small, locally owned economic enterprises to nationwide
multi-unit corporations. This consolidation and expansion was made possible by
technical advances in communications and transportation, abetted by the doctrine of
laissez-faire by the government, enabled large corporations to amass a great deal of
power. The excesses of these large corporations resulted in the progressive reform
movement.
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Brigham‟s (1998) work has received mixed reviews. While praised as an
“excellent study” that “significantly extends our understanding of electrification”
(Cannon, 2000), it has also been criticized for “reductivist tendencies” in that he tends
to generalize and categorize various complex issues into two or three conceptual nodes
(Wollner, 2001) and for presenting an overly simplistic and incomplete account
(Williams, 2000). While these criticisms may be true, they do not detract from the
value of Brigham‟s work to this study. Brigham dispassionately lays out the key
arguments of advocates of both private and public power. In doing so, he presents one
of the few relatively in-depth renderings of the free market perspective. He centers his
argument on three case studies in the search for inexpensive electricity: Seattle, Los
Angeles, and eight small-towns across America. Although it may have its flaws,
Brigham helps a layperson understand the foundations upon which the public-private
power debate rested.
Whereas Brigham (1998) discusses the public power movement prior to
Roosevelt, Phyliss DeLuna‟s (1997) book focuses on the period immediately
thereafter. Public vs. Private Power During the Truman Administration: A Study of
Fair Deal Liberalism presents the efforts of New Dealers to retain what they saw as the
gains of the public power movement that was coming under increasing attack by promarket advocates. DeLuna‟s stated intent is to contribute to the understanding of the
political significance of the Truman years with regard to public power policy, focusing
on the period 1949-1952. She offers insights into Fair Deal liberalism with regard to
the public-private power debate. Just as Brigham (1998) argues that the debate did not
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begin with Roosevelt‟s election, DeLuna (1997) argues that it did not end with his
death.
The policy position of the Truman administration was that government should
be run for the benefit of the public at large versus narrow interests. “Espousing a form
of economic democracy, Truman and certain administration officials put themselves
forward as defending the country‟s natural resources against monopolization by
special interests and ensuring that they were developed for the good of the whole
citizenry” (p. xi). DeLuna (1997) goes on to recount a resurgent effort to install first a
Columbia Valley Authority in the Northwest, followed by a more modest Columbia
Valley Administration. Neither effort succeeded, as the nation and region were more
comfortable with voluntary, collaborative associations, such as the Columbia Basin
Inter-Agency Committee, that came into being in the 1940s. DeLuna offers an
excellent account of the politics and positions of federal agencies, states, and private
interests as this debate played itself out.
Michael Blumm, a professor at Northwestern School of Law and director the
law school‟s Northwest Water Law and Policy Project, has authored numerous books,
essays, and articles on Columbia Basin issues. His work is often critical of the
impacts of the hydropower system on the environment. The paper reviewed for this
study was his 1982 paper The Northwest‟s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. The paper was
published in 1982, two years after enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act (1980 Power Act).
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Blumm (1982) argues that current resource conflicts are a legacy of past
policies and programs. His intent is to provide historical perspective on Northwest
hydropower policies that led to the 1980 Power Act. He provides a thoughtful,
chronological discussion of key events leading to enactment of his Act. Somewhat
similar to Bessey (1963), he organizes his paper by periods that changed the direction
of important power policy. His categories are the pre-New Deal (or progressive
period); World War II and the post war years; and the region‟s hydro-thermal program
where it was envisioned that regional energy needs could be best met by adding
nuclear generators to the region‟s hydropower system. In so doing, he provides a factladen history of dates and events that provide context for the creation of the Council.
Roy Hemmingway served as a member of Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber‟s
administration and one of the original appointees to the Northwest Power Planning
Council. Hemmingway, an attorney by training, also wrote his essay The Northwest
Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future Role shortly after passage of the 1980
Power Act. Like Blumm (1982), his purpose is to outline the history of the Council
and articulate its roles and potential. He begins his 1983 history with the hydrothermal program, preferring to devote more discussion on the potential for the future
rather than recounting the past.
Hemmingway (1983) describes the Council as a unique experiment in
American federalism. The 1980 Power Act was not a case of surrendering federal
jurisdiction or power to the states, but sharing authority among federal agencies and
the Northwest states in regional decision making. It did not require federal agencies to
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follow the plans and programs prepared by the Council, but only to consider them
when making decisions. As such, Hemmingway envisioned the Council as a check on
arbitrary agency decision-making.
What Blumm (1982) and Hemingway (1983) both point out is that, unlike its
predecessor structures, the Council was the first in which the region recognized an
obligation to balance hydropower with the systems impact on fish and wildlife and to
tribal interests. The crisis generated by construction cost overruns in the governmentbacked nuclear power facilities, an inflated projection of regional energy needs, and
other issues opened a window in which environmental and tribal interests could obtain
a seat at the regional governance table.
Bill Crampton and Barry Espenson have methodically covered Columbia Basin
FCRPS issues for years, and their first-hand reports are a primary source of
information on the rise and collapse of the CRBF as related in Chapter 1. In 2009,
they summarized their reporting in Salmon and Hydro: An Account of the Litigation
over Federal Columbia River Power System Biological Opinions for Salmon and
Steelhead, 1991 – 2009. Bill Crampton is the owner of Intermountain
Communications and serves as editor and publisher of both the website and the
Columbia Basin Bulletin on-line newsletter. He has worked for 20 years as a
newspaper reporter and editor in Alaska and the Northwest. Barry Espenson is a
senior writer for the Columbia Basin Bulletin. He has worked for 20 years as a
newspaper reporter and editor in the Northwest, often specializing in natural resource
and agriculture issues.
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Salmon and Hydro is a summary of their reporting over the years and an
overview of litigation concerning NOAA‟s series of FCRPS biological opinions on
ESA listed salmon and steelhead. It begins with the first listing of Snake River
Sockeye on November 20, 1991 and follows through 12 subsequent listings and the
issues in front of the court as of the date of publication. The authors‟ intent is to
provide the reader with “a general understanding of the history of biological opinion
litigation – how the Northwest moved, in legal terms, from the first salmon listings
under the Endangered Species Act to the 2008 Federal Columbia River Power system
Biological Opinion – and the major issues involved in case after case” (p. 4). Source
material comes from original reporting by the authors as published in the periodic
Northwest Salmon Recovery Report, which ran in print from 1997 to 1999, and in the
on-line Columbia Basin Bulletin from 1998 to the present. Their central thesis is that
the 1995 biological opinion and the court decision on that opinion rendered in 1997
were turning points in regional salmon management and hydropower operations.
The “issue summary” condenses what are likely hundreds, if not thousands of
pages of court filings, declarations, motions, and orders into a concise 77 pages. As
such, it only offers the broadest outline of the key issues at play in the courts. In their
effort to be brief, the authors may confuse readers not intimately familiar with the
details of which they are writing. For example, terms like “population,” “stock,”
“evolutionary significant unit (ESU),” and “distinct population segment (DPS)” are
not well defined and may appear to the lay reader to be interchangeable when, in fact,
each is a term of art with its own specific meaning and application. A second example
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is their discussion of the Regional Forum. The Regional Forum originally consisted of
an Executive Committee of sovereign leaders, an Implementation Team of senior
managers and policy advisors, and several technical teams. The authors introduce the
Executive Committee and technical teams on pages 12 and 13, discuss Oregon‟s
objections to them on page 17, and the court‟s ruling on them on page 27. The term
“Regional Forum” is not introduced until page 28. To a reader not familiar with
Regional Forum organization and history these may appear to be separate, unrelated
entities.
However, these criticisms are minor in comparison to what the authors
accomplish. Salmon and Hydro presents a succinct outline, laid out in generally
chronological order, of the listing of thirteen species of salmon in the Columbia Basin,
the associated biological opinions written by the National Marine Fisheries Service on
the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), and the sequence of litigation
that followed. It summarizes the major parties involved, their interests and
motivations, the key decisions rendered by the courts, and the impact of those
decisions on FCRPS system operations. Consequently, the authors largely achieve
that which they set out to do.
The authors also tangentially provide useful insights as to how the Basin‟s
litigation battles over fish affected experiments with different governance systems.
These systems include the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council, the
Regional Forum, the CRBF, the Columbia River Fisheries Council, and the lower
river tribes‟ Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission, all discussed only to the
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degree they intersect with the litigation narrative. For example, the authors note that it
was the region‟s inability to agree on a coherent salmon recovery strategy that led to
the ESA listings and collapse of the Regional Forum‟s Executive Committee. The
resulting frustration motivated the initiation of the Three Sovereigns Process, which
eventually resulted in creation of the CRBF. The authors do no more than introduce
the CRBF. The (rightful) implication is that the CRBF, although at least partially
linked to regional efforts to respond to litigation actions, proved functionally
inconsequential to later decision making.

Domain: The Impact of Development on Regional Salmon
There is no shortage of written material on the status of northwest salmon and
related institutions. Much is written to promote various policy positions. For
example, James Buchal‟s 1998 The Great Salmon Hoax attributes the salmon decline
to overfishing, mismanaged hatchery practices, and ulterior political motives of
federal regulatory agencies while dismissing the impact of Columbia Basin dams.
Alternatively, Michael Blumm et al. (1998) place primary blame on the existence and
operation of the dams. As Taylor (1999) puts it, “Every interest claimed to speak for
citizens and salmon, but their rhetoric revealed that the core dispute was less about
salmon than social legitimacy” (p. 165) as they argued so vehemently over who was to
blame for the salmon decline.
Basic background facts were obtained primarily from two sources. The
National Research Council‟s Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest
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(1996) provides a comprehensive general overview of the evolution of the salmon
situation and the causes of salmon decline. Rather than focus on any one cause, the
Council outlined the threats to traditional salmon runs brought about by changes in
salmon habitat, development of the dams and hydropower system, over harvest,
hatchery management, and changes in ocean conditions. For this study, Upstream was
used for general background information and facts.
Similar use was made of Cone and Ridlington‟s The Northwest Salmon Crisis:
A Documentary History (1996). As Pevar (2002) did with key source documents
central to tribal rights, Cone and Ridlington provide excerpts from source documents
central to understanding the policy decisions and social structures that underlay the
salmon decline. These documents include statutes, policy statements, Indian treaties,
text from speeches, and technical reports. Each document is accompanied by editorial
comment from a variety of regional salmon experts representing a variety of
perspectives and viewpoints. Cone and Ridlington provide an excellent,
comprehensive desk-side compendium of key documents with accompanying context.
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide holistic
treatments of the social aspects of the salmon debate and the impacts of cultural
perspectives on salmon policy. All provide a comparison between the tribal and
Anglo-American worldviews and the consequences of those worldviews with respect
to the environment in general and regional salmon runs in particular. As such, they
provide both insights into the social aspects of the salmon situation and add to the
understanding of the tribal worldview introduced above.
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In Salmon Without Rivers: A History of the Pacific Salmon Crisis (1999),
James Lichatowich argues that the concept of hatcheries to offset the impacts of
development on salmon runs created an unrealistic and devastating perception that the
Northwest could have it all – salmon plus the benefits of development. Thus, it is not
a critique of hatchery management per se, but a critique of an industrial approach to
resource management that viewed nature as a warehouse of marketable commodities.
Of particular interest to this study is Lichatowich‟s (1999) contrast of the
traditional Indian gift-based economy with the Western market-based economy. He
states that the relationship between man and salmon in the Northwest began to evolve
about 9,000 years ago on the Fraser River in Canada and about 7,000 – 8,000 on the
Columbia at The Dalles. The technology for preserving salmon through drying and
smoking evolved about 3,000 years ago. This allowed salmon to be stored between
fishing seasons, thus boosting the region‟s human carrying capacity and laying the
basis for development of complex cultural customs. Fully developed salmon
economies appeared in Oregon and Northern California about 1500 years ago.
The author notes that the common perception that Indians lived within the
constraints of the natural ecological economy is misleading. The Indians developed a
sustainable salmon based on the power of their own world-view, a way of thinking
that would not have accommodated modern ecological concepts. “The sustainable
relationship between the Pacific salmon and Native Americans derived not from
ecology but from an economy based on the age-old concept of the gift and a belief
system that treated all parts of the earth – plants, animals, rocks – as equal members of
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a community.” (p. 34). The economy was based on gift giving, a way to transfer
goods and redistribute wealth. Gift-based economies worked on a cycle of obligatory
returns.
Joseph Taylor‟s 1999) Making Salmon: an Environmental History of the
Northwest Fisheries Crisis looks holistically at the historical events leading to the
current state of the region‟s development and its impacts on salmon. His work
critically examines the major northwest resources users – logging, grazing, mining,
commercial and sport fishing, pre- and post-contact tribal activities, and the effects of
development through dam building and the spread of urban areas. Similar to
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor provides a cultural and historical context for the evolution
of perspectives regarding salmon in the PNW in general and the “Oregon country” in
particular.
Taylor (1999) looks at the intersection of culture, economy, and nature to
examine the long-running collapse of the salmon fishery in the Pacific Northwest. He
notes that the “crisis” has been unfolding in plain sight for over 150 years, with
imminent extinction of salmon runs being first prophesied in 1875. Throughout most
of the book, he presents an even-handed and meticulously researched history of the
region, offering insights, ironies, and paradoxes. He saves his opinions and
conclusions for the end.
Also like Lichatowich (1999), Taylor‟s (1999) main critique is social rather
than technical. Taylor argues that history is story telling and, like any story, the
narrator makes decisions about what to include and exclude. He states,
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History is political. Its ability to legitimate or condemn activities of the state,
society, and markets make it a force in public debates, which is, in part, why
Pacific northwesterners have argued so vehemently about Who is to Blame for
the decline of salmon. Every explanation has rested on a rendition of the past,
and each version holds profound social, cultural, and environmental
consequences…We do not all view the world through a common lens.
Identity, culture, and location affect how we understand the present and
remember the past (Taylor, 1999, pp. 237-238, emphasis in original).
Northwesterners segregated the salmon fisheries by race, ethnicity, class, and
geography. Each side claimed themselves to be decent citizens, property owners, and
taxpayers while disparaging other groups as greedy, self-serving, and corrupt. “Every
interest claimed to speak for citizens and salmon, but their rhetoric revealed that the
core dispute was less about salmon than social legitimacy” (Taylor, 1999, p. 165). His
key insight is that the salmon decline is not a sudden disaster discrete in time, but the
result of a long-running process. “The essence of the salmon crisis is the struggle to
define and solve a complicated environmental and social problem, but resolution has
been elusive because participants have so little in common.” (p. 4). “How people
respond depends on who they are, where they live, what they do for a living, and how
they think it happened.” (p. 4).
Taylor‟s (1999) summary argument is that once salmon became viewed as an
economic commodity rather than an integral part of a natural process, they fell victim
to other sectors of industrial development that offered greater financial return.
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“Fishers, managers, and scientists tried to moderate damage, but their combined
numbers and strongest arguments paled before the bureaucratic might, popular appeal,
and Progressive ideology of the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and
Bonneville Power Administration. “Salmon fishing was simply less profitable than
other industries” (Taylor, 1999, pp. 225-226) such as timber, mining, hydroelectricity,
and agriculture.
In 1992, the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council requested
that an independent science group (ISG) to review the Council‟s 1992 fish and wildlife
program. The members of the ISG, which included James Lichatowich, subsequently
published their recommendations and the logic behind them in a collection of essays
titled in Return to the River: Restoring Salmon to the Columbia River (2006), edited
by Richard Williams (also a member of the ISG). The intent of the book is to present
a critique of the failure of salmon and steelhead management in the Columbia Basin
and suggest a new “conceptual foundation” for salmon management for the 21st
century. It also presents a critique of the Council as a suitable governance body to
address the salmon issue, arguing that it is captive to the developmental worldview of
the federal agencies, fishery managers, and regional electrical power interests.
The authors note the region‟s well-documented failure to halt the decline in
salmon runs. Of interest to this study is their insight on the role of perspective,
identity, and culture in that decline – making arguments consistent with Taylor (1999)
and, not surprisingly, Lichatowich (1999). “What is [sic] less recognized is the lack of
an explicit and scientifically based conceptual foundation and the consequences of this
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on salmon management and recovery actions” (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss,
Stanford, and Williams, 2006, p. 4).
The authors‟ (2006) intent is to propose an alternative to the commoditiesbased conceptual foundation with one that holistically stresses the role of natural
ecological processes. They characterize the dominant regional market perspective as
one that began with a belief in an inexhaustible supply of resources that was later
replaced with the belief that technical fixes, through engineering and artificial
propagation, could mitigate for the loss of natural processes.158 This new conceptual
foundation is based less on engineering nature to fit societal needs and more on
managing human activities to facilitate natural processes that shape the environment.
This “return to the river” concept envisions the Columbia as an ecosystem as opposed
to the organic machine described by White (1995).
Williams and his colleagues (2006) write from the perspective of the ecologist.
As such, they seem to miss a fundamental implication of their own argument. The
authors, in their essays, present a detailed history of the region‟s development and
support their arguments with a large amount of detailed, technical information. In
effect, they attempt to use a rational argument to convince the reader of the correctness
of the conceptual foundation they propose.
The findings of this study of Columbia Basin governance and history of
regional governance calls the “lack of an explicit and scientifically based conceptual
foundation” part of their argument into serious question. Arguably, the problem is not
the lack of a conceptual foundation but the large number of them, all conflicting in
158

Again, consistent with Taylor (1999)
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their objectives and all claiming scientific underpinnings and legitimacy. They also
miss (or do not acknowledge) the fact that others can look at the same technical data
they do and either derive different conclusions or offer counter-data in challenge.
This is because, to use the authors‟ own language, conceptual foundations are
defined as “a body of prior knowledge reflecting training, beliefs, and experience”; a
“lens through which we interpret observations and thereby form conclusions”; and a
set of “principles and assumptions” (p. 29). “Conceptual foundations are often buried
so deep in the culture of management agencies that they are rarely articulated,
examined, or evaluated.” (p. 36). Their definition is very similar to the “shared basic
assumptions” that Schein (2004) uses in his definition of culture. Consequently, an
argument to adopt a new framework centered on salmon restoration and preservation
as the region‟s most important value is unlikely to sway the beliefs and values of
others based on rational argument, regardless of how well supported.
What this study does confirm is Williams‟ and his colleagues‟ (2006) more
fundamental point on the power of conceptual foundations (or worldviews) to drive
social system and structure. “A conceptual foundation or „worldview‟ is fundamental
to how we interpret the „facts‟ garnered from observation or scientific investigation,
and, in turn, to how we manage human interactions with the environment” (p. 4). This
point will be tested in the examination of governance structures presented in the
chapter to follow.
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006), in addition to
offering the connections between culture, social organization, and policy decisions all
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provided detailed accounts of the history behind the regional salmon fishery
development. As such, they add to (and largely complement) the accounts of dates
and events provided by Schafer (1943/1918), Johansen (1967), Dodds (1986) and
Lyman (1963/1917); the just-the-facts narratives of the National Research Council
(1996) and Cone and Ridlington (1996); and the discussion of basin commercial
development provided by Ogden (1949), McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele
(c.1970), Norwood (c.1981), Hemmingway (1982), Blumm (1982), White (1995),
DeLuna (1997), Brigham (1998), and Pope (2008).

Domain: The American Environmental Movement
Early roots and philosophic underpinnings.
Although the earliest roots of the American environmental movement can be
traced to the Middle Ages and biblical teachings (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Kline,
2000; Dunlap, 2004), environmental historians generally credit George Perkins Marsh
as providing the intellectual foundation of the American environmental movement.
For example, in 1931 Lewis Mumford credited Marsh as “the fountainhead of the
conservation movement” (quoted by Lowenthal in introduction to Marsh, 1965/1864,
p. ix) and Dunlap (2004) describes Marsh as providing “the first lengthy discussion of
humans as a geological and biological force” (p. 37).
Marsh‟s (1965/1864) intent, as stated in his introduction was:
“…to indicate the character and, approximately, the extent of the changes
produced by human action in the physical conditions of the globe we inhabit;
to point out the dangers of imprudence and the necessity of caution in all
operations which, on a large scale, interfere with the spontaneous arrangements
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of the organic or the inorganic world; to suggest the possibility and the
importance of the restoration of disturbed harmonies and the material
improvement of waste and exhausted regions; and, incidentally, to illustrate the
doctrine, that man is, in both kind and degree, a power of a higher order than
any of the other forms of animated life, which, like him, are nourished at the
battle of bounteous nature.” (p. 3).
His basic argument was that humankind was destroying the land and water
upon which it depended for its existence. As he put it, “man has too long forgotten
that the earth was given to him for usufruct alone, not for consumption, still less for
profligate waste” (p. 36) and “man…is essentially a destructive power” (p. 36) against
which nature cannot respond fast enough.
Man in Nature (1965/1864) chronicles Marsh‟s observations regarding
apparent linkages between timber over-harvest and over-grazing to hillside erosion,
insect infestations, disease, the drying up of springs, and the destruction of fish
spawning beds by the resulting sedimentation.
Benjamin Kline (2000) provides a more holistic history in First along the
River: a Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement. His intent was to present
an introductory study of the history of American environmentalism by discussing the
historical foundations of the U.S. environmental movement and introduce the
important facts and themes essential to understanding the movement. Kline is,
however, an environmental advocate and his book is in essence a critique of the
market-capitalist worldview. His presentation of historical events is, however, fairly
straight forward.
Of interest to this study is his presentation of the philosophical underpinnings
of European society‟s relationship with the natural world. Kline (2000) argues that
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this relationship is based on the philosophy of the Judeo-Christian tradition, citing the
biblical commandment to multiply and subdue the earth. He notes the spread of
Christianity across Europe by 500 AD and the corresponding reduction in paganism.
Whereas paganism taught that people and the natural world were connected and
interdependent, Judaism and Christianity taught that people were placed separate from
and above nature by God. It was God‟s will that man dominate nature in the struggle
for sustenance and life, following the bible‟s examples of Adam and Noah.
Kline (2000), like Weber (2002/1920), provides the philosophic justification
for – and perceived inherent rightness of - commercial development of natural
resources. Wiebe (1967) and Hays (1957 and 1999/1959) explain how the
administrative capacity for a nationwide application of that philosophy developed.
Thomas Dunlap (2004) takes an additional step: rather than just limiting himself to an
accounting of the development of environmental thought he argues that
environmentalists should directly challenge the righteousness of the market
philosophy by countering it with environmentalism‟s own sense of spirituality.
Thomas Dunlap‟s Faith in Nature: Environmentalism as Religious Quest
(2004) was inspired by the reaction of some historians and environmental advocates to
an essay delivered by William Cronon entitled The Trouble with Wilderness.159
Cronon argued an academic point that the concept of “wilderness” was socially
constructed. By this, he meant that certain areas of land were designated “wilderness”
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Of interest is the similarity between Dunlap‟s account of his motivation for writing Faith in Nature
and the observations by Stuart Albert and David Whetten of colleagues‟ reaction to relatively minor
budget reductions imposed by the Illinois state legislature on the University of Illinois. That
observation led to their development of a theory of organizational identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985).
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based on historical processes and events and certain characteristics. This in turn
shapes the way the public looks at those lands and nature in general. Members of the
environmental community were outraged – in their view, wilderness was something
real with objective and intrinsic characteristics. Dunlap points out that Cronon made a
distinction between “wilderness” – which, as mentioned, Cronon believed to be
socially constructed - and “wild nature” or “wild land” which Cronon saw as an
objective condition in nature. This distinction was lost on or ignored by Cronon‟s
critics, and they in effect condemned him for an argument that he did not make. In the
view of his critics, arguing that wilderness was anything less than an objective reality
gave anti-environmentalists a basis to argue against wilderness preservation.
The vehemence of the environmentalist reaction to Cronon‟s argument seemed
to Dunlap (2004) analogous to the reaction of Christian fundamentalists to historical
critiques of the Bible. Even if such a critic was a Christian in good standing,
suggesting that Scripture was the product of human recorders influenced by the social
conditions of their time and not a direct, inherently truthful rendition of God‟s words
brought charges of apostasy. Impressed by the passion of the environmentalists‟
reaction to Cronon, Dunlap looked more closely at its source.
Dunlap‟s (2004) adoption of a religion-like perspective is his book‟s main
argument and its greatest weakness. It is weak for two reasons. First, Dunlap‟s
(2004) justification for his argument reads as strained and contrived. Second, the way
he makes his argument opens Dunlap to the same situation as befell Cronon – of
being attacked for a making a case that he has no intention of making. Dunlap (2004)
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carefully stops short of declaring environmentalism to be its own religion. He does
not call for a new paganism or the worship of animals, trees and rocks. Nevertheless,
devout religious believers and rationality-oriented capitalists alike could easily make
the point that this is exactly what he is doing, and thus completely dismiss Dunlap‟s
work through ridicule.
These weaknesses are unfortunate, because they mask the book‟s otherwise
tremendous strengths. In a concise 172 pages, Dunlap presents a cogent and
accessible history of the development of the American environmental movement. In
effect – to borrow from Giddens (1985) – Dunlap outlines the structuration of that
movement. He identifies agents who most influenced the American movement‟s
evolution beginning with Marsh‟s Man in Nature and through Aldo Leopold, Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, Rachel Carson,
and more recent authors Michael Pollan and Sara Stein, among many others. He sets
this evolution in historical and cultural context, noting the movement‟s link with and
contradictions over American values such as private property, the role of science,
individual choice, and Western instrumental rationality over time. Of greatest interest
to this research project are the values and belief systems he notes underlying the
movement‟s current branches.
Marsh (1965/1864) provided an intellectual framework for the conservation
movement grounded in the American capitalist and protestant traditions, while Kline
(2000) and Thomas Dunlap (2004) trace the historical trajectory of environmental
philosophy from the Middle Ages up through the 1990s. What follows next is a
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review of literature charting the history of the movement‟s institutional development
as presented by Hays (1999/1959 and 2000), Riley Dunlap and Mertig (1992a), and
Rosenbaum (2005).

Institutional history.
Marsh‟s arguments in Man in Nature partially inspired the Progressive
Conservation movement. Samuel Hays‟ examined that movement in his Conservation
and the Gospel of Efficiency: the Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920
(originally published 1959; edition reviewed published 1999). Hays uses the
evolution of policies during the progressive conservation era to study the political
structure of the time and the decision-making system that efficiency and conservation
represented. He wished to produce a history of the structure of power, not solely an
intellectual history of conservation policy development. He sees conservation not as
just a public policy, but as an integral part of the evolution of the United States‟
political structure.
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency is, in a sense, a critique of the
normal way environmental history is presented. Hays (1999/1959) argues that to most
environmental historians, the significance of the conservation movement lies in the
substance of progressive policies concerning sustained yield forestry, multiple use
river development, and efficient public land management. He wants to look at the
period differently, not as a recounting of events and decisions but rather to examine
the patterns of social forces that caused the events to occur. To Hays, and reminiscent
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of Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991), history is best understood as a “web of
human relationships, of patterns of human interaction within the larger society” as
opposed to a simple sequence of events (Hays, 1999/1959, p. ix).
Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig collected and edited a series of essays
presented in American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement, 1970
– 1990 (1992a). They note that, despite predictions to the contrary, the American
environmental movement has not had the short life span of most social movements. It
ranks among the relative few that significantly changed society. Their purpose was to
describe the evolution of the environmental movement from 1970 – 1990 and to assess
its current status. The book provides an overview of environmentalism‟s major
organizations and explores the diversity of the movement.
Although Dunlap and Mertig (1992a) place the roots of American
Environmentalism in the Progressive Movement‟s late 19th century backlash to the
reckless exploitation of natural resources, government corruption, and bureaucratic
ineptitude (consistent with Marsh (1965/1864), Kline (2000), and T. Dunlap (2004)),
they note the catalyst for the modern movement as the first Earth Day in 1970. They
then trace the evolution of the movement through three “waves.” The first wave
occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s and was primarily grounded in the wise
management of natural resources for human use, although they acknowledge the
preservationist movement‟s origins also date to approximately the same time. The
second wave occurred during the Franklin Roosevelt administration and addressed the
environmental consequences of the dust bowl and massive flooding. The third wave
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began in the 1950s as more Americans gained affluence in the post World War II
economic boom, creating an increased demand for preservation of natural areas for
public enjoyment. By the 1960s, this third wave had evolved into modern
environmentalism.
An even more up to date accounting of institutional environmentalism is
Walter Rosenbaum‟s sixth edition of Environmental politics and policy published in
2005. Rosenbaum notes that in recent times Americans have lost their “ecological
innocence.” Only a few decades ago the average American never heard of
environmentalism, whereas now they debate the wisdom of international treaties on
global warming. Environmentalism has thus changed Americans‟ view of themselves
and their place in the natural order. His intent is to offer an accounting of how far the
nation has progressed, how far is left to go, what has been lost, and what has been
gained. Like Dunlap and Mertig (1992a, whom he cites and, who in turn, cite his
earlier editions), he places the catalytic origin of the modern environmental movement
to Earth Day 1970. His goal is to speak to the changes from that point forward,
emphasizing the political context of environmental issues and the political
implications of policy decisions.
Of interest to this study is Rosenbaum‟s (2005) chronicling of changes in
national policy due to changes in presidential administrations and congressional
makeup; the shift from single issue policies for protection of individual elements of
the environment such as water, air, and discrete species to more holistic concerns over
ecological impacts; the uncertainty of science; and the political difficulty of justifying
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costs for environmental consequences that fall to individual consumers whereas the
benefits are spread over the population. He argues that environmentalism is a passive
consensus issue, by which he means that public support is widespread but not intense
unless flamed by specific issue or action. He also notes traditional American
resistance to supporting specific actions when inconvenience or personal cost is
involved. Although Rosenbaum speaks from a national perspective, his arguments are
germane to Northwest natural resources policy in general and salmon restoration in
particular. He places the number of organized groups as over 10,000, with
organizational membership largely drawn from upper middle class, well educated,
whites. Consequently, the movement is frequently criticized for being racist and
elitist, especially when confronted with issues of environmental justice, public health,
and poverty.
Rosenbaum (2005) also catalogues the basic ideologies of the movement into
the following subgroups:
The “ideological mainstream” of pragmatic reformers. These groups
emphasize political action through government. There is a great deal of
diversity within the mainstream groups, from preservationism as promoted by
the Sierra Club vs. wise use and economic exploitation represented by the
NWF or Izaak Walton League.
The “deep ecologists” who feel man is at best a part of nature, and all life
forms have an equal right to exist. Deep ecologists call for fundamental
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changes in national institutions and lifestyles are essential to preserve global
ecological integrity.
The “radical environmentalists” who do not support compromise and favor
direct and occasionally violent action.
Rosenbaum‟s concluding argument is that 21st century environmental
degradation is being resolved under 19th century rules and institutions. Checks and
balances, federalism, interest group liberalism, and congressional localism were
created by the Constitution or were implicit in its philosophy. Administrative politics
now play as fundamental a part in environmental policy as any other element of
government. The growth of regulation and legislation, coupled with the intransigence
of many environmental challenges, has created a permanent new policy domain within
federal and state governments.
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APPENDIX B
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction
Images of the Columbia River as a “spiritual force” and “cornucopian provider
of economic value” (Lang, 1999, p. 147) and as a natural ecological system heavily
degraded by manmade structures and operations (Williams, 2006) illustrate
profoundly different worldviews of the relationship between the people of the Basin
and their place in the natural order. This study identified three worldviews operative
in the Pacific Northwest and relevant to the establishment of governance structures
and systems. They are characterized as “tribal,” “market-commodity,” and
“environmental.”
Within each of these worldviews evolved numerous organizations, institutions,
and other societal systems created to carry out specific missions and purposes –
purposes defined within the context of the worldview held by the original institutional
organizers. Examples include native Indian tribes and clans, state and federal
agencies, private business corporations, and non-profit interest groups among
numerous others. Each of these institutions subsequently evolved with their own
cultures, values, and senses of identity consistent with the purposes for which they
were created and shaped by organizational members, the constituents they served, the
sociological environment in which they operated, and their experiences over time.
The sheer number of institutions operating within a defined geographical space
would anticipate disagreements over resource use priorities based on differing
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organizational missions and interests. Rational, interest-based conflict of this nature is
termed “realistic” (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) or
“instrumental” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979). Long standing lines of realistic
conflict within the Columbia Basin conflict include debates over public vs. private
hydropower development (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.
1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997); commercial versus sport and tribal fishers
(Taylor, 1999); fishery managers versus hydropower system developers (Robbins,
2004) and others as identified in Chapter 8. However, if these disagreements were
simply over rational allocation of resource use, and if the parties‟ interests could be
served by agreement on an optimum allocation of those resources, one would expect
governance systems that successfully address those needs to generate support from the
parties concerned and thus enjoy extended periods of stability.
There are examples from outside the scope of this study where this has been
the case. The Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement and the “single utility”
concept essentially resolved the regional debate between public and private power and
has been in place since the 1960s (Pope, 2008). An even longer lasting example is the
commercial harvest allocation process agreed to between Oregon and Washington
under the Columbia River Compact, codified in 1918, that resolved forty-four years of
dispute over fishery management (Taylor, 1999).
In sharp contrast to the constancy enjoyed by the Pacific Northwest
Cooperation Agreement and the Columbia River Compact is the variety of attempts at
a Basin-wide governance system. Interest-based (also called instrumental or realistic)
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conflict theory suggests that this is due to the much broader array of interests affected,
thus making stable agreement that much more difficult to attain. This study concluded
that the consistent desire for a rational approach to regional decision could be
attributed to instrumental (or realistic) conflict theory.
Instrumental conflict theory does not explain the intensity and personal
attachment with which parties in the basin hold to various positions. Recognition of
this phenomenon in other settings led to the development of “social” conflict under
social identity theory. Social conflict is based on findings that merely being a member
of a group can lead to feelings of hostility toward other groups even where no realistic
competition exists. Social conflict is grounded in group values and the degree to
which an individual‟s identity is linked to the values of the social group(s) in which
the individual is a member (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979). Related to identity is the
influence of organizational culture on individual belief patterns. At its core,
organizational culture consists of a set of shared basic assumptions that are
normatively taught to organizational members and inform them of the proper way to
think, feel, and perceive conditions and circumstances within and external to the
organization (Schein, 2004). Taken together, influences of identity and culture form a
powerful interpretive lens through which members perceive, think, and relate to their
environment (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Schein, 2004).
Chapter 7 concluded that a major reason that so many Basin governance
systems failed was due to an inability to instill into participating individuals a sense of
identity that could both transcend the identities and values of members and be
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reconciled and integrated with the values framework of their respective institutions. It
further concluded that the reason for the durability of other systems, such as the
Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement and the Columbia River Compact, is that
the parties to those agreements did adopt and internalize the goals and purposes of
those arrangements into their cultural and identity frameworks. Consequently, those
systems were able to persevere in the face of the same circumstances that caused other
systems to collapse.
Chapter 7 went on to offer four hypotheses regarding the influence of values
on individual participants. This chapter establishes a theoretical framework within
which those hypotheses may be tested. To do so, it draws on the theoretical domains
of sociology, social psychology, and psychology. Such an amalgamation is necessary
in that no single body of theory provides a complete explanation for neither the
process by which the memorandum of agreement establishing the CRBF (and, by
extension, other systems) came about nor the reasons for which the CRBF eventually
failed.
Empirical Setting and Research Focus
The theoretical framework presented herein is proposed to be tested using the
circumstances surrounding negotiation of the Columbia River Basin Forum
memorandum of agreement as its empirical setting. The CRBF offers several
advantages for studying the underlying dynamics of regional governance. First, its
initiation, development, activation, and demise occurred in a discrete period providing
clear start and end points for the entire process. Second, the nature and substance of
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the debate over its creation was well documented by the local press. Third, meetings
were open and well recorded, both by a hired facilitator and note-taker and by two
news reporters who faithfully attended and reported on almost every meeting. Fourth,
the institutional interests and issues at play in the development of the CRBF MOA –
which became the Forum‟s operating charter - are consistent with the interests at play
in previous regional governance attempts. Fifth, almost all of the participants
involved in the CRBF reside locally and are available for interview. Consequently,
the CRBF provides a potentially rich empirical setting through which to examine the
region‟s governance history using the theoretical framework introduced above.
In addition to the CRBF records, there is a rich body of literature on the Pacific
Northwest‟s history of development and the major political and social trends affecting
the region over time. There is, however, no published work that deals exclusively
with the issue of interjurisdictional governance within the Columbia Basin.
Contributions to theory.
This proposed study approach offers three contributions to theory. The first is
the integration of several bodies of theory to explain the CRBF paradox. The
historical record alone is insufficient to fully explain why the region has not just failed
but actively resisted establishing a governance system with the authority to solve the
problems that cause many to think such a system necessary. A complete answer can
potentially be found through an integration of:
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Theories of structuration (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984) and social becoming
(Sztompka, 1991), as reinforced with theories of organizational culture
(Schein, 2004) and social conflict (Giddens, 1979; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).
Theories of organizational and individual identity (Tajfel and Turner,
2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and
Terry, 2001).
Theories of individual decision making, in particular image theory (Beach,
1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
Social formation is the product of the “duality” of collective norms and
individual choices. Individuals or select groups of individuals act as agents in the
development of social structures. Their actions result in social structures - rules and
norms – that serve to constrain or enable future behavior. Yet the choices available to
these agents are in turn constrained or enabled by those social rules enacted by those
that came before them. Thus, agents do not create totally new social systems. They
reproduce or transform systems already in existence, remaking them through the
“continuity of praxis” (Giddens, 1984, p. 171, emphasis in original; Sztompka, 1991,
p. 41). Through praxis, the boundary of social organization is constantly challenged
and changed by agents even as the opportunities available for change are shaped by
existing rules and norms. Thus, social structure is both the result of agent action and
the medium in which such action occurs. Furthermore, structuration theory stresses
the importance of history. All social structures are evolutions of the structures they
replace and, in turn, set the foundations for the structures yet to come.
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The historical evolution of regional governance and the development of the
CRBF is a case study of structuration and social becoming in action. The Northwest
has experimented with issues of regional governance since the Columbia River system
was first envisioned in the 1920s. The institutions involved have remained relatively
constant over this period, although there have been significant periods where some
interests‟ voices were muted by others.160
The governance structure preferences for participating institutions have also
remained relatively stable over this period. The history of governance in the region
demonstrates the following, all consistent with structuration theory:
There have been repeated initiatives since the 1920s to establish a regional
governance structure in the Northwest.
Institutions put forward representatives to serve as agents in the public debate
over the structure and authority of these governance initiatives.
These agents work to change, defend, or abolish the structures in existence at
the time consistent with their respective institution‟s interest at the time.
Institutional interests consist of both material interests and institutional
worldview values.
Each new governance structure has a pedigree that can be traced to previous
governance decisions.
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For example, tribes, harvest interests, and environmental advocates had little voice in regional
decision making from the 1920s through the 1960s. This changed with the rise of the tribal sovereignty
movement, the Boldt Decision, and the environmental movement in the 1960s/1970s and passage of the
Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Act of 1980.
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Thus, structuration theory provides a more comprehensive framework for
understanding the CRBF than does interest group theory alone. In fact, the concept of
praxis provides the context in which institutional interests played themselves out. But
structuration theory still does not fully explain the CRBF paradox. It does not, for
example, explain the intensity of belief that agents brought to the MOA development
process. Although it asserts that all human beings are knowledgeable agents with the
capacity to effect change through their actions, it does not explain how some members
of a social group are selected (or accepted) as agents in specific circumstances and
others not. And it does not fully explain how institutional values are transmitted –
relatively consistently - through generations of members over time.
Identity and image theories help fill in these blanks. Indeed, in his 1984 book
on structuration, Giddens states that societies are “social systems” with defining
features, among which are feelings of “some sort of common identity” (p. 165). He
describes social identity as a “marker” in the “virtual time-space of structure” and
associates identity with social roles (p. 282). The literature on social identity theory
argues that individuals self-categorize themselves into social and organizational
groups that either display values the individual already holds or would like to assume.
Thus, social groupings become collections of like-valued individuals, albeit with
varying degrees of attachment to the values and norms of the group. Those with the
strongest attachment integrate the values and goals of the group as part of their
personal sense of self. Moreover, identity provides an interpretive lens which defines
how members think and perceive of events around them. The organizational
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representatives involved in the CRBF MOA negotiations approached the discussion
with their own sense of what was right, a sense shaped by the social identity of the
organization and institutions they represented. Identity therefore helps explain the
intensity of belief that individual agents brought to the MOA development process.
But identity theory does not explain how individuals cognitively process and
come to accept organizational norms and values as their own. Although there are
likely other theories of cognitive psychology that attempt to explain this phenomenon,
this study will focus on image theory (Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach, 1998; Beach
and Connolly, 2005). Image theory explains the process of individual decision
making as being grounded in the principles and values of the individual decision
maker.
In summary, traditional interest group theory is insufficient to explain the
value disputes that underlay the CRBF MOA development. The phenomenon of the
MOA process is likewise not fully explainable by structuration, identity, or image
theory by themselves. Taken together, however, a more complete explanation of the
MOA can be compiled. Conversely, the development of the CRBF MOA offers an
empirical vehicle through which elements of each of these bodies of theory can be
examined, hopefully adding to the better understanding of each.
A second contribution to theory is the application of identity theory and image
theory to better understand the nature of agency.
A third contribution to theory is to potentially offer further development of
social conflict theory and the role of identity in conflict settings. The body of
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literature that has evolved since the early 1980s linking social identity with social
conflict mostly focuses on violent conflict along international, ethnic, or religious
lines. There is recognition of the applicability of identity to organizational and
domestic political conflict, but there doesn‟t appear to be much direct treatment on
that particular subject (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001). An exception is the work
of Pruitt and Kim‟s (2004) which offers an integration and synthesis of several
interrelated theoretical domains from the social psychology field. These include
theories on conflict, strategic choice, inter-group competition, and conflict group
mobilization. Fundamental to these theories is social identity and, relevant to the
dynamics of Northwest governance issues, its application to organizations through
organizational identity theory.
This assertion of Northwest relevance is based on the observation that the
debate and development of the CRBF tended to play out along organizational lines.
Representatives and leaders from state and federal agencies, business entities, nonprofit organizations, tribal governments, and, in some cases, organizations comprised
of a coalition of organizations, were the primary actors (or agents, to put it in the terms
of structuration theory) in advocating that the mission, structure, and power of the
CRBF be shaped consistent with their respective organizational interests161. The
upshot of their actions was an MOA that preordained the eventual failure of the CRBF
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There were also a large number of consultants involved in the effort. Some of these were members
of relatively large consulting firms whose interest in the outcome was limited to their firms‟ contractual
obligation to the client. But a significant number of others were self-employed individuals long
associated with and whose personal values and beliefs closely aligned with the organizations they
represented.
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despite the widespread support for a meaningful and substantive governance process.
Understanding the processes of identity and how identity encourages or dampens
social conflict impulses can thus contribute to a deeper understanding of the reasons
why an effective northwest regional governance structure proved so elusive in this
particular case, with potentially generalizable lessons to be applied elsewhere.
The remainder of the chapter is organized into two sections. It begins by
reviewing the literature regarding theories of structuration, identity, and decision
making. In section 2, it argues the need to draw from multiple theories in order to
fully explain the region‟s governance experience. The chapter concludes by
identifying the opportunity presented by this model and the CRBF for empirical
validation.
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Section 1
Literature Review: Theories to Guide Future Research

Introduction
The long-running disputes over natural resource use in the Columbia River
Basin is highlighted by not just the deep differences over interests but by the intensity
of the positions observed in proponents of those interests. Traditional interest-group
theory alone cannot explain the paradox of Northwest governance. There is no one
theory, or even field of theory, that completely explains the development of
governance systems in general or the behaviors and decisions that produced the CRBF
MOA in particular. Consequently, this study looks to theories from the fields of
sociology, social psychology, and psychology162 for a more comprehensive and
integrated theoretical framework within which to further explore the reasons behind
the rise and demise of regional experiments with governance systems. Specifically, it
reviews a relevant sampling of literature from theories of structuration, social identity,
and decision making upon which such a framework may be based.

Theories of Social Structuration
Structuration theory.
Anthony Giddens first addressed structuration in his 1973 book, The Class
Structure of Advance Societies. Known for his interdisciplinary approach to

162

The boundaries between these fields are muddy, at best. Much of the bodies of literature found
relevant to this study are themselves syntheses from multiple theoretical fields of study. Examples
include structuration (Giddens, 1984), organizational culture (Schein, 2004), and organizational identity
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004).
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sociology, Giddens interweaves anthropology, linguistics, psychology, philosophy,
history, and economics throughout the body of his work. He apparently began his
work on structuration around 1969 (Giddens, 1979).163
Structuration theory did not originate with Giddens; Jones (1999) cites its
general emergence in Europe in the late 1970s. According to Bryant and Jary (1997),
Giddens borrowed the term from Piaget and Gurvitch. But Giddens is credited with
being “the single most important figure in the debate” over macro and micro
influences in society (Bryant and Jary, 1997, p. 4) and with presenting “the most
serious attempt to provide one, single, comprehensive, true social theory (Boyne,
1997, p. 72). Although disagreeing with his presentation and conclusions, many of
Giddens‟ critics agree that his treatment of the topic is among - if not the - most
influential in the field and it is his work to which most writers react (Held and
Thompson, 1989; Bryant and Jary, 1991; Bryant and Jary 1997).
Giddens is credited with the maturation of structuration as serious sociological
theory through its sequential, evolutionary treatment in New Rules of Sociological
Method (1976), Central Problems of Social Theory (1979), and The Constitution of
Society (1984) (Bryant and Jary, 1991). Giddens describes The Constitution of
Society as “a summation of [his] previous writings, setting them out in a developed
and coherent manner” (Giddens, 1984, preface). As such, and although these three
books are reviewed below, it is Constitution that is most heavily relied on for the
purposes of this study.
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Giddens introduces his 1979 book Central Problems in Social Theory as the latest in a ten-year
project of studying the legacy of 19th century European social theory.
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In New Rules (1976), Giddens presents a critical analysis of 19th century social
theory – specifically hermeneutics (or interpretive sociology) and functionalism - and
its legacy of application in the 20th century to the fields of sociology, anthropology,
and political science. His stated intent was to elaborate upon and begin a
reconstruction of the problematic manner in which these prevailing theories dealt with
human social activity. He was especially critical of the way the theories treated
“action” by individuals within social contexts. His two main arguments were that (1)
social theory must treat action as rationalized conduct ordered reflexively by human
agents and (2) that it must grasp language as the practical medium whereby reflexive
action is made possible.
New Rules (1976) introduced several of Giddens‟ central tenets of
structuration, specifically the concepts of system, structure, agency, institutions, and
the duality of structure – described more fully in the discussion of Constitution (1984)
below. Giddens (1976) also displays his ambivalence toward empirical research with
regard to structuration. He specifically states that this book is “not a guide to practical
research” and that he is avoiding specific research proposals. Rather, the book is
intended as “an exercise in clarification of logical issues.” (p. 8). He provides that
clarity by proposing eleven “new rules” to guide future theoretical development,
organized under four categories.
In 1979‟s Central Problems Giddens completes his critique of prevailing
theory by addressing structuralism. His confidence in structuration theory apparently
grows as he here formally proposes it as a more holistic and complete than are the
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hermeneutic, functionalist, and structuralist approaches upon which he draws and
integrates. He does not give language the centrality in Central Problems as he did in
New Rules, focusing instead on theories regarding “volunteerism” of the individual
and the “determinism” of social groups. He argues that, up until his work, the two
were treated as incompatible opposites164 unable to address or cope with the questions
and problems that one posed to the other. Because of these incompatibilities, Giddens
argues that two could not simply be added together; they had to be substantially
adjusted.
In Constitution (1984) Giddens states his intent as to put an end to the debate
between the school of “functionalists” and “structuralists,” with their emphasis on the
primacy of social constraints over individual action, and the schools of “humanism”
and “hermeneutics” that claimed that the voluntary actions of and meanings held by
individuals are the prime explanation for human social conduct. “The basic domain of
study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the
experience of the individual actor nor the existence of any form of social totality, but
social practices ordered across time and space.” (1984, p. 2).
Critiques of structuration theory.
Although applauded for his effort to present a grand theory of sociology,
Giddens Constitution of Society has his critics.165 Some are very positive: Mario
Zamora (1985) welcomed the book as “one of the best standard reference works on
164

Giddens used the term “antimonies” to describe this mutual exclusiveness, a word for which this
author could find no definition.
165
Critical reviews of New Rules (1976) and Central Problems (1979) are not presented since Giddens
proclaimed Constitution (1984) as the culmination of all of his previous work on structuration.
Consequently, the focus here is critiques of his finished product.
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Anthony Giddens‟s [sic] ideas” and recommended it be “in the library of every serious
social scientist (p. 568). Others less so: Charles Powers (1988) states that while
Constitution is filled with “penetrating insights” (p. 1124) and constructively adds to
Giddens‟ previous discussion of time and space, it falls short of Giddens‟ stated
objective of presenting a complete and comprehensive theory. As such, he sees the
book as another step in the progression of Giddens‟ ideas rather than the end point the
author envisioned.
Further critique is found in three anthologies of essays dedicated to
Constitution. The tones of the essays range from constructively critical to outright
dismissive. The first to be published was Social Theory of Modern Societies:
Anthony Giddens and his Critics, edited by Held and Thompson in 1989. The second
was Giddens‟ Theory of Structuration: a Critical Appreciation, edited by Bryant and
Jary in 1991. The third, also by Bryant and Jary, was published in 1997 and entitled
Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments. The arguments in those essays can be
summarized as follows:
Giddens arguments are “conflicting and contradictory” and suffer from
“ambiguity and vagueness.” Consequently, it is questionable if structuration
theory is even relevant to understanding the critical functions of society.
(Bernstein, 1989).
Rather than bridging the macro-micro argument, structuration theory
“reinstitutes an outer deterministic force” that influences action without being
affected by society‟s actors. In fact, too much autonomy and influence is
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awarded to individuals as Giddens turns “social pattern[s] and distribution”
into a “process.” (Bauman, 1989, emphasis in original).
Giddens' “lack of coherence on key questions cast doubt on his work as a
whole,” especially in his treatment of class and citizenship (Held, 1989).
Giddens' treatment of time and space is frustratingly limited. His focus on
“presence or absence” in time and space fails to account for human ability to
reproduce and represent space, especially through symbols and narratives
(Gregory, 1989). His formulations on time and space index important issues
but do provide enough information to adequately explain a fully worked out
position (Urry, 1991).
Giddens misappropriates elements of his theory, discounting portions that do
not align with his overall conclusions (Boyne, 1991; Jary, 1991). He
especially misrepresents the work of French social theorists, such as Foucault.
(Boyne, 1991).
Structuration theory is “unhelpful when trying to account for variations in the
proportions of volunteerism and determinism” and “degrees of freedom and
constraint associated with action” (Archer, 1997).
Giddens oversimplifies the psychology of individuals (Craib, 1997) and the
role of the routine in motivating behavior (Willmott, 1997).
It is beyond the scope of this study to address or reconcile the comments of
Giddens‟ critics. What is of interest here is the very limited amount of empirical
research that either supports or contradicts Giddens‟ arguments, a fact lamented by at
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least one team of researchers (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). The critiques cited above
and the others found in the edited volumes of Bryant and Jary and Held and Thompson
are almost all theoretical in nature.166 The only one that addresses empirical issues is
Boyne (1991) who critiques Giddens use of Foucault‟s study of French prisons. One
critic (Gregson, 1989) lays the blame for this on Giddens, dismissing structuration
theory as a “second order” theory that conceptualizes the general outline of human
society but is too abstract and imprecise to generate concepts that directly apply to
empirical settings. In essence, Gregson argues, structuration theory as presented by
Giddens is inherently non-empirical.
Giddens himself seems ambivalent on the issue. In 1976‟s New Rules he
states his intent specifically as not to present a model for research but rather to address
the logic of prevailing theory. Although he devotes a chapter to laying out an
empirical approach in 1984‟s Constitution, noting the importance of ensuring that any
theory must be relevant to the world as actually experienced, he subsequently seemed
to downplay importance of empirical validation. In a 1989 reply to his critics Giddens
states, “Theoretical thinking needs in substantial part to proceed in its own terms and
cannot be expected to be linked at every point in empirical considerations” (Giddens,
1989, p. 294). He also argues in Constitution that whereas empirical research is fully
appropriate for study of the natural sciences, given nature‟s “factual” basis, it is an
incomplete tool for the study of society since social reality is based on the experiences
and interpretations of those living it.

166

Presumably the arguments and positions presented in the essays were based on empirical research
conducted by or known to the authors. Such research, if conducted, was not cited.
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Social becoming.
Adding to the work of Giddens, Piotr Sztompka addresses, albeit indirectly,
some of the criticisms of Giddens‟ work by offering a “synthesis of syntheses” to
explain what happens as social organizations come into being. His 1991 book Society
in Action: the Theory of Social Becoming, like Giddens‟ Constitution (1984), attempts
to bridge the human action vs. group determinism argument. Also like Constitution,
Society in Action is an argument grounded in theoretical reasoning rather than
empirical observation. Although published after Constitution, and covering much of
the same ground, Society in Action is not derived from Giddens‟ work. Sztompka
acknowledges and references structuration theory, but he – as did Giddens - roots his
theory in earlier sociological theory. Thus, his conclusions, although consistent with
Giddens‟, appear to have developed in parallel with Giddens‟ with roots in similar
intellectual ground.
Sztompka starts from two broad lines of theoretical development. The first is
“agency” which he describes as the active, constructive side of social life by
individuals, but with due recognition to constraints posed by the structural framework
within which human conduct takes place. The second is historical sociology, which
reintroduces the dimension of time and provides the causal mechanisms through which
agential creativeness and structural influences merge in the flow of historical process.
Sztompka (1991) summarizes his theory with three insights:
That society (defined as any social grouping) is humanly constructed.
That humans are socially shaped
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That society and humans are both immersed in the flow of historical time
Sztompka apparently did not attract the same degree of critical attention as did
Giddens; no critiques of his theory of social becoming were found in the course of this
review. Sztompka answers and resolves a number of issues raised by Giddens‟ critics.
He is much clearer in his discussion of the interface between individuals and collective
society, better explaining praxis and Giddens‟ duality of individual action and social
constraint. He is also clearer in the way he addresses time-space, using his “historical
coefficient” to explain society as a constantly dynamic and sequentially evolving
series of events over time.
Both Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) recognize the role of formal rules,
allocation of resources, and normative social expectations as constituents of structure
and their role in the evolution of social systems. For the purposes of creating a
framework for future research of regional governance, a closer examination of
normative expectations within systems, or organizational culture, is warranted.
Organizational culture.
Edgar Schein started writing on organizational culture in 1968, publishing his
first book on the subject in 1985. Organizational Culture and Leadership (1985) was
widely accepted and cited within the organization theory community (Shafritz and Ott,
1996). Miner (2005) identifies Schein as being considered by his peers as having
developed one of the “essential theories” of organizational behavior – despite its
relative lack of empirical support and the view of some that, like Giddens structuration
(1984), Schein‟s theory is inherently non-empirical. Schein‟s 1985 edition presented
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“the most comprehensive and integrative statement of the organizational culture
school” up to that point in time (Shafritz and Ott, 1996, p. 25).
Schein published his second edition in 1992 and the third in 2004. The
difference between earlier and later work is that subsequent editions edit the chapters
and incorporate more recent case studies while leaving his basic argument and
construct intact. Consequently, it is the 2004 publication that is reviewed here.
Schein (2004) maintains that unique cultures can evolve in social units of any
size. His focus, however, is at the organization level. He describes organizational
culture as a complex psychology-based phenomenon that is difficult to understand but,
once understood, clarifies much about a given organization‟s behavior that might
otherwise appear irrational.
Whereas Schein‟s (2004) concept of culture explains the normative element of
social structure (as used in the Giddens (1984) sense), it leaves little room for
individual agency. Schein notes that some cultures of the world are grounded in the
freedom of the individual while others are centered on the importance of the group.
Thus, individual agency can only exist if the culture allows it to – in contradiction of
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991). Schein seems to make an exception for
organizational leaders, noting that one of the sources of culture is the beliefs and
practices of the group leader at the time the group first forms. Once ingrained, it
defines all group behavior until such time as the group is threatened, at which point
the group will again look to the leader for innovative solutions. In other words,
agency is confined to the leader and then only under specific circumstances.
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In this Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) seem to have the better argument.
For example, Schein‟s theory does not cover situations in which individuals belong to
multiple organizations and the role that influences from one organization may act as
an "external influence" on the behavior of individuals within another organization,
thereby contributing to the evolution of the second organization‟s culture. An
example would be a business employee‟s involvement with an environmental group
that leads to promotion and adoption of conservation practices within the business.
Schein cannot account for this cultural interplay at the individual level, since such
interplay does not represent the “shared group experience” central to his model.
Additionally, if behavior is always determined by cultural disposition or in response to
external situations, how does one explain behavior deviant to organization cultural
norms or social “counter-movements” (Sztompka, 1991)? Schein (2004) does not
provide an answer, whereas the theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social
becoming (Sztompka, 1991) do. Despite this omission, Schein (1984) offers an
elegant, “logically tight and compelling theory” (Miner, 2005, p. 343) that provides
clarity to structuration theory‟s normative component of social “structure.”
Intergroup conflict.
In the main, with the obvious exception of the Indian wars and the tribes‟
relocation to reservations in the mid 1800s, issues of conflict in the Pacific Northwest
played out without widespread violence (Dodds, 1986). The conclusion that the
search for a rational and peaceful way to resolve regional disputes is the primary
reason for consistent support for some form of Basinwide governance system. A
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theoretical understanding of non-violent conflict is therefore needed. Giddens and
Sztompka observe the existence of conflict and explain it through the framework of
agency, power, and control. But their discussion of the causes of conflict is
frustratingly sparse. Although Giddens‟ Central Problems (1979) attributes the causes
of conflict to competing interests, group identity, and ideology, his Constitution
(1984) – self-described as his cumulative summary of structuration – is silent on these
issues. Sztompka (1991) does not address the causes of conflict at all.
In the 1980s and 1990s other social and behavioral researchers, picking up on
the work of Tajfel and Turner (2004/1979) and others, increasingly emphasized the
role of identity as a major source of intergroup conflict. In Social Identity, Intergroup
Conflict, and Conflict Resolution (2001), Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David
Wilder collect a set of essays that seek to explain ways in which (1) social identities
create and exacerbate intergroup conflicts, (2) intergroup conflict in turn influences
social identity, and (3) addressing social identity may help resolve some intergroup
conflicts. They note that issues of self and identity occur at multiple levels of conflict.
These include disputes among individuals within a social context, among groups
within larger social groupings (such as a nation), and among nations. The essays
selected focus on real world conflicts among ethnicities, races, religions, and nationstates, and draw contributors from a variety of social sciences such as anthropology,
political science, psychology, and sociology. Of use to this study is the authors‟
conclusion – consistent with Giddens‟ and Sztompka‟s “duality of structure” - that
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analysis of intergroup conflict cannot be reduced to either to the individual or group
levels; both be taken into account.
Alice Eagly, Reuben Baron, and Lee Hamilton‟s 2004 book, The Social
Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict is, at its heart, a tribute to the work
of Herbert Kelman renowned for his theoretical and practical contributions to conflict
resolution. The contributors to this collection of essays are all students or followers of
Kelman‟s work. The book is organized in three sections. Beginning with several
essays that review of the precepts of social psychology, the book then presents case
studies of application in various contexts, ranging from health psychology, student
access to the internet in schools, and business organizations. The third section is more
directly focused on psychological approaches to conflict resolution, discussing case
studies from Sri Lanka, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Cyprus.
While underscoring the important role of identity in conflict, the scale and
scope of the conflicts in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution
(2001) and The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict (2004) are of,
at best, indirect applicability to governance issues in the Northwest. A more
generalized and useful discussion is found in Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim‟s 2004
book, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (3rd edition). The authors
integrate and synthesize several interrelated theoretical domains. These include
theories on conflict, strategic choice, inter-group competition, conflict group
mobilization and social identity.
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Pruitt and Kim wrote their book intending to “produce a readable and
integrated synthesis of theory and research on social conflict and its resolution” (p.
xvii.) incorporating literature from the social psychology field. They note that conflict
has been studied since antiquity, with modern treatment rooted in work by Charles
Darwin (with his emphasis on the benefits of biological competition to long term
species survival), Sigmund Freud (Individual resolution of internal psychodynamic
conflict), and Karl Marx (the inevitable existence of conflict within society). With
Darwin, Freud, and Marx providing intellectual inspiration, modern social psychology
developed from the great academic interest in the “cauldron of social conflict”
surrounding the World War II years (p. xiii).
For the purposes of this study, Pruitt and Kim (2004) offer the most useful
synthesis of conflict theory. Their description of not just the sources of conflict, but
their discussion of components, strategies, conditions, and stages of conflict resonate
with the nature of the conflicts observed in the Columbia Basin.
The literature on structuration, culture, and conflict is summarized in Table B1. This literature offers a theoretical frame for explaining “what” happens as social
organizations are formed, sustained and modified over time. The theories discussed
also partially explain “why” such changes occur in terms of individual autonomy,
structure (to include culture), agency, and the role of conflict in those changes.
But these concepts alone are not sufficient to explain the circumstances
regarding Columbia Basin governance in general or the CRBF in particular. They do
not, for example, explain why some individuals become accepted as agents of change
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Table B-1.
Theories of Structuration, Social Becoming, Organizational Culture, and
Intergroup Conflict
Representative Literature

Organizational
Culture

Theories of Structuration and Social Becoming

Category

Year

Author(s) /
Editor(s)

1976

Giddens

1979

Giddens

1984

Giddens

1991

Sztompka

2004

Schein

Title: Relevance
New Rules of Sociological Method: Critiques the manner in
which 19th century social theory has been incorporated into
20th century thinking. Introduces structuration theory to
address the problematic manner in which social systems and
structure and individual agency are addressed in prevailing
theoretical thinking. Offers eleven “rules” to guide future
sociological theorizing and research.
Central Problems in Social Theory: Continues author‟s
critique of the application of 19th century theory to 20th
century situations. Offers a more rigorous critique of
prevailing thinking and further refines his theory of
structuration.
The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration: The author‟s most complete and mature
argument for structuration theory. The essence of the theory
is that social structures are products of the irreducible duality
of collective constraint and individual action. Social
structures are created by human agents while simultaneously
constraining their actions. Structure is thus both the product
and medium of social change. Agents do not create social
systems, but remake that which is already made. This
interplay between the individual and collective is constant and
continuous.
Society in Action: The Theory of Social Becoming: The
author reaches similar conclusions to those of Giddens and,
like Giddens, seeks the middle ground between collective
determinism and unbridled voluntarism. He presents his work
as a “synthesis of syntheses” emphasizing agency, history,
and praxis. Offers a “triple insight” of social becoming: (1)
society is humanly constructed, (2) humans are socially
shaped and (3) society and humans are both immersed in the
flow of time.
Organizational culture and leadership (3rd ed.) Defines
organizational culture as a pattern of basic assumptions that
was learned by the group over time and is taught to new
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel.
Culture‟s power lies in its psychological effect on group
members, defining what to pay attention to, what things mean,
how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what
actions to take in various situations.
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Table B-1. (Continued)
Theories of Structuration, Social Becoming, Organizational Culture, and
Intergroup Conflict
Representative Literature

Social Conflict

Category

Year

Author(s) /
Editor(s)

2001

Ashmore,
Jussim, and
Wilder

2004

Eagly,
Baron, and
Hamilton

2004

Pruitt and
Kim

Title: Relevance
Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution.
Interdisciplinary collection of essays on social conflict,
centering on the role of identity. Argues that identity
contributes to conflict just as conflict influences future
identity. States applicability to all levels of conflict, while
focusing on case studies of ethnic, racial, religious, and
nationality based conflict.
The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict.
A collection of case studies from the field of social
psychology focusing on intra- and international scaled
conflict.
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (3rd
edition). The authors integrate and synthesize several
interrelated theoretical domains from the social psychology
field. These include theories on conflict, strategic choice,
inter-group competition, conflict group mobilization and
social identity. Fundamental among these is social identity
theory and its application to organizations through
organizational identity theory.

and others do not, nor explain differences in the degree of passion and commitment
that exist among individual organizational members. Finally, neither theory attempts
to explain “how” individuals reach decisions as to whether to support or rebel, to
follow or lead. Filling out the answers to questions of “why” and “how” is the basis
for the following discussions of social identity decision theory.

Theories of Social and Organizational Identity
Although noting its importance, Giddens only mentioned identity twice in
Constitution, and then only briefly. He recognizes “the prevalence, among the
members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of common identity
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however that might be expressed or revealed. Such feelings may be manifest in both
practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a ‘value consensus.‟
Individuals may be aware of belonging to a definite collectivity without agreeing that
it is necessarily right and proper”(Giddens, 1984, p. 165, emphasis added.) In this
argument, identity serves as a “marker” in the “time-space of structure” (p. 282).
Sztompka (1991) does not discuss identity directly, but argues that the human
traits of creativeness, educability, the need for self-realization and self-fulfillment, and
the tendency of individuals to put their talents and abilities to use are the cornerstones
of agency. But, as will be shown, these traits are shaped by how individual members
of society see themselves as individuals and relate to those around them.
Seminal theoretical treatments on identity.
Sociologist Charles H. Cooley‟s defined the self in social terms (Hatch and
Schultz, 2004b). Writing in 1902, Cooley‟s Human Nature and the Social Order
sought to reconcile arguments within psychology over what constituted society. He
proposed a concept of “organic synthesis” which envisioned that “society” and
“individuals” are not separable phenomena, but are collective and distributive aspects
of the same thing. In Cooley‟s view, individuality and sociality always existed in the
human experience side by side – a precursor to Giddens and Sztompka‟s duality of the
social structure. Cooley argued that the individual‟s very concept of self is made
within the context of his or her relationship with others.
In 1934 George H. Mead furthered the concept of the individual‟s relationship
to the social structure. He defined two aspects of self as the “I” and the “me.” The “I”
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represents thought, behavior, and feelings unique and internal to the individual. The
“me” is derived from the assumptions about the attitudes of others, echoing Cooley‟s
concept of the “looking glass self.” The incorporation of the attitudes of others into
“me” is the mechanism through which society influences and becomes part of the
individual, whereas unique and innovative responses generated by the “I” are the
mechanism through which the individual shapes society (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b;
Mead, 2004).
Irving Goffman expanded the understanding of the psychological interaction
between the individual and society by reasoning that, since the perception of societal
judgment greatly influences over the individual; it follows that the individual will
actively present him/herself in the most positive light to others in society.167 Using the
analogy of the interaction of the performance of theatrical actors with their audience,
Goffman suggested that identity is an interactive performance with the “actors” ability
to manage perception a function of interpersonal skill. In contrast to Cooley and
Mead, Goffman argued that identity is communicated by the individual to others
through impression management, as opposed to being formed through the opinions of
others (Goffman, 2004; Hatch and Schultz, 2004b). The relevance of this insight to
organizations is the role that external stakeholders can play in shaping organizational
identity, a hypothesis later supported with empirical research by Dutton and Dukerich
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).

167

Note that Giddens cites and critiques Goffman in Constitution. He states that Goffman‟s writings
“comprise a major contribution to an exploration of the relations between the discursive and practical
consciousness in the contexts of encounters” (p. 70).
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Henri Tajfel and John Turner published The Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations in 1979 in which they were the first to propose a theory of social identity
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004b). They reviewed and conducted empirical research that
focused on in-group and out-group identification, competitive ethnocentrism, and
negative stereotyping among social groups. They observed behaviors that could not
be explained by the then-dominant notion that phenomena of group morale,
cohesiveness, and cooperation were strictly byproducts of intergroup competition over
interests. They concluded that identification with an in-group could operate
independently of competition and that, even without competition, “the mere
perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorization per se - is
sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group” (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004, p. 56). “Social categorization” forms the basis for group definition
where individuals define themselves and are defined by others as a group. Individuals
in a group “perceive themselves to be members of same social category, share
emotional involvement in the common definition of themselves, and achieve a degree
of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership in it”
(Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 59). Social identity consists “of those aspects of an
individual‟s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives
himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 59). Thus, social categorizations
provide a system of self-reference that clarifies the individual‟s place in society.
These categorizations are comparative and consist of three variables. First, the
individual must have internalized group membership as some aspect of their self
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concept. Second, the social situation must allow for comparisons to be made between
the individual‟s and other groups. Third, groups do not necessarily compare
themselves with every available out-group; to merit comparison other groups must in
some manner relevantly intersect with the interests of the in-group along a dimension
of shared values. Supportive of Pruitt and Kim‟s (2001) synthesis of social conflict
theory is the distinction made between social and instrumental (or realistic)
competition. Social competition168 is grounded in the group‟s sense of identity and is
based on social comparison. As such, it needs only those comparisons to evolve.
Instrumental or realistic competition is based on self-interest, incompatible group
goals, and/or struggle over scarce resources (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Hatch and
Schultz, 2004b).
Independent of the foregoing work in the psychology and social psychology
fields was Stuart Albert and David Whetten‟s Organization Identity published in 1985.
Through this work Albert and Whetten are recognized as inaugurating organizational
identity as a field of study in the United States. The importance of this paper is
manifest by the number of scholars in the field who either reference Albert and
Whetten‟s criteria for organizational identity without comment or make their mark by
challenging them all or in part (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).
Without reference to the rather substantial body of social identity literature
existing in the social psychology field at the time they wrote – and working within the
field of organizational psychology - Albert and Whetten (1985) claimed that identity
had historically been treated as a “loosely coupled set of ideas and concepts” better
168

Pruitt and Kim prefer to skip the “social competition” term, applying “social identity” in its place.
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considered a “framework” as opposed to a theory. They sought to build on the historic
literature and define “organizational theory” in a way that passes a rigorous test of
theory and that opens clear avenues of empirical research. The authors presented a
sequence of researchable questions and hypotheses throughout paper to facilitate the
building of a research agenda.
They argued that to truly be part of an organization‟s identity, any claimed
feature must satisfy three criteria. The feature must be seen as the essence of the
organization, “the criterion of claimed central character”; the feature must distinguish
the organization from others against which it may be compared, “the criterion of
claimed distinctiveness”; and the feature must exhibit some degree of sameness or
continuity over time; “the criterion of claimed temporal continuity” (p. 265). Despite
the enduring quality of certain aspects, organization identity can evolve over time in
reaction to such things as loss of an identity-sustaining element or individual or
changes to the organization‟s collective status.
While acknowledging the psychological aspects of individual interpretation of
organizational identity, Albert and Whetten (1985) did not really explain how or why
that process takes place. Ashforth and Mael (1989) addressed that issue by examining
Albert and Whetten‟s organization identity theory in terms of Tajfel and Turner‟s
(1979) theory of social identity (which they dubbed with the acronym SIT). They
noted SIT‟s social-psychological perspective as to how and why people perceive, join
and remain in social groupings. Under SIT, people classify themselves and others into
social categories (such as gender, age, race, religion, organization membership, etc.).
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Such categorizations allow individuals to locate themselves in the environment
through relational and comparative definition with others resulting in a perception of
oneness with a group of like-minded people. Thus, individuals will seek to join one or
more social groups in which their perception of the group‟s values, prestige, and
behaviors enhance or reinforce the self-image individuals have or would like to have
for themselves. SIT, therefore, defines the relationships among the members of an
organization in terms of psychological connectivity as opposed to a mere extension of
personal or economic interactions. This connectivity also creates a distinct
interpretive lens through which organizations perceive their external environment.
The stronger the alignment between the individual‟s self image and the organizations
perceived identity patterns, the greater the degree of identification. Conversely, a
weakening of this alignment either through changes in the individual‟s self image or
changes to the organization will weaken the sense of identification and may result in
the individual leaving the group altogether.
Taken together, these six theoretical works offer a powerful explanation as to
how individuals and social groupings in general (and organizations in particular)
interrelate and respond to other social groupings in their external environment. By
linking individual self-image (who am I?) to social and organization identity (who are
we?) the authors collectively offer a social-psychological construct through which
organizational behavior in general and interorganizational conflict in particular can be
interpreted and better understood. Thus, either internal changes or the presence of outgroups that are perceived to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about the central,
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distinctive, and enduring attributes that members most admire in their organizations
will generate anxiety and perhaps hostility. In conflict situations, strong identity with
group goals and values reinforce belief in the “rightness” of the group‟s beliefs,
exacerbates points of disagreement, and causes trivial differences to take on an
importance beyond what the merits would otherwise indicate.
Empirical research on organizational identity theory.
Unlike Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) theoretical work, which
apparently inspired little or no empirical study, Albert and Whetten‟s (1985) theory
spawned a significant body of empirical research. These included a seven-year study
of the New York/New Jersey Port Authority‟s response to homeless transients
occupying Authority facilities (Dutton and Dukerich,1991); a study of strategic change
management at universities (Gioia and Thomas, 1996); a study of responses to the
1992 Business Week rankings of business schools (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); a
study of the management of competing identities within a non-profit firm (GoldenBiddle and Rao, 1997); and a seven-year study of two banks holding differing
strategic orientations and how those orientations affected the organizational response
to external conditions (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998).
These five empirical studies both enhanced and challenged various aspects of
Albert and Whetten‟s (1985) and Ashforth and Mael‟s (1989) original theories.
Dutton and Dukerich (1991) noted the degree to which perceived organization
identity affected issue interpretation and action. Goia and Thomas (1996) found that,
under conditions of strategic change, top management perceptions and communication
490

of image and identity – especially the desired future identity – are essential to the
sense making process for subordinate members and serve as an important link between
organizational context and member issue interpretation. Strategic change implies a
revision of interpretive schemes by management, members, and stakeholders.
Consequently, significant change must be accompanied by alterations in the overall
perception of organization identity. Contrary to Albert and Whetten‟s (1985)
conclusion that identity changes were reactive and incidental, Gioia and Thomas
found that such change can be deliberately managed and may take place in shorter
time periods than originally theory envisioned.
Elsbach and Kramer (1996) found that, in the absence of a generally accepted
objective measure of what attributes are considered truly important in business
education, individual business schools evolved unique identities and programs. By
ranking the schools in a national magazine, Business Week implied that such an
objective standard did in fact exist. The rankings therefore presented threats to
organization identity by challenging that which was perceived to be “distinct and
central” (Albert and Whetten, 1985)169 to each school. The authors found that
individual members used categorization tactics to reinterpret the findings in ways that
affirmed positive perceptions of their school‟s identity.170 Thus rather than distancing

169

The researchers made a point of noting that the rankings did not threaten the physical survival or
even the schools‟ well being. All except one remained among the top-20 in national rankings. What
caused the consternation was the relative shifting within the top-20, or the fact that a school did not do
as well as they thought they should have. Thus, the threat was more to each school‟s identity, not
legitimacy.
170

Members would emphasize their school‟s membership in elite social groups not addressed in the
rankings, affirm cherished organizational attributes and identities neglected by the rankings but valued
in the business community and select alternate groups of comparison to favorably relate to other schools
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themselves from the organization – as would be predicted under Albert and Whetten‟s
(1985) construct - members distanced themselves from the negative attributes of the
rating and emphasized other, unchallenged attributes thereby affirming the intrinsic
good of the organization. In effect, members elected to selectively categorize their
organization rather than categorize themselves in a different way. This finding
strongly supported Ashforth and Mael‟s (1989) connection between individual and
organization identity, reinforcing a similar finding by Dutton and Dukerich (1991).
Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) studied an organization possessed of dual but
contradictory identities at both the member and board of director levels that all
considered “central and enduring” (Albert and Whetten, 1985). Members perceived
themselves both as a volunteer driven organization and a family of friends. The board
of directors perceived themselves as vigilant monitors of organization resources as
well as friendly, supportive colleagues. Consequently, some members and directors
viewed the strict review of budgets by other directors intrusive and over-bearing. An
influential sub-set of directors resolved the conflict by reinforcing the conflicting
values at play (accountability and stewardship versus collegiality) to the satisfaction of
all. The researchers concluded that the resolution of such conflicts consistent with
identity is more important to organization stability than objective merits of given
budget proposals.

higher in the rankings. For example, members responded with statements such as “many of our
students turned down Harvard to come here,” “we are the best among public institutions” and “we are a
top regional school „like‟ Michigan.”
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Finally, Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt (1998) found that organizations‟
strategic orientations act as interpretive filters resulting in different responses to the
same strategic environmental pressure. Their study also reinforced the importance of
leadership in managing identity to ensure changes sustain over time.
Integrative treatments.
In subsequent years, the findings and conclusions of these empirical studies,
along with studies from other fields, were theoretically revisited, integrated, and
synthesized. In 1994 Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail presented a model and a revised
typology to help explain how images of one‟s organization shape the strength of the
individual‟s personal identification with the organization. Elegantly melding the
theories of Albert and Whetten (1985) and Ashforth and Mael (1989) and building on
the work of Dutton and Dukerich (1991), they define organizational identification as
“the degree to which a member defines him or her self [sic] by the same attributes that
he or she believe define the organization” (p. 239). Borrowing from Albert and
Whetten (1985), they labeled the set of beliefs that members collectively share to be
distinct, central and enduring about the organization as “collective identity.”
Supportive of Ashforth and Mael (1989), individuals assess their organizations to
determine if the organization will provide a supportive environment and offer
opportunities for self-expression. The closer one identifies oneself with the
organization, the more personally threatening a negative image (or reinforcing a
positive image) can be.
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About ten years after publication of Organization Identity (1985), David
Whetten organized the first of what became a series of three conferences with scholars
who were active in identity research and development. The participants met to reflect
on what had been learned and to determine if in fact organizational identity warranted
a true place as theory. The results of those conferences – both individual papers and
transcripts of participant conversations – were collected and published in Identity in
Organizations: Building Theory through Conversations (1998), edited by David
Whetten and Paul Godfrey. The book is a statement-in-time on the status of
organization identity theory at the point it was published, and does not really present a
coherent, consensus view beyond Albert and Whetten‟s three original criteria and the
recognition of social identity processes within organizations.
Although Identity in Organizations did not come to closure on a number of
questions, it did offer an important advancement. This book appears to be the first to
look at the relationship of organization identity to organizational culture. Writing
from the perspective of achieving organizational change, and referencing Schein‟s
1985 book Organizational Culture and Leadership, several conference participants
suggest that the difference between the two is one of perspective. Identity is defined
within a social – or cultural – context. Thus identity answers the question of „who are
we‟ in relation to larger contexts of meaning and culture. Noting the subjectivity of
the work in culture, the difficulty of getting to values and normative beliefs that are
often unconscious to those who hold them, and the body of writing describing how
difficult changing organizational culture can be, Fiol, Hatch, and Golden-Biddle
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(1998) propose that identity may offer managers a more malleable way to manage
organizational change as opposed to challenging culture directly.
Essays in the January 2000 issue of The Academy of Management Review
were dedicated exclusively to the topic of organization identity. Brown and Starkey
(2000) argued that individuals and organizations are motivated to maintain self-esteem
by preserving existing senses of identity. They assert that organizations fail to learn
because of ego defenses that maintain the sense of collective self-esteem. Scott and
Lane (2000) discuss the degree to which relationships among organizational
stakeholders (which include external interests as well as internal organization
employees and managers) can shape image and identity. They argued that managing
stakeholder relations is a key task of leadership given the profound effect perceptions
of the organization by outsiders can have on the workforce. Pratt and Foreman (2000)
examined the phenomenon, challenge and benefits of managing multiple organization
identities. The major benefit is the capacity to respond to a wider range of conditions
than single identity organizations, thus increasing the probability of survival in
complex environments. Conversely, multiple identities can lead to internal conflict
and ambivalence among members unable to reconcile contradictory images of what
the organization is about. Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000a) followed up on the
conclusions of Gioia and Thomas (1996) and directly challenged Albert and Whetten‟s
(1985) argument concerning the enduring aspect of identity. They argued that the
accepted definition of organization identity is too static to apply to the pace of change
in contemporary organizations, and does not hold up when studied over time. In a
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companion article, Gioia et al., (2000b) question if the metaphor of individual identity
is really applicable to organization identity. They suggest there are important
differences between the individual and organizational character. Individual identity is
extremely personal and resistant to change. Organization identity is by its nature more
removed, varied, and malleable as it is constructed by fluid internal and external
interactions. Thus, emphasizing psychological metaphors may be blinding researchers
from other avenues of study that allow organization identity to be better dealt with on
its own terms.
In the Academy of Management Review‟s (2000) closing article, three of the
earliest theorists and researchers offer their conclusions as to what it all means (Albert,
Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000). They maintain that identity and identification are root
constructs in organizational phenomena and a subtext of many organizational
behaviors. In order to effectively interact with their environment, organizations need
an answer to the question “who are we,” just as outside entities need an answer to the
question “who are they.” Thus, the authors maintain the central and distinct aspects of
organization identity first hypothesized by Albert and Whetten (1985) and the social
identity theory offered by Ashforth and Mael (1989). But they seem to accept the
critique that identity may be less permanent than originally thought.
A comprehensive integration of social and organizational identity theories is
presented in the 2001 book Social Identity Processes in Organizational Contexts edited
by Hogg and Terry. Hogg and Terry and their contributors affirm many of the
findings identified above; as such, their work won‟t be repeated here. Of greater
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relevance to this study is their clear framing of organizational identity as a specialized
case of social identity. They state that “organizational contexts provide a near-perfect
arena for the operation of social identity processes” (p. 1), and that for “many people
their professional and/or organizational identity may be more pervasive and important
than ascribed identities based on gender, age, ethnicity, race, or nationality” (p. 2).
Noting that “the basic idea of social identity is that a social category (e.g. nationality,
political affiliation, organization, work group) within which one falls, and to which
one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining
characteristics of the category” (p. 3, (emphasis added).
Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz edited and published Organizational
Identity: a Reader in 2004 to address the issues of scholars and practitioners looking to
identity theory for insights on corporate branding, recruiting, strategy, fostering
employee loyalty, and other purposes (Hatch and Schultz, 2004a). The book offers
excerpts from a collection of the original sociological and social psychological papers
that underlay the current state of theory and more recent papers. Of particular value
are the editors‟ contextual introductions to the book as a whole and to each of its three
parts.
Identity and Conflict
The literature reviewed for this section further illustrates the contributions of
identity to intergroup conflict (Giddens, 1984; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). The manner in
which organizations respond to threats or thwarted aspirations (Pruitt and Kim, 2004)
depends on a number of identity-related factors. Organization type (Albert and
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Whetten, 1985); organization orientation and the nature of the change being faced
(Fox-Wolfgramm et.al., 1998); the degree of threat perceived (Dutton and Dukerich,
1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); the perceived gap between current identity and
desired future identity (Gustafson and Reger, 1995); the number of identities within
the organization that are affected (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Pratt and Foreman,
2000); proactive leadership (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gustafson and Reger, 1995;
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998;
Pratt and Foreman, 2000); perceptions of stakeholders (Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and
Lane, 2000); and the degree to which an organization is preconditioned to respond to
change (Brown and Starkey, 2000) can restrict or facilitate selection and
implementation of response actions. Members‟ sense of identity (Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994), the organization‟s strategic orientation (FoxWolfgramm et al., 1998), and management perceptions (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991;
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm et al.,
1998), all serve as powerful filters for interpreting what is going on and what is to be
done about it. These influences will initially cause culturally familiar routines to be
activated in the face of perceived threats while constraining the degree to which other
actions are considered acceptable (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). The organizational
response of interest to this study is the determination to accept and support or reject
and challenge any given Basin governance system, whether in place or proposed.
What emerges from this set of writings (summarized in Table B-2) is a general
endorsement of organization identity as a legitimate theory within the more
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generalized framework of social identity theory. Although some question what is
really meant by the enduring aspect of identity (Gioia et al. 2000a and 2000b; Albert,
Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000), and although perspectives of identity other than
cognitive psychology may deserve exploration (Gioia et al., 2000b), the concept of
identity as that which is central and distinctive and the relationship between individual
and organization identity is seemingly well supported and accepted.
Thus, understanding the role identity plays in organizational behavior is
essential to understanding any given social conflict. It is also essential to understand
the role identity plays in individual decision making. By recognizing that identity
serves as a major interpretive lens through which organization members perceive their
place in the environment and understanding the psychological mechanisms through
which individuals process their identity in reaching decisions, greater understanding
can be reached regarding the positions taken in public policy discussion and debate.

Table B-2:
Theories of Social and Organizational Identity

Landmark
Theoretical Treatments

Category

Year
1902
1934
1959

1979

Representative Literature
Author(s) /
Title: Relevance
Editor(s)
Society and the Individual: Integrated individual and
Cooley
social levels of analysis.
Mind, Self, and Society: Distinguishes between the
Mead
“I” and “me” in social settings.
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life: Introduces
Goffman
role of audiences in the context of identity and selfpresentation.
An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict:
Tajfel and
Introduced social identity theory into social
Turner
psychology
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Supporting
Empirical Research

1985

Albert and
Whetten

1989

Ashforth and
Mael

1991

Dutton and
Dukerich

1996

Gioia and
Thomas

1996

Elsbach and
Kramer

1997

Golden-Biddle
and Rao

1998

FoxWolfgramm,
Boal, and Hunt

Organizational Identity: Introduced organizational
identity; produced parallel to developing literature on
social identity.
Social Identity Theory and the Organization:
Introduces social identity theory to organizational
studies.
Keeping an Eye on the Mirror: Image and Identity in
Organizations: Links organizational theory and image
to strategic choices made in organizational settings.
Identity, Image, and Issue Interpretation:
Sensemaking during Strategic Change in Academe:
Concluded that identity is more malleable than first
thought; introduced identity and image management
as key leader tasks in times of change.
Members‟ Responses to Organizational Identity
Threats: Encountering and Countering the Business
Week Rankings: Examined how org. members
respond to threats to identity.
Breaches in the Boardroom: Organizational Identity
and Conflicts of Commitment in a Nonprofit
Organization: Linked individual and organizational
identity with corporate governance.
Organizational Adaptation to Institutional Change: A
Comparative Study of First Order Change in
Prospector and Defender Banks: Strategic orientation
impacts response to and duration of imposed
organizational change.

Table B-2. (Continued)
Theories of Social and Organizational Identity

Integrative Treatments
/ Synthesis

Category

Year

1994

1998

Representative Literature
Author(s) /
Title: Relevance
Editor(s)
Organizational Images and Member Identification:
Dutton,
Explains how images of one‟s organization shape the
Dukerich, and
strength of personal identification with the
Harquail
organization.
Identity in Organizations: Building Theory through
Whetten and
Conversations: Collection of papers, reflections, and
Godfrey
transcripts of discussions between org. identity
theorists and researchers.
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2000

-

2001

Hogg and
Terry

2004

Hatch and
Schultz

Academy of Management Review: January issue
dedicated to reflection on empirical organizational
identity research.
Social Identity Processes in Organizational Contexts:
Frames organizational identity as specialized case of
social identity; promotes application of social identity
in organizational analysis.
Organizational Identity: A Reader: Presents
anthology of central papers on the development of
organizational identity theory.

Theories of Individual Decision Making
Although the philosophic nature of decision making has been studied for over
300 years (Connolly and Beach, 1998) its rigorous systematic examination actually
began in the 1940s (Beach and Mitchell, 1998). Early attempts (termed as
“traditional” or “classical” decision theory) explained decision processes in terms of
either statistically-based analyses of probable outcomes or microeconomics-based
models of maximum utility. These traditional models, however, did not stand up to
empirical scrutiny as to how decisions were observed to actually be made (Mitchell,
Rediker, and Beach, 1986; Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach, 1990; Beach and
Mitchell, 1998).
In response rose alternative schools of thought. Generally termed “naturalistic
decision theory” (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 4), they included approaches based on
decisions based on pattern recognition from previous experiences and decisions as
incremental learning processes (Connolly and Beach, 1998). Leroy Beach, Terry
Mitchell, and a group of their colleagues and students viewed these approaches, along
with the traditional models, as not so much wrong as incomplete. In response, they
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developed “image theory” as a more holistic theory that incorporates the essential
elements of each of the others and, based on their research and observations, better
explains how decisions are actually made (Connolly and Beach, 1998). Image theory
sees decisions not as mechanistic calculations of optimum outcomes, but rather
“guided by the beliefs and values” of the decision maker as held to be relevant to the
decision at hand. The analytical assessment of most desired outcome called for under
traditional theory does not take place until after available options have been screened
for compatibility with those beliefs and values (Beach, 1998, p. x).
This section reviews the formulation of image theory, supporting empirical
research, the current state of the theory, and discusses its applicability to this study of
Columbia Basin governance. In essence, image theory provides the theoretical “how”
of individuals translating personal values and beliefs into policy choices within an
organizational context. It also provides empirical methodologies that can be used to
empirically examine theoretical components of structuration.

The Formulation of Image Theory:
“Image Theory” was developed in the mid-1980s in response to observed
weaknesses in traditional decision theory and extant critiques of the traditional
approach (Connolly and Beach, 1998). It was first presented as a chapter by Mitchell,
Rediker, and Beach in Sims and Gioia‟s The Thinking Organization (1986) and as a
journal article by Beach and Mitchell in Acta Psychologica (1987). The theory was
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first given book treatment in Beach‟s 1990 Image Theory: Decision Making in
Personal and Organizational Contexts.
Image theory is presented as a descriptive theory that attempts to explain the
way in which individuals makers represent information to themselves as they make
decisions and interact with the world around them. Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach
(1986) and Beach and Mitchell (1987) presented a relational model that defined the
process by which an individual defines his/her current state and plots a course to
achieve an anticipated future state through the use of internal mental images. These
images were defined as “schemata” that embody the individual‟s guiding principles,
goals, and values. The constitutive elements of such images evolve early in life.
These early constructs have a life-long, disproportionate impact on how individuals
view and react to the world. Although long lasting, these early-formed images can be
shaped through membership in organizations and institutions as individuals assimilate
organizational values and norms into some portion of their own self-image.
Decisions, in the authors‟ context, are defined as those of more than routine
importance. They contend that their theory accounts for both decisions that an
individual makes in a rational, deliberative manner (i.e. traditional decision theory)
and those made in a more intuitive manner that is bounded and shaped by internalized
values and principles.
Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach (1986) and Beach and Mitchell (1987) initially
defined the following as the key elements of image theory:
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Self Image: Represents personal beliefs, values, ethics, and morals that one
intuitively accepts as true. Self-image is constituted of principles, which guide
an individual‟s acceptance or rejection of a goal or course of action.
Trajectory Image: Represents an individual‟s agenda for the future. It is
constituted through goals, which may be either concrete and specific events or
a more abstract desired end-state.
Action Image: Consists of the plan and tactics envisioned to attain the goals of
the trajectory image.
Projected Image: The projected image consists of events anticipated if the
action image (plan) is adopted. Its principle value is that it allows analysis of
alternate plans and assessment of plans currently underway.
The four-image construct was revised by 1990. The “projection” and “action”
images were combined into a new “strategic” image, and the “self” image was
modified as a “values” image171 (Beach, 1990). This three-image theoretical
construct, although refined over time, remained intact over the subsequent fifteen
years of empirical research (Beach, 1996 and 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
Critiques of Image Theory:
Image theory was not well received when first proposed; Beach (1998) notes
the difficulty he and his colleagues initially had in getting the theory published in the
171

According to Beach (1990), this revision came about in preparation for a presentation to a lay
audience for which the presenter combined the “projection” and “action” images into one for purposes
of simplification. This in turn caused the authors to reexamine the usefulness of the original constructs
theoretical usefulness. Upon reflection, they determined that the components of the projected and
action images were so interrelated as to be better consolidated into just one. The author does not
explain the shift in terminology from the “self” to the “value” image, leaving the language explaining
the two as essentially the same.
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United States. Although published in Sims and Gioia‟s 1986 The Thinking
Organization, it is worth noting that the book‟s editors were specifically seeking
innovative, avant-garde approaches to understanding organizational social cognition
(Sims and Gioia, 1986, introduction). The books editors encouraged contributors to
not be bound by traditional or conservative conventions. Beach and his colleagues
apparently found little traction in their own right. Beach and Mitchell (1987) thus
turned to the Dutch journal Acta Psychologica. Beach‟s 1990 Image Theory: Decision
Making in Personal and Organizational Contexts was published in England by Wiley
as the first in an envisioned series on industrial and organizational psychology.172
One critic of Beach‟s 1990 book described it as “intellectually heuristic” (by
which the critic meant the theory being useful for research but may be incapable of
proof). He further claimed it unconvincing in how it described the manner in which
decisions are in fact made, that it ignored relevant literature on the same topic, and that
Beach misrepresented the three studies he used in support (Agor, 1992). Another
concluded that the key components of the theory are only partially worked out and that
a non-associate of the author would have a hard time adopting the books precepts in
isolation (Boothroyd, 1991). Both Agor (1992) and Boothroyd (1991) are especially
critical of the book‟s editing and inconsistent use of terms, making it hard to
understand. Both also, however, note the book‟s potential.
These problems for the most part appear to have been overcome with time; no
similar critiques of any kind were found for Beach‟s subsequent publications.

172

Apparently, the envisioned series did not work out as hoped; it is not mentioned on the Wiley
website whereas other thematic series are.
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Meanwhile, each succeeding publication (Beach 1996, 1998; Beach and Connolly,
2005) incorporated the conclusions of empirical study and became clearer in
presentation. Miner‟s (2005, 2006) survey of the opinions of organizational
behavioral theorists cites image theory as an “essential” theory of organizational
behavior and observes that its major weakness is that it is relatively unknown outside
of Beach‟s circle of colleagues and students.
Empirical Support:
Beach‟s 1996 and 1998 books both summarize the results of research
conducted and offered proposals for additional study. The 1996 book focuses on
research in specific settings. Examples include studies in job search and selection by
Stevens and Beach (Beach, 1996); supervision and job satisfaction by Bissell and
Beach (Beach, 1996); and audit decisions by Beach and Frederickson (Beach, 1996).
The 1998 book focuses on research into the compatibility and profitability tests.
Examples include the effect of screening in assessing decision options by Zee,
Paluchowski, and Beach (Beach, 1998); the role of imperfect information in prechoice screening by Potter and Beach (Beach, 1998; and problem solving strategies by
Christensen-Szalanski (Beach, 1998). Both books use the results of the empirical
research presented to reflect upon and refine the theory, such as Weatherly and
Beach‟s (1998) empirical study of organizational culture. They used image theory as
a framework to examine the impact of culture on organizational decision making,
holding that the role of an organization‟s culture, goals, and plans on organizational
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decision making is analogous to the role of individual principles, goals, and plans in
individual decision making.
In his review of organizational theories, Miner (2005, 2006) observes that –
despite its empirical validity - image theory is not well known outside of Beach and
Mitchell‟s circle of colleagues and students. That may be changing: Ruby Brougham
and David Walsh (2007) used image theory to study retirement decisions, comparing
image theory‟s predictive power with a decision model based on goal facilitation and
another based on cost/benefit analysis. They found that goal compatibility (image
theory„s “compatibility” test) held more predictive power than the goal facilitation
model and equaled the cost/benefit model.
Beach and Connolly (2005) summarized the state of image theory based on
empirical research to date and placed its development within an historical context of
decision theory development. The key elements of image theory as presented in the
2005 book and therefore used for the purposes of this study are:
Image theory is centered on three elements:
o The value image is constituted on individual principles, which serve as
self-evident truths that dictate how things should be and how people
ought to behave. Principles underscore what the individual and group
stand for and form the foundation for decision making.
o The trajectory image provides the goals the individual has selected for
the future.
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o The strategic image consists of the plans, tactics, and forecasts selected
to achieve one‟s goals. Plans are implemented through tactics and
compared over time against forecasts to judge progress.
o Individuals tend to stay in organizations where the values of the
individual and organization are congruent, reinforcing the findings of
social identity research (Tajfel and Turner, 1970; Ashforth and Mael,
1989).
The decision theory literature reviewed above is summarized in Table B-3. In
essence, image theory sees decisions as based on the beliefs and values of the decision
maker as considered relevant to the issues at hand and often made on an intuitive
rather than objectively analytical basis (Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach 1990, 1996,
and 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005). Image theory does not dismiss the analytical
process of traditional decision theory, but rather relegates its use to those situations
where two or more decision alternatives have passed the process of value screening.
Beach and his colleagues‟ work provide additional insight to both structuration and
identity theory.
Table B-3
Image Theory
Representative Literature
Category

Year

Author(s)
/
Editor(s)

Title: Relevance
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Early formulation

1986

1987

1990

Empirical Support

1996

Mitchell,
Rediker,
and Beach

Beach and
Mitchell

Beach

Beach

1998

Beach

2007

Brougham
and
Walsh

Image Theory and Organizational Decision Making: Published
as a chapter in The Thinking Organization (1986) apparently
based on the same manuscript used for the 1987 Acta
Psychologica article. Critiques traditional decision theories based
on statistical gaming and economic models. Introduces image
theory as more comprehensive alternative, consisting of four
components (self image (principles), trajectory image (plans and
goals), projected image (ordering of events), and action image
(tactics).
Image Theory: Principles, Goals, and Plans in Decision Making:
Authors present a descriptive theory to explain the way in which
people make individual decisions as they interact with the world
around them. They suggest a decision-making process in which
an individual assesses their current state and then plots a course
to achieve a desired future state. This theory contends with
decisions made in a rational, deliberative manner as well as those
made automatically. Consists of essentially the same content as
the 1986 chapter in The Thinking Organization.
Image Theory: Decision Making in Personal and Organizational
Contexts. First book-length treatment. Consolidates the fourimage constructed presented in previous articles to three: the
values image (principles), trajectory image (goals), and strategic
image (plans and tactics). Continues critique that economic and
statistics-based decision models are too mechanistic and not
reflective of how decisions are observed to be made.
Decision Making in the Workplace: Presents collection of essays
that presents results of empirical research of image theory and its
application in the work place.
Image Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations: Presents
additional empirical results and theoretical extensions. Notes
strong empirical support for theoretical components of
compatibility testing, profitability testing, progress decisions, and
strategy selection. Notes lack of support or research on the
concept of “images.”
Image Theory, Goal Compatibility, and Retirement Intent.
Empirical study that uses image theory as framework for
understanding retirement decisions. Only research found outside
the coterie of Beach colleagues and students.

Table B-3. (Continued)
Image Theory
Representative Literature
Category

Year

Author(s)
/
Editor(s)

Title: Relevance
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Synthesis

2005

Beach and
Connolly

The Psychology of Decision Making (2nd Ed): Provides
summation of evolution of the course of decision making theory
over the years, to include growth of various schools of theoretical
thought. Provides typology of decision theory. Argues that
image theory most comprehensive and allows for holistic nesting
of other theories within the image theory construct. Basic
construct of image theory is unchanged, but component elements
much more clearly defined and discussed.
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Section 2
A Theoretical Framework for Future Research

Introduction
This chapter summarizes the substance of the theories reviewed in Section 1,
outlines the reason why an integration of these theories is necessary in order to fully
explain the paradox of Northwest regional governance, and presents a framework
within which the concluding hypotheses from Chapter 7 may be tested.

Summary of Relevant Theories
Sociology: theories of structuration and social becoming
Anthony Giddens summarized his work on social structuration in The
Constitution of Society, published in 1984. His stated goal was to put an end to the
debate between functionalists and humanists over the relationship between the social
whole and individuality. Functionalists emphasized the primacy of structural
constraints (both formal and normative) imposed over individual members as the
dominant explanation for social behavior. Alternatively, advocates of the humanist or
hermeneutic school described society as the summation of individual actions. Giddens
reconceptualized these oppositions as a coexisting duality of “agency and structure.”
(p. 162). In his construct, humans are knowledgeable agents within social systems,
with the capacity to simultaneously subordinate themselves to social order and engage
in autonomous, creative activity (Giddens, 1984).
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Giddens (1984) describes daily life as a flow of intentional actions. Human
actors within society have an inherent capacity to understand what they do while they
do it and are thus free to accept societal expectations or not. Life is simplified through
routinization, in which non-salient decisions are relegated to the rules and normative
expectations of those around them. Indeed, routinization is considered vital to
psychological mechanisms in that it sustains a sense of trust and ontological security
among society members. Salient issues are acted on in a more affirmative manner,
providing a capacity for creativity and innovation that can serve to challenge or defend
existing social arrangements. The concept of agency thus represents intentions and the
capability of people to do the things they intend. “Agency concerns events of which
an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a
given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have
happened if the individual had not intervened” (Giddens, 1984, quote from p. 9).
Under Giddens‟ (1984) construct, social groups are manifest through systems
and structures. Systems are the relationships among and practices of human agents,
patterned to the point that they define identifiable social entities (such as groups,
organizations, or other social collectivities). Structures are recursively organized sets
of rules and resources recognized by members as legitimate properties of the social
system and sustained in memory of human agents. As such, these institutionalized
features of social systems have structural properties (or rules) that serve to stabilize
relationships across time and space, contributing to social order. These rules come in
two forms. Normative elements are the non-codified behavioral expectations that
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members hold for themselves and others. Those rules more formally established are
termed codes of signification.
“Structuration” is the patterning of social practices in time-space involving the
reproduction of situated practices (through rules and alignment of resources).
Structure exists in the practice of social activities by members and is recorded in their
memories. It is through these practices and memories that human conduct is oriented,
fostering social stability. “The most deeply embedded structural properties,
implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, I call structural principles. Those
practices which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be
referred to as institutions” Giddens, 1984, p. 17, emphasis in original). He further
states that “the most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively
involved in institutions.” (p. 24.) Structuration thus governs the continuity or change
of systems, and therefore the reproduction of social systems, with change made more
difficult based on the degree of institutionalization that has taken place. Fundamental
is the point that agents, systems, and structures are not independent phenomena, but
coexist as an irreducible duality. The continuous interaction between system and
individual agency means that actors (agents) do not create social systems. They
“reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of
praxis” (Giddens, 1984, p. 171, emphasis in original). These human activities are
recursive, a product (praxis) of individual ability to monitor the ongoing flow of life
and adjust social systems accordingly.
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Piotr Sztompka approached his theory of social becoming (1991) with the
same intent as Giddens. He too sought to resolve the long standing sociological
debate on the location of “agency” (the capacity for change) between the “macro” of
societal structures and the “micro” of the individual. His goal was to “…combine
these efforts by introducing a concept of social becoming which attempts to find the
middle ground between the rigid determinism of reified totalities and the unbridled
voluntarism of free individuals.” (p. 5). Although cognizant of Giddens‟ work,
Sztompka does not build his theory upon Giddens. Rather, he seems to work from
similar sources in parallel with Giddens. In so doing, he reinforces and clarifies some
of Giddens‟ conclusions while introducing others of his own.
Sztompka (1991) describes his theory of social becoming as a synthesis of past
syntheses. Consistent with Giddens, he treats totalities (social structures and
constraints) and individualities (individual creativity) a dualities, arguing that they are
“two analytic dimensions of human nature, separable only in imagination.” (p. 5).
“The real, not merely conceptual, synthesis of those analytical aspects – individualities
and totalities, creativeness and constraints – is due to the historical, processual nature
of social life, to its ontological embeddedness in time.” (p. 5).
Also consistent with Giddens is Sztompka‟s (1991) treatment of agency and
praxis, summarized in his diagram presented here as Figure B-1. Sztompka (1991)
defines agency as the ultimate cause of events. It is the active, constructive side of
social life carried out by individuals but with due recognition of the structural
framework within which human conduct takes place. Thus, social structure is both the
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medium for its own continual development and the product of that developmental
process. Like Giddens, Sztompka sees agency as carried out by individuals, but notes
that multiple individuals can engage in agency collectively for common goals. But
Sztompka (1991) expands the concept of agency through introduction of the concept

Figure B-1.
Sztompka‟s Model of Agency and Praxis
Potentiality

Actuality
Structure building
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Unfolding
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Agency construction
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(From Sztompka, 1991, Figure 5.3 (p. 99))

of an agential coefficient active in social construction. This coefficient is defined by
six ontological assumptions:
1. Society is a process, undergoing constant change. Society and its members
are immersed in the flow of historical time. As such, social systems are not created
but evolve from that which came before.
2. Change is, for the most part, produced from within society.
3. The ultimate motor of change is the agential power of human individuals or
social collectivities.
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4. The direction, goal, and speed of change are contestable among multiple
agents. Direction, goal, and speed thus become the area of conflict and struggle.
5. Action occurs within a context of encountered structures, which agents
shape in turn. This results in the dual quality of structures as both shaping and shaped
and the dual quality of actors as both producers and products.
6. The interchange of action and structure occurs in time by means of
alternating phases of agential creativeness and structural determination.
Sztompka (1991) treatment of praxis is likewise consistent with Giddens, but
greatly clarified. Sztompka describes praxis is the context of mediation, defining it as
“the actual manifestations of social fabric…where operation and action meet, a
dialectic synthesis of what is going on in a society and what people are doing.” (p. 96).
As such, it “provides the bridge between acting individuals and changing structures”
(p. 41). Thus praxis is doubly conditioned from below by individual actions and
above by the operation of wider society. “But it is not reducible to either. It is
something more than the sum of individual actions, and it is something more than the
outcome of ongoing operation. With respect to both levels – individualities and
totalities – it is a new emergent quality. Having its own specific ontological quality as
reality sui generis, it emanates in two directions, engendering actors‟ conduct and
originating systemic tendencies. It is the true core of social life.” (p. 41).
“Praxis” thus provides both the product of social becoming - society - and the
medium in which societal changes take place. To Sztompka, “society” is seen as the
collection of social groupings in which individuals participate, from local church or
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community groups up through civilization levels (Sztompka, 1991). Accordingly, any
social grouping can thus be nested within other groupings, each undergoing its own
simultaneous process of structuration / becoming.
Sztompka (1991) is clearer in describing the role of time than is Giddens
(1984). He uses historical sociology to explain the causal mechanisms through which
agential creativeness and structural influences merge in the flow of historical
processes. He introduces the concept of an historical coefficient which, like his
agential coefficient, is defined by six ontological assumptions:
1. Social reality is not a steady state but a dynamic process. It occurs rather
than exists and is composed of events, not objects.
2. Social change is a confluence of multiple processes with various vectors,
partly overlapping, partly convergent, and partly divergent. These vectors may be
mutually supportive or destructive.
3. A social grouping undergoing change may be perceived not as an entity but
as a fluid set of relations pervaded by both tension and harmony, by conflict and
cooperation.
4. The sequence of events within each social process is treated as cumulative.
Each phase is culmination of previous phases and sets the stage for the next phase.
Future courses of action are delimited by past courses adopted.
5. Social process is constructed by individual or collective human agents
through their actions over time.
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6. People do not construct society as they please, but within given structural
conditions inherited from the past (constructed by their predecessors). “…there is
dialectic of actions and structures, in which actions are partly determined by earlier
structures and later structures are produced by earlier actions.” (Sztompka, 1991, p.
26).
Finally, Sztompka (1991) offers an enhanced definition of “structure.”
Whereas Giddens (1984) defined structure as a recursively organized sets of rules and
resources, Sztompka offers four-fold typology of structural “levels” identified as
normative, ideal, interaction, and opportunity.173 The normative level is the network
of rules, norms, values, and institutions prescribing the proper expected conduct and
proscribing “wrong” conduct. This level is found in systems of laws, mores, and
customs and make up a reality of social facts external to any single individual. At the
ideal level is the network of ideas, beliefs, images, and convictions about reality. This
level clusters in creeds, dogmas, doctrines, and ideologies. Next is the interactional
level, consisting of communication networks such as formal channels and lines of
access that serve to coordinate the mutually oriented actions of multiple individuals.
Finally is the opportunity level. This level is grounded in classes, societal
stratification, and prospects for social mobility.
Sztompka (1991) summarizes his theory with three insights:
That society (defined as any social grouping) is humanly constructed.
That humans are socially shaped

173

Giddens‟ (1984) definition of structure encompasses Sztompka‟s (1991) normative and ideal levels.
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That society and humans are both immersed in the flow of historical time
As wide-ranging as they are, structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social
becoming (Sztompka, 1991) provide only incomplete explanations of the regional
governance experience. They explain “what” happened through the role of individual
and collective agents in shaping systems and structure, the influence of systems and
structure on individuals, and the historical connectivity between structures. To a
limited extent, they also explain “why” things happened the way they did in terms of
the roles of individual autonomy and freedom and the cognitive consciousness of
members in their own social phenomena. But while they note the varying degrees in
intensity of commitment held by individuals, they do not explain what motivates some
members of a social group to act as change agents while others act just as passionately
as agents of the status quo. Nor do they explain “how” individuals process the
systems and structures of the social groups in which they are members when rendering
individual decisions. Therefore, other theoretical domains must be looked to for a
more complete explanation.
Social Psychology: Culture, Identity, and Conflict
Worldviews and culture:
Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka (1991) assert that social groups are
recognizable through organizational patterns and structures of formal rules, norms,
customs, and belief systems. Within this construct, the tribal, market-commodity, and
environmental worldviews identified in Chapters 3 through 7 represent normative
elements of structure. Each provides what Lichatowich et al. (2006) describe as a
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conceptual foundation of principles and assumptions that guide activities. They exist
at the broadest possible societal level and, though themselves unwritten, will inspire
and guide promulgation of laws, regulations, rituals, and other written and unwritten
manifestations of social expectations that serve to guide member behavior.
Worldviews may be thought of as “culture” in the anthropologic sense.
Culture also exists at the organizational level. Edgar H. Schein (2004) argues
that culture is a complex learning process that occurs within social units holding a
shared history. It originates in one of two ways. It may begin through spontaneous
interactions within an unstructured group that gradually leads to patterns and norms of
behavior as the group becomes better organized over time. In more formal groups, it
begins with the values of the organization‟s founder. In this circumstance, the
founder‟s vision, goals, beliefs, and assumptions as to how things should be are
imposed on group members. Initially, the acceptance of this imposition is
transactional in nature. It produces compliance but not necessarily buy-in. However,
as the group experiences success over time, these values and beliefs become validated
and eventually shared within members of the group. “What was originally the
founder‟s individual view of the world leads to shared action, which, if successful,
leads to a shared recognition that the founder „had it right.‟ The group will then act
again on these beliefs and values and, if it continues to be successful, will eventually
conclude that it now has the „correct‟ way to think, feel, and act” (Schein, 2004, p. 16,
emphasis in original). Regardless whether originating through group consensus or an
individual founder, this evolved culture provides a shared sense of stability that
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becomes embedded within the group and spans all aspects of group functions. It then
leads to patterning of routine behaviors that help members make sense of the world
around them. Schein summarizes his definition of culture as:
…a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by the group as
it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
relation to those problems” (Schein, 2004, p. 17).
Schein (2004) maintains that culture can evolve within any size social
groupings in which people share significant experiences over time. Such shared
experiences lead to learning a shared view of the world and condition future responses
to the environment based on those experiences. Over time, the original reason for the
behavior may be forgotten, but the behavior continues.
Culture‟s power is drawn from its psychological effect on group members.
“Culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to pay attention to, what
things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in
various kinds of situations” (p. 32). Culture can evolve within any size social
groupings in which people share significant experiences over time. Such shared
experiences lead to learning a shared view of the world and condition future responses
to the environment based on those experiences. Over time, the original reason for the
behavior may be forgotten, but the behavior continues. Therefore, all behaviors result
from either the ingrained culture or in reaction to external events.
Culture, then, explains why organizational members behave as they do in
carrying out organizational business and complements Giddens‟ (1984) and
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Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of structure. But it does not fully explain personal
commitment. To illustrate, envision two proverbial employees. One is only in a
business organization “for the job.” This individual adheres to organizational
expectations, carries out duties assigned, but departs promptly at closing. To this
employee, membership in the organization has no intrinsic meaning other than as a
source of income. In contrast is the employee who devotes much extra time and effort
into organizational goals. This employee always volunteers to organize after-hour
social events, puts extra time into getting products completed to the highest quality
possible, and actively promotes the organization in external forums. In contrast to the
first employee‟s purely transactional relationship, the second relates to the
organization on a personal basis to the degree that membership is integral to the
individual‟s self image. Identity theory explains this difference in ways that, like
culture theory, complements structuration theory and provides additional insight into
the regional governance experience.
Organizational and Individual Identity:
Giddens recognizes a role for identity in structuration when he notes “…the
prevalence, among the members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of
common identity, however that might be expressed or revealed. Such feelings may be
manifest in both practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a ‘value
consensus.‟ Individuals may be aware of belonging to a definite collectivity without
agreeing that it is necessarily right and proper” (Giddens, 1984, p. 165, emphasis
added.) This, however, is the limit of Giddens‟ examination as to how identity shapes
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structuration and vice versa. Identity theory merits further discussion given its
importance.
Individuals exist within social systems and structures and define their sense of
self in relation to the members of the social situation in which they reside. Individual
identity is therefore heavily influenced by others (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead,
2004/1934). In response, individuals will cognitively attempt to in turn influence the
perceptions of others in their social group (Goffman, 2004/1959). An individual‟s
drive for self-enhancement and desire to associate with groups of like-minded
individuals determine which social groups they do or do not decide to join. Among
social groups that people choose to join are organizations (Hogg and Terry, 2001) and
people will self-categorize into organizations that share values and worldviews with
which they identify or wish to emulate (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and
Mael, 1989). This results in organizations tending to evolve into collections of likevalued people. Individual and organizational identity is thus inextricable linked, the
degree varying with the level of alignment between individual self-image and the
organization‟s perceived values and behavior patterns (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Albert
and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and
Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).
Strong psychological bonds may form between individuals and their
organizations resulting in individuals adopting attributes of the organization as their
own (Dutton et al., 1994). For many people, “their professional and/or organizational
identity may be more pervasive and important than ascribed identities based on
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gender, age, ethnicity, race, or nationality” (Hogg and Terry, 2001, p. 2). Not all
members of an organization will necessarily share the same intensity of psychological
bonding with the group. Often members will recognize and adhere to social
expectations without psychologically identifying with them (Giddens, 1984; Albert
and Whetten, 1985; Schein, 2004; Ashforth and Mael, 1989). For those who do so
identify, perceived threats to the organization become perceived threats to the
individual, with the response varying by the nature and degree of the threat (Dutton
and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).
The combination of individual and organizational identities becomes a
powerful lens through which interpretations of other groups within the environment
and acceptable response alternatives to intergroup relations are viewed (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991, 1994; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). This
interpretive lens shapes the selection of organizational responses to the actions of
others. Organization leaders affect perception by explaining what is going on in the
environment within the context of the organizational identity lens, thus facilitating
member sense-making (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Consequently, the understanding
of observed organizational behavior – such as exhibited during negotiations over the
CRBF‟s MOA - can be greatly informed by the contexts of individual and collective
identity of those participating.
An organization‟s relationship with its environment is iterative and reciprocal
(Albert and Whetten (1985); Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996;
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Scott and Lane, 2000). Organizational leaders are charged with the formal
representation and defense of the organization to the public. Individual members also
influence outside perceptions as well through customer service, interaction through
professional associations, and other contacts (Scott and Lane, 2000). Organization
leaders affect the perception of change by explaining what is going on in the
environment within the context of organizational identity thus facilitating member
sense-making. These identity mechanisms are not permanently fixed, and may evolve
over time (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Gioia and
Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 2000a).
Other significant factors influencing perceptions of the environment include
perceptions by outsiders (Cooley, 2004; Mead, 2004; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991;
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Scott and Lane, 2000), the
worldview as held by members of the organization (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Albert
and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and
Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998), and the
strategic orientation of the organization (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm
et al., 1998). An organization‟s relationship with its environment is iterative and
reciprocal. Organizations prepare images for public consumption designed to put the
organization in the best positive light (Albert and Whetten (1985); Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Scott and Lane, 2000). Managers –
acting as representative agents - have a key role in this process, since they are charged
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with the formal representation and defense of the organization to the public (Scott and
Lane, 2000).
Outsiders evaluate these images within the context of organization behavior,
media coverage, and their personal relationship and identification with the
organization and its members. They reflect their interpretation of the images back to
the organization (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; FoxWolfgramm et al., 1998). Individual members will then compare their self-identity
and their perceptions of the organization‟s identity with the perception of the
organization as articulated by management and reflected by relevant stakeholders
(Goffman, 2004; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and Lane,
2000). Thus, the organizational perception of environment is a complex interaction
among organization members, organization leadership and external stakeholders that
is filtered and interpreted through the organization‟s internal orientation and sense of
identity. For Basin governance, this means that those participating in governance
negotiations would be expected to represent their views and interests in the best
possible light while dismissing or trivializing the alternative messages offered by
others.
Conflict:
The history of events surrounding the structuration of Columbia Basin
governance is replete with conflict. Examples include clashes between advocates of
public and privately owned electrical power (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Brigham,
1998; Pope, 2008); fisheries proponents and river developers (Scheufele, c.1970;
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Blumm, 1981; Robbins, 2004); states and tribes over fishery allocations and other
tribal rights (Wilkinson, 2005; Pevar, 2002); turf disputes between federal agencies
(McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996); and among just about everybody in the
West over water (Wilkinson,1992; Pisani, 2002). These and other regional lines of
conflict are recorded in greater detail in Chapters 3 through 7.
On the surface, these regional conflicts could be viewed as struggles among
divergent interests over scarce resources. Indeed, up until the late 1970s, resourcebased (or instrumental (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979) or divergent interest (Giddens,
1979) or realistic (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) competition
was considered – at least within social psychology circles – as the dominant reason
conflict occurred (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b). But this reasoning did not address
observed hostility between groups with no apparent competing interests. This gap was
answered when Henri Tajfel and John Turner published their theory of social identity
in 1979. Social identity has subsequently assumed a dominant role in conflict analysis
by some (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004) and
a co-equal role with interest-based causes by others (Cox, 1996/1993).
Giddens devotes a chapter to conflict in Central Problems (1979). He defines
conflict as the “struggle between actors or collectivities expressed as definite social
practices” (p. 131). He notes “two senses of conflict,” one being disputes over
divergent interests and the other as struggle among groups or actors based on the mere
existence of those groups.174 He emphasizes the role of ideology in conflict. Writing

174

This second source was the phenomenon under study by Tajfel and Turner at approximately the
same time. See section 2 below.
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within the context of World War II‟s Jewish holocaust, he describes ideology as a
“belief system.” He notes that the promise of science in the age of enlightenment was
to end what had been traditions of irrational and unfounded prejudices of unthinking
belief. To Giddens, that failed in the face of Nazi ideology in the Germany of the
1930s and „40s thus illustrating the potential for positions of belief to undermine and
overwhelm positions of reason.
Giddens did not carry forward this discussion of conflict in Constitution
(1984). But he implicitly invokes it through his discussion of critical situations,
power, and control. He defines critical situations as those where the “established
modes of accustomed life are drastically undermined or shattered” (Giddens, 1984, p.
60). He defines power as “the means of getting things done” (p. 283) and control as
the capability of some actors to influence the circumstances of others. By defining
agency as the capacity for individuals to act autonomously, he endows them with the
power to challenge the status quo of prevailing systems and structures as enforced
through the power and control of those in charge. Power and control represent the
exercise of agency by some actors as they seek to constrain the agency of others
seeking change. The resolution of critical situations, the exercise of power, the
imposition of constraint, and agency occur in praxis. Power and constraint represent
the exercise of agency by some actors as they seek to restrict the agency of those with
whom they disagree. Thus, the capacity for and occurrence of social conflict is
inherent in Giddens‟ theory.
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Sztompka (1991) is more forthright on the subject. He devotes a great deal of
discussion to social movements and counter movements. Such movements result in
the emergence of new creeds, beliefs, norms, values, tactics, internal structures, and
relationships. Any society wishing to grow must foster the conditions for the
emergence of social systems that can effectively challenge the status quo. Thus, in
Sztompka‟s construct, conflict appears essential to social evolution. In summary,
Giddens and Sztompka observe the existence of conflict and explain it through the
framework of praxis and agency. What they don‟t do is explain the triggering
mechanisms that cause conflict to begin.
There are two bodies of theory that do. The first is conflict based on
competing group interest. Rational, interest-based conflict of this nature is termed
variously as “realistic” (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) or
“instrumental” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979). Realistic, or instrumental, competition
originates with incompatible group goals and manifests in struggles over tangible
(such as territory, money, or food) or intangible (such as power, prestige, honor, or a
sense of physical security) resources in short supply (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Tajfel and
Turner, 2004/1979; Hatch and Schultz, 2004b). The second source of conflict is social
identity. Under this theory, the mere knowledge that another group exists within the
salient environmental framework of an in-group can lead to out-group bias and
discrimination. Termed “social competition” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979), such
conflict is based solely on social comparisons as made by group members (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001).
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Conflict may arise under conditions of either realistic or social competition. The
presence of both, however, can greatly exacerbate the nature of the conflict and make
resolution that much more difficult (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001).
Pruitt and Kim (2004) define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interest, a
belief that the parties‟ current aspirations are incompatible” (p. 8, emphasis in
original). The central components of realistic conflict are interests, which are defined
as “people‟s feelings about what is basically desirable” (p. 15) and aspirations,
defined as “mental representations of the things [a party to the conflict] strives for or
believes it must achieve” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16). Conflict size (or intensity) is
influenced by the salience of any given threat to a group interest or aspiration.
Conflict thus arises through the perception of “relative deprivation” that occurs when a
party believes that a reasonable interest or aspiration is threatened or has been
thwarted.
The manner in which organizations respond to threats or thwarted aspirations
depends on a number of identity-related factors. Organization type (Albert and
Whetten, 1985); organization orientation Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996); the nature of
the change being faced (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996); the degree of threat perceived
(Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); the perceived gap between
current identity and desired future identity (Gustafson and Reger, 1995); the number
of identities within the organization that are affected (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997;
Pratt and Foreman, 2000); proactive leadership (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991;
Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997;
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Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Pratt and Foreman, 2000); perceptions of stakeholders
(Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and Lane, 2000); and the degree to which an organization is
preconditioned to respond to change (Brown and Starkey, 2000) can restrict or
facilitate selection and implementation of response actions. Members‟ sense of
identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994), the organization‟s strategic
orientation (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998), and management perceptions (Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; FoxWolfgramm et al., 1998), all serve as powerful filters for interpreting what is going on
and what is to be done about it. These influences will initially cause culturally
familiar routines to be activated in the face of perceived threats while constraining the
degree to which other actions are considered acceptable (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).
For the purposes of this study, the organizational response of interest is the
determination to accept and support or reject and challenge any given Basin
governance system, whether in place or proposed.
Theories of culture, identity, and conflict answer the questions of “why” not
addressed under structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social becoming (Sztompka, 1991).
The deeply embedded assumptions regarding the correct way to think, feel, and
perceive that underlay organizational culture explains why organizational members act
the way they do (Schein, 2004). The strong psychological connection that develops in
organizational members as they incorporate organizational values and goals as part of
their own self-identity (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and Mael, 1989;
Dutton et al., 1984) explains why some organizational members hold the degree of
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intensity they do to given positions. Realistic and social competition theories explain
the nature of conflict, whether over competing interests or due to the existence of other
social groups (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Pruitt and
Kim, 2004). Identity theory explains why organizations respond to perceptions of
threats or thwarted aspirations the way they do (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, others). Taken
together, they greatly help explain the dynamic nature of the region‟s governance
history. But the explanation is still incomplete in that these theories do not explain
“how” the influences of culture and identity get translated into individual decision
making.
Psychology: image theory and individual decision making
Left unanswered in culture and identity theory is the question of “how”
individuals come to make the decisions they do and how organizational values are
transferred between individuals and from generation to generation. Decision theory,
especially “image theory,” more fully answers the “how” questions in exploring the
role values and beliefs play in individual decision making.
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) define agency as the capacity to effect
changes to social systems and structures. They argue that individuals exercise agency
individually or collectively based on a cognitive understanding of their social
environment. Implied is an individual decision making process that leads one to
actively challenge, actively defend, or passively acquiesce to the status quo.
Consistent with Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of agency, Beach
and Mitchell (1998) argue that all decision making occurs at the individual level.
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Once the individual makes up their own mind, the result may be subject to adjustment
when presented to and discussed with others. Groups, per se, do not make decisions,
but rather serve as “the contexts within which individual members‟ decisions become
consolidated to form a group product” (p. 9). At issue here is how those individual
decisions come to be made and the influences in play as those decisions are tested and
defended or modified during inter-group and intra-group interactions.
Traditional prescriptive models of decision making are not up to this task.
Traditional decision theory, borrowing from economic theory, presumes decision
makers engage in a relatively formal analytical process, evaluating the consequences
of available actions to maximize utility. Although simple and easy to model, the
prescriptive model relies on assumptions not clearly borne out by empirical research
and does not fully reflect how decisions are actually made (Mitchell, Rediker, and
Beach, 1986). Traditional theory overly simplifies the “messiness” of day-to-day
decision making through abstraction. It is rooted in a linear decision tree model,
where decision move only in one direction. Individual values, motives and
preferences (which may change over time) are dismissed. Time is simplified into
“now” (point at which decision is made) and “later” (when result is achieved). There
is no continuum over which things can change (Connolly and Beach, 1998).
Beach and Mitchell (1998) argue that, in practice, these formal analytical
strategies are seldom used. As a practical matter, formal utility-based models are too
time consuming and resource intensive for simple decisions and too “coldly
intellectual” (p. 6) for important ones. Furthermore, traditional analytical models
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presume a search for the “best” of a range of plausible options, with “best” being
defined as the one that maximizes utility. Consequently, they do not explain situations
in which only one option is under consideration. Left unaddressed is the process by
which the array of options is first determined and the implication if that process results
in only one plausible option. Actual decision making is most often based on doing the
“right” thing, even which this “right” option is not in the individual or organization‟s
best interest. They observe that in those cases where a formal analytical decision
model is used, decision makers will frequently reject the results the results run counter
to their concept of “rightness.”
In summary, traditional utility-based theory is prescriptive in that it identifies
how decisions should be made, but falls short of accurately describing how decisions
are actually made. “In both individual and organizational settings, the problems are
the same: decision making is much richer and more subtle than the formal models
would suggest, while at the same time it is less thoroughly thought through and less
premeditated than the formal models demand” (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986, p.
295).
Connolly and Beach (1998) identify other decision making models that have
challenged the traditional model and attempted to explain decision making
complexity. Descriptive models based on theories of “cognitive situation
assessments,” “decision through argument,” and “decision through exploration” all
involve situation assessments, past experience, and causal thinking. “Decision cycle
theory” is more incremental, arguing that one‟s view of a given situation is modified
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through the experience of implemented behavior. Subsequent decisions are based on
that experience, with subsequent behavior modified accordingly. Cognitive processes
allow for learning that guides and justifies decisions through time. These theories
address the “messiness” of actual decision making, but still do not fully address the
role of values in shaping the selection of alternatives and ultimate decisions made. As
such – like traditional decision theory - they are not so much wrong as incomplete
(Connolly and Beach, 1998).
“Image theory” (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986; Beach and Mitchell,
1987 and 1998) holistically incorporates the essential elements of these theories
(Connolly and Beach, 1998). Image theory assumes decision makers use three
“schematic knowledge structures,” or “images” to organize and frame their thinking
(Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 12).
The first of these is the “value image.” The value image is composed of
“principles.” Principles are the imperatives for individual behavior and the behavior
of the organization(s) to which the decision maker belongs. They are the decision
maker‟s beliefs, morals, ethics, and social conventions. These “principles” are “self
evident truths” that must be respected, thus providing a “rigid criteria” by which the
rightness or wrongness of a goal or plan is judged (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 9).
As such, they “serve to internally generate candidate goals and plans for possible
adoption” as well as criteria against which the goals and plans of others may be
evaluated (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 12, emphasis in original). Principles begin to
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be developed in childhood and evolve over the course of one‟s life. As such, they are
inherent to one‟s self-image and sense of identity.175
Principles can run the gamut from specific to general; from the compelling to
the trivial; from admirable to abhorrent; from rational to irrational. For example,
greed and accumulation of personal power can be as important a principle to some as
altruism and charity are to others. Regardless, principles form the foundation upon
which all decisions are based. As such, the ultimate legitimacy of decision outcomes
is defined by the degree to which the outcomes conform to principles. Goals and
strategies not in accordance with principles – whether internally or externally
generated - will be deemed unacceptable. More fundamentally, choice alternatives not
consistent with the decision maker‟s principles will be rejected from further
consideration regardless of utilitarian value (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and
Connolly, 2005).
The second image is the “trajectory image” consisting of the goals for the
future as generated from the decision maker‟s principles. These goals are not static,
however, and extend through time. Goals can be specific or abstract. The more
abstract the goal, however, the more difficult the selection of plans and strategies
become (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
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In earlier versions of image theory, the authors specifically identify “self-image” as one of four
images used in decision making. They describe self-image and its constituent principles as reflecting
how one sees oneself and as precepts for the conduct of one‟s life. They represent personal beliefs,
values, ethics, and morals that one intuitively accepts as true. See Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986,
and Beach and Mitchell, 1987. In later versions, the number of images is reduced to three, with the
concept of “self-image” apparently subsumed into the “value image” described above. See Beach and
Mitchell, 1998.
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The third image is the “strategic image” consisting of the plans adopted for
achieving the trajectory image‟s goals. Each plan is an “abstract sequence of potential
activities, beginning with goal adoption and ending with goal attainment” (Beach and
Mitchell, 1998, p. 13; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
Embedded within the three images are two types of decision. The first is the
“adoption decision” which answers whether the goal or strategy is reasonable and
achievable. The second decision is termed the “progress decision.” This is the
decision to proceed with the adopted choice based on whether the desired goal will be
achieved. Consequently, the “progress decision” recurs over time as experience grows
and new information is acquired (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly,
2005).
Both the “adoption” and “progress” decisions are subject to two tests. The first
is termed “compatibility testing.” Compatibility testing screens candidate goals and
plans against the three “images,” identified above. This screening depends exclusively
on whether the choice presented violates the decision maker‟s principles. This
comparison against principle is not weighted or nuanced in any way – it is solely an
“accept or reject” determination, and might well occur subconsciously. In progress
decisions a determination of non-compatibility will usually lead to adjustments in the
plan rather than automatic withdrawal. The second test is termed “profitability
testing.” Profitability testing is used when multiple candidates survive compatibility
testing. The decision maker will engage in some analytical method or strategy (which
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may be formal or informal, to include traditional decision theory) to select the “best”
of the surviving candidates (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
Connolly and Beach (2005) amplified on other precepts introduced in early
image theory publications. Framing consists of applying relevant elements of the
three images to situation at hand. All decisions are made individually; there is no such
thing as a “group” decision, per se. Group decisions are agreements reached as each
member of the group processes options through their image processes. Agreement is
reached at the point when either the option(s) is (are) modified to be congruent with
each party‟s principles, goals, or plans or the individuals involved modify their goals
and plans to be consistent with the rest of the group. This modification of options
and/or principles, goals, and plans did not occur in the CRBF experience, contributing
to its failure.
The basic precepts of image theory are illustrated in Figure B-2.176 Individual
decision makers frame situations within their experience and knowledge of past and
present events and select (often intuitively) those principles (from the values image),
goals (from the trajectory image) and plans and tactics (from the strategy image) as
applicable to the circumstances at hand. Any given choice is thus subject to the
“compatibility test” to determine whether the options at hand violates the decision
maker‟s principles, goals, or plans. If only one option survives this screening, it is
adopted. If more than one option survives, it is then subjected to a “profitability” test
of varying degrees of formality and consistent with traditional theory to determine
176

This figure first appears in Weatherly and Beach‟s 1998 essay (presented in Beach, 1998) on the
relationship between organizational culture and decision making. Although appearing long after image
theory‟s first formulation, it illustrates the theory as first envisioned very well.
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which provides the best outcome (as defined in terms of principles, goals, and values).
If no options past these tests, it is possible for the decision maker to redefine and
adjust their principles, goals, and plans depending on the criticality of the decision and
the situation at hand.

Figure B-2.
Image Theory
Value Image:
Principles

Trajectory Image:
Goals

Multiple
survivors

Option(s)

Compatibility
Test:
Screening

Strategic Image:
Plans

Profitability
Test

Decision

One survivor

Decision
From Weatherly and Beach, 1998,
(Adapted from figure 14.1, p. 212)

Weatherly and Beach (1998) use image theory to examine the relationship
between organizational culture and the decisions made within that organization. Their
intent is to propose a theoretical link between culture and decision making and to test
the implications of that link. Citing the work in organizational culture of Schein,
Schneider, and Trice and Beyer,177 authors define culture as a body of
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Schein, E. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schneider, B. (Ed.). (1990). Organizational culture and climate. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
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“organizationally relevant beliefs and values that are mutually understood and
subscribed to by its members.” They summarize the work of these authors in this
way: Being grounded in values, culture prescribes what is “true, necessary, and
desirable” and thus dictates goals and the strategies considered acceptable. Likewise,
it prescribes what is “false, unnecessary, and undesirable” and, thus, “goals and
actions that one should not pursue oneself and that one ought to resist when proposed
by others” (Weatherly and Beach, quotes from p. 211).
Weatherly and Beach (1998) illustrated both the fundamentals of image theory
and the relationship of image theory to culture as shown in Figure B-3.178 In their
construct, the firmly-held principles of the decision maker‟s value image are
analogous to the culture of the organization. Similarly, the organizational vision and
selected strategies are similar to the decision maker‟s trajectory and strategic images,
respectively. Any decision option is subject to a compatibility screening using the
constituents of the value, trajectory, and strategic images as screening criteria. Should
multiple choice options survive the compatibility test, they are subjected to formal or
informal profitability testing, again based on the decision maker‟s images, to
determine which choice represents the best decision. In cases where only one
candidate survives compatibility screening, that option becomes the decision with

Trice, H.M. & Beyer, J.M. (1993). The cultures of work organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
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Figure 8-3 is shown as essentially presented by the authors. It is, however, a bit misleading in that it
visually suggests a linearity and finality to decisions that is not consistent with the fluidity described in
Beach and Mitchell, 1998. What is apparently missing in the diagram are feedback loops from
decisions as they get recycled through the process once new information becomes available, decisions
are met with unforeseen obstacles, or checks are made to ensure the goals and strategies are on track.
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further analysis to be conducted over time as new information comes available
(Weatherly and Beach, 1998).

Figure B-3
An Image Theory Analysis of Organizational Culture179
Value Image:
Principles
(Org Culture)

Option(s)

Trajectory Image:
Goals
(Org Vision)

Compatibility Test
(Screening)

Multiple
survivors

Strategic Image:
Plans
(Org Strategy)

Profitability
Test
(Best Choice)

Decision

One survivor

Decision
(From Weatherly and Beach (1998), Figure 14.1, p. 212)

Although written from an organizational perspective, this does not violate
Beach and Mitchell‟s (1998) assertion that all decisions are made individually.
Rather, it articulates the role that organizational culture plays on those individual
decisions. Weatherly and Beach (1998) argue that “potential goals for inclusion in the
vision and tactics for inclusion in the strategic plan must not violate the organization‟s
culture, its existing vision, or its existing plans(s)” (p. 213) and that any new ideas
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Figure B-3 is shown as essentially presented by the authors. It is, however, a bit misleading in that it
visually suggests a linearity and finality to decisions that is not consistent with the fluidity described in
Beach and Mitchell, 1998. What is apparently missing in the diagram are feedback loops from
decisions as they get recycled through the process once new information becomes available, decisions
are met with unforeseen obstacles, or checks are made to ensure the goals and strategies are on track.
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must be compatible with members‟ image of themselves as an organization and their
goals for the future. Since organizational members share these images, individual
decisions will tend to be compatible with member principles even when made in
isolation. The implication is that, consistent with Schein (2004), member images and
principles will effect member acceptance or rejection of decisions made on the
organization‟s behalf by their leaders. Decisions or ideas that are not compatible with
member images risk the leader losing legitimacy in the eyes of those members.
Image theory thus explains “how” values underlying theories of organizational
culture and identity are processed into decisions, positions, and actions by individuals.
Adding this to the “what” as provided by theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and
social becoming (Sztompka, 1991), and the “why” provided by theories of culture
(Schein, 2004) and identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934; Goffman,
2004/1959; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and
Mael, 1989) a comprehensive theoretical framework can be offered to explain the
evolution of Columbia Basin governance in general and the rise and fall of the CRBF
in particular.

Why an Integration of Multiple Theories is Necessary
There is no single body of theory that adequately addresses the question as to
why the CRBF failed. As wide-ranging as they are, structuration (Giddens, 1984) and
social becoming (Sztompka, 1991) provide only incomplete theoretical explanations
for the regional governance experience. They explain “what” happened through the
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role of individual and collective agents in shaping systems and structure, the influence
of systems and structure on individuals, and the historical connectivity between
structures. To a limited extent, they also explain “why” things happened the way they
did in terms of the roles of individual autonomy and freedom and the cognitive
consciousness of members in their own social phenomena. Schein‟s (2004) theory of
organizational culture helps flesh out the concept of structure and helps further explain
how normative expectations influence organizational member behavior. But, while
acknowledging the varying degrees of intensity in individual commitment, neither
Giddens (1984) or Sztompka (1991) explain what motivates some members of a social
group to act as change agents while others act just as passionately as agents of the
status quo. Nor do they explain “how” individuals process the systems and structures
of the social groups in which they are members when rendering individual decisions.
Similarly, theories of interest based conflict, centered on competition over
resources or other conflicts of interest (Coser, 1964) do not account for situations
where no such conflict of interest exist (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979). Theories of
individual and group identity help fill in the “why” gaps in the theories of structuration
and conflict.
Theories of individual identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934;
Goffman, 2004/1959) explain the concept of individual self within social settings.
Social and organizational identity speak to the strong psychological connection that
can develop in organizational members as they incorporate organizational values and
goals as part of their own self-identity (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and
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Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1984) and explain why some organizational members hold
the degree of intensity they do to given organizational positions and values (i.e. a
system‟s normative structures). Theories of social competition, grounded in social
identity, expand the understanding of the nature of conflict and argue that identitybased competition can either exacerbate conflict over competing interests or lead to
conflict in its own right merely based on the existence of other social groups (Tajfel
and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004;
Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004). Identity theory further explains why
organizations respond to perceptions of threats or thwarted aspirations the way they do
(Albert and Whetten, 1985; Dutton et al., 1994; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996; Dutton
and Dukerich, 1991; Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Gioia
and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Scott and Lane, 2000; Pratt and
Foreman, 2000; Brown and Starkey, 2000; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Taken together,
they greatly help explain why the interrelationship between the social group and the
individual occurs the way it does. But the explanation is still incomplete in that these
theories do not explain “how” the influences of system structure, agency, and identity
get translated into individual decision making.
Decision theory, especially “image theory,” more fully answers the “how”
questions in exploring the role values and beliefs play in individual decision making.
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) define agency as the capacity to effect changes
to social systems and structures. They argue that individuals exercise agency
individually or collectively based on a cognitive understanding of their social
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environment. Implied is an individual decision making process that leads one to
actively challenge, actively defend, or passively acquiesce to the status quo.
Consistent with Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of agency,
Beach and Mitchell (1998) argue that all decision making occurs at the individual
level. Once the individual makes up their own mind, the result may be subject to
adjustment when presented to and discussed with others. Groups, per se, do not make
decisions, but rather serve as “the contexts within which individual members‟
decisions become consolidated to form a group product” (p. 9). At issue here is how
those individual decisions come to be made and how the influences of structure and
group identity come to play as those decisions are tested and defended or modified
during inter-group and intra-group interactions.
Traditional prescriptive models of decision making and more recent
naturalistic models are not up to this task. Traditional decision theory, borrowing
from economic theory, presumes decision makers engage in a relatively formal
analytical process, evaluating the consequences of available actions to maximize
utility. Although simple and easy to model, the prescriptive model relies on
assumptions not clearly borne out by empirical research and does not fully reflect how
decisions are actually made, (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986). Furthermore, these
structured models are seldom used in practice. They are too time consuming and
resource intensive for simple decisions, too “coldly intellectual” (p. 6) for important
ones, and assert that actual decision making is often based on doing the “right” thing,
even which this “right” option is not in the individual or organization‟s best interest.
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They observe that in those cases where a formal analytical decision model is used,
decision makers will frequently reject the results the results run counter to their
concept of “rightness” (Beach and Mitchell, 1998). Similarly, while descriptive
models based on theories of “cognitive situation assessments,” “decision through
argument,” “decision through exploration,” and “decision cycles” address the
“messiness” of actual decision making, they still do not fully address the role of values
in shaping the selection of alternatives and ultimate decisions made. As such – like
traditional decision theory - they are not so much wrong as incomplete (Connolly and
Beach, 1998).
The empirical research on image theory (Beach, 1996, 1998) tends to focus on
decision makers situated under relatively passive circumstances. Decision makers are
either portrayed as facing problems imposed upon them. The studies of Beach and his
colleagues do not report on situations in which the subject is aggressively pursuing a
predetermined agenda or outcome.
There is another body of theory, termed “motivated reasoning,” that does.
Motivated reasoning theory states that motivation to a particular belief or outcome
affects reasoning through “reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies
for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.” These processes appear in two
major categories: those in which the motive is to arrive at an accurate (or factually
correct) conclusion and those in which the motive is to arrive at a particular,
directional conclusion (or predetermined outcome). This second case is constrained
in that people wishing to arrive at particular conclusion construct justifications that
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would persuade dispassionate observers. These justifications, however, is based on
memories of beliefs and rules that support the conclusion and creative combinations of
accessed knowledge. The individual or people in question believe the arguments thus
construed to be objective and factually based, missing the point that their very process
is biased by the goals they are attempting to achieve. This is not cognitive hypocrisy,
but rather unconscious decision making based on only a relevant subset of the body of
knowledge and beliefs available (Kunda, 1990).
Motivated reasoning has been applied to explain numerous situations, such as
perceptions among American Democrats and Republican Party members regarding
justifications for and support of the Iraq War (Jacobson, 2010). There are clear
parallels between motivated reasoning theory and image theory. Image theory‟s
grounding in the way in which people access those personal principles, goals, and
plans relevant to a given situation (Beach, 1998) is remarkably consistent with
motivated reasoning‟s use of belief‟s and strategies in arriving at desired conclusions.
As such, this body of literature will not be further examined here.180
Image theory integrates the values underlying identity theory with individual
decision making. It also offers insight into the relationship between organizational
culture (Schein, 2004) and individual agency (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991).
Weatherly and Beach (1998) illustrate the relationship of image theory to culture as
shown in Figure B-2. In this construct, the firmly-held principles of the decision
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The literature on motivated reasoning theory was identified late in this study effort and is not
reviewed here in more detail due to its similarities with image theory and also in the interests of time.
A cursory web search revealed that the literature on motivated research is extensive in the psychology
and social psychology fields. Its roots appear at least partially grounded in identity theory.
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maker‟s value image are analogous to the culture of the organization and, by
extension, other expectations of system structure. Similarly, the organizational vision
and selected strategies are similar to the decision maker‟s trajectory and strategic
images, respectively. Any decision option is subject to a compatibility screening
against both organizational and individual value, trajectory, and strategic images.
Should multiple choice options survive the compatibility test, they are subjected to
formal or informal profitability testing, again based again on the organization‟s and
decision maker‟s images, to determine which choice represents the best decision. In
cases where only one candidate survives compatibility screening, that option becomes
the decision with further analysis to be conducted over time as new information comes
available (Weatherly and Beach, 1998).
Image theory thus explains “how” the values underlying theories of
organizational culture and identity are processed into decisions, positions, and actions
by individuals. Adding this to the “what” as provided by theories of structuration
(Giddens, 1984) and social becoming (Sztompka, 1991), and the “why” provided by
theories of culture (Schein, 2004) and identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934;
Goffman, 2004/1959; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985;
Ashforth and Mael, 1989) completes the explanation as to “how” agents come make
the decisions they do. From this combined set of theories, coupled with observations
drawn from the governance history presented in Chapters 3 through 7, a
comprehensive theoretical framework can be offered to explain the evolution of
Columbia Basin governance in general and the rise and fall of the CRBF in particular.
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In summary, structuration and social becoming theory explain what happens as
social organizations emerge and evolve and partially explains why they do so. Social
conflict is at least one vehicle through which social evolution occurs in the praxis
process. Theories of individual, social, and organizational identity complete the
explanation for why agents choose to engage in various issues and the intensity of
commitment to social organization values and objectives. Image theory explains how
individuals come to accept social values and norms and incorporate them into ones
sense of self. These theories provide the building blocks from which a framework can
be constructed to guide future research into the region‟s governance paradox.

Research Framework
A generalized model of governance structuration.
Figure 8-4 presented the pattern of structuration for Columbia Basin
governance systems as found in the historic record. This figure was generalized as
shown in Figure 8-5. The discussion which follows discusses the model with respect
to the findings of this study on governance and the theories introduced above. This
generalized model is not limited to situations of governance. It could, for example, be
used to explain the evolution of a local Friday night poker club, a government agency,
or any other system.
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Theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) hold that all
systems and their associated structures exist in the flow of historical time, with any
given system having been built on what came before even as it serves as the
foundation for what will come later. This point is illustrated in the box in Figure 8-5
entitled “Existing Systems and Structures”. Each existing system is comprised of its
own set of structures. Structures include the formal and informal rules and
expectations guiding social behavior (Giddens, 1984). These include the normative
expectations of culture (Schein, 2004) and organizational identity (Albert and
Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, (1989). These structures provide stability to the
group over time, allow for routinization of mundane tasks, and provide group
members a sense of security (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991); contribute to an
individual‟s sense of self (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934); and provide
interpretive lenses that shape how members think about, feel, and perceive other
systems and events within their environment (Schein, 2004; Albert and Whetten,
1985; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).
The relationship among systems can be in alliance or in conflict. Conflictual
relationships can be due to competition over resources and interests and/or issues of
social identity (Giddens, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). These
existing relationships also consist of patterns of dominance and subjugation as more
powerful systems are able to further their interests at the expense - perceived or actual
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- of others (Giddens, 1984) thus frustrating the aspirations of weaker systems and
creating the potential for future conflict (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).
Internally, each system will evolve through time as established systems and
structures are either adjusted or defended in response to actions and agency exercised
by its members (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) and internal movements and counter
movements (Sztompka, 1991) – in effect going through its own process of
structuration internally. Such internal evolutions occur consistent with member
principles (Beach, 1990, 1996, 1998) and organizational values (Schein, 2004) and
identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985). This internal structuration is unlikely to rise to
the level of attention of other systems unless the other systems‟ senses of identity
and/or interests are challenged (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and
Hunt, 1998; Scott and Lane, 2000).
The stability of the existing arrangement of systems will continue until
challenged by situation of sufficient criticality to threaten the status quo (Giddens,
1984) as portrayed in the box labeled “Critical Situation.” Critical situations may call
the existing patterns of internal and external relationships into question by challenging
member identity attachments to the organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Elsbach
and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998) or challenge external
relationships by creating opportunities to reopen unresolved differences, create new
issues of conflict over resources or interests, or exacerbating conflicts due to identity
(Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Eagly, Baron, and
Hamilton, 2004).
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Critical situations may or may not result in conflict. For example, the
ascendancy of the Republicans to a majority in Congress in 1943 resulted in the
defunding of New Deal central planning entities, to include the Pacific Northwest
Regional Planning Commission. This occurrence did not result in conflict; the
participants to the PNWRPC at the regional and national levels met and voluntarily
reformed themselves into the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (Bessey,
1963; Scheufele, c.1970). Conversely, the hydro-thermal crisis and Bonneville Power
Administration‟s notice of insufficiency in 1976 presented a situation where long
suppressed tribal, commercial, and sport fishery concerns over the impact of the
hydropower system on regional fisheries resulted in creation of the (now named)
Northwest Power and Conservation Council which gave those interests more influence
over operational decision making (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).
Regardless of whether or not conflict occurs, institutional and other regional
leaders will attempt to find resolution. Where conflict does occur, organizational
identity and individual principles will serve to reinforce the righteousness of
organizational positions and serve as filters through which members interpret the
issues and events at hand (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989;
Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Beach, 1998; Ashmore,
Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004).
Critical situations do not necessarily need to result in conflict between systems; they
can serve simply as catalysts for internal change within a system (Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991; Goia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao; 1997).
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Consequently, although regional leaders may be seeking a rational and
objective way to resolve the issues at hand, agents engaging in resolution negotiations
come to the negotiation table with a personal suite of principles and values heavily
informed by institutional worldview, organizational culture, and social identity (Tajfel
and Turner, 2004/1979; Schein, 2004; Beach and Connolly, 2005).
Critical situations affecting relationships among systems, whether involving
conflict or not, will lead to calls for rational resolution by system leaders (Hypothesis
1). Organizations will select agents to engage in negotiations to defend organizational
values and values and obtain an outcome consistent with those values and interests
(Hypothesis 2). Selected agents will enter into these discussions influenced by
organizational expectations as well as their own sense of identity, principles, goals,
and plans (Hypothesis 3; Beach 1990, 1996, 1998). If the catalytic situation is critical
enough to fundamentally threaten the values and interests of the negotiating parties,
then the senses of social identity at risk may be altered as may the image goals and
plans of individual agents (Goia and Thomas, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt,
1998; Scott and Lane, 2000; Beach, 1990, 1996, 1998)181 and compromises reached
that result in new systems and/or reconstructed patterns of relationships. Over time, as
these new systems patterns become established, they will become the foundations for
future changes in the face of new critical situations (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991).
If the situations prove to be not of sufficient criticality, the old patterns and systems
will likely continue.
181

Alternatively, identity forces can cause interpretations of events that ignore actual threats and
foreclose the possibility of resolution (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996).
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Figure B-4 illustrates how the bodies of theory discussed above can be
combined with the historical record of Columbia Basin governance to help explain the
inception, rise, and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum focusing on
examination of the causes for the structural weaknesses of the CRBF‟s memorandum
of agreement. Structuration, identity, and decision theories combined establish the
linkage between group values and interest and individual decisions and actions. This
in turn explains the how the institutional representatives selected to negotiate and later
execute the CRBF MOA behaved in the way they did to create such a weak
organizational structure leading to the system‟s ultimate failure. The historical record
of governance change recounted in Chapters 3 through 7 and illustrated in Figure 8-4
(and generalized in Figure 8-5) provides the social and political context that both
provided the background from which the CRBF emerged and shaped the institutions
whose agents participated in the CRBF development and operation.

Research Approach
The creation of the CRBF MOA provides a unique opportunity to apply the
theoretical concepts identified above against the hypotheses presented in Chapter 8.
The research methodology to test these hypotheses should consist of both inductive
and deductive components. The study‟s unit of analysis would be the organizations
represented in the development of CRBF MOA; the unit of observation would be the
organizational representatives to MOA development proceedings. The elements of
evidence to be obtained by interview will be collected using structured, open ended
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Figure B-4.
Theoretical Framework for Analysis of Governance Structuration

interview questions will be administered as prescribed by Patton (2002). In effect, the
questions are used as an interview guide versus a rigidly followed script to allow
fullest possible identification of participant values, predispositions, and
beliefs. Recommended participants are to be selected from the formally appointed
representatives to the CRBF and close observers, such as the group facilitator and
reporters who attended most CRBF meetings. Basic themes to be explored in the
interviews include:
What did the organization / institution that you represented expect the CRBF to
accomplish?
What did the organization / institution that you represented think it would
accomplish?
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What did you personally expect the CRBF to accomplish?
What did you personally think it would accomplish?
What did you / your organization believe to be the salient issues that needed to
be addressed by the CRBF?
To what degree were you free to negotiate those issues within the CRBF?
To what degree were you restricted from negotiating issues within the CRBF?
This effort will, by its nature, rely heavily on qualitative techniques. As such,
it faces challenges of validity and generalizability. In qualitative research, validity has
been described in terms of trustworthiness (Krefting, 1999) which will be assessed in
the eye of the reader. Several authors (Johnson, 1999; Maxwell, 2002; Krefting, 1999)
offer frameworks for assessing qualitative work. Others (Schofield, 2002; Lincoln and
Guba, 2002) suggest validity is best achieved through careful selection of
methodology. Krefting (1999) offers a strategy for achieving validity that consists of
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. But, Maxwell (2002)
suggests, the only elements of validity under the direct control of the researcher are
descriptive validity and interpretive validity. The upshot, according to Maxwell
(2002), is that good qualitative work must be transparent in its articulation of author
background, potential biases, and selected methodology. It must also be relentless in
its accurate representation of findings. Authenticity and trustworthiness can be
enhanced through transparency of method and use of direct quotation evidence to
highlight key points. The point is great care must be taken with study and instrument
design to ensure the results are supportable and applicable.
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Appendix Summary
This study treats the series of governance systems experienced by the
Northwest as regional social organizations that, consistent with Giddens (1984) and
Sztompka (1991), have evolved over time within a context of the social and political
environments of the day, salient regional issues, and institutional competition. The
deeply held beliefs and values underlying the cultures of those institutions (the
worldviews), the sense of social identity shared by their members, and the principles
held by their members influenced the positions and perceptions of institutional agents
participating in the negotiations over those various systems. Consequently,
understanding the Columbia River Basin Forum and its predecessors requires an
understanding of the values and worldviews of the regional institutions engaged in
their creation.
Neither structuration nor social becoming offers a clear empirical roadmap
through which their assumptions and conclusions can be tested. Indeed, Giddens‟
structuration theory has been critiqued as “inherently unempirical” (Gregson, 1989)
with Giddens (1984 and 1989) appearing ambiguous (at best) on whether there is even
a need for empirical study.
A broader study of Columbia Basin governance should be premised on the
grounds that individual decisions and perspectives, as played out in negotiations over
the CRBF MOA, were shaped by the social identity and worldviews of the participants
and the institutional culture of the organizations they represented. The methodological
challenge is how to make this connection.
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